Poindexter v. Clarke

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. See Opinion for details. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 04/03/2015. (ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

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APR - 3 2015

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Richmond Division
clerk, u s. DiSTRiCT COURT
RICHMOND. VA

IVAN POINDEXTER,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:13CV736

v.

HAROLD CLARKE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ivan Poindexter, a former Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, filed

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.' The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and 1915(e)(2).
A.

Preliminary Review

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any
action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); jyee 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
first standard includes claims based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,'" or claims

where the "'factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417,427

' The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is
the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356

(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded

allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980

F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations
omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,

rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must
"allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de

Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly,
while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,1151 (4th

Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and
constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v.

Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City ofHampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

B.

Summary of Allegations

In his Complaint, Poindexter alleges, in sum:
On or about Dec. 16, 1997, Stanley Brathwaite was arrested and later
convicted of robbery. He was sentenced to 18 [years] as was myself. Ivan
Poindexter was arrested 2 1/2 months later [on] March 26, 1998 and later was
convicted and sentenced. The sentencing date was Nov. 12, 1998. Mr.
Brathwaite was released August 6, 2013. He did 15 [years] 8 [months] on 18
[years].
The Department of Corrections has me doing 15 [years] 11 [months] that
is an extra 3 months.

Virginia Department of Corrections is violating my constitutional rights
by not treating me equally as my co-defendant.
I'm not seeking more good time, just good time that is allowed to me.
(Compl. 4, ECF No. 1 (capitalization and punctuation corrected).) Poindexter seeks $750,000 in

monetary damages and two and a half months of good time credit toward his sentence. {Id. at 5.)
C.

Analysis

First, from reviewing Poindexter's allegations, it appears that Poindexter's co-defendant
Brathwaite, was arrested two and half months earlier than Poindexter. Thus, the Court notes that

the alleged two and a half month disparity in release date, more than likely, stems from the two
and a half months Brathwaite served in jail before Poindexter's arrest, which would have been
credited with against his eighteen-year sentence.
Moreover, Poindexter fails to allege sufficient facts to make out a plausible equal

protection claim.^ "The Equal Protection Clause ... is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike." City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living dr., 473 U.S.
432,439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982)). In order to state an equal

protection claim, Poindexter must allege that; (1) that he and a comparator inmate were treated

differently and were similarly situated; and (2) that the different treatment was the result of
discrimination. See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Poindexter claims that he and his co-defendant were treated differently because his codefendant was released three months earlier despite receiving the same eighteen-year sentence.

Poindexter's bare allegations fail to make out an equal protection claim. Poindexter fails to
adequately allege facts that plausibly indicate that his co-defendant is a similarly situated

comparator inmate or that Clarke treated him differently. The mere disparity in release date,
standing alone, fails to state an equal protection claim. Cf. Guerrero-Guerrero v. Clark, 687 F.
Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1988) (explaining that claim based solely on allegation that co-

defendants were paroled earlier was insufficient to state an equal protection claim without
requisite information to ascertain whether co-defendants were similarly situated comparator
irunates and were treated differently {oXXxng Patten v. North Dakota Parole Bd., 783 F.2d 140,
144 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Truelove, 482 F.2d 1361 (4th Cir. 1973))). Despite being

co-defendants and receiving sentences of the same length, Poindexter fails to explain how they

^"No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

are similarly situated. Poindexter provides no information about his co-defendant's institutional

behavior or other information relevant to the award of good conduct credit that would factor into
his release date. See id. at 1028. Thus, Poindexter fails to allege that he and his co-defendant
were similarly situated for the purpose of release dates. Poindexter fails to allege facts indicating
that Clarke violated his equal protection rights. Accordingly, Poindexter's claim is frivolous and
will be DISMISSED.
D.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the action will be DISMISSED. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to note the
disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/

James R. Spencer
Date:

Richmond, Virginia

Senior U. S. District Judge