Smith v. Fargo et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 10/16/2015. Copy mailed to plaintiff.(tjoh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHMOND. VA
KEVIN LEON SMITH,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:13CV638
V.
ALBERT FARGO,effl/.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kevin Leon Smith, a Virginia inmate proceedingpro se and informa pauperis, filed this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.' By Memorandum Order entered October 15, 2014, the Court directed
Smith to file a particularized complaint because "Plaintiffs current allegations fail[ed] to provide
each defendant with fair notice of the facts and legal basis upon which his or her liability rests."
(ECF No. 13,at 1 (citation omitted).) Smith filed a Particularized Complaint that partially
corrects the deficiency identified by the Magistrate Judge. ("Complaint," ECF No. 15.) Smith
contends that, inter alia. Defendants Fargo, Milewczik, and Lightfoot, officers with the
Chesapeake Police Department ("Defendants") unlawfully searched and detained him.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint. For the reasons stated below, the Court will
GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the Motion to Dismiss.
' The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citation omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the lightmost
favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 1 F.3d 1130,1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see
also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a
courtconsidering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" BellAtI. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations
omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "toraise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,
rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when theplaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing BellAtl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
orderfor a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the
plaintiffmust"allege facts sufficient to stateall the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft
Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. UnitedStates, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th
Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construespro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing
statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint.
See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City
ofHampton, 11S F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985),
11.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
The sum ofSmith's allegations isas follows:^
1.) On December 8th, 2012,1 was detained in the back of a police car by
police officers Albert Fargo, Joseph Milewczik, and Jason Lightfoot, for over (6)
hours in the Lowe's parking lot in Chesapeake. I was denied water and use of the
restroom.
2.) Albert Fargo took my cellphone and went through (looked, viewed
names [and] numbers) and then made various phone calls from my phone. He
also took $656.00 from off my person[ ] and didn't inventory the money or give
me a receipt for my money that was took out [of] my pocket. My cell phone was
never inventoried on my personal property sheet.
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
a) In section (#1), Albert Fargo, Joseph Milewczik, and Jason Lightfoot all
neglected me, when they refused to give me water and use the restroom. Also for
unlawful detainment, when I was handcuffed and seated in the back of the police
cruiser for over (6) hours, before I was taken to the police station to be booked on
any charge.
b) In section (#2), Officer Albert Fargo did an unlawful search of my
cellphone, without a valid search warrant. That was a violation of my privacy.
Mr. Fargo took ($656.00) from me without writing me a receipt for my money or
my cellphone. This was a theft and an abuse of power.
(Compl. 1-2.) Smith demands monetary damages. {Id. at 2.)
^The Court corrects the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in quotations from
Smith's submissions.
Smith fails to identify a constitutional right that he believes Defendants violated by their
conduct.^ Nevertheless, the Court generously construes Smith to raise the following claims for
relief:
Claim One:
Defendants unlawfully detained Smith in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'^
Claim Two:
Defendant Fargo violated Smith's rights under the Fourth Amendment^ by
searching his phone without a warrant.^
Claim Three: Defendants violated Smith's Fourteenth Amendment rights by detaining him for
six hours without permitting him water or use of the bathroom.
III.
A.
ANALYSIS
Fourth Amendment
In Claim Two, Smith argues that Officer Fargo unlawfully searched his cell phone
without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Smith alleges that while Smith was
detained. Defendant Fargo "took his cell phone and went through (looked, viewed, names &
numbers) and then made various phone calls from [Smith's] phone." (Compl. 1.) The Fourth
^Smith fails to explain how his allegations against Defendant Fargo of "theft and an
abuse of power" for taking money and his cell phone and a "violation of my privacy" state a
claim of constitutional dimension. (Compl. 2.) These allegations will be SUMMARILY
DISMISSED.
^"No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law
" U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
^"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall notbe violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause ...." U.S. Const, amend IV.
^Although Smith fails to specifically invoke the Fourth Amendment, his reference to
Defendants' failure to obtain a search warrant to search his cell phone calls to mind that
amendment. Cf. Martin v. Gentile^ 849 F.2d 863, 867-68 (4th Cir. 1988) (observing that facts
pled bypro se plaintiffwere sufficient to make out a cognizable claim despite "no specific
reference" to appropriate constitutional amendment (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1972))).
Amendment protects individuals "against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const,
amend. IV. "Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of
criminal wrongdoing,... [the Fourth Amendment] generally requires the obtaining of a judicial
warrant." Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (omission in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable
only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement." Id. (citation omitted).
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful
arrest, wherein an officer may search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control.'" United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). However, not every search "is acceptable solely because
a person is in custody." Marylandv. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013). The Supreme Court
has recently held that "the search incident to arrestexception does not apply to cell phones" and
"a warrant is generally required before sucha search." Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493-94. Smith
alleges that no warrant was obtained prior to Defendant Fargo's search of his cell phone.
Accordingly, Smith has adequately alleged a Fourth Amendment claim of an illegal search of his
cell phone without a warrant.
Officer Fargo argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for any search and seizure
of Smith's cell phone. "When qualified immunity is asserted, the reviewing court should usually
first ask whether the right was violated on the facts alleged, and then determine whether that
right was 'clearly established.'" LeSueur-RichmondSlate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 264
(4th Cir. 2012) (citing Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 2009)); see Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,236 (2009) (first alteration in original) ("[W]e conclude that, while the
sequence set forth [in Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194 (2001)] is often appropriate, it should no
longer be regarded as mandatory."). Defendant Fargo's assertion of qualified immunity is
limited to a recitation of the general jurisprudence governing qualified immunity, one case
citation,^ and an acknowledgment that warrant exceptions for cell phones '"is an open
question.'" (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 5 (citation omitted)).
Smith has adequately alleged a Fourth Amendment claim of an illegal search of his cell
phone without a warrant. Furthermore, in light of the inadequacy of the briefing described
above. Officer Fargo fails to demonstrate that the right was not clearly established. See Allen v.
CityofFredericksburg, No. 3:09CV63, 2011 WL 782039, at *11 n.5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2011).
The Court has previously explained:
In order to properly place the defense of qualified immunity before the Court a
defendant:
must: (1) identify the specific right allegedly violated; (2) brief,
with full pinpoint citation to authority, whether the right was so
clearly established as to put a reasonable official on notice of his
legal obligations; and (3) describe to the Court the factual scenario
supporting the assertion that a reasonable official in Defendant's
situation would have believed his conduct was lawful.
Hogge V. Stephens, No. 3:09CV582, 2010 WL 3834849, at *7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24,
2010) (citing Collinson v. Gott, 895 F.2d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 1990)).
^Defendant Fargo cites United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009), for the
proposition that Defendant Fargo's search ofSmith's cell phone would not exceed the scope ofa
permissible warrantless search. Murphy, however, presented an entirely different set of
circumstances than Smith alleges here. Murphy provided conflicting information to officers
about his identify during a traffic stop. Id. at 408. Murphy willingly gave the police officers his
cell phone and told them about particular information on the phone that could verify his identify.
Id, On plain error review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court because the initial search
of the cell phone occurred "in Murphy's presence and at his direction." Id. at 412.
Defendant Fargo also cites a 2009 case from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia to suggest that how warrant exceptions relate to cell phones is "an
open question." (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4-5 (quoting Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d
440, 447 (W.D. Va. 2009)). Defendant Fargo fails to adequately explain how this 2009 case
would accurately reflect clearly established rights pertaining to warrantless searches of cell
phones in December 2012.
Id. Officer Fargo's briefing on qualified immunity is inadequate. Accordingly, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Claim Two based upon qualified immunity is DENIED. Officer Fargo is free
to raise the issue of qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment.
B.
Fourteenth Amendment
In Claim One, Smith alleges that Defendants unlawfully detained him in the back of a
n
police car for six hours. In Claim Three, Smith argues that Defendants violated his rights by not
permitting him water or use of the bathroom during his detention. To the extent Smith seeks to
bring a constitutional claim for the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by Defendants, as
a detainee, such a claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Goodman v. Barber,
539 F, App'x 87, 89 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). "Due process requires that a pretrial
detainee not be punished." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.l6 (1979); see Martin v. Gentile,
849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). "[N]ot every inconvenience encountered during pretrial
detention amounts to 'punishment' in the constitutional sense." Martin, 849 F.2d at 870 (citation
omitted). Under the Fourteenth Amendment standard, to establish that a particular condition or
restriction of his detention "is constitutionally impermissible 'punishment,' the pretrial detainee
must show either it was (1) imposed with an expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably
related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective
" Id. (citation omitted); see
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473-74 (2015) (citation omitted) (explaining that a
^Smith does notallege facts challenging his initial seizure and detention which is
governed by the Fourth Amendment. Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 119 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Ithas
been consistently recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects a citizen's right to be free from
unreasonable seizures."); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir. 1989). Nevertheless,
because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit "has rejected any concept of a
continuing seizure rule ... [o]nce the single act of detaining an individual has been
accomplished, the [Fourth] Amendment ceases to apply." Robles v. Prince George's Cty, Md.,
302 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Once Smith was arrested, he became a
pretrial detainee and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause governs Smith'sclaim of
continued detention. Id. at 269 (citation omitted).
detainee may prevail by "providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental
action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in
relation to that purpose")- "[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to
'punishment.'" Belh 441 U.S. at 539.
The relevant precedent teaches that "punishment, whether for a convicted inmate or a
pretrial detainee, is the product of intentional action, or intentional inaction, respecting known
and substantial risks of harm." Westmoreland v. Brown, 883 F. Supp. 67, 72 (E.D. Va.l995)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994)). Additionally, "a particular condition
constitutes punishment only where it causes physical or mental injury." Id. at 76. Thus, "[t]o
successfully assert a claim of punishment without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,
an inmate must assert not only that the defendant[] w[as] deliberately indifferent to the
substantial risk of harm posed by [the challenged condition], but also that this deliberate
indifference causeda physical or emotional injury." Id. "There is, of course, a de minimis level
ofimposition with which the Constitution isnot concerned." Bell 441 U.S. at 539 n.21 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Police officers are not required to provide
comfortable conditions of detention for pretrial detainees. Cf. Tesch v. Cty. ofGreen Lake, 157
F.3d 465,476 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that "[c]orrectional officials are not required to provide
comfortable jails" for pretrial detainees). Instead, the short-term limitation ofvarious freedoms
and privileges "are simply partof the general level of discomfort anyone canexpect to
experience while in custody." Id.
With regard to his general claim of unlawful detention. Smith fails to allege facts
indicating that Defendants' conduct constituted punishment. Smith fails to allege facts that
plausibly suggest the Defendants' decision to detain him inthe back ofthe police car for six
hours was objectively unreasonable. Moreover, Smith fails to assert facts indicating that the
Defendants held him with the expressed intent to punish. See Martin, 849 F.2d at 870. Instead,
at the time Smith alleges the incident occurred, Defendants held Smith as a pretrial detainee, as
they clearly were investigating him as a criminal suspect. Defendants' action in confining Smith
in the back of the police car was reasonably related to the legitimate police objective of securing
a criminal suspect and preventing his escape during their investigation. Smith also fails to allege
facts suggesting that he sustained any constitutionally significant injury as a result of being
detained by police.^ Accordingly, Claim One will be DISMISSED.
In Claim Three, Smith argues that Defendants violated his rights by not permitting him
water or use of the bathroom during his detention. Smith's unadorned allegation that, "I was
denied water and use of the restroom" (Compl. 1) is potentially sufficient to allege a Fourteenth
Amendment claim. Nevertheless, Defendants point to no persuasive authority to support the
proposition that denying a detainee water and the bathroom for a six-hour period fails to state a
Fourteenth Amendment claim. Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with
respect to Claim Three.
^In the conclusion of his Response, Smith vaguely suggests for the first time that"since,
I've had terrible lower back issues from being in the back of that police cruiser for all those
hours." (Response 5, ECF No. 21.) Smith fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest that his
alleged back pain, three years later, stems from merely sitting in a police car. Thus, Smith's
factual allegations are not sufficient to "produce an inference of liability strong enough to nudge
the plaintiffs claims 'across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 683 (2009)).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) will be GRANTED with
respect to Claim One. The Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED with respectto Claims Two and
Three.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
/S/
Date: i 0-IC'
James R. Spencer
Senior U. S. District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
10
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