Deavers v. Spotsylvania County Sheriff's Department
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 7/2/2014. Copies as directed to counsel of record.(cmcc, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
ALICIA DEAVERS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:14CV365-HEH
SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT and
HOMERO VASQUEZ,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Defendant's Motion to Dismiss1)
This is essentially a civil rights action filed against a Spotsylvania County deputy
sheriff, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a number of Fourth Amendment violations and
related common law claims. The underlying incident involves Plaintiffs alleged false
arrest for being drunk in public and the use of unnecessarily harsh force to detain her.
This case is presently before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed
pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Defendant, Deputy Sheriff
Homero Vasquez, challenges both the substantive sufficiency of the Complaint and,
alternatively, seeks to invoke qualified immunity. Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant
have filed memoranda of law supporting their respective positions. Since the task at hand
1The Defendants move to dismiss the Spotsylvania County Sheriffs Department as a party. The
Defendants correctly maintain that there is no such legal entity. Doud v. Commonwealth, 282
Va. 317, 321 (2011); see also Revene v. Charles Co. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 874 (4th Cir.
1989). Plaintiffdoes not dispute that the Spotsylvania County Sheriff, rather than the Sheriffs
Department, is the proper party. (PL's Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 4 n.6, ECF No. 6.) The
Spotsylvania County Sheriffs Department will therefore be dismissed as a party. If Plaintiff
wishes to add the Sheriff as an individual party, she may file the appropriate motion.
is constrained by the four corners of the Complaint, oral argument is unnecessary at this
stage of the proceedings.
According to the Complaint, Spotsylvania County Deputy Sheriff Homero
Vasquez ("Deputy Vasquez") was dispatched to the Plaintiffs residence during the early
morning hours of May 18, 2013 for a complaint of excessive noise. "Plaintiffwas in her
garage at the time with her garage door open. Deputy Vasquez advised Plaintiff and
some friends gathered at her house they could not be in public view while drinking and
instructed everyone to go inside, and Plaintiff did." (Compl. ^ 4, ECF No. 1-1.) When
some of the persons present attempted to close the garage door, Deputy Vasquez "placed
his foot inside the door to prevent it from being closed." {Id.) Several minutes after she
entered her home, Deputy Vasquez allegedly requested that she "come back outside."
{Id. \ 5.)
When Plaintiff complied, Deputy Vasquez stepped into her dwelling and
yanked her outside and informed her she was being arrested for being drunk
in public. Deputy Vasquez then grabbed Plaintiffs phone out of her hand,
threw it down and handcuffed Plaintiff so tight that Plaintiff had bruises on
her wrists and lost feeling in her right thumb. Additionally, Plaintiff
suffered bruising on her upper arms due to Deputy Vasquez squeezing them
so hard in the process of handcuffing her. Deputy Vasquez then called for
backup and 6 police cars even though Plaintiffhad not resisted the unlawful
arrest he had no reason to feel threatened.[2]
{Id.)
2Virginia Code § 18.2-388 reads in pertinent part, "[i]fany person profanely curses or swears or
is intoxicated in public ... he shall be deemed guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor." The Court of
Appeals of Virginia has construed this code section to authorize custodial arrests for public
intoxication. Crislip v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d 96, 99 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); see also
Carrsquillo v. Commonwealth, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 274 *8-9 (May 22, 2001).
Plaintiff further states in her Complaint that Deputy Vasquez "went through the
text messages on Plaintiffs cell phone ... accidentally called Plaintiffs 14 year old
daughter and hung up, causing her daughter to worry unnecessarily." {Id. 16.) Plaintiff
also maintains that
Upon arrival at the magistrate's office, Deputy Vasquez told the magistrate
Plaintiff had stepped out of her garage and become belligerent, prompting
her arrest; this was untrue and Plaintiff has video evidence to prove it.
Plaintiff informed the magistrate she did not step out of her garage or
become belligerent; Deputy Vasquez, unaware of the video evidence, told
Plaintiffto"shutup."
(Id.)
Lastly, Plaintiffalleges that she reported Deputy Vasquez's conduct to the
Spotsylvania County Sheriffs Department and provided them with video evidence. {Id.
^17.) The charges were eventually dismissed. {Id. t 12.)
This Court's review of a motion to dismiss filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
focuses on the facial sufficiency of the well-pleaded facts contained in the complaint. At
this preliminary stage, the Court does "not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the
merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin,
980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs well-
pleaded allegations are taken as true, and the complaint must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. T.G. Slater & Son, Inc. v. Donald P. & Patricia A. Brennan
LLC, 385 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 2004). Legal conclusions, however, enjoy no such
deference by the reviewing court. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To
survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, a complaint need only contain "enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007).
Therefore, in reviewing the complaint for facial sufficiency, this Court must parse
out the legal conclusions and extraneous commentary. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Francis v. Giacomelli, "naked assertions of wrongdoing
necessitate some factual enhancement within the complaint to cross the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The standard of review articulated above applies as well to the defense of qualified
immunity. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1998) (rejecting heighten
burden of proof standards where qualified immunity is defense). This Court is aware of
the U.S. Supreme Court's admonition that qualified immunity should be addressed at the
earliest possible stage—ifthe record before the court is sufficient. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Since Defendant's Motion to Dismiss raises no challenge at this stage to the
sufficiency of Count One, alleging malicious prosecution, this Court will therefore begin
its analysis with Count Two, generically styled "1983 Action." As is characteristic of the
Complaintgenerally, Count Two is rich in its conclusions but lean in supporting facts.
Its core components appear to be claims of arrest without probable cause and use of
unreasonable and excessive force. Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff contends that her Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when she was arrested without probable cause for being
drunk in public. According to the Complaint, "Plaintiff had stepped out of her garage
and become belligerent, prompting her arrest...." (Compl. ^ 6.) However, even under
the deferential standard of review accorded Plaintiff under Rule 12(b)(6), nowhere in the
Complaint does she unequivocally deny that she was intoxicated at the time of arrest or
provide any factual basis to infer that she was not in a public area atthe time.3 Therefore
with respect to the arrest without probable cause element of Count Two, that claim fails
to survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. In Crislip v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia concluded that "[f]he plain meaning of'in public,' [] is a place in open view,
visible to the community." 554 S.E.2d at 98. It is not limited to places open to public
accessibility. Id. Moreover, a person may be guilty of a public offense while on their
own premises. Id. at 99; see also Hackney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 892 (1947).
Plaintiffs excessive force claim within Count Two is based on her allegation that
"Deputy Vasquez ... handcuffed Plaintiff so tight that Plaintiff had bruises on herwrists
and lost feeling in her right thumb. Additionally, Plaintiffsuffered bruising on her upper
arms due to Deputy Vasquez squeezing them so hard in the process of handcuffing her."
(Compl. f 5.) It is well established that a seizure effectuated by excessive force
contravenes the Fourth Amendment. Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 476 (4th Cir.
2005). As the Fourth Circuit noted in Clem v. Corbeau, "[w]hether an officer has used
excessive force is judged by a standard of objective reasonableness." 284 F.3d 543, 550
3In Count One of the Complaint, which is not directly at issue in the immediate motion, Plaintiff
alleges that Deputy Vasquez did not administer a Breathalyzer or conduct a field sobrietytest to
determine if she was legally intoxicated. (Compl. ^11.) While such procedure may have
potentially had evidentiary value, there is no statute or case authority that requires such testing as
a prerequisite to arrest for public intoxication.
(4th Cir. 2002); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The
reasonableness of an officer's actions is "not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). But rather, "requires careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Graham, 490 U.S. at
396; see also Clem, 284 F.3d at 550. In assessing the reasonableness of the force
employed, the Court should consider "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest...." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Obviously, a determination of whether the force applied by Deputy Vasquez was
excessive is context specific. At this stage, the Court must rely on the well-pleaded
allegations in the Complaint. The facts supporting the excessive force claim add little
marrow to an otherwise skeletal complaint; however, the alleged injury, standing alone
and unexplained, is sufficient to pass muster at this point. See Morrison v. Bd. ofTrs. of
Green Township, 583 F.3d 394, 402-403 (6th Cir. 2009) (bruising and wrist marks alone
may be sufficient injury for claim of excessive force depending on circumstances).
Deputy Vasquez may well have a different version of what occurred in the early morning
hours ofMay 18, 2013.4
4As a subsidiary part of Count Two, Plaintiffalleges in paragraph 21 of the Complaint that
"Deputy Vasquez unlawfully searched Plaintiffs cell phoneand called her daughterwithout any
legal basis whatsoever, violating the 4th amendment." There is no allegation that Deputy
Vasquez searched for or retrieved any information stored in the phone's database. Without some
description of the nature of the search, this allegation fails to state a constitutional claim.
Furthermore, at the time this incident occurred, the law in the Fourth Circuit permitted minimally
intrusive examination of seized cell phones. United States v. Lowing, 703 F.3d 229,238 (4th
Cir. 2012), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 1851 (2013).
Alternatively, Deputy Vasquez argues that even if Count Two is facially
sufficient, his actions were objectively reasonable and he is therefore entitled to qualified
immunity. "Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations
but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions
were lawful." Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011). The determination of
whether a right is clearly established hinges on "whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (citation omitted). So long as qualified immunity does not turn
on disputed facts, "whether the officer's actions were reasonable is a question of pure
law." Henry, 652 F.3d at 531. The degree of force appropriate here is directly
proportionate to Plaintiffs resistant conduct—which she denies in her Complaint. An
informed assessment of the objective reasonableness of the force employed by Deputy
Vasquez necessarily requires greater factual development. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372,381 (2007).
"[A] defendant can raise the qualified-immunity defense at both the motion to
dismiss and summary judgment stage." Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 393-94 (4th Cir.
2013) (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996)). Based on the present record,
this Court is unable to determine whether or not the amount of force used by Deputy
Vasquez to handcuffthe Plaintiff was warranted. The Court does note that according to
the Complaint, Deputy Vasquez required six additional units to assist with Plaintiffs
arrest. (Compl. 1 5.) As the Fourth Circuit has frequently noted, qualified immunity is
peculiarly well-suited for resolution at the summaryjudgment stage with the benefit of a
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more fulsome record. See Willingham v. Crook, 412 F.3d 553, 558-59 (4th Cir. 2005).
This is such a case.
Count Three alleges that Deputy Vasquez committed common law battery by
touching "Plaintiff in a harmful and offensive manner as described above without lawful
justification." (Compl. H24.) This claim turns on the same basic allegations underlying
the excessive force element of Count Two. Unrebutted, Count Three states a frail—but
plausible—claim of battery. The destiny of this claim will ultimately turn on whether
Plaintiffs arrest was lawful and if so, whether the attending circumstances justified the
force employed. Crislip, 554 S.E.2d at 97.
Finally, in Count Four, Plaintiffmaintains that she was falsely imprisoned,
presumably because she was arrested without probable cause. Under Virginia law, false
imprisonment is defined as restraint of one's liberty without sufficient legal excuse.
Lewis v. Kei, 281 Va. 715, 724 (2011). However, if the Plaintiffs arrest was lawful,
Plaintiffcannot prevail on a claim of false imprisonment. SeeDe Chene v. Smallwood,
226 Va. 475,481 (1984).
According to the somewhat inartfully crafted Complaint, Plaintiff contends that
she was "yanked [] outside" by Deputy Vasquez and informed she was "being arrested
for being drunk in public." (Compl. ^ 5.) However, Plaintiff also alleges in the
succeeding paragraph of the same Complaint that Deputy Vasquez informed the
magistrate that she "had stepped out of her garage and becomebelligerent, prompting her
arrest
" (Id. ^ 6.) As noted above in finding portions of Count Two deficient, despite
Plaintiffs virulent assertion of innocence, the Complaint supplies no factual support for
her conclusions. Critically, the Complaint contains neither a denial of Plaintiffs
intoxication nor a sufficient description of the area in which she was encountered by
Deputy Vasquez to support her contention that she was not visible to the community.
Simply put, there is no basis from the face of the Complaint to plausibly conclude that
Deputy Vasquez lacked probable cause to place her under arrest.
It is also well settled in the Commonwealth of Virginia that an arrest is lawful if a
law enforcement officer reasonably had probable cause to believe that the individual he
arrested was committing a misdemeanor in his presence, even if it is later discovered that
the officer was mistaken. De Chene, 226 Va. at 478. An arrest is lawful if a law
enforcement officer had a reasonable belief that the facts and circumstances constituted a
violation of the law. Id. at 479; see also Yeatts v. Minton, 211 Va. 402, 406 (1970).
Even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as required at this stage,
Count Four fails to plead a plausible claim of false imprisonment or arrest. To withstand
a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but
more is required than naked assertions of wrongdoing—it necessitates "some factual
enhancement within the complaint to cross the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief." Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Count Four falls short of that mark—both factually and legally.
The Court will therefore grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in part. That
portion of Count Two that alleges Plaintiffs arrest without probable cause and alleged
search of Plaintiffs cell phone will be dismissed without prejudice. The motion will be
denied, however, as to the excessive force facet of Count Two. The motion will be
denied as to Count Three (common law battery) and granted as to Count Four (common
law false imprisonment). Count Four is dismissed without prejudice.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
4^
/s/
Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge
Date: TV/<, 2.%0/lf
Richmond, VAY
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