Sitton v. Hussain et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION. See for complete details. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 02/22/2016. Clerk mailed copy to pro se Plaintiff. (nbrow)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
LeROY SITTON, JR.,

[L

FEB 2 2 2016
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHMOND, VA

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:14CV693

SAJJAD HUSAIN, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
LeRoy Sitton, Jr., a former Virginia inmate proceedingpro se and informa pauperis,
filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. 1 The matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss and the Court's authority to review complaints by individuals proceeding in forma

pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 2 For the reasons set forth below, the action will be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 3

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The statute provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law ....
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u.s.c. § 1983.
2

"Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action ... fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted ...." 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).
3

Sitton provides the following list of defendants: Sajjad Husain, a physician at the
Alexandria Detention Center ("ADC"); Zelke Bennet, a physician at ADC; Dorothy Pope; Frank
Milano, and Shelbert Williams, Captains at ADC; Jerome Garris, the Director of Aramark Food
Services at ADC; and, Dana Lawhorne, the Sheriff for the City of Alexandria.

I. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citation omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see

also Martin, 980 F .2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a
court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 u.s. 662, 679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations
omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id at 570,
rather than merely "conceivable." Id "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the
plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.L

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DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft
Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th

Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes prose complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 514
F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing
statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint.
See Brockv. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudet! v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

II. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
The Court directed Sitton to particularize his complaint in order to provide each
Defendant with fair notice of the facts upon which his or her liability rested. Sitton, however,
did not do a particularly good job of providing those facts. Specifically, the sum of Sitton's
allegations is as follows:
After arriving at the Alexandria Detention Center, medical staff diagnosed
me with hypertension. I was placed on high blood pressure medication, which
was not properly administered.... Sajjad Husain and Zelke Bennet violated my
8th Amendment Right[4] to receive high blood pressure medication properly and
be monitor[ed] on a monthly basis.
After being diagnosed with Hypertension, nurses within the facility
advised that I be placed on a low sodium diet to aide in controlling my blood
pressure. The normal diet within the detention center contains processed, high
sodium foods, which exacerbate high blood pressure, as well as causes weight
gain. I requested to have a low sodilim diet. Despite my many requests, I was not
provided a low sodium diet until eighteen (18) months after my initial request. As
a result of this delay, my high blood pressure worsened, and the excessive weight
gain contributed to other health related issues . . . . Sajjad Husain, Zelke Bennet,
Dorthy Pope, Jerome Garris violated my gth Amendment right by not providing
me the proper diet according to my medical conditions.
While in processing, I advised the Medical Staff of knee and back pain. I
later visited the Medical Facility where Xrays were performed, with no findings.
Despite knowledge of how ineffective Xrays may be when diagnosing certain
orthopedic issues, no more extensive testing was provided. Medical staff stated
that I would not be in the center long and I would have to tough it out. My stay in
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"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
3

the Alexandria Detention Center was 21 months. The nurse advised me that I
needed shoes with proper arch support to lessen knee pain and prevent it from
getting worse. I requested tennis shoes with arch support, but was told that I
could not have my own shoes with arch support in them from my property for
security reasons and I would have to order them myself. An outside source
purchased tennis shoes through canteen that should have provided arch support,
but did not. I was later provided shoes from the facility in the wrong size or none
at all and walked around in unbearable pain, as a result of improper support. I
was provided only Tylenol and Ibuprofen for pain, which did not help. . . . Sajjad
Hussain, Zelke Bennet, Frank Milano, Shelbert Williams, and Dana Lawhorne
violated my gth Amendment by not addressing my disabilities, health and dietary
issues.
After being released from the Alexandria Detention Center, I visited
Alexandria Hospital in such unbearable pain in my knees that needed immediately
medical attention. The doctor informed me that I had Bilateral Knee Pain,
Degenerative Joint Disease of the Knee and Obesity. I had to return to Mt.
Vernon hospital and was told my blood pressure was 200/87, close to a heart
attack and/or stroke, due to knee pain.
(Particularized Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 12 (capitalization and punctuation corrected) (paragraph
numbers omitted).) Sitton demands monetary damages and injunctive relief. (Id at 2.)
Sitton asserts that he is entitled to relief upon the following grounds:
Claim One

Defendants Husain and Bennet violated Sitton's rights under the Eighth
Amendment by failing to properly monitor his blood pressure and provide blood
pressure medication.

Claim Two

Defendants Husain, Bennet, Pope, and Garris violated Sitton's rights under the
Eighth Amendment by not providing Sitton with a proper diet for his medical
conditions.

Claim Three

Defendants Hussain, Bennet, Milano, Williams, and Lawhorne violated Sitton's
rights under the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide shoes and medical care
for Sitton's knee and back pain.

III.

ANALYSIS

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a
person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right
conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke

Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). "Government officials may not be held liable for the

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unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior." Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676 (citations omitted). "[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Id
Here, Sitton has failed to plead sufficient facts that plausibly suggest each named defendant was
personally involved in the violation of Sitton's rights. That deficiency alone warrants the
dismissal of his claims. Moreover, as explained more fully below, Sitton has failed to plead
sufficient facts to support an Eighth Amendment violation by any of the defendants.
To allege an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts that indicate (1) that
objectively the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted "was 'sufficiently serious,' and (2) that
subjectively the prison officials acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind."' Johnson v.

Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991)). With respect to the denial of adequate medical care, "a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A medical need is "serious" if it "'has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Jko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The subjective prong requires the plaintiff to allege facts that indicate a particular
defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
"Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet
it." Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1976)).
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both

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be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a substantial
risk of harm is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference between those
general facts and the specific risk of harm confronting the inmate." Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
same). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the deliberate indifference standard requires a
plaintiff to assert facts sufficient to form an inference that "the official in question subjectively
recognized a substantial risk of harm" and "that the official in question subjectively recognized
that his actions were 'inappropriate in light of that risk."' Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372
F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rich, 129 F.3d at 340 n.2).
Here, Sitton simply has failed to allege facts that indicate any of the defendants
"subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm" to Sitton and further recognized that his or
her "actions were 'inappropriate in light of that risk."' Parrish ex rel. Lee, 372 F.3d at 303
(quoting Rich, 129 F .3d at 340 n.2). Indeed, Sitton has failed to allege sufficient facts to suggest
that any of the defendants were aware of any of his medical ailments or his purported medical
dietary needs. Although Sitton alleges that he alerted "medical staff' to his back and knee pain
(Part. Compl 2), allegations of this ilk are insufficient to impute liability to either Dr. Hussain or
Dr. Bennet. See Davis v. Ruby, No. 3:13CV288, 2015 WL 501926, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2015)
(explaining that '" [v]ague references to a group of defendants, without specific allegations tying
the individual defendants to the alleged unconstitutional conduct"' fail to support a claim for
relief against the individual defendants (quoting Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 778 (7th
Cir. 2008))); see also Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint
alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defe11dant and the complaint is silent as to the

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defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed,
even under the liberal construction to be given prose complaints." (citing U.S. ex rel.

Brzozowski v. Randall, 281 F. Supp. 306, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1968))). Accordingly, the Motions to
Dismiss (ECF Nos. 19, 21) will be GRANTED. Sitton's claims will be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) and Motion for
Waiver of Oral Argument (ECF No. 26) filed by Defendants Bennet and Hussain will be
DENIED AS MOOT. Sitton's Motion for an Extension of Time (ECF No. 32) to respond to the
Motion for Summary Judgment will be DENIED AS MOOT. The action will be DISMISSED.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

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