Ball v. United States of America
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 01/20/2015. (ccol, )
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
JAN 2 0 2015
Richmond Division
CLERK. U.S. DiST,vCT COURT
VA
MONICA L. BALL,
Plaintiff,
V.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 3; 14-CV-839-HEH
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction)
This is an action through which Plaintiff Monica L. Ball ("Plaintiff), proceeding
pro se, seeks the return ofcertain personal property or its money equivalent.' On
November 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Warrant in Detinue in the General District Court for
the City of Richmond, Virginia, naming Jeffrey Becker, an individual who serves as the
District Manager for the Richmond District of the United States Postal Service, as the
defendant. (Warrant in Detinue, Notice of Removal Ex. 1, Dec. 17, 2014, ECF No. 1.)
The United States removed the matter to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and
noticed its substitution as the proper party-defendant on December 17, 2014. (Notice of
Removal, ECF No. 1; Notice of Substitution, ECF No. 2.) By separate Order, entered
this date, this Court substituted the United States of America as the proper party-
defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), and dismissed Jeffrey Becker, as he was
' Plaintiff specifies the articles of personal property of which she seeks the return on the
Warrant in Detinue filed in the state court. (Warrant in Detinue, Notice of Removal Ex.
1, Dec. 17, 2014, ECF No. 1.) She values such property at $1,625.00, and also seeks
$58.00 in costs. {Id.)
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acting within the scope of his federal employment with respect to the conduct which
forms the basis of Plaintiffs Warrant in Detinue.
This case is presently before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by the United States of America on
December 18,2014 (ECF No. 3). The United States served an appropriate Roseboro
Notice with its Motion to Dismiss (Roseboro Notice to PI., Dec. 18, 2014, ECF No. 5), as
required by Local Civil Rule 7(k) and Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.
1975). As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion, Plaintiff has failed to file a
response, has not requested additional time in which to do so, and has not otherwise
indicated any interest in opposing the Motion to Dismiss. This Court, nevertheless, is
obligated to ensure that dismissal is proper even when a motion to dismiss is unopposed.
See Stevenson v. City ofSeat Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014).
A motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenges the court's
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaint. Where such a motion challenges
the existence of the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction—as the United States does here—
the Court may look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint—or in this
case, the Warrant in Detinue—and view whatever evidence has been submitted to
determine whether, in fact, subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See Virginia v. United
States, 926 F. Supp. 537, 540 (E.D. Va. 1995); see also Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d
187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th
Cir. 2009). The plaintiff bears the burden to establish and preservejurisdiction in a
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") case. Kerns, 585 F.3d at 194; see also Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. UnitedStates, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
"If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The United States argues that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and
dismissal of Plaintiffs suit is appropriate because (1) the state court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction so this Court acquired none following removal, and (2) Plaintiff failed to
comply with the administrative prerequisites required prior to filing suit under the FTCA.
Actions sounding in tort against the United States, such as Plaintiffs Warrant in
Detinue, must be brought pursuant to the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); 28 U.S.C. §§
2671, etseq.;see also Hicks v. UnitedStates, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78293 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 3, 2010) (construing Warrant in Detinue against FBI agent as action sounding in tort
for which exclusive remedy is suit against United States under FTCA). As applicable
here, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides that "the district courts ... shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,...
[or] for injury or loss of property." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Thus, federal district courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA claims; and therefore, such claims cannot
originate in the state courts. Moreover, "[t]hejurisdiction of the federal court on removal
is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject-matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although it might in a like
suit originally brought there have had jurisdiction." Bullock v. Napolitano, 666 F.3d 281,
286 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & OhioR.R., 258 U.S.
377,382(1922)).
appropriate, as this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim because
it appears Plaintiff has not submitted an administrative claim to the United States Postal
Service prior to filing suit—ajurisdictional prerequisite to an FTCA suit.
In sum, the Court finds that it never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs claim following removal from state court under the doctrine of derivative
jurisdiction, and even if Plaintiffhad originally filed suit in this Court, subject-matter
would still be lacking as it appears Plaintiff has failed to submit an administrative claim
with the United States Postal Service, as required prior to filing suit. Accordingly, the
Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant United States of America will be granted.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
M
/s/
Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge
Date:
Richmond, Virgmia
Plaintiff originally filed this matter in state court, and the United States
subsequently removed her case to this Court. Because Plaintiffs claim falls within the
purview of the FTCA, the state court—the General District Court for the City of
Richmond, Virginia—lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim.
Consequently, when the case was removed, under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction,
this Court acquired no jurisdiction. Lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, dismissal is
appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1).
Even if Plaintiffs claim had originated in this Court, dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1), nevertheless, would remain appropriate, as Plaintiff failed to comply with the
administrative prerequisites to filing suit under the FTCA. Because the FTCA is a
limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States, plaintiffs like Monica L.
Ball must file their claims in careful compliance with the terms of the FTCA. Kokotis v.
United States Postal Serv., 223 F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 2000). A prerequisite to filing
suit under the FTCA involves the presentation of an administrative claim to the
appropriate federal agency within two (2) years of the incident. M; see also 28 U.S.C. §
2401(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). "Moreover, 'the requirement of filing an administrative
claim is jurisdictional and may not be waived.'" Kokotis, 223 F.3d at 278 (quoting
Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiff has not alleged that she filed an administrative claim with the appropriate
federal agency, which, in this case, is United States Postal Service. Furthermore, the
United States submitted an affidavit as evidence that Plaintiff failed to file the required
administrative claim. Accordingly, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) would also be
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