Marshall v. Emery et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 4/28/2015. (sbea, )

APR 2 8 2015
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

RICi-iMOtviP. VA

Richmond Division

JEFFREY ANDREW MARSHALL,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:13CV761

V.

WAYNE L. EMERY, e/fl/.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jeffrey Andrew Marshall, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informa pauperis,

filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.' The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
A.

Preliminary Review

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any

action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
first standard includes claims based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,'" or claims
where the "'factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417,427

' The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. IVilliams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is
the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;

importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Parly ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356

(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130,1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering

a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,

rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell All. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In

order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must
"allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemonrs & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d
193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270,281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly,

while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th
Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and
constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See

Brock V. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
B.

Summary of Allegations

Because the basis upon which Marshall sought to hold the defendants liable was far from

clear, by Memorandum Order entered on February 6, 2015, the Court ordered Marshall to file a
particularized complaint. On February 20, 2015, Marshall filed his Particularized Complaint.

(ECFNo. 14.)^

In his Particularized Complaint, Marshall names as defendants: Wayne L. Emery,^ Harry
T. Taliaferro, III, and Jessica R. Vaughn ("Defendants"). Nevertheless, even after the filing of
the Particularized Complaint, Marshall's theory as to how exactly the defendants violated his

" The Court corrects the capitalization and the punctuation in the quotations from the
Particularized Complaint.

^Emery is the Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond County, Virginia. (Compl. 1,
ECFNo. 1.) Vaughn is a probation officer. (Mat 2.) Talliaferro is a judge. {Id.)

rights remains opaque. It appears Marshall believes the defendants are liable for wrongfully

revoking his probation."* Specifically, Marshall alleges:
Richmond County's prosecution ordered a show cause for my personage

around March 13'*' of 2011, based on a probation violation for peace and good
behavior, exercised by Probation Officer Jessica R. Vaughn in lieu of a legal
conviction in Chesterfield County, VA [for a nonexistent criminal background].
However, the show cause was one year and three months late from the issued

warrant in Chesterfield on the date of January the 1®'of 2010.
.. . When this specific article was announced to the attention to Harry J.
Taliaferro, III, by my attorney, Marshall C. Davison, the judge proceeded to
extract a large tome of legal statutes, which appeared rather outdated and or
antiquated. Whereas he began to recite some article of legal code in which I
highly doubt is still in effect, or was ever passed by a majority vote by one-third
of Congress. Abruptly finishing his recital, he proceeded with the sentence and a
rapt of the gavel.

(Part. Compl. 2.) Marshall contends that Taliaferro is liable for his "inaccurate ruling based on
outdated show cause [and] possible ineffective legal statutes extracted from a source of reference
unknown. {Id. at 3.) In his Particularized Complaint, Marshall makes no coherent request for

relief In his original complaint, he demanded monetary relief As explained below, the action
will be dismissed as frivolous.

C.

Analysis

"[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Accordingly, the

plaintiff must allege facts that affirmatively show "that the official charged acted personally in
the deprivation of the plaintiflj'js rights. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977).
Although Marshall mentions Defendant Vaughn in the body of the Particularized Complaint, he
fails to articulate any facts that plausibly suggest that she violated his constitutional rights.
Accordingly, all claims against Defendant Vaughn will be DISMISSED.
On the first page of the Particularized Complaint, Marshall contends Defendants
violated his rights by depriving him of "personal freedom against [his] will." (Part. Comp. 1.)

Marshall's claims against Defendant Emery are barred by prosecutorial immunity. "[A]
prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages when he acts within the
scope of his prosecutorial duties." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,420 (1976) (citations
omitted). Prosecutorial immunity extends to actions taken while performing "the traditional

functions of an advocate," Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997) (citations omitted), as
well as functions that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. To ascertain whether a specific action falls within the ambit of

protected conduct, courts employ a fianctional approach, distinguishing acts of advocacy from
administrative duties and investigative tasks unrelated "to an advocate's preparation for the

initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings." Buckley v. FUzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,

273 (1993) (citation omitted); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 261-63 (4th Cir. 1994).^ "[0]nce a
prosecutor possesses probable cause," he is entitled to immunity when deciding "whether to
prosecute, which charges to initiate, [and] what trial strategy to pursue ...." Goldstein v. Moatz,
364 F.3d 205,215 (4th Cir. 2004). Litigating the issue of whether Marshall violated the terms of

his probation, was clearly within the scope of Defendant Emery's prosecutorial duties.
Goldstein, 364 F.3d at 215. Accordingly, all claims against Defendant Emery will be
DISMISSED.

Defendant Taliaferro also enjoys immunity from suit. Judges are absolutely immune
from suits under § 1983 for acts committed within their judicial discretion. Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349,355-56 (1978). "Absolute judicial immunity exists 'because it is recognized that

judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted must be able to exercise discretion vigorously
and effectively, without apprehension that they will be subjected to burdensome and vexatious

^ Marshall fails to allege facts thatsuggest he seeks to hold Defendant Emery liable for
any investigative tasks.
5

litigation.'" Lesane v. Spencer, No. 3:09CV012,2009 WL 4730716, at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 3,

2009) (quoting McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted), overruled

on other grounds. Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1995)). Judges are entitled to
immunity even if "the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority ...." Stutnp, 435 U.S. at 356. Only two exceptions apply to judicial immunity: (1)

nonjudicial actions, and (2) those actions, "though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence
of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (citation omitted). Marshall fails

to allege facts that suggest either exception applies in this instance. Accordingly, all claims
against Defendant Taliaferro will be DISMISSED.
The action will be DISMISSED as legally frivolous. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to
note the disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
h\

James R. Spencer

Date:

'!P

Richmond, Virginia

Senior U. S. District Judge