Washington v. Martinez
Filing
63
MEMORANDUM OPINION - The Court GRANTS John Doe's Motion for SummaryJudgment 39 and DISMISSES Defendant John Doe from this action WITHPREJUDICE. SEE OPINION FOR DETAILS Signed by Magistrate Judge Roderick C. Young on 06/11/2015. (tjoh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
KEVIN WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
V.
REBECCA MARTINEZ,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 3:14CV677 (RCY)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant John Doe's Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 39). On May 28, 2015, the Court issued an Order (ECF No. 52) granting
Defendant John Doe's Motion, with an opinion to follow. Thereafter, on June 8,2015, the parties
reached a settlement in which they agreed to dismiss this case with prejudice. However, as the
Court granted summaryjudgment with an opinion to follow, the Court will briefly discuss the
reasons for granting the motion and dismissing John Doe.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuinedispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ, P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry in a
summaryjudgment analysis is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). When considering a case for
summary judgment, the Court cannot weigh the evidence to enter a judgment, but simply must
determine if a genuine issue exists for trial. Greater Bait. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns v.
Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2013) {aaaoMng Anderson, All U.S. at249).
In reviewing a motion for summaryjudgment, the Court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-movingparty. Andreson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nonetheless, to defeat an
othervsdse properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must rely on
more than conclusory allegations, "mere speculation," the "building of one inference upon another,"
the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence," or the appearance of some "metaphysical doubt"
concerning a material fact. Lewis v. City ofVa. Beach Sheriffs Office, 409 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704
(E.D. Va. 2006) (citations omitted). A "material fact" consists of one that might affect the outcome
of a party's case. Anderson, All U.S. at 247-48; JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Wash. Sports Ventures,
Inc., 264 F.3d 459,465 (4th Cir. 2001). Whether a fact should be considered "material" must be
determined by the substantive law, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248; Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001). A "genuine" issue
concerning a "material" fact only arises when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, offers a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in that party's
favor. Anderson, All U.S. at 248.
Analysis
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe operated his motor vehicle negligently, causing the
collision in question. (Am. CompL, ECF No. 32 fl 13-14.) However, Nationwide Property and
Casualty Insurance Company—in the name of John Doe—^argues that the evidence fails to
demonstrate that John Doe exists. (Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company's Mem.
Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mem."), ECF No. 40 at 3-4.)
In Virginia, to survive a motion for summary judgment on a motor vehicle collision claim a
plaintiff must make out a primafacie case that a defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of
the collision. See Weddle v. Draper, 204 Va. 319, 322-24 (1963) (granting summary judgment for
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defendant where plaintiffhad not made out aprima facie case for negligence); see also Burnellv.
Doe, 41 Va. Cir. 625, at *2 ("Plaintiff has the burden of proving that an unknown motorist, John
Doe, was present at some point and that his negligence proximately caused the collisions.").
"Negligencecannot be presumed form the mere happening of an accident." Weddle, 204 Va. at
322. Where facts, "at best... create no more than a possibility of negligence on the part of the
defendant," a plaintiff cannot recover. Id. at 324.
Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make ouXdiprima
facie case against John Doe. Specifically, the Courtfinds that the facts are legally insufficient for a
reasonable jury to find both that John Doe was present at the sceneof the traffic collision and that
his alleged negligence proximately caused the collision in question. The Courtcan identify no facts
that a jury coulduse to supporta finding that John Doe was negligent in operating his vehicle.
Taking the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, at best, the facts support an inference
that John Doe was present and struck Defendant Martinez's vehicle. {See Def's Mem, Ex. D
("BuchananDep."), ECF No. 40-4 at 6.) There are no facts in the record, however, that
demonstrate that negligence on the part of John Doe causedthe contact betweenhis vehicle and
Defendant Martinez's vehicle. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a primafacie case of negligence
against John Doe, and summaryjudgment is appropriate. Cf Doe v. Houser, 213Va. 617, 619
(1973) (findingthat evidence which demonstrated "that an unknown motorist was present who
made contact with plaintiffs vehicle ... was insufficient, as a matter of law, to show that John Doe
was guilty of negligence that proximatelycaused the accident"). "Mere injury is not sufficient;
there must also be evidence of wrongdoing or a[] presumption of innocence will attach to
Defendant." Corbin ex rel Estate ofCorbin v. Smith, 2007 WL 2155746, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 25,
2007) (granting summary judgment for defendant).
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court GRANTS John Doe's Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 39) and DISMISSES Defendant John Doe from this action WITH
PREJUDICE.
Let the Clerk file this Opinion electronically and notify all counsel accordingly.
Isf
Roderick C. Young
United States Magistrate Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Date: June 11. 2015
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