Walton v. Greensville Correctional Center, et al.

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roderick C. Young on 5/21/2015. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

JOHN T. WALTON,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 3:14CV628 (RCY)

V.

GREENSVILLE CORRECTIONAL

CENTER, e/iz/.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff John T. Walton ("Walton"), proceeding pro se, brings this action against

Defendants, the Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC"), Greensville Correctional Center

("GCC"), Harold W. Clarke, and Eddie L. Pearson (collectively "Defendants"). ^
Walton filed his First Amended Complaint (First Am. CompL, ECF No. 5) on October 1,

2014.^ The First Amended Complaint does not refer to a specific statute, but it arguably alleges
a failure by his employer, GCC, to accommodate Walton's religious beliefs, in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. On October 24,
2014, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss (Defendant's [sic] Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mot.

to Dismiss"), ECF No. 11) and supporting memorandum (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Mot.
to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem. Supp."), ECF No. 12), arguing that the First Amended Complaint

*Inhis proposed Second Amended Complaint, Walton adds two additional parties, Benjamin Wright, former
Warden of GCC, and Joyce Johnson, Human Resource Manager at GCC.

^The First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5)was a duplicate ofthe original Complaint (ECF No, 4) with the
exception of the addition of the names of Clarke, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, and Pearson,
Warden of GCC. Plaintiff explains that his First Amended Complaint was filed in response to the Clerk "advising
him that he needed to advise the [C]ourt of a person that he wanted the complaint served on since the complaint
could not be served on an organization but a person." (Resp. to Defs. Mem. of Law in Opp'n to PL's Mot. for Leave
to File Second Am. Compl. ("PL's Resp. to Defs.' Opp'n"), ECF No. 17 at 5.)
1

should bedismissed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "8(a), 10(b), 12(b)(1) and/or

12(b)(6)." (Defs/ Mem. Supp. at 1.) Walton responded (ECF No. 13), and Defendants filed a
reply (ECF No. 14).

On December4, 2014, Walton filed Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second

Amended Complaint (PL's Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl. ("Mot. to Amend"), ECF
No. 15). Filed as an exhibit to the Motion to Amend is Walton's proposed Second Amended
Complaint (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 15-1). The proposed Second Amended Complaint
seeks to cure alleged deficiencies noted by Defendants in theirmemoranda in support of their

Motion to Dismiss, includes a specific reference to Title VII of the Civil Rights Actof 1964 with
regard to Count One, sets forth the allegations and claims in separately numbered paragraphs,
adds two additional defendants (BenjaminWright and Joyce Johnson), and adds two counts

related to alleged violations of VDOC policies and procedures, in particular VDOC "Operating
Procedure 101.2 VIIIB" and VDOC"Policy on Postingof Specialized Post." (Second Am.

Compl.

19-20.) Defendants oppose Walton's Motion to Amend. (Mem. of Law in Opp'n to

Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Opp'n"), ECF No. 16.)

For the reasons set forth herein. Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint will be GRANTED, and Defendant's [sic] Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. WALTON'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Finding it appropriate to do so, the Court will grant Walton's Motion to Amend.
Moreover, for the reasons set forth below, the Court will apply Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to
the applicable portions of Walton's Second Amended Complaint.

A. Walton's Motion to Amend

A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after
serving it or "if the pleading is oneto which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after

service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f),
whichever is earlier." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Walton amended his original Complaint oncein
accordancewith Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1). (First Am. CompL, ECF No. 5.) For

additional amendments, a party is permitted to amend its pleading "only with the opposing
party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A "court should fireely

give leave when justice so requires." Id. "This liberal rule gives effectto the federal policy in
favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities." Laber v.
Harvey, 438 F.3d 404,426 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,48 (1957)).

The Fourth Circuithas interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide that "'leave to amend a pleading should
be denied only when the amendmentwould be prejudicialto the opposing party, there has been

bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile.'" Id.
(quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178,182 (1962))).

Defendants assert that Walton's motion should be denied because it was not accompanied

by a written brief, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(F)(1). However, given the policy in favor of
resolving cases on their merits, the Court declines this invitation. "The federal rule policy of
deciding cases on the basis of the substantive rights involved rather than on technicalities
requires that plaintiff be given every opportunity to cure a formal defect in his pleading."

Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 252-53 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting 5A Charles Allen Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (2d ed. 1990)). Furthermore, the

Court notes that Walton is proceedingpro se and that "[a] document filedpro se is 'to be
liberally construed.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97,106 (1976)). "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to

less stringentstandards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
1. Bad Faith and Prejudice

There is no indication of bad faith on the part of Walton or prejudice to the Defendants.

Walton, who is pro se, moved to file the proposed Second Amended Complaint within several
weeks after Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was briefed, and he properly attached the proposed

Second AmendedComplaint. Walton explains that he consultedthe United States District Court
Eastern District of Virginia Richmond DivisionPro Se Litigant Handbookto help write his
complaint and subsequent pleadings. (PL's Resp. to Defs.' Opp'n at 5.)

Furthermore, the substantive differences between the First Amended Complaint and the

proposed Second Amended Complaint are few. The differences include alleged facts that would
come into the record through discovery, two additional defendants, and two additional claims.

As discussed below, the Court dismisses the additional two defendants and new claims.^ As
such,the proposed SecondAmended Complaint does little more than add and clarify alleged
facts relevant to the Title VII claim and correct formatting errors found in the First Amended
Complaint. Granting the Motion to Amend, therefore, is not prejudicial to the Defendants.
2. Futility of Amendment

Defendants argue that Walton's Motion to Amend should be denied under the doctrine of

futility. "Leave to amend ... should only be denied on the ground of futility when the proposed

^Asdiscussed infra, these defendants and claims are dismissed bytheCourt under the informapauperis screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
4

amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face." Johnson, 785 F.2dat 510 (citing

Davis V. PiperAircraft Corp., 615 F.2d606, 613 (4thCir. 1980), cert, dismissed, 448 U.S. 911
(1980)). "[A] district court may deny leave if amending the complaint would be futile—^that is,
*ifthe proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal rules,'"

including Rule 12(b)(6). United States exrel Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d
370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United Statesex rel. Fowler v. CaremarkRX, LLC, 496 F.3d
730, 740 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Arguably, amendment is futile with regard to the Second Amended Complaint's newly
alleged claims and newly addeddefendants. However, the Courtfinds that amendment is not

futile with regard to Walton's Title VIIclaim against VDOC andGCC. Indeed, as explained in
detail below, the Court finds that Walton has sufficiently alleged a cognizable Title VII claim

against VDOC and GCC. Therefore, withregards to thatclaim, the Second Amended Complaint
is not "insufficient or fnvolous on its face." Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510 (citation omitted).

While some of the amended claims are arguably futile, rather than granting Walton's

Motion to Amend and"cherry-picking" outthe futile claims, the Court finds it more appropriate
to grant Walton's Motion in full. However, as Walton is proceeding informa pauperis ("IFP"),
following the granting of Walton's Motion, the Courtwill use its statutory authority to evaluate
the Second Amended Complaint and sua spontedismiss the portions that "fail[] to statea claim
on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15).

B. Effect of an Amended Pleading

"As a general rule, 'an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it
of no legal effect.'" Young v. City ofMount Ranter, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). Thus, motions, such as motions to dismiss, directed at superseded pleadings may be
denied as moot. See Colin v. Marconi Commerce Sys. Emps.' Ret. Plan, 335 F. Supp. 2d 590,

614 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2004) (earlier motion to dismiss was rendered moot by the filing of
second amended complaint); Turner v. Kight, 192 P. Supp. 2d 391, 397 (D. Md. Mar. 25,2002)
(citing 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1476 (2d ed. 1990))("A pleadingthat has been amended ... supersedesthe

pleading it modifies

Once an amended pleading is interposed, the originalpleading no

longer performs any function in the case.").
Notwithstanding that general rule,

defendants should not be required to file a new motion to dismiss
simply because an amended pleading was introduced while their
motion was pending. If some of the defects raised in the original
motion remain in the new pleading, the court simply may consider
the motion as being addressed to the amended pleading. To hold
otherwise would be to exalt form over substance.

6 Charles Alan Wright et al.. Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2014); see, e.g.,

Garrettv. Aegis Cmty. Group, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-131, 2014 WL 3572046, at *2 & n.4(N.D.W.

Va. July 21,2014) ("extend[ing] [defendant]'s motion to dismiss to [plaintiff]'s amended
complaint" after granting motion for leave to amend complaint). Accordingly the Court will
considerthe Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with regard to Walton's Title VII claim, raised in
both his First Amended Complaint and his Second Amended Complaint.

Having found that Walton should be granted leave to file his Second Amended
Complaint and that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be applied to the Title VII Claim in

Walton's Second Amended Complaint, the Court now turns to analyzing Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.
n. BACKGROUND

The Court construes the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaintin favor of

the non-moving party, as required when resolving a motionto dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);
Randall v. UnitedStates, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994)(citation omitted) ("In reviewing the

legal sufficiency of the complaint, this court mustaccept as true all well-pleaded allegations and
mustconstrue the factual allegations in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff"). Legal

conclusions enjoy no such deference. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Under this
standard, the Court determines the facts to be as follows.

A. Facts Alleged in the Second Amended Complaint

On June 14,2010, Walton, then a corrections officer at GCC, sent a request for religious

accommodation in the form of an emailrequesting a schedule change to Stanley D. Mayes, the
Chief of Security at GCC. (Second Am. Compl. ^ 8.) The email stated:
I wanted to know if there is another schedule that I could be placed

on. My dad, who was also my pastor, passed away on June 10. I
was serving under him as his assistant pastor. Since his passing I
have taken on the duties of pastor at our church. I wanted to know
if there is another schedule that I could be placed on so that I can
attend services more.

(Second Am. Compl. Attach. B, ECF No. 15-2 at 2.) Chiefof Security Mayes asked Walton if
he had tried to work with his Watch Commander, and Walton responded, "I haven't spoken with

them about this yet. Is that what I need to do?" (Id. at 2-3.) Mayes responded "yes." (Id. at 3.)
Walton then sent a similar email to Watch Commander Joycetine Boone that stated, "I have
taken on the role of Pastor" and "I would appreciate it if you could work with me on some

Sundays so that I will be able to conduct services at my church." (Second Am. Compl.^ 8;

Second Am. Compl. Attach. C, ECF No. 15-2 at 4.) Boone respondedthat Walton "will need to

follow policy and submita leave request at least sevendays in advance for approval/disapproval
for any day you may need off work." {Id.)

During 2011, GCC beganrenovations that required the hiring of security staff on a
schedule of Monday through Friday to work with the contractors doing renovations. (Second
Am. Compl. ^ 9.) Despite a GCCpolicythat provided that "[t]he availability of specialized

posts such as a 5-2would be advertised or posted internally for a minimum period of 2 weeks to
allow staffto express interest in thatpost assigning by submitting a written request to be

considered forthe postassignment," GCC didnotsolicit applications for these jobs through job
postings, and thus, Walton did not apply. (Second Am. Compl. Attach. D, ECFNo. 15-2 at 5;

Second Am. Compl. HI 9-10.) One of the officers eventually assigned to the Monday through
Friday position told Walton that he had notrequested the position, but instead had been asked if
he wanted the position. (Second Am. Compl. 111 •)

Walton discussed these positions with Warden Wright on August 1,2011, and Warden
Wright told Waltonthat the Chief of Security would choosethe officers that workedthe new
schedule with the contractors. (Second Am. Compl. H11.) During a meeting with Warden

Wright, Warden Wright told Walton thatthere was a position in the mailroom for which he could
apply but that, at that time, a person needing an Americans with Disabilities Act accommodation
was occupyingthe position. (Second Am. Compl. 112.) After the meeting, Walton emziiled a
request to Wright asking to be consideredfor the mailroomposition, but GCC claims never to
have receivedthe request. (Second Am. Compl. 112; Second Am. Compl. Attach. E, ECF No.
15-2 at 6.)

On November 27,2011, Walton learned about Title VII and sent another email to the

Watch Commander, Major William Jarratt, and Human ResourceManager Joyce Johnson

specifically requesting a religious accommodation and citing Title VII. (Second Am. Compl. ^
15; Second Am. Compl. Attach. F, ECF No, 15-2 at 7.) This email stated:
I am C/0 J. Walton. I have been serving as Pastor of St. John

Powerhouse Apostolic Faith Church since June 2010. We conduct
services every Sunday starting at 10AM and every Tuesday and
Friday starting a[t] 7:30 PM. For the past little over a year I
haven't been able to conduct my services on every other Sunday
because of my work schedule. I am requesting accommodation in
accordance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so that I
can fulfill my religious obligation.

Title VII requires an employer, once on notice, to reasonably
accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief,
practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless
providing the accommodation would create an undue hardship.
Under Title VII, the undue hardship defense to providing religious
accommodation requires a showing that the proposed
accommodation in a particular case poses a "more than de
minimis" cost or burden.

Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter.
(Second Am. Compl. Attach. F., ECF No. 15-2 at 7.)

On November 29, 2011, Walton was called to the Warden's office for a meeting with

Warden Wright, Major Jarratt, andJoyce Johnson. (Second Am. Compl. H15.) During the
meeting, Walton was toldthat he could not stay in security andwork Monday through Friday.
(Second Am. Compl. H15.) Walton was offered a position in the mailroom andwas toldthatthis
would be a demotion and that there would be a five percent reduction in pay. (Second Am.

Compl.

13,15.) Thepay reduction was ultimately ten percent. {Id. H15.) In response to the

offerof the mailroom position, Walton stated that "if this was the only way that he could be
accommodated that he would accept it." (Second Am. Compl. ^ 15.) On December 2,2011,

Walton's demotion to the mailroom position was confirmedvia email. (Second Am. Compl.
18; Second Am. Compl. Attach. F., ECF No. 15-2 at 12-13.)

B. Claims Brought in the Second Amended Complaint
Count One of the Second Amended Complaint alleges a violation of Title VII,

specifically a failure to accommodate claim; Walton arguably alleged this same claim in his

original Complaint and his First Amended Complaint. (SecondAm. Compl. ^19; see Compl.,
ECF No. 4 at 2; First Am. Comp., ECF No. 5 at 2.) Counts Two and Three are two new claims

againstthe Defendants, allegingviolations of VDOC's own internal operating policy and

procedures. (Second Am. Compl.

20-22.) In CountTwo, Walton asserts that GCCviolated

VDOC Operating Procedure 101.2 VIIIB for failing to afford him a religious accommodation.
(Second Am. Compl. ^ 20.) In Count Three, Walton asserts that GCC "breached its duty when
specialized post[s] were not postedin accordance to [VDOC] policy." (Second Am. Compl. ^
22.)
III. Standard of Review

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;

importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the

applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.

1992) (citation omitted). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a shortandplain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the
defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl

Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)).

A complaint need not assert "detailed factual allegations," but must contain "more than labels
and conclusions" or "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

10

omitted). Thus, the "[f]actual allegations must be enoughto raise a right to relief above the

speculative level," to one that is "plausible on its face," rather than merely "conceivable." Id. at
555, 570 (citation omitted). In considering such a motion, a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations
are taken as true, and the complaint is viewed in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff. T.G.
Slater & Son, Inc. v. Donald P. & Patricia A. Brennan LLC, 385 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted). Legal conclusions enjoy no suchdeference. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
IV. Analysis

Having found it appropriate to do so, the Court will consider Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss with regard to Walton's Title VII claim, raised in both his First Amended Complaint and
his Second Amended Complaint. Furthermore, in the interest ofjudicial economy andas Walton

is proceeding IFF, theCourt will also exercise its statutory authority to evaluate thewholly new
portions of Walton's Second Amended Complaint.

The United States Code provides thatwhen a plaintiff is proceeding IFFthe Court "shall
dismiss thecaseat anytime if the court determines that-... (B)the action ... (i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which reliefmay be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief" 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Emritv.

Bank ofAm., 566F. App'x 265,265 (4thCir. 2014) (dismissing a non-prisoner IFF plaintiffs

complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(A)); Michau v. Charleston Cnty., 434F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir.
2006)) ("Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which governs IFF filings in addition to complaints filed by

prisoners, a district court mustdismiss an action thatthe court finds to be frivolous or malicious
or that fails to state a claim." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Hopkins v. Mayor and City

Council ofBaltimore, No. WDQ-14-2786,2014 WL 4658172, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 15,2014)
(summarily dismissing a non-prisoner IFF plaintiffs complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii));

11

Bardes v. Magera, No. 2:08-487-PMD-RSC, 2008 WL 2627134, at *8 (D.S.C. June 25,2008)
("§ 1915(e)(2) does not contain language indicating that it only appies to actions filed by

prisoners ... [ajccordingly, the fact that Plaintifffiled his actionwhile a non-prisoner will not
necessarily prevent this court jfrom performing a § 1915(e)(2) analysis." (citations omitted)).
Ultimately, for the reasons discussed below, the Courtwill GRANT Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss with regard to individually named Defendants Harold W. Clarke and EddieL.

Pearson andwith regard to Walton's punitive damages claim, but will DENY Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss with regard to Plaintiff's Title VII claim against VDOC and GCC.

Additionally, evaluating the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to § 1915, the Court will
DISMISS individually named Defendants Benjamin Wright andJoyce Johnson and further will
DISMISS Counts Two and Three of the Second Amended Complaint.
A. Count 1 - Title VII Claim

As to Walton's Title VII claim. Defendants argue (1) that the individually named

Defendants cannot be liable under Title VII, (2) that punitive damages are unavailableagainst a

governmental entity, and (3) that Walton has not sufficiently alleged a cognizable failure to
accommodate claim under Title VII.

1. Claims Against Walton's Supervisors

Defendants argue that supervisors cannot be held individually liableunderTitleVII,
citing Lissau v. Southern FoodServ., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1998) and district court
cases relying on Lissau. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. at 5-6.) The Courtagrees. The FourthCircuit has
made it clear "that individuals are not liable under [Title VII]." Lissau, 159 F.3d at 180. "To

permit individual liability would improperly expand the remedial scheme crafted by Congress."
Mat 181.

12

[E]verycircuit that has confrontedthis issue since the enactment of
the [Civil Rights Act] has rejected claims of individual liability.
These circuits have founded this conclusion on the language of
Title VII and the fact that its remedial scheme seems so plainly tied

to employer, rather than individual, liability.["*]

[The Fourth

Circuit has] join[ed] these courts and reiterate[d] that supervisors
are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations.

Id. (collecting cases); see also Lee v. Virginia BeachSheriff's Office, No. 2:13cvl09,2014 WL

1493560, at *15 (E.D. Va. April 14,2014) (holding that "[s]upervisors do not fit within the
definition of *
employer,' and [that] as such [they] cannot be held liablein their individual

capacities under Title VII,"andthatthe only proper defendant wasthe Virginia Beach Sheriffs
Office); Parker v. Eye Surgery Ltd., LLC, No. 2:13cv710, 2014 WL 6085298, at *5 (E.D. Va.

Nov. 12, 2014) (citations omitted) (noting that the Fourth Circuit has held that Title VII does not

provide a remedy against individual defendants who do not qualify as employers); Blackburn v.
Virginia Dep't ofCorr., No. 1:01cv039,2002 WL 242352, at *4 (W.D. Va. Feb. 19,2002)

(citing Lissau, 159 F.3dat 181) (noting that "[s]upervisors are not individually liable under Title
VII," and rulingthat "[t]he only viable defendant in this case is the Commonwealth of Virginia
Department of Corrections"); Reeves v. Virginia Dep't ofCorr. Educ., No. 2:02cv020,2003 WL
76117, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 9, 2003) (citingLissau, 159 F.3d at 181) ("[S]upervisors are not
subject to individual liability for discrimination under Title VII.").

Moreover, no individuals were named in the EEOC charge and, as a general rule, a Title

VII action may be brought only "against the respondentnamed in the [administrative] charge."
Alvarado v. Bd. ofTrusteesofMontgomery Cmty. College, 848 F.2d 457,458 (4th Cir. 1988)

"Title VII defines employerto include certainpersonswho employ fifteen or more workers and ... any agentof
such a person." Lissau, 159 F.3d at 180 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit
explains that "the inclusionof 'agent' did not signal a congressional desire to impose liabilityon individual
supervisors," but "[i]nstead, it simplyrepresented 'an unremarkable expression of respondeat superior-that
discriminatory personnel actionstaken by an employer's agent may create liability for the employer.'" Id. (quoting
Birkbeckv. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994)).
13

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)) (alteration in original). There are exceptions to this general

rule, see, e.g., Clay v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co., LLC, 955 F. Supp. 2d 588, 601 (N.D.W.
Va. 2013); however, given that anindividual cannot beheld liable if heor she does not qualify as
the employer, there is no reason to consider the exceptions in this case.

Based onthe foregoing analysis, the Court will GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

with regard to Defendants Harold Clarke and Eddie Pearson. Based on the same analysis, the
Court further finds that the Defendants added in the Second Amended Complaint, Benjamin

Wright and Joyce Johnson, should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants Harold Clarke, Eddie
Pearson, Benjamin Wright, and Joyce Johnson.
2. Punitive Damages

Defendants also argue that Walton's claim for punitive damages^ should be dismissed.
Again, the Court agrees. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l), a Title VII plaintiff may not

recover punitive damages against a government agency such asthe two remaining defendants VDOC and GCC. See Burke v. Virginia, 938 F. Supp. 320, 324-25 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 114

F.3d 1175 (4th Cir. 1997); McClam v. City ofNorfolk Police Dep %877 F. Supp. 277,284 (E.D.

Va. 1995). Accordingly, to the extent Walton seeks punitive damages, such a claim will be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. Failure to Accommodate

Relying on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 10(b), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6),
Defendants make several arguments in favor of dismissal of the First Amended Complaint. As

^Walton sought punitive damages inthe Complaint and the First Amended Complaint but hedoes not explicitly
seek punitive damages in the Second Amended Complaint.
14

explained previously herein, the Court will consider those arguments to the extent that they are
applicable to the Second Amended Complaint.
i. Federal Rules 8(a), 10(b), and 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim

showing thatthe pleader is entitled to relief,' in orderto 'give the defendant fair notice of what
the ... claimis and the grounds uponwhich it rests.'" BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson^ 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)). A complaint need not assert

"detailed factual allegations," but must contain "more thanlabels and conclusions" or "formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the "[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to reliefabove the speculative level," to onethatis
"plausible on its face," ratherthanmerely "conceivable." Id. at 555, 570 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs are also required to state "claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, eachlimited as
far as practicable to a single set of circumstances." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Defendants argue that Walton's FirstAmended Complaint was a shotgun pleading that
did not comply with either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b). (Defs.' Mem. Supp. at 4-5.) A shotgun

pleading is one in which the complaint "failsto articulate claims with sufficient clarity to allow
the defendant to frame a responsive pleading ... or if it is virtually impossible to knowwhich
allegations of fact are intended to support which claims(s) for relief" Suntrust Mortg., Inc. v.
First Residential Mortg. Servs. Corp.^ 3:12CV162, 2012 WL 7062086, at *7 (E.D. Va. Sep. 11,

2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants also argued that it was

"impossibleto determine whether the Court has [subject matter] jurisdiction over this matter
since the Plaintiff has failed to cite the particular law he claims was violated when his
accommodation request allegedly was denied." (Defs.' Mem. Supp. at 4.)

15

Despite the deficiencies in the First Amended Complaint, Defendants concede in their
Motion to Dismiss that Walton "appears to be claiming a violation of Title VII," and Defendants
were able to frame a responsive pleading. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. at 1.) As such, the Defendants

were put on fair notice of the failure to accommodate claim that Walton describes in both his
FirstAmended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint
will not be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8(a).

Nor will the Second Amended Complaint, with its numbered paragraphs, be dismissed

for failure to comply withRule 10(b). Under similar circumstances, courts within the Fourth

Circuit have allowed pro se plaintiffs a period of time to amend their complaints to comply with
procedural rules. SeeRivers v. Hodge, No 1:1 lcv644,2013 WL 989957, at *1 (Mar. 12,2013)

(noting that plaintiff had been given an opportunity to file an amended complaint that would
comply withRules 8(a) and 10(b)); Gordon v. James Madison Univ., No. 5:12cv00124,2013
WL2297186, at *3 (W.D. Va. May 24, 2013) ("Becausepro se plaintiffs are held to a lesser

standard than those represented, plaintiff should be given an opportunity to comply with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8 and 10 rather than risk an out-of-hand dismissal."); Fontell v. McGeo UFCWLocal
1994, No. AW-09-2526, 2010 WL 3086498, at *16 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2010) ("The Court will

overlook these [Rule 10(b)] failures dueto Plaintiffs pro se status."). However, as Walton has
already submitted a Second Amended Complaint that complies withRules 8(a) and 10(b), further
amendment is unnecessary.

The Court also finds no basis for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, unlike a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "the district court
may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue [of subject
matter jurisdiction] and may consider evidence outside the
pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary
judgment." Therefore, this Court may weigh the evidence and
16

resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction by considering
evidence outside the Complaint.

Johnson v. Portfolio Recovery Asses., LLC, 682 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (E.D. Va. 2009) (quoting
Velasco v. Gov't ofIndonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004)) (citing Williams v. United
States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995)).

As a prerequisite to filing a Title VII suitin federal district court, "[a] plaintiff is required
to file a charge withthe EEOC and exhaust his administrative remedies." Id. at 569 (citing
Bryantv. BellAtlantic Md, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132(4th Cir. 2002); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)).
"The scope of the plaintiffs right to file a federal lawsuit is determinedby the charge's

contents." Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Bryant, 288

F.3dat 132). "[A] failure by the plaintiffto exhaust administrative remedies concerning a Title
VII claimdeprives the federal courts of subject matterjurisdiction over the claim." Id. (citing
Davis V. North Carolina Dep't ofCorr., 48 F.3d 134,138-40 (4th Cir. 1995)).

In his Second Amended Complaint, Walton indicates that he filed "a complaint withthe
EEOC." (Second Am. Compl. H17.) Moreover, the record herein includes a copy of the EEOC
charge(ECFNo. 16-1) and the EEOC right-to-sue letter(ECFNo. 17-4)—^attached as exhibits to
a response and reply, filed by Defendants and Walton respectively. These documents
demonstrate that Walton exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to his failure to

accommodate claim prior to filing this civil action. Accordingly, the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this action.
it Failure to State a Claim - Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants also argue, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), that Walton has failed to allege

sufficientfacts to support a claim for relief (Defs.' Mem. Supp. at 7.) Defendants specifically
argue that Walton has not met the "plausibility requirements of Twombly and Igbal.'^ (Id.) The
17

Court disagrees with Defendants and finds that Walton has alleged a cognizable claim under
Title VII.

An employee bringing suitunder Title VII may assert two separate theories of religious
discrimination: disparate treatment andfailure to accommodate. See Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of
Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1017(4th Cir. 1996). Here, Walton is alleging a failure to

accommodate claim. (Second Am. Compl. H19.) In analyzing religious accommodation cases,

theFourth Circuit employs a burden-shifting scheme similar to the one laidout in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textile Co., 515
F.3d307, 312(4th Cir. 2008). Once a plaintiffmakes out aprima facie case of discrimination,

theburden shifts to the employer who must show thatit was unable to provide the plaintiff with a
religious accommodation without undue burden. See id. (citing Chalmers, 101 F.3dat 1019).

At this stage of the proceedings, the burden-shifting analysis is not implicated. That is,
on a motion to dismiss, the Court need not evaluate the reasonableness of any accommodations

or the burden an accommodation wouldput on the defendant. A plaintiffcan survive a motion to
dismiss a Title VII claim if he simply presents "allegations sufficient to reasonably infer o.prima

facie case of discrimination" under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Petrosyan v. Delfin
Grp. U.S.A., LLC, 2015 WL 685266, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 18,2015) (evaluating a motion to
dismiss a Title VII claim).

To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must allege

facts sufficientto infer "that (1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an

employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; [and] (3) he or she
was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement." See

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Firestone Fibers, 515 F.3d at 312 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original).

Withregard to the first factor, TitleVII defines religion "to include 'all aspects of

religious observance and practice, as well as belief" See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1018 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). Because TitleVII includes sucha broad definition of religion, Walton
satisfies the first factor by alleging in the Second Amended Complaint that he had a religious

belief, observance andpractice. Specifically, Walton alleges that he asked for a schedule change
in orderto lead religious services on Sundays. (Second Am. Compl. Attachs. B, C, E, F, ECF
No. 15-2 at 2,4, 6, 7.)

As to the second factor, Walton clearly alleges that he told his supervisors that he needed

a religious accommodation. Specifically, Walton has provided several emails thathe sent to his
supervisors asking to adjust his work schedule so that he would not need to work on Sundays.
(See Second Am. Compl. Attachs. B, C, E, F, ECF No. 15-2 at 2,4, 6, 7.) In at least oneof these
emails, Walton specifically requested a religious accommodation so that he would not need to
work on Sundays. (SecondAm. Compl. Attach. F, ECFNo. 15-2 at 7.) Thus, Walton's
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint satisfy the second factor.

Finally, Walton has also alleged facts sufficient to infer satisfaction of the third factor by
alleging that he received a demotion and a reduction in pay in response to his request for a
religious accommodation. UnderTitle VII, the employer must '^actively attemptto accommodate
an employee's religious expression or conduct." See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1018 (emphasis
added). Walton contends that GCC did not attemptto accommodate, but instead simplyoffered
him a positionthat constituted a demotion. (Second Am. Compl. fl 11-15.) Moreover, Walton

19

alleges that he was simply offeredthe demotion to the mailroom position, despite the factthat
Monday through Friday corrections officer shifts were available. {Id.

9-12.)

Given that the only emplojmient change offered by GCC was demotion to the mailroom,
Walton was then left to choose between his bona fide religious belief or accepting a demotion in

orderto remain employed with GCC. Noting againthat the reasonableness of offering the

mailroom demotion as an alleged accommodation—^and Walton's acceptance of that demotion—
is a matter thatis properly evaluated at summary judgment or trial, the Court finds thatWalton's
allegations allowhis Second Amended Complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. Walton has
alleged that he only accepted the demotion as he believed it to be the only way to continue

working at GCC without violating his bona fide religious beliefs. (Second Am. Compl. ^ 15.)
Furthermore, Walton alleges that the demotion was not in fact the only way he could
have continued working at GCCas there were allegedly Monday throughFriday security shifts
available at the time. (Id

9-11.) Specifically, Walton alleges that he discussed the security

positions that provided a Monday through Friday workweek with Warden Wright in August

2011, but that he was not offered one of the positions. (Second Am. Compl. ^^11-12.) Walton
also alleges that he requested a religious accommodation in November 2011. (Second Am.

Compl. 115.) Subsequently, Defendants only offered to accommodate Walton's religious
practice conflictby giving him a demotionand reduction in pay. (Second Am. Compl. HH 13,
15.)

Basedon the foregoing, the Court finds that Walton has alleged facts sufficient to infer
satisfaction of the third factor of aprimafacie failure to accommodate case. See Andrews v.
Virginia Union Univ., No. 3:07CV447, 2007 WL 4143080, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 2007)

(citing Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019) (denying a motion to dismiss a religious accommodation

20

claim and finding that a demotion and pay reductionwere "adverse consequences [that could]

properly be characterized as 'discipline'"); cf.Lovell v. BBNTSolutions, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d
611, 626 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citing Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253,255-56 (4th Cir. 1999))

("Discharge, demotion, decrease in compensation, loss ofjob title or supervisoryresponsibility,

and reduced opportunities for promotion are examples of typical adverse employment actions.").

Viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Walton, he has alleged facts sufficient to
infersatisfaction of the third element of aprimafacie case for a failure to accommodate claim.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to Walton's
Title VII failure to accommodate claim directed against VDOC and GCC.
B. Count Two - Procedures Manual as to Discrimination Charge

In Count Two, Walton alleges a violation of VDOC "Operating Procedure 101.2VIIIB."

(Second Am. Compl. at 8.) Specifically, Walton alleges that "[t]he Defendant owedthe plaintiff
a duty of being afforded religious accommodation if there is no undue hardship to Greensville

Correctional Centerand the Virginia Department of Correction." (Jd. K20.) In support of his
allegation, Waltonhas attacheda singlepage fi:om the VDOC Operating Procedure Manual.
(Second Am. Compl. Attach A., ECF No. 15-2 at 1.)

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Operating Procedure Manual merely seems

to discuss VDOC's internal procedures for processingemploymentaccommodationrequests. It
does not appear to create any cause of action for failure to follow those procedures.

Furthermore, the Court notes that "[t]he mere fact that an employer failed to follow its own

internalprocedures does not necessarily suggest that the employer was motivated by illegal
discriminatory intent." Vaughanv. Metrahealth Cos., Inc., 145 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Leake v. Ryan *s Family

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Steakhouse, 5 F. App'x 228,232 (4th Cir. 2001). Such a failure, however, could "serve as a

basisfor a wrongful discharge actionunderstate law." Id, (quoting Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
990 F.2d 812, 819 (5th Cir. 1993)).

In the instant case, Walton's employment was not terminated, ratherhe simply accepted a
demotion. Moreover, Walton does not specifically raiseany claim for wrongful discharge.

Indeed, it is unclear what legal claim Walton raises in Count Two as Walton has also failed to

allege facts that suggest the VDOC Operating Procedure Manual created any sortof contractual
relationship between VDOC andWalton as to religious accommodation. Additionally, to the
extent that Walton raises a breach of contract claim, the Court need not accept his legal

conclusions as to duty and breach. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Ultimately, the Court cannot determine what actionable legal claim, if any, Walton
alleges in Count Two. "Principles requiring generous construction ofpro se complaints are not.
.. without limits." Beaudett v. CityofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274,1278 (4th Cir. 1985). District

courts arenot required "to conjure up questions never squarely present to them. District judges
are not mind readers." Id.

In lightof the foregoing, the Court finds that Count Two of Walton's Second Amended

Complaint "fails to state a claim on which reliefmay be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Count Two.
C. Count Three - Promotion Procedures

In Count Three, Walton alleges that Defendants violated VDOC "policyon posting of
specialized post." (Second Am. Compl. at 9.) Walton specifically alleges that "Defendant owed
the Plaintiffa duty of being notified and given the chance to apply for specialized post... [and
that] the Defendantbreached its duty when specializedpost were not posted in accordance to

22

[VDOC] policy." {Id. f 21-22) In support of his allegation, Walton has attached what appears to

be a questionnaire that VDOC answered ("Answered Questionnaire") and submitted to the
EEOC as part of its administrative investigation. {See Second Am. Compl. Attach. D, ECFNo.
15-2 at 5; see also Second Am. Compl.

9-10,21-22.)

The Court first notes that Waltonhas not specifically put forward a legal basis for Count

Three. Presumably, Walton is alleging a breach of contract; however, he has not alleged the
existence of anysort of contractual relationship between himselfandVDOC that would give rise
to a private cause of action against VDOC for its failure to follow its internal job assignment

policy. Furthermore, the Courtfinds that the Answered Questionnaire submitted by Walton does

not suggest that VDOC owed anyduty to Walton to listspecialized posts, suchas the 5-2post, in
any particular manner. The Answered Questionnaire is not a contract, and it does not suggest

that VDOC was legally boundto follow anyparticular listing policy. Indeed, the Answered
Questionnaire merelyseemsto discuss in broad termsVDOC's standard policyfor listing

specialized posts. Again, the Court notes that it need not accept Walton's unsubstantiated legal
conclusions as to the existence of a contract and any related duties and/or breaches. See
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Walton may disagree with VDOC's policy or may allege that it was not followed
properly; however, any such disagreement or allegation is not a cognizable legal claim. It is not
the province of courts to over-see the internal procedures of an employer. See DeJarnette v.

Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998)(explaining that it is not the role of the courts to
"sit as a kind of super-personnel department [to weigh] the prudence of employmentdecisions
made by firms charged with employment discrimination"). Thus, the Court cannot police
whether or not the Defendant simply violated internal operating procedures.

23

In the absence of any factual allegations or documentation suggesting that VDOC or

GCC owed some contractual duty to Walton to listthe specialized posts in a certain manner, the
Courtcannot find that Walton has sufficiently allegeda claim that VDOC or GCC owed such a

duty, let alone breached it. The Court again notes thatdistrict courts are not required to "conjure
up questions never squarely present to them." Beaudett, 11S F.2d at 1278.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Count Three of Walton's Second Amended
Complaint "fails to statea claimon which reliefmaybe granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Count Three.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Walton's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended

Complaint(ECF No. 15) will be GRANTED, and Defendant's [sic] Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
11) will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss will be GRANTED to the extent that (1) the individual defendants, Harold W. Clarke
and Eddie L. Pearson, will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action and (2) any

claim for punitive damages will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss is otherwise DENIED.

Furthermore, having found it appropriate to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court will
also DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the individual defendants Benjamin Wright and Joyce
Johnson. The Court will further DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Counts Two and Three of

Walton's Second Amended Complaint.
An appropriate Order shall issue.

Let the Clerk file this Order electronically, notify all counsel accordingly, and mail a
copy to pro se Plaintiff at his address of record.

/s/

1ZA{)

Roderick C. Young
United States Magistrate Judge

Richmond, Virginia
Date: Mav21.2015

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