Goode v. Central Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 08/12/14. (kyou, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
FREDDIE L. GOODE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:14cv281-HEH
CENTRAL VIRGINIA
LEGAL AID SOCIETY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Granting Motion to Dismiss)
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15)
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated
herein, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and the case will be dismissed without
prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
As required by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
assumes Plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations to be true, and views all facts in the light
most favorable to him. T.G. Slater & Son v. Donald P. & Patricia A. Brennan, LLC, 385
F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th
Cir. 1993)). Viewed through this lens, the facts are as follows.
Plaintiff, Freddie L. Goode ("Goode"), an African-American male, worked for
Defendant, Central Virginia Legal Aid Society ("CVLAS"), from 1988 until his allegedly
wrongful termination on March 31, 2013. (Compl. ffi] 1-2, 7, 10.) CVLAS is a 501(c)(3)
organization. (Id. f 3.) Goode started as a volunteer at CVLAS, and progressed to other
positions, which included paralegal, staff attorney, senior staff attorney, managing
attorney, and most recently, Senior Managing Attorney. (Id. ffl 7-9.) At the time of his
termination, Goode was seventy-two (72) years old, earned an annual salary of $85,000,
and was one of nine attorneys working for CVLAS. (Id. fflj 2, 11-12.)
In his work as Senior Managing Attorney, Goode's duties included: representing
and advising clients on civil matters; overseeing the Social Security, elder law, and public
benefits units; and supervising the volunteer lawyer pro bono hotline. (Id. ffl| 13, 31.)
Goode contends that during his tenure at CVLAS, he always met or exceeded
performance expectations. (Id. ^ 18.) Goode worked out of CVLAS' Richmond office
under Stephen Dickinson, a Caucasian male and the Executive Director of CVLAS. (Id.
114.)
On March 11, 2013, the CVLAS Board of Directors ("Board") allegedly met and
discussed potential restructuring of its attorney workforce in light of a loss in government
funding. (Id. ffl| 20-21.) Goode heard that the Board discussed all CVLAS employees at
this meeting and that his "veteran and other benefits" were mentioned as reasons Goode
would be less affected than others by the reorganization. (Id. ffl| 21-22.) Subsequently,
CVLAS terminated Goode and four other African-American employees over the age of
forty (40). (Id. 123.) Goode does not state the gender, exact age, or position of the other
terminated employees, but he was the oldest CVLAS employee at the time. (Id. ^ 24.)
Prior to his termination, Goode suggested to Dickinson alternative methods to
reduce spending that would have allowed Goode to maintain his employment status. (Id.
ffil 27-28.) Goode's suggestions included increasing employee contributions to health
insurance premiums, requiring managing employees in Richmond to pay their own
parking fees, and cutting annual salaries that exceeded $65,000 by ten percent. (Id.)
Dickinson allegedly rejected these suggestions, because they would not sufficiently
reduce costs and he had promised employees raises. (Id. ^ 29.) Dickinson indicated that
two female Caucasian attorneys were single parents who would be affected by Goode's
proposed salary reduction. (Id. U30.) As an alternative to termination, Dickinson offered
Goode a position in which he would continue to supervise the volunteer lawyer pro bono
hotline. (Id. ^ 13, 31.) Goode does not explain how he responded to this offer. On
April 8, 2013, eight days after terminating Goode, CVLAS offered him a severance
package which Goode rejected as "meager" and an inadequate reflection of his work
history. (Id. ffil 34-36.)
Explaining its decision to terminate Goode and eliminate his position, CVLAS1
cited budget cuts and a decision to stop litigating Social Security cases, which was one of
Goode's responsibilities. (Id. ffil 37,40.) Goode alleges these explanations were pretext
for CVLAS' actual reasons for his termination—race, sex, and age discrimination. (Id.
H37.) Though Goode was terminated, others remained employed by CVLAS. (Id. Uf 26,
39,45-46.)
Martin Wegbreit, the Senior Managing Attorney in charge of litigation services,
was Caucasian, "substantially younger" than Goode, and his salary was higher. (Id. 1fl|
1The reasons given for Goode's termination are not credited to any one person in the Complaint.
Instead, Goode refers to "CVLAS" or to "CVLAS, through its members, supervisors, employees
and agents." (Compl. 1fl] 37,40,44-48, 52-53, 56-57.)
15-17.) Goode alleges that he and Wegbreit were "similarly situated ... in terms of
workload and responsibility." (Id. ^ 15.) According to the Complaint, CVLAS retained
Wegbreit in the same capacity and at the same salary as before Goode's termination. (Id.
H26.) There is no indication of Wegbreit's exact age, salary, or job description beyond
that he was "in charge of litigation services." (Id. U 15.)
Christianne Queiroz, a "much younger" female Latina attorney, also continued
working for CVLAS. (Id. 1ffl 39,46.) Queiroz's employment status changed to part-time,
but her salary allegedly remained the same after Goode's termination. (Id.) The
Complaint provides no information regarding Queiroz's exact age, salary, or job
description beyond "attorney." (Id. ^ 46.)
In response to these events, Goode filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging race, sex, and age discrimination. (Id. 16.)
After receiving a "Notice of Right to Sue" letter from the EEOC, Goode brought this
action against CVLAS. (Id.) He asserts three separate counts of discriminatory
termination based on race (Counts I and II) and age (Count III) in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 ("Title VII"), 42
U.S.C. § 1981, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S. C. § 623(a)(1)
("ADEA").2 CVLAS moves to dismiss all claims against it pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
2In his introduction, Goode also alleges employment discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. However, he does not assert a separate count for the alleged Section 1983 violation nor
does he reference the statute in the remainder of the Complaint. The same is true for his claim of
sex discrimination. (Compl. at 1.) Even if Goode pled a Section 1983 claim, the Fourth Circuit
has held that Section 1983 has a state-action requirement, and no factual allegations purport that
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952
(4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only
'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in
order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.'" BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)). A complaint need not assert "detailed factual
allegations," but must contain "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations
omitted). Thus, the "[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level," id. (citation omitted), to one that is "plausible on its face," id. at
570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. In considering such a motion, a plaintiffs
well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. T.G. Slater, 385 F.3d at 841 (citation omitted). Legal
conclusions enjoy no such deference. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
As a general proposition, "[p]leadings must be construed to do justice." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(d). At the same time, courts recognize that a plaintiff "can plead himself out of
court by pleading facts that show that he has no legal claim." Atkins v. City ofChicago,
CVLAS was a state actor. DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 506 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted). Accordingly, the Court need not address the Section 1983 or sex discrimination claims.
631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (citing Hecker v. Deere &Co., 556 F.3d
575, 588 (7th Cir. 2009); Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008);
EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007); Orthmann v.
Apple River Campground, 757 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 1985); and Trudeau v. FTC, 456
F.3dl78, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Complaint fails to state a tenable claim for relief. Goode's unlawful
discrimination claims (1) do not offer direct evidence of discrimination and (2) fail to
state an actionable discrimination claim.
Goode asserts three counts of discrimination: two based on race (Counts I & II)
and one based on age (Count III). (Compl. at 7-9.) The Court will address the claims in
that order.
A.
Race Discrimination Claims
Because the requirements to establish race discrimination claims are identical in
both Title VII and Section 1981, the same analytical framework will apply to Counts I
and II. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
To establish a claim of race discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff may either
follow the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973), or offer direct evidence of race discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002); Coleman v. Md. Court ofAppeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-15). Because he is not obligated to
follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach, he may plead his case simply
by alleging that "he had been terminated on account of his [race]" and by "detailing] the
events leading to his termination, providing] relevant dates, and including] the [races]
of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination." Swierkiewicz,
534 U.S. at 514. At a minimum, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that he was
"discharge[d]... because of [his] race." Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2). But in doing so, the facts must "plausibly" support allegations of
discrimination, and cannot rely on mere "conclusory" allegations. Id. at 190-91.
Alternatively, a plaintiff may follow the McDonnell Douglas framework and
allege the elements of a primafacie case, which are: (1) membership in a protected class;
(2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different
treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Id. (citing White
v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004)). If factual allegations fail
to support even one element, the claim fails. See Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190-91.
Under either approach, Goode's Complaint fails to state a claim. Goode alleges
that he was terminated after the Board met to discuss reorganizing CVLAS due to a loss
of funding. (Compl. ffl| 20-21,23.) While he alleges unlawful termination, Goode
acknowledges that CVLAS faced financial constraints and decided to stop representing
clients in Social Security matters. (Id. HU 21, 28-29,40-41.) He simply disagrees with
CVLAS' decisions. (Id. ffl| 27-28, 41.) By admitting that CVLAS' reasons for his
termination were at least partially true, Goode essentially pleads himself out of court.
Atkins, 631 F.3d at 832. In conclusory fashion only, he associates his termination with
unlawful discrimination. (See, e.g., Id. f 37.) No factual allegations support this
conclusion. Goode asserts several of his own beliefs or feelings with regard to the
circumstances surrounding his termination. (Id. fflj 33,35, 37.) Conclusory statements of
personal beliefs are not accepted as factual allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; E.
Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd., 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted).
Because Goode does not offer direct evidence of racial discrimination, his factual
allegations are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas approach. The Court finds, and
CVLAS does not dispute, that Goode is a member of a protected class and his termination
clearly qualifies as adverse employment action. See Boone v. Goldin, 178 F. 3d 253,
255-56 (4th Cir. 1999) (including "firing" and "discharging" in the definition of adverse
employment action) (citations omitted). Goode's satisfactory job performance and
CVLAS' different treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class
remain in dispute and require further analysis.
1. Satisfactory Job Performance
Goode lists various positions he held over nearly 25 years while employed at
CVLAS, and he details his duties at the time of his termination. (Compl. Ifff 9, 13.)
While these facts are descriptions of his work history and associated duties and
responsibilities, they fail to support a tenable inference, positive or negative, as to the
quality of Goode's job performance when he was terminated. In April 2009, the Virginia
State Bar awarded Goode its Legal Aid Lawyer of the Year Award. (Compl. If 19.)
Henry McLaughlin, III, Director of CVLAS at that time, acknowledged Goode's
"'extraordinary record of innovation in recruitment and supervision of volunteers'" in
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connection with the award. (Id.) Taken together, these allegations give rise to the
inference that Goode performed his job satisfactorily in and leading up to early 2009.
However, Goode's termination occurred nearly four years later, and the Complaint offers
no indication of his performance after 2009. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (dismissing
claims in which"[p]laintiffs ... have not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible."). The Complaint provides no information concerning
subsequent job evaluations, awards, or recognition given to him after 2009. There is
simply no plausible inference to be drawn about the quality of Goode's performance in
March 2013 from the award he received or comments made by a previous CVLAS
Executive Director in 2009.
In conclusory fashion, Goode alleges that he "has always met or exceeded the
performance expectations of CVLAS." (Compl. f 18.) This recitation is insufficient to
show that CVLAS was satisfied with Goode's job performance at the time of his
termination. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Merely bolstering the statement with the
word "exceeded" does not transform the conclusory allegation into a plausible fact.
2. Different Treatment of Similarly Situated Employees
Even if Goode had established his satisfactory job performance at the time of his
termination, he fails to establish the final element of a prima facie race discrimination
case. Goode must plausibly show that he received different treatment than similarly
situated employees outside the protected class. Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190-91 (citation
omitted). Specifically, this requires factual allegations that CVLAS replaced Goode with
someone outside the protected class with comparable qualifications or that after his
termination, Goode's position remained open to similarly qualified applicants. Causey v.
Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Blistein v. St. Johns College, 74 F.3d
1459, 1467-68 (4th Cir. 1996); Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1228
(4th Cir. 1998)). To show another employee was similarly situated to him, and thus an
appropriate comparator, Goode must '"show that [he is] similar in all relevant respects to
[his] comparator.'" Kelley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F. App'x 285, 286 (4th Cir.
2013) (quoting Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App'x. 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
However, no allegations suggest that CVLAS replaced Goode. In fact, Goode
admits "CVLAS ... eliminated [his] position." (Compl. f 40.) Instead, Goode alleges he
was terminated "in favor of retaining" two individuals, Martin Wegbreit and Christianne
Queiroz. (Id. ffif 38-39,45-46.) Goode fails to allege any facts which allow a plausible
inference that Wegbreit or Queiroz are similarly situated to Goode or that his position
remained open to them.
With respect to Wegbreit, Goode alleges that he was a Caucasian, senior managing
attorney "in charge of litigation services," with a similar workload to, but higher salary
than, Goode. (Compl. ff 15-17.) These allegations do not allow an inference of
similarity, but instead quite the opposite. See Dickens v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., No. 942494, slip op. at 4 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996) (per curiam) (holding that employees with the
same job title but different responsibilities were not similarly situated). By asserting that
Wegbreit headed litigation and was compensated at a higher rate than Goode, it is logical
to conclude that Wegbreit had different, indeed higher-ranking, responsibilities than
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Goode. Litigation is a broad category under which several of Goode's own duties such as
"representing clients in civil matters" and "advising clients" could be encompassed.
(Compl. U13.) It follows that because Wegbreit was in charge of litigation, and Goode
had responsibilities related to litigation, the two were not similarly situated. Merely
having the same job title does not establish that Goode and Wegbreit were "similar in all
relevant respects." Haywood, 387 F. App'x. at 359-60 (explaining that an exact match is
not required but comparators must have enough common features for a meaningful
comparison) (citations omitted). Further, Goode does not allege that after his termination
his position remained open to Wegbreit. He simply alleges that CVLAS retained
Wegbreit "in the same capacity and at the same salary." (Compl. f 5.) This suggests
Wegbreit continued in the same position that he had before Goode's termination.
With respect to Queiroz, Goode alleges that she was a "non African American
(Latino) [sic] female" attorney. (Compl. ffif 39,46.) According to the Complaint,
Queiroz's hours were reduced while her salary remained unchanged, and the Court infers
that this occurred after Goode's termination. (Id.) Goode alleges no other facts related to
Queiroz's responsibilities, nor does he allege that Queiroz was similarly situated to him.
These bare allegations support no inference that Goode and Queiroz were similarly
situated. It also cannot be inferred from these facts that Queiroz replaced Goode or that
his position remained open to her. Since Goode does not identify any similarly situated
employees outside the protected class who received different treatment from him, he fails
to plausibly establish the final element.
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Because Goode alleges, at least in part, that his termination was part of a
workforce reduction, he could satisfy the fourth element of his race discrimination claim
by alleging facts to show CVLAS "did not treat... race neutrally when making its
decision." Causey, 162 F.3d at 802 (citation omitted). Goode does not set forth facts
which give rise to such an inference. Goode concedes that Executive Director Dickinson
offered him a position to continue supervising the pro bono hotline. (Compl. ^f 31.)
Eventually, Goode and four other African-American employees were terminated from
CVLAS due to the budget shortfall. (Compl. f23.) Goode mentions four other employees
at CVLAS: Wegbreit (Caucasian), Queiroz (Latina), and two unidentified "Caucasian
female[]" lawyers (Compl. ffif 15, 30, 39). While Wegbreit and Queiroz maintained
employment after Goode's termination, there is no allegation as to whether or not the two
unidentified women kept their jobs. These allegations do little more than identify traits
of various employees, and they fail to raise a logical inference that any connection
existed between Goode's race and his termination.
In sum, Goode fails to allege sufficient facts supporting his claim that his
termination was the result of unlawful discrimination, regardless of whether he proceeds
under McDonnell Douglas or a theory of direct discrimination. Accordingly, Counts I
and II are dismissed without prejudice.
B.
Age Discrimination Claim
To establish a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, the first three
elements are the same as those for a racial discrimination claim: membership in a
protected class, satisfactory job performance, and adverse employment action. Causey,
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162 F.3d at 802 (citation omitted). In an age discrimination claim, the fourth element
requires that a plaintiff be replaced by someone outside the protected class with
comparable qualifications. Id. For reasons similar to his previous claims, Goode fails to
state a claim for which he is entitled to relief under the ADEA.
With respect to the first three elements, the Court adopts its previous analysis and
similarly finds that Goode has failed to sufficiently plead his satisfactory job performance
at the time of his termination. See supra Parts III.A., III.A.l. The fourth element
requires the plausible inference that someone outside the protected class replaced Goode.
See supra Part III.A.2. Goode does not allege he was replaced by anyone at all. Instead,
he acknowledges that his position and some of his job duties were eliminated, though he
disputes the reasoning as to both. (Compl. ^flf 40-41.) These allegations establish that
Goode was not replaced, let alone by someone outside the protected class. Goode fails to
allege sufficient facts that his termination resulted from age discrimination. Accordingly,
Count III is dismissed without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court finds that Goode has failed to state a claim for unlawful
discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the ADEA. Accordingly,
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted and the case is dismissed without prejudice.
3In comparison to his own age, Goode merely alleges that Wegbreit was "substantially
younger" and Queiroz "much younger." (Compl. ffif 16, 39.)
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An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Afr^
/s/
Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge
Date: fli^a^ 1 l2~2QiV
Richmond, Virginia
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