Melvin v. U.S.A. Today et al

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 7/28/2015. Copy of Memorandum Opinion was mailed to Plaintiff, and electronically distributed to all counsel of record. (sbea, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
RICHMOND DIVISION

PAMELA MELVIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 3:14–CV–439

U.S.A. TODAY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for the Court to Clarify its
January 30, 2015 Order That the Court Upheld in its June 23, 2015 Order Dismissing This
Action With Prejudice (“Motion to Clarify”) (ECF No. 47); and (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief From Judgment or Order and to
Amend the Complaint to Add Defendants and Claims (“Motion to Alter or Amend”) (ECF No.
48). For the reasons that follow, each of the aforementioned Motions is hereby DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2014, Plaintiff Pamela Melvin (“Melvin”) filed a Complaint against eleven

newspaper defendants, including USA Today, The Washington Post, Detroit Free Press, The
Star-Ledger, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Dallas Morning News, Inc. (collectively, “the
newspaper defendants”), Sun-Times Media, LLC, d/b/a Chicago Sun-Times (“Sun-Times”),
Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC (“Boston Globe”), Los Angeles Times, Tampa Bay Times,
and The Atlanta Journal Constitution, alleging violations of her First Amendment rights as well
as violations of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In September 2014, the newspaper
defendants as well as the Sun-Times and Boston Globe each filed a motion to dismiss. On
January 20, 2015, this Court granted each of the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See ECF Nos. 41, 42.) The

Court further ordered that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice against the newspaper
defendants, the Sun-Times and the Boston Globe. (Id.)
On January 30, 2015, Melvin filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (ECF No.
43), pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finding that the motion was
procedurally improper, this Court denied Melvin’s motion on June 23, 2015. (ECF No. 46.)
Melvin then filed the present Motions on July 7, 2015. None of the defendants responded
to the Motions, and their time for doing so has now passed.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
A motion to reconsider takes the form of a motion to alter or amend a judgment under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 116 F.3d 110, 112 (4th
Cir. 1997). Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to alter or amend
a judgment. The Rule simply provides, “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed
no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
It is well-settled, that there are only three grounds for granting a motion to alter or
amend a judgment: “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.” Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). Rule 59(e) is
intended to allow “a district court to correct its own errors, ‘sparing the parties and the appellate
courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.’” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins.
Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors
Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995)). A Rule 59(e) motion is "an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly." Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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b. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
“In order to justify relief under Rule 60, a movant must make a showing of timeliness, a
meritorious defense, lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and exceptional
circumstances.” Siegel v. Arlington Cnty. Dep’t of Cmty. Planning Housing and Dev., No. Civ.
A. 02-902-A, 2003 WL 23733547, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2003) (citing Werner v. Carbo, 731
F.2d 204, 206–07 (4th Cir. 1984)). If the movant makes this preliminary showing, then she
“must proceed to satisfy one of the following six grounds for relief: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other
conduct; (4) the judgment is void; (5) a prior judgment upon which the judgment is based has
been reversed or vacated; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from judgment.” Id. (citing
Werner, 731 F.2d at 207; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
c. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15
Rule 15(a) states that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within
21 days after serving it or within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(A)–(B). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Fed. R .Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Typically, a court should allow a party to amend unless an
amendment would prove futile or the party seeking the amendment proceeds in bad faith.
Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F.3d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 2004); Sykes v. Bayer Pharm. Corp.,
548 F. Supp. 2d 208, 216 (E.D. Va. 2008).
III.

DISCUSSION

(1) Motion to Clarify
In her Motion to Clarify, Melvin asks the Court to answer the following questions:


“[W]hether this Court’s dismissal with prejudice bars Plaintiff from filing civil
actions against the doctors, the health care providers and others who were
not defendants of this action and whom the court could not obtain personal
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



jurisdiction over but whose facts of acts were alleged in this action as
constituting claims of injunctions and declaratory relief against the
Newspaper Defendants;”
“[W]hether this Court’s dismissal with prejudice include [sic] the Court’s
determination that it had or could have had personal jurisdiction over the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina and jurisdiction
over civil action no. 5-09-CV-2351;”
“[W]hether this Court’s dismissal with prejudice bars any matter within civil
action no. 5-09-CV-235 that was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District Court of North Carolina.”

(Mot. to Clarify at 1–2.) Based on Melvin’s request, the Court construes the Motion to Clarify as
seeking legal advice. Because this Court cannot provide legal advice and is not required to do so,
the Court DENIES the Motion to Clarify.
(2) Motion to Alter or Amend
In her Motion to Alter or Amend pursuant to Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(6),
Melvin requests the Court to amend the judgment from a dismissal with prejudice to a dismissal
without prejudice. She argues that a dismissal with prejudice “is void because it deprives
Plaintiff of fundamental and substantive rights including the First and Fifth Amendments [sic]
rights of access to the court and to judicial due process.” (Mot. to Alter or Amend at 2.) Similar
to her Motion to Clarify, Melvin argues that this Court did not have jurisdiction over civil action
no. 5-09-CV-235 or any claims alleged in that matter. (Id. at 8.) Alternatively, Melvin requests
leave to amend her Complaint to add claims and defendants that were not originally included.
Melvin’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment must be denied because Melvin fails to
satisfy the standards defined above. Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise,” an involuntary dismissal “operates as an
adjudication on the merits.” In other words, “[a] district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
. . . with prejudice unless it specifically orders dismissal without prejudice. That determination is
within the district court’s discretion.” Carter v. Norfolk Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 761 F.2d 970,
974 (4th Cir. 1985). With this standard in mind, Melvin fails to demonstrate a clear error of law
Case no. 5-09-CV-235 referenced by Melvin appears to be a separate action that Melvin filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. (See Mot. to Clarify at 3.)

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or manifest injustice, (see Mot. to Alter or Amend at 9), or that the judgment is void, (id. at 5).
The Court justifiably dismissed the Complaint with prejudice against the newspaper defendants,
the Sun-Times and the Boston Globe.
Next, Melvin alternatively requests leave to amend her Complaint to add claims and
defendants. As the Fourth Circuit previously explained:
[A] district court may not grant a post-judgment motion to amend the complaint
unless the court first vacates its judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or
60(b). To determine whether vacatur is warranted, however, the court need not
concern itself with either of those rules’ legal standards. The Court need only ask
whether the amendment should be granted, just as it would on a prejudgment
motion to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In other words, a court should
evaluate a postjudgment motion to amend the complaint under the same legal
standard as a similar motion filed before judgment was entered–for prejudice,
bad faith, or futility.
Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). As to the prejudice prong, “[w]hether an amendment is prejudicial
will often be determined by the nature of the amendment and its timing.” Laber v. Harvey, 438
F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006). “Futility is apparent if the proposed amended complaint fails to
state a claim under the applicable rules and accompanying standards: ‘[A] district court may
deny leave if amending the complaint would be futile–that is, if the proposed amended
complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal rules.’” Katyle, 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370,
376 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Melvin fails to specifically identify the defendants or claims that she wishes to add to her
original Complaint, and also does not attach a proposed amended Complaint. From what the
Court can decipher, however, Melvin apparently wants to include the defendants from case no.
5-09-CV-235. But she inexplicably states that “this Court could not have personal jurisdiction
over those defendants.” (Mot. to Alter or Amend at 1, 11.) Thus, any proposed amendment would
be futile and leave to amend must be denied. Moreover, because Melvin fails to attach a
proposed amended Complaint, the Court denies her leave to amend. See Williams v. Wilkerson,
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90 F.R.D. 168, 170 (E.D. Va. 1981) (“[T]he Court adopts as a general rule of practice before this
Court that when plaintiff seeks leave to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a), or any other
pleading, a copy of the proposed amended pleading . . . must be attached to the motion.”)
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Clarify is DENIED and the Motion to Alter or

Amend is DENIED.
Plaintiff is advised that she may appeal this decision, pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, by filing a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty
(30) days of the date this Order is entered.
Let the Clerk send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion to the pro se Plaintiff as well as
all counsel of record.
An appropriate Order shall issue.

_____________________/s/________________
James R. Spencer
Senior U. S. District Judge
ENTERED this _28th_ __ day of July 2015.

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