Langhorne et al v. Virginia State Board of Elections et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Norman K. Moon on October 16, 2013. (sfc) [Transferred from Virginia Western on 10/16/2013.]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
LYNCHBURG DIVISION
ARELIA S. LANGHORNE and
HOWARD M. BUTLER

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, )
CHARLES JUDD, KIMBERLY BOWERS,
)
DON PALMER, and
)
ROBERT F. MCDONNELL,
)
Defendants. )

CASE NO. 6:13-CV-00052
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief arising out of 2011
redistricting plan for House of Delegates districts promulgated by the Virginia General
Assembly. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, Article II, section 6 of the Virginia Constitution, and section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Plaintiff requests, inter alia, the following: a
declaration “that the 2011 legislative redistricting plan . . . is unconstitutional”; an injunction
barring the Governor and the Virginia Board of Elections “from implementing and conducting
further elections pursuant to the invalid redistricting plan”; that the Court order the defendants
and the Virginia General Assembly to “develop, enact, and present to this Court for review a new
redistricting plan”; and that the Court “issue an order requiring the defendants to pay plaintiffs’
costs, expenses, and reasonably attorney’s fees.” As venue is not proper in this matter, it must,
without any comment on the underlying claims, be transferred to a court with proper venue.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, plaintiffs have requested a three judge panel. A district
court consisting of three judges must be empanelled to grant injunctive relief or judgment on the
merits in cases challenging the apportionment of any statewide legislative body. 28 U.S.C. §§

2284(a), 2284(b)(3). “Upon filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is
presented shall, unless he determines that three judges are not required, immediately notify the
chief judge of the circuit,” who must then empanel the court. Id. § 2284(b)(1). However, three
judges are not required where the complaint “does not state a substantial claim for injunctive
relief.” Md. Citizens for a Representative Gen. Assembly v. Governor of Md., 429 F.2d 606, 611
(4th Cir. 1970). Where the court lacks jurisdiction, the claim is by definition insubstantial and a
single district judge may dismiss the case. See Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31 (1933) (“the
provision requiring the presence of a court of three judges necessarily assumes that the District
Court has jurisdiction.”); Md. Citizens, 429 F.2d at 611; Atkins v. Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 874,
875 n.1 (4th Cir. 1969).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, a district court has a duty to inquire into whether jurisdiction is
proper, and to dismiss an action if it is not. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). However, the standard
remedy when a case is filed in an improper venue is to transfer the case to a proper venue rather
than to dismiss. See, e.g, 15 Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3827 at 268-29 (2nd Ed. 1986) (“It is not surprising that in most
cases of improper venue the courts conclude that it is in the interest of justice to transfer to a
proper forum rather than to dismiss”).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on
diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in” the
following districts: “a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State”; “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise

to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is
situated”; or “a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in
which the action may otherwise be brought.”
In this case, it is apparent that the defendants, sued in their official capacities, reside in
the Eastern District of Virginia, and venue properly lies in Richmond. And although plaintiffs,
by claiming that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), may be assuming that” a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in the Western District of
Virginia, that assumption is incorrect. Any actions taken by the defendants in enacting or
enforcing a redistricting plan would have been performed in Richmond, where the defendants
perform their functions, rather than in Lynchburg, where the House of Delegates districts under
consideration exist. Cf. Shayer v. Kirkpatrick, 541 F. Supp. 922, 925 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (“A claim
arises where the complained-of acts or omissions of a defendant occur . . . The defendant, [the
Missouri Secretary of State], has his offices in the Western District (Jefferson City, Missouri),
and his actions relating to elections would [therefore] occur in the Western District.)
Thus, venue is improper in the Western District of Virginia. Accordingly, the matter will
be transferred to Richmond Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia.
The Clerk of Court will be directed to send a certified copy of this memorandum opinion
and the accompanying order to all counsel of record.
16th
Entered this ______ day of October, 2013.