Chapman v. Bacon et al

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 3/17/2016. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

LOUIS ROY CHAPMAN,

Plaintiff,

V.

Civil Action No. 3:14CV641

G. BACON, et al,^
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Louis Ray Chapman, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informapauperis, filed

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.' The action is proceeding on Chapman's Amended Complaint.
(ECF No. 16.) The matter is before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 21, 22) filed

by the Commonwealth ofVirginia, D.A. Slaw, and R. Woodson,^ the Court's authority to review
complaints by individuals proceeding informapauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and
Chapman's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 37). Forthe reasons that follow, the
Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim withrespect to Defendants
Slawand Woodson (ECF No. 22). Regarding the Commonwealth of Virginia, the Court will

' The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

^D.A. Slaw is an institutional hearing officer at Lawrenceville Correctional Center
("LVCC"). (Am. Compl. 1.) R. Woodson is the Regional Ombudsman for the Virginia
Department of Corrections ("VDOC"). (Id)

GRANT the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (ECF No. 21). The Court
will DENY Chapman's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 37).
I. Standard for Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

When anindividual is proceeding informa pauperis, this Court must dismiss the action if
the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a claim onwhich relief

may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The first standard includes claims based upon "'an

indisputably meritless legal theory,'" or claims where the "'factual contentions are clearly
baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417,427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), affd. No. 93-6534,1994 WL 520975, at * 1 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1994).
The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;

importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, orthe
applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice andProcedure § 1356

(1990)). Inconsidering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed inthe light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 1 F.3d 1130,1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin,
980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies onlyto factual allegations, however, and "a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin byidentifying pleadings that, because they
are no morethan conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a shortand plainstatement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
whatthe ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" BellAtl Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (omission in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions"
or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a

plaintiff must assert facts that rise above speculation and conceivability to those that "show" a
claim that is "plausible onits face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);

Twombly, 550 U.S. at570). "Aclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or

complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the plaintiffmust "allege
facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Lastly, while the Court liberally

construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not
act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the

inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,

243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274,1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
II. Summary of Claims and Pertinent Allegations

Chapman's Amended Complaint spans twenty-five pages and lists nine separate claims
for relief.^ TheCourt recites here only those allegations pertinent to the claims against
^The Court corrects thepunctuation, capitalization, emphasis, and spacing in the
quotations from Chapman's submissions.

Defendants Slaw and Woodson. Chapman makes the following claims against Defendants Slaw
and Woodson:

Claim 7

Byfalsely keeping Chapman inpunitive segregation. Institutional
Hearings Officer Slaw violated Chapman's rights under (a) the

Fourteenth Amendment"^ and (b) the Eighth Amendment.^ (Am.
Compl. 3.)

Claim 8

C. Jones, the LVCC Facility Ombudsman and R. Woodson, the Regional

Ombudsman, violated Chapman's rights under the First Amendment^ and

the Fourteenth Amendment by failing "to process valid complaints," by

failing "to give tracking numbers," and by "respond[ing] to grievance[s]
concerning her (Jones)" in violation of institutional procedures. {Id.)
A.

Background

On December 10, 2013, while housed in LVCC, Chapmanwas struck by his cellmate,

Marcus Gunn. (Am. Compl. ^3.) On "December 18,2013, Gunn put his arm andhand on

Chapman's chest to keep [Chapman] from leaving his cell." {Id. ^ 4.) Chapman did notreport
either of the above incidents to prison officials. {Id. ^ 5.)

OnJanuary 30, 2014, in response to Chapman's request that Gunn turndown his CD

player, Gunn kicked Chapman in the face and then began punching Chapman. {Id. ^2.)

"Chapman did NOT fight Gunn." {Id.) "Chapman was bleeding into his left eye, down his face
onto his shirt and undershirt, from the cut put there by Gunnwith his boot." {Id.) Chapman

^"No State shall... deprive anyperson of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law
" U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Chapman also invokes the Due Process Clause of
the FifthAmendment. (Am. Compl. 17.) However, as no federal officials are involved,
Chapman's claims are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Castillo v. McFaddan, 399
F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[Plaintiffs] citation of the Fifth Amendment was, of course,
incorrect. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons of due
process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without due process
by the several States

").

^"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, amend. VIII.

^"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ofspeech ...," U.S. Const,
amend. I.

contends that, "Marcus Gunn, a known racist, should have never been putin the same cell as
Chapman, an elderly white man." {Id. ^ 54.)
B.

Allegations Pertaining to Defendant Slaw

Following this attack. Chapman received an institutional charge of "Fighting with

Anyone." {Id. H21.) Gunn pled guilty to assaulting Chapman and spent fifteen (15) days in
segregation. {Id. H23.) VDOC officials placed Chapman in segregation on January 30,2014,
and released him from segregation onFebruary 23, 2014. {Id.

99, 103.) Although Chapman's

charge was eventually dismissed. Chapman spent twenty-three (23) days insegregation. {Id.

1124.)'
OnFebruary 7,2014, Chapman's institutional charge of Fighting with Anyone was

dismissed. {Id. K101.) Even though the charge of Fighting with Anyone was dismissed.
Chapman contends that Institutional Hearing Officer Slaw denied him due process because:
"(1) Slaw denied all Chapman's witnesses; (2) Slaw denied the medical records and pictures
taken of Chapman's bloody face, chest, neck, and right thumb; [and] (3) Slaw [refused to

consider Chapman's] eight (8) [institutional] requests to bemoved from Marcus Gunn ...." {Id.
1197.)
C.

Allegations Pertaining to Defendant Woodson

OnFebruary 19, 2014, Chapman filed an informal complaint against Defendant Jones,
the Facility Ombudsman, wherein he complained about herconduct in processing his grievance.

{Id. H114.) According to Chapman, VDOC Operating Procedure 866.1(IV)(G)(3) prohibits
individuals who are the subject of the grievance from responding to the grievance. {Id. ^ 113.)
^Counselor Hill told Chapman thatthe delay in releasing Chapman from segregation
flowed from the fact that"'they were looking for a bottom bunk for [Chapman]."' (Am. Compl.
^ 108.) Chapman contends that "Hill's statement is not true." {Id.) "Chapman did not have
bottom bunk status at that time." {Id.)

Defendant Jones violated this policy and "responded to the grievance concerning her ...{Id.

T| 116.) "R. Woodson, Regional Ombudsman, approved this overt act

[thereby] violating

OP 866.1(IV)(G)(3) and the First and Fourteenth Amendments." {Id. H117.)

On January 31, 2014, Chapman filed an informal complaint alleging that J. Cooper had
falsely charged Chapman with aninstitutional infraction. {Id. HUB.) Defendant Jones

responded, "'This issue needs to be addressed at the hearing.'" {Id. H119.) Thereafter,

Chapman filed a regular grievance asserting that J. Cooper had falsely charged Chapman with an
institutional infraction. {Id. H120.) Defendant Jones refrised to assign a tracking number to this
grievance and noted onthe"INTAKE" portion of the grievance form thatthe matter was not

grieveable because it concerned a disciplinary matter. {Id. H121; Compl. Ex, N, at 2, ECF
No. 1-15.) Chapman appealed that decision to Defendant Woodson, who upheld the intake
decision. (Compl. Ex, N, at 2.)

OnMarch 7,2014, Chapman submitted a grievance wherein he challenged the fact that
he had received an "institutional charge with no investigation." (Am. Compl. H123 (citing Ex.

O).) Defendant Jones refused to assign a tracking number to the grievance and noted onthe

"INTAKE" portion ofthe grievance that the 30-day filing period for pursuing the grievance had
expired. (Compl. Ex. O, at 2.) Chapman appealed the intake decision. {Id.) Defendant
Woodson upheld the intake decision. {Id.) Chapman contends that his "efforts to exhaust his
grievance were frustrated by Jones and Woodson." (Am. Compl. f 128.)
IIL Analysis of the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
A.

Defendant Slaw

Chapman contends thatDefendant Slaw denied him due process and subjected himto

cruel and unusual punishment by allowing Chapman to languish in segregation for 23 days.

1.

Due Process

The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives an individual of a

legitimate liberty orproperty interest. Bd. ofRegents ofState Colls, v. Roth^ 408 U.S. 564, 569
(1972). Thus, the first step inanalyzing a procedural due process claim isto identify whether the

alleged conduct affects a protected interest. Beverati v. Smithy 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997)
(citing cases). Aliberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, orfrom state laws and
policies. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,220-21 (2005).
a.

The Constitution Fails to Confer a Liberty Interest in Avoiding.
Segregation

"The Due Process Clause standing alone confers no liberty interest in freedom from state
action taken 'withinthe sentence imposed.'" Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995)

(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,468 (1983)). "[C]hanges in a prisoner[']s location,
variations of daily routine, changes in conditions of confinement (including administrative

segregation), and the denial ofprivileges [are] matters which every prisoner can anticipate [and
which] are contemplated by his [or her] original sentence to prison

" Gaston v. Taylor, 946

F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991). Thus, the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest
in avoiding segregation. Id.
b.

Analysis of State-Created Liberty Interests

Demonstrating the existence of a state-created liberty interest, requires a "two-part

analysis." Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 249 &n.3 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Tellier v. Fields,
280 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2000)). First, a plaintiff must make a threshold shoving that the

deprivation imposed amounts to an"atypical and significant hardship" or that it "inevitably
affect[s] the duration of his sentence." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484,487 (1995); see Puranda v.
Johnson, No. 3:08CV687, 2009 WL 3175629, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2009) (citing cases). If

the nature of the restraint the plaintiff challenges meets either prong of this threshold, the

plaintiff must next show that Virginia's statutory orregulatory language '"grants its
inmates ... a protected liberty interest inremaining free from that restraint.'" Puranda, 2009
WL 3175629, at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting

v. Armstrong, 209 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir.

2000)).

With respect to the Sandin threshold analysis, the Court must first "determine what the
normative 'baseline' is: what constitutes the 'ordinary incidents of prison life' for this particular

inmateT' Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Prieto, 780 F.3d at 253).
Second, "with thebaseline established, [the Court] determine[s] whether theprison conditions

impose atypical and substantial hardship in relation to that norm." Id. (citing Prieto, 780 F.3d at
254). The United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit has observed that, "[a]lthough
the general prison population is not the relevant atypicality baseline in all cases, it is the
touchstone in cases where the inmate asserting a liberty interest was [initially] sentenced to

confinement inthe general population and later transferred to security detention." Id. at 528-29
(citing Prieto, 780 F.3d at 252)

Sandin itselfforecloses the notion that all forms of punitive or administrative segregation

presumptively constitute an "atypical and significant hardship ... inrelation to the ordinary
incidents ofprison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. InSandin, the Supreme Court rejected
Conner's claim that he enjoyed a liberty interest in avoiding confinement in punitive segregation
for thirty (30) days. Id. at 487. The dissent observed:

In the absence of the punishment, Conner, like other inmates in [the] general
prison population would have left his cell and worked, taken classes, or mingled
with others for eight hours each day. As a result of disciplinary segregation,
however, Conner, for 30 days, had to spend his entire time alone in his cell (with
the exception of 50 minutes each day on average for brief exercise and shower

periods, during which he nonetheless remained isolated from other inmates and
was constrained by leg irons and waist chains).

Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). However, the majority concluded that the
foregoing conditions "did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation inwhich a
State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
Here, Chapman has supplied no facts with respect to what life was like inthe general

prison population. Nor has Chapman supplied any facts regarding the conditions he experienced
in segregation, much less facts that indicate those conditions were significantly more harsh than
the conditions described in Sandin such that a State might conceivably intend to createa liberty

interest in avoiding the conditions. Cf. Beverati, 120 F.3d at 504 (finding that more burdensome
conditions in segregation were not sufficiently atypical). Moreover, courts in theFourth Circuit
have repeatedly rejected the notion that inmates enjoy a protected liberty interest in avoiding
confinement in segregation. See United States v. Daniels^ 222 P. App'x 341, 342n.* (4th Cir.

2007) ("Extended stays on administrative segregation ... do notordinarily implicate a protected
liberty interest." (citing Beverati, 120 F.3d at 502)); butsee Incumaa, 791 F.3d at 530-32
(concluding solitary confinement for twenty years involved onerous, severely restrictive
conditions and constituted an atypical and significant hardship). Because Chapman fails to

allege facts thatsuggest he enjoyed a protected liberty interest in avoiding a twenty-three-day
(23) stay in segregation, his due process claim against Defendant Slaw, Claim 7(a), will be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.^

^Although doubtful, it is possible that Chapman could supply sufficient facts to plausibly
suggest thathe had a protected liberty interest in avoiding confinement in administrative
segregation. See Maitwee v. Palmer, 471 F. App'x 594, 595-96 (9thCir. 2012) (citation
omitted) (observing thatdismissal of claims should be without prejudice if the defect in pleading
may be curable). Therefore, the dismissal of Claim 7(a) is without prejudice to file a proper
amended complaint.

2.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

To state anEighth Amendment claim, aninmate must allege facts that indicate (1) that

objectively the deprivation suffered orharm inflicted "was 'sufficiently serious,' and (2) that
subjectively the prison officials acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state ofmind.'" Johnson v.
Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,298

(1991)). Under the objective prong, the inmate must allege facts that suggest that the deprivation
complained ofwas extreme and amounted to more than the "'routine discomfort'" that is '"part
ofthe penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society

Strickler v.

Waters, 989 F.2d 1375,1380 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9

(1992)). "Inorder to demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, a prisoner must allege 'a serious
or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions
De 'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381).

Chapman supplies no factual allegations that plausibly suggest that the conditions in segregation
deprived him of any basic human need or resulted ina serious orsignificant physical or
emotional injury. See In re Long Term Admin. Segregation ofInmates Designated as Five
Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 471-72 (4thCir. 1999). Accordingly, Claim 7(b) will be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.

B.

Defendant Woodson

In Claim 8, Chapman contends that Defendant Woodson violated Chapman's rights under
the Firstand Fourteenth Amendments by approving Defendant Jones's decision to reject some of

Chapman's grievances at the intake level and allowing Defendant Jones to process grievances

that pertained to Jones's conduct. "[T]here is no constitutional right to participate in grievance
proceedings." Adams v. Rice^ 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing

10

v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728,

729 (8th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, a prison official's failure to comply with grievance procedures
is notactionable under § 1983. See, e.g.. Chandler v. Cordova, No. 1:09CV483 (LMB/TCB),
2009 WL 1491421, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Va. May 26,2009) (citations omitted) ("Because a state's

grievance procedure confers no substantive rights upon prison inmates, a prison official's failure
to comply with the grievance procedures is not actionable under § 1983

"); Banks v. Nagle,

Nos. 3:07CV419-HEH, 3:09CV14, 2009 WL 1209031, at *3 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2009)

(dismissing claim that officials failed to properly process a grievance because no constitutional
right to participate in such proceedings exists). Therefore, the portions ofClaim Eight pertaining
to Defendant Woodson will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IV, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss an action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Indeciding a motion made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), the court must ascertain whether '"plaintiffs allegations, standing alone and
taken as true [plead] jurisdiction and a meritorious cause of action.'" Allianz Ins. Co. ofCanada
V. Cho Yang Shipping Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d787, 789 (E.D. Va. 2000) (alteration in original)
(quotingDickey v. Greene, 729 F.2d 957, 958 (4th Cir. 1984)).

The Eleventh Amendment provides that"[t]he Judicial Power of the United States shall

notbe construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
U.S. Const, amend XI. "Thisbarto federal jurisdiction also extends to suits against a state by its
own citizens." In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924, 927 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134

U.S. 1,10 (1890)). Nevertheless, "[s]tate sovereign immunity is not absolute

11

Congress,

pursuant to authority bestowed upon it by the [C]onstitution, can abrogate sovereign
immunity.... Alternatively, a state may waive its protection under the Eleventh Amendment."
Taylor v. Virginia, 951 F. Supp. 591, 593-94 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citations omitted). With respect
to suits under 42U.S.C. § 1983, Congress hasnot abrogated the Commonwealth of Virginia's

immunity and the Commonwealth ofVirginia has not consented to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Madden v. Virginia, No. 3:11CV241-HEH, 2011 WL 2559913, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 28,
2011) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Chapman's claims against the Commonwealth ofVirginia. The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction (ECF No. 21) will be GRANTED. All claims against the
Commonwealth of Virginia will be DISMISSED FORLACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION.^
V. Chapman's Motion for Preliminarv Iniunctive Relief

Chapman has filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 37). Inthe
Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, Chapman complains
that Defendants Jones, Woodson, and Townes continue to violate his rights by failing to properly

process his grievances. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 1-6, ECF No. 38.) Chapman requests that
the Court enjoin Defendants Jones, Townes, and Woodson from responding to Chapman's
informal complaints and grievances. {Id. at 6.)

"[A] preliminary injunction is 'an extraordinary remedy thatmay only be awarded upon a

clear showing thatthe plaintiff is entitled to such relief.'" Perry v. Judd, 471 F. App'x. 219,223

(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,22 (2008)). Such
^ Of course, the Commonwealth of Virginia's immunity does not preclude this Court's

ability "to 'enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal
law.'" Cobb V. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. ofVa, 69 F. Supp. 2d 815, 824 (W.D. Va. 1999)
(quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979)).
12

remedy is"never awarded as ofright." Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. "[Gjranting a preliminary
injunction requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or

refrain from acting, in a certain way." Hughes Network Sys. v. InterDigital Commc 'ns Corp., 17
F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Therefore, preliminary injunctions are "to be

granted only sparingly." Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 634 F.Supp.2d 586, 590-91 (E.D. Va. 2008)
(quoting In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig, 333 F.3d 517, 524 (4thCir. 2003)).

In order to sustain a claim for a preliminary injunction,'^ the party seeking such relief
must demonstrate each of the following factors: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2)

the likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief; (3) the balance

of equities between the parties tips in favor ofthe party seeking such relief; and, (4) the public
interest. Winter^ 555 U.S. at 20; Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575

F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), reinstated in
relevant part, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010). Chapman, as the party seeking a preliminary

injunction, bears the burden of establishing that each factor supports granting the injunction.
Real Truth, 515 F.3d at 346. Each factor must be demonstrated by a "clear showing." Winter,

555 U.S. at 22. Thefailure to show any one of the relevant factors mandates denial of the
preliminary injunction. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 346.

Chapman fails to demonstrate that any of foregoing factors favors granting preliminary
injunctive relief. As discussed above, seesupra Part III, it is now clear that Chapman will not
succeed on his claims with respect to Defendants Woodson and Slaw. Chapman also makes no
effortto demonstrate that he will likely succeed on the merits of his other claims or demonstrate
how he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.

A decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the
district court. Perry, 471 F. App'x at 223 (citation omitted).
13

Furthermore, neither the balance of the equities nor the public interest favors granting a

preliminary injunction. To the extent that Chapman raises equitable or public interest concerns
because the conduct of Defendants frustrates his ability to utilize the grievance procedure for any

of his pending claims, the remedy does not lie in an injunction. Rather, Chapman canproffer
howDefendants allegedly failed to properly process his grievances in response to an assertion by
Defendants that Chapman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, neither the
balance of the equities nor the public interest favors granting an injunction. Accordingly,
Chapman's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 37) will be DENIED.
VI. Conclusion

The Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 22) and the Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 21) will be GRANTED. Chapman's Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 37) will be DENIED. Claim 7(a) will be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Claim7(b) will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Claim 8
against Defendant Woodson will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/ //ff/

M. Hannah Lauck
, ^

r vr ^

United States District Judge

Date: MAR 1 7 2016
Richmond, Virginia

14