Fariasantos v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC
Filing
63
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 10/27/2014. (jsmi, )
IP L_L-_i-n
OCTtfZOW
IN THE tJNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT
CLEW RlCHWOiiD.VACOURT
U.S. DISTBICI
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
CLAUDIO FARIASANTOS,
on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
V.
Civil Action No.
ROSENBERG & ASSOCIATES,
3:13CV543
LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the
DEFENDANT
ROSENBERG
CERTIFICATION
(Docket
CERTIFICATION
TO
FILE
reasons
HIS
set
&
(Docket
FIRST
ASSOCIATES,
No.
37),
No.
49),
AMENDED
forth
Court on
denied,
and
MOTION
FOR
PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT
CLASS
and
(Docket No.
(Docket
FOR
No.
CLASS
FOR LEAVE
44).
For
the
&
ASSOCIATES,
37)
is granted,
(Docket
TO
CLASS
FOR
MOTION
(Docket No.
LEAVE
FOR
MOTION
ROSENBERG
CERTIFICATION
44)
MOTION
PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT
MOTION
following motions:
PLAINTIFF'S
LLC'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
PLAINTIFF'S
LLC'S
COMPLAINT
herein,
the
FILE
No.
49)
HIS
is
FIRST
is denied.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff,
of
himself
action
and
against
Claudio
all
Fariasantos
others
Defendant
("Fariasantos"),
similarly
Rosenberg
situated,
&
on
brought
Associates,
behalf
this
LLC
("Rosenberg")
alleging
Practices Act,
violations
15 U.S.C.
Class Action Complaint
§
of
1692,
the
^
seq.
(Docket No. 1).
to dismiss pursuant to
Fed.
R.
Civ.
allege
violations
("the
P.
12(b)(6)
2014,
ruling that Counts I,
of
the
Fair
Debt
Debt
FDCPA").
the Court denied
II,
and III,
Collections
(Mar.
2014) (Docket
the
pending motions,
judgment,
30,
as
30) .
well
as
Thereafter,
a
motion
Act
See Mem.
Op.
the parties
for
which
Practices
each state a plausible claim for relief.
No.
See
and an answer.
("FDCPA"),
10,
Collection
Rosenberg filed a motion
By Memorandum Opinion issued on March 10,
the motion to dismiss,
Fair
partial
filed
summary
which was denied as moot by Order issued on September
2014.
The
Court
heard argument
on the pending motions
on
September 29, 2014.
PROCEDXJRAL
This
parties
case,
matter
agree
but
is
that
there
are
in
class
an
POSTURE
unusual
procedural
certification
competing motions
is
for
"Either plaintiff or defendant may move
whether the action may be
Wright
2014) .
& Miller,
Federal
posture.
appropriate
class
for
a
The
in
certification.
determination of
certified under Rule 23(c)(1)."
Practice and
The difference between the
Procedure
this
§
1785
competing motions
7AA
(3d ed.
for
class
certification is the scope of the class definition and thus the
scope of class membership.
DISCUSSION
Introduction
Rosenberg's
certify
Class
the
statewide
Action
definition
Motion
for
class
Complaint
i s as
(A)
Class
that
(Docket
Certification's
Fariasantos
No.
1).
seeks
proposed
That
proposed
in
to
the
class
follows:
All Virginia residents to whom Defendant
sent
a
letter in
the
which contains
the
of
form of Exhibit A,
rights
validation
15 U.S.C.
in
§
text
(B)
1692g notice
identical
to
that in Exhibit A,
(C)
in an attempt to
collect
a
home
loan debt,
(D)
that was
incurred primarily for personal, household
or family purposes, (E) during the one year
period prior to the filing of the Complaint
in this matter.
Class
Motion
seeks
Action Complaint
for
to
Class
certify
(Docket No.
Certification
a
class
than Virginia residents)
case after discovery."
50)
at 2 n.l.
of
1),
SI
(Docket
Henrico
40,
No.
County
at
49),
10.
his
Fariasantos
residents
(rather
"to comport with the narrowing of this
Pl.'s Mem.
Supp. Class Cert.
(Docket No.
The new proposed class definition is as follows:
(A)
All
residents
of
Henrico
County,
Virginia to whom Defendant sent a letter in
the
In
form
of
Exhibit
A,
(B)
which
contains
the 15 U.S.C. § 1692g notice of validation
rights in text identical to that in Exhibit
A, (C) in an attempt to collect a home loan
debt,
(D)
that was incurred primarily for
personal, household or family purposes, (E)
during the one year period prior to the
filing of the Complaint in this matter.
Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Class Cert.
Thus,
if so,
which class to certify.
class or not,
scope
of
the
6 F.3d 177,
Pilot
Ins.
Life
Co.,
(M.D.
Ga.
414 n.7
The
Citizens
1985);
(5th Cir.
The Court has the discretion to
See
185
445
MAMSI Life & Health Ins.
v.
at 2.
and this discretion extends to defining
class.
Grace Co.,
Meyer
50)
the Court must decide whether to certify a class and,
certify a
the
(Docket No.
Wesleyan
{4th Cir.
F.3d
Co.,
311,
1993);
317
256 F.R.D.
& Southern
In
Cent.
Nat.
Thorn v.
(4th Cir.
158,
Bank.,
related motion
for
leave
to
162
106
re Monumental Life Ins.
2004), cert, denied,
College
125 S. Ct.
file
an
W.R.
Jefferson-
2006);
(D.
365
277
Wu v.
Md.
F.R.D.
Co.,
v.
2008);
356,
360
F.3d 408,
(2004).
amended complaint
filed by Fariasantos would amend the class definition to a class
of Henrico County residents rather than a statewide class.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's Requirements
To satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a),
must
find
that
prerequisites
the
-
class
numerosity,
adequacy of representation.
members
also
must
it
be
certifies
complies
commonality,
Fed.
R.
ascertainable
Civ.
and
P.
the Court
with
four
typicality,
and
23(a).
The class
identifiable.
Rule
23
was amended in 2003 to require that "[a]n order that certifies a
class action must define the class and the class claims,
or defenses."
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
issues,
23 (c) (1) (B) (emphasis added).
See
also Wm. Moore et al.,
ed.)
5 Moore^s Federal Practice § 23.21[1]
(3d
("A class action is possible only when the class definition
provides
a
determining
"For a
court
who
with
is
tangible
and
who
and
is
practicable
not
a
member
class to be sufficiently defined,
standards
of
the
for
class.").
the court must be able
to resolve the question of whether class members are included or
excluded
Moore,
from
supra,
the
Here,
enumerated
Servs.,
Inc.,
both parties
of Civil
reference
to
"the class action must
categories
Healthplan
by
objective
criteria."
§ 23.21[3][a].
In addition,
three
class
348
in
fall
Rule
F.3d
within one of the
23(b)."
417,
424
Gunnells
(4th
seek certification pursuant to
Procedure
23(b)(3).
Rule
23(b)(3)
Cir.
v.
2003).
Federal Rule
requires
that:
(1)
common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions
affecting only individual class members; and (2) proceeding as a
class must be superior to other available methods of litigation.
Fed.
R.
Civ.
obligation to
P.
23(b)(3).
perform a
The
"rigorous
Court
analysis"
of the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met.
Adair,
Inc.
V.
764 F.3d 347,
Dukes,
131 S.
The parties
class
members
in
358
(4th Cir.
Ct.
agree
both
2541,
and
2551
to
an
independent
ensure
that
EQT Production Co.
all
v.
2014) (citing Wal-Mart Stores,
(2011)).
the Court
proposed
has
concurs
classes
are
that
the putative
ascertainable
and
identifiable.
at
issue
would
In fact,
have
already
include
statewide
83
those who received the FDCPA form letter
been
identified.
consumers
class
would
in
Henrico
include
2,332
A
county-wide
County,
class
Virginia.
consumers
A
throughout
Virginia.
Rule 23(a)(1)
requires that the class be "so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable."
claimants
Lines,
74);
375
is
726
required.
F.2d 136,
Cypress
F.2d
v.
648,
See,
146
Newport
653
e.g.,
(4th Cir.
No specific number of
Brady
v.
1984) (certifying a
News
Gen.
Cir.
(4th
Thurston
& Nonsectarian
1967) (certifying
a
Motor
class of
Hosp.
class
Ass'n,
of
18).
Both proposed classes satisfy the numerosity requirement.
Rule
member's
23(a)(2)
claim
requires
"depend[s]
commonality,
upon
a
common
that
each
contention"
class
that
"is
capable of classwide resolution - which means that determination
of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke."
131
S.
Ct.
at
2551.
The
requirement is satisfied.
parties
agree
that
the
Dukes,
commonality
This Court and others have held that
commonality is met in cases involving the receipt of identical
debt-collection
Assocs.,
Nov.
3,
P.C.,
2011);
letters.
No.
See
3:llcv78,
Talbott v.
Bickinq
2011
v.
Mitchell
WL 5325674,
GC Servs.
Ltd.
Pshp.,
at
Rubenstein
*2
191
&
(E.D.
Va.
F.R.D.
99,
103
(W.D.
Va.
2000).
Both
proposed
classes
satisfy
the
commonality requirement.
Rule
are
of
23(a)(3)
typical
of the
typicality
claims
Dieter
or
requires
the
class members.
must
defense
v.
that
involve
with
Microsoft
a
"[T]he
plaintiff's
of
436
the
F.3d
of
the
absent
461,
claims
appropriate analysis
comparison
those
Corp.,
named
466
plaintiffs'
class
(4th
members."
Cir.
2006).
The parties agree that the typicality requirement is satisfied.
Fariasantos'
All
class
claims and the class members'
members
were
sent
FDCPA
form
the identical language at issue herein.
about
Fariasantos'
claims.
claims are
letters
identical.
that
contained
There is nothing unique
Both proposed
classes
satisfy the
typicality requirement.
The
fourth
requirement
representation pursuant
satisfied as
argument
to both
that
he
statewide class.
on
behalf
demonstrates
(1)
in
of
favor
of
Fed.
be
an
Rule
The
23(a),
Civ.
R.
classes.
may
P.
Court
unwilling
adequacy
23(a) (4),
rejects
is
of
also
Fariasantos'
representative
of
the
The Class Action Complaint that counsel filed
Fariasantos
that
Fariasantos'
to
of
there
is
and
a
proposed
adequacy of
statewide
class
representation because:
counsel is well-qualified to prosecute the case
either
class;
and
(2)
Fariasantos
has
no
interests
that
are antagonistic to the interests of
the class members of
either class.
The
parties
requirement
Court
is
"The
classes
adjudication
by
turns
the
both
single
classes
Inc.
2011
Windsor,
again,
'tests
cohesive
Bicking,
v.
and,
inquiry
sufficiently
predominance
521
whether
to
WL
the
warrant
5325674,
U.S.
591,
at
623
"[e]ach class member's potential claim
question of whether
[the
letter]
violated
That shared issue clearly predominates over potential
peripheral
matters,
this case."
Id.
predominate
making
over
All
the
collective
resolution
Questions of law and fact
any
class
claims
questions
members
letters by Rosenberg,
establish
to
23(b)(3)'s
predominance
Prods.,
As in Bicking,
members.
Rule
representation.'"
(1997)).
the FDCPA.
as
are
(quoting Amchem
on
that
satisfied
concurs.
proposed
*3
agree
were
in
common to the class
affecting
sent
sensible
the
only
same
individual
FDCPA
form
and no individualized proof is needed to
of
Fariasantos
or
the
other
class
members.
The predominance requirement is satisfied as to both classes.
The
action
is
final
requirement
superior to
is
other methods
adjudicating the controversy."
Bicking,
"class
whether,
litigation
Fed.
for
adjudicating the claims presented here,
this
fairly
R. Civ.
provides
8
in
a
P.
case,
"a
class
and efficiently
23(b)(3).
superior
As in
means
of
as the minimal recovery
available
to
incentive
most
for
litigants
class
under
members
individually." 2011 WL 5325674,
preclude
In
some
class
FDCPA
certification,
cases,
the
the
to
pursue
at *4.
particularly in
class
Eltman,
Eltman
& Cooper,
members
P.C.,
gives
their
little
claims
Small recoveries do not
the only award is distributed cy pres.
V.
FDCPA
FDCPA cases.
receive
no
payment
Id.
and
See, e.g., Reade-Alvarez
2006
WL
3681138
(E.D.N.Y.
2006) (approving a $15,000 cy pres payment to the local legal aid
society) .
A class action will be a far more efficient means of
adjudicating
this
prosecutions,
controversy,
even
incentive,
assuming
time,
individually.
and
Many
rather
that
not,
many
consumers
knowledge
would
than
to
and
individual
would
pursue
their
have
their
claims
the
claims
would
be
unprosecuted.^
The factors to be considered in determining the superiority
of
a
class
individual
action
are:
prosecutions;
litigation;
(2)
the
the
interest
existence
in
of
controlling
other
related
(3) the desirability of concentrating the litigation
in the forum;
and
Here,
who
those
(1)
(4)
manageability.
wish
prosecutions may do so.
to
opt
out
Fed.
and
R.
Civ.
pursue
P.
23(b)(3).
individual
Currently, there is no other litigation
^ In addition, the statute of limitations may run before the
potential plaintiffs understand that they may have a claim and
how to pursue it.
pending
that
arises
letters
have
since
potential
statewide
But
whether
are
class
a
identical
revised.
Virginia
Finally,
the
the
been
classes
appropriate.
from
form
Since
letters,
the
members
residents,
this
both classes are manageable.
would
Henrico
satisfy
County
the
class
superiority
would
and
of
the
both
forum
is
Undoubtedly,
requirement.
satisfy
this
final
requirement will be addressed in the next section.
Given
the
Court's
findings
with
regard
to
Rule
23's
requirements, this matter will proceed as a class action.
Which Class Should Be Certified?
Rosenberg asks
that the Court grant
its motion for
class
certification and certify the original statewide class "on the
issues
of both
Rosenberg's
liability and damages
available
to
the class and impose a statutory damages cap of one percent (1%)
of
Rosenberg's
net
worth
pursuant
to
1692k(a)(2)(B).Def.'s Mem. Supp. Class Cert.
^ In
a
class
action,
the
FDCPA
15
tJ.S.C.
§
(Docket Nos. 38 &
provides
for
a
maximum
recovery of statutory damages of up to $1,000 to each named
plaintiff and limits the recovery available to the class "not to
exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1
of the debt collector." 15 U.S.C.
per centum of the net worth
§ 1692k (a) (2) (B) . Rosenberg
has provided, under seal, its purported net worth, from which
the parties have calculated the limited statutory damages.
The
recovery, per class member, would be much less if there are
2,332 class members rather than 83 class members.
10
43)
at 1.
Fariasantos opposes Rosenberg's motion and asks the
Court to grant his motion to certify the Henrico County class.
According
presented by
to
Fariasantos,
"the
only
material
[his motion for class certification]
issue
is whether or
not this smaller class meets Rule 23's numerosity requirement."
Pl.'s
Mem.
Supp.
Class
Cert.
noted previously herein,
(Docket
No.
50)
at
2.
But,
as
the Court finds that both classes meet
Rule 23's numerosity requirement.
In
response
Fariasantos
are
cannot
statewide
class
representative.
has
Fariasantos
all
for
the
but
he
establish
it
seeks
his
of
for
the
class
also
adequacy
because
Pl.'s Mem.
rejected
and
that
met
complaint,"
Rosenberg
Court
Rosenberg's motion
"agree [s]
certification
original
to
Opp'n
it
class
requirements
defined
takes
of
the
argument
counsel
satisfy
in
of
cannot
position
for
this
that
the
compel an unwilling
55)
at 2,
is
and
class
Plaintiff's
representation
(Docket No.
this
certification,
4-6.
confident
requirement
for
The
that
both
classes.
Rosenberg argues that the class of Henrico County residents
"is
not
a
superior method
particularly as
of
compared to a
adjudicating
Virginia Class."
Pl.'s M. Class Cert.
(Docket Nos.
determined
statewide
that
the
Plaintiff's
54 & 57)
class
11
at 11.
satisfies
claims,
Def.'s Opp'n to
The Court has
the
superiority
requirement,
does
so.
but must now consider whether the county-wide class
The
superiority
requirement
requires
the
Court
to
determine whether the "class action is superior to other methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."
Plaintiff s
arguments
in
support
of
the
narrower
Henrico
County class include that such a class would include "uniformly
treated
such
consumers,"
class
manner,
sign
member
using the
deeds
timing
of
uniform."
that
and
the
the
would
"foreclosures
have
been
threatened
handled
in
for
an
each
identical
same third party collection subcontractor to
process
foreclosure
advertisements
Pl.'s Mem.
Supp.
for
sales,"
the
and
sales
Class Cert.
that
would
(Docket No.
"tt]he
have
50)
been
at
17.
Fariasantos also argues that the class members would be close to
each other geographically,
and that
the
limited fund would be
"more effective and fair" if divided among a smaller group.
Rosenberg disputes plaintiff's arguments.
Id.
It contends that,
even if plaintiff's arguments for limiting the class to Henrico
residents,
such as how the
foreclosures were handled,
are true,
they are irrelevant because this action has nothing to do with
how
the
based
foreclosures
solely on
Rosenberg
about
the
sent
the
to
were
conducted.
violations
all
disclosures
members
is
in
of
the
the
tailored
12
Instead,
to
FDCPA
this
form
Virginia
letters
class.
consumers
action
who
is
that
Nothing
live
in
Henrico County.
court,
rejecting
Hennepin
logical
start
to
Minnesota,
limit
with
"R"
(Docket Nos.
certification
County,
Messerli
*5
Def.'s Opp'n
the
or
& Kramer,
(D. Minn. Mar.
P.A.,
21,
to
[]
a
class
observed
class
to
of
[]
in
would
as
whose
own
lasts
out
Borcherding-Dittloff v.
than
that
there
are
Wenig
v.
at
decisions
Transworld Systems,
1999)(granting
certification
a
nationwide
class
in
Credit
Solutions,
Inc.,
297
FDCPA
reasons
plaintiff
for
relies
doing
so.
address
authorizes statewide,
42
Inc.,
of
action);
F.R.D.
And the Court would consider a
sound
that permit
a
See,
statewide
Diaz
e.g.,
185 F.R.D.
v.
(E.D.N.Y.
558
rather
Residential
2014)(same).
county-wide class if there were
But most
the
issue
as opposed to,
of
of
the
cases
whether
nationwide,
as opposed to a statewide class,
on
the
which
FDCPA
class actions,
and those cases do not support the argument that a
class,
names
2013 WL 1176062,
11CV3547,
cats."
classes to be limited to specific geographic areas.
Wis.
be
2013).
Plaintiff points
(W.D.
One
addresses
"it
consumers
who
at 8-9.
with
that
consumers
Case No.
54 & 57)
county-wide
is a superior method of
adjudication here.
If the Court certifies Fariasantos'
class,
form
then
letter
the
from
2,000-plus
Rosenberg
individuals
but
13
who
do
proposed Henrico County
who
not
received
reside
the
in
FDCPA
Henrico
County would have to bring individual lawsuits or other countyby-county actions, or their claims would go unprosecuted.
Such
a result would be counter to one of the main purposes of class
actions -
avoiding multiple lawsuits.
Services,
Inc.,
2005) (citing
404
Crown,
F.
Supp.
Cork
Campos v.
2d
& Seal
1164,
Co.
v.
Western Dental
1172
Parker,
(N.D.
462
Ca.
U.S.
345
(1983)) .
Fariasantos
certification at
is
trying
to
recovery
itself
of damages
Pl.'s
previously,
Rosenberg's
least in part
insulate
forced payment
possible."
opposes
to
Opp'n
of
statutory
because,
"from
as
damages
he
a
No.
class
Rosenberg
exposure
group
55)
for
contends,
greater
large
(Docket
in a class action,
motion
at
of
and
consumers
1.
As
the
as
noted
the FDCPA provides for a maximum
of
up
to
$1,000
to
each
named
plaintiff and limits the recovery available to the class "not to
exceed the
of
the
lesser of
debt
$500, 000
collector."
15
or 1
U.S.C.
per centum of the net worth
§
1692k(a) (2) (B) .
Rosenberg
contends that plaintiff's counsel wants to limit this action to
Henrico
County
residents
and
thereafter
bring
a
class
action
like this one in other counties in the Commonwealth of Virginia
in
order
to
increase
the
recovery per plaintiff.
liability for
attorneys'
fees
This would,
thus,
1% of its net worth,
14
and
obtain
a
larger
subject Rosenberg to
over and over again for the
same
infirmities
Virginia
class.
Essentially,
aimed at
in
the
Def.'s
FDCPA
form
Opp'n
(Docket
Rosenberg's argument
avoiding the
letter
is
sent
Nos.
that
statutory damages
54
to
&
the
entire
57),
at
1.
"serial class actions
cap are
not
a
superior
method of adjudication under Rule 2 3 ( b ) ( 3 ) I d . at 5.
Although Fariasantos contends that the "net worth" argument
is
not
relevant
to
these motions,
he
also
argues
that
a
capped
fund of money divided among 83 Henrico County consumers will be
more
He
its
fair
than
dividing
also contends
that
letters after this
FDCPA
has
a
one-year
that
same
fund
since Rosenberg
case was
statute
among
2,332
claims to have
filed about a
of
consumers.
corrected
year ago and the
limitations,
then
it
is
not
likely that plaintiff s counsel can bring other county-by-county
actions.
The Court does not believe that plaintiff's counsel intends
to bring additional county-by-county actions.
hearing,
as an
partners
have
officer of
lined
the Court,
class
actions against Rosenberg based on this FDCPA form letter.
But,
plaintiff's
wide action is superior,
for
that neither he nor his
county-wide
notwithstanding
up plaintiffs
He stated at the
arguments
other
regarding
possibility
a
county-
the Court disagrees with that position.
If the Court certified a Henrico County class,
the
why
of multiple
lawsuits.
15
And,
it would increase
if
there
were
not
multiple lawsuits,
unprosecuted.
then the claims of most Virginians would go
Neither of those results is desirable.
A Henrico
County class is not superior to other means of adjudication and,
therefore,
denied.
Fariasantos'
See Campos,
There
County
are
claims
no
and
motion
for
class
certification
will
be
404 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
material
those
differences
from
other
between
counties.
the
Henrico
Dividing
the
Virginia class based on geography is not supported by any facts
or case law.
A Virginia class
is a
members,
and
it
the
judicial
resources,
would
reduce
and adjudicate
manageable number of class
number
the
residents who received the same letter.
plaintiff sought
in the beginning.
of
claims
And,
Clearly,
action is superior to many individual suits.
cases,
preserve
of all
Virginia
that class is what
a
statewide class
Rosenberg's motion
for class certification will be granted.
Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to File His First Amended Complaint
Citing Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
15(a),
Fariasantos moves
for
leave
to file an amended complaint in order to conform with his motion
for
class
requires
certification
that
requires."
"leave
and a
shall
Henrico
be
freely
County
given
class.
The
Rule
when
justice
so
The Supreme Court listed the factors that should be
considered.
16
In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by
amendments
previously
allowed,
undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance
of the amendment,
futility
of
amendment, etc. - the leave sought should,
as the rules require, be "freely given."
Foman
v.
Davis,
enumeration
of
371
U.S.
factors
178,
cannot
182
be
(1962).
thought
"While
exclusive,
Foman^ s
they
do
embody a principle which focuses on prejudice or futility or bad
faith as the only legitimate concerns in denying leave to amend,
since
only
these
truly
relate
to
protection
of
the
judicial
system or other litigants." Davis v.
Piper Aircraft Corp.,
F.2d
Fourth Circuit
606,
613
"Unless a
because
(4th
of
substantive
or
Having
Rule
deny
the
The
determined
23(b)(3)'s
motion
procedural
the merits of the
the decision whether
meet
1980) .
proposed amendment may clearly be
conjecture about
into
Cir.
for
to
that
leave
to
seen to be
futile
litigation should not
Henrico
superiority
continues:
considerations
allow amendment."
the
the
enter
Id.
County
requirement,
file
615
class
the
amended
fails
Court
to
will
complaint
as
futile.
CONCLUSION
For
the
ASSOCIATES,
reasons
set
LLC'S MOTION
forth
above,
DEFENDANT
FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
17
ROSENBERG
(Docket No.
&
37)
is granted,
No.
49}
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (Docket
is denied,
and PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE HIS
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (Docket No. 44) is denied.
I t is so ORDERED.
/s/
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Date:
October 2^7/ 2014
18
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