Woodson v. United States of America
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 2/2/15. Copy sent: Yes (tdai, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
FRIZZELL C. WOODSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:15CV004-HEH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an action through which PlaintiffFrizzell C. Woodson ("Plaintiff),
proceeding prose, asserts claims of defamation, libel, and slander, which allegedly
resulted in the termination of his employment with the United States Postal Service
(hereinafter, the "USPS"). On December 1, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Warrant in Debt in the
General District Court for the City of Richmond, Virginia, naming William A. Smith as
the defendant, and seeking $25,000.00 in monetary damages, plus costs and interest.
(Warrant in Debt, Notice of Removal Ex. 1, Jan. 2,2015, ECF No. 1-1.) The United
States removed the matter to this Court (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1), and noticed its
substitution as the proper party-defendant on January 2,2015 (Notice of Substitution,
ECF No. 2). Thereafter, this Court substituted the United States of America as the proper
party-defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), and dismissed William A. Smith, as
he was acting within the scope of his federal employment with respect to the conduct
forming the basis of Plaintiffs claims. (Order, Jan. 6,2015, ECF No. 3.)
This case is presently before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by the United States of America on
January 8, 2015 (ECF No. 4). The United States served an appropriate Roseboro Notice
with its Motion to Dismiss (Roseboro Notice to PI., Jan. 8, 2015, ECF No. 6), as required
by Local Civil Rule 7(K) and Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).
Plaintifffiled a response to the motion on January 27, 2015 (ECF No. 7), to which the
United States replied on January 30, 2015 (ECF No. 8). The pending motion is ripe for
disposition, and the Court will dispense with oral argument, pursuant to E.D. Va. Loc.
Civ. R. 7(J), finding it unnecessary to aid in the decisional process, as the matters before
the Court have been adequately briefed.
A motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenges the court's
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case. Where such a motion challenges the
existence of the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction—as the United States does here—the
Court may look beyond thejurisdictional allegations of the complaint—or in this case,
the Warrant in Debt—and view whatever evidence has been submitted to determine
whether, in fact, subject-matterjurisdiction exists. See Virginia v. United States, 926 F.
Supp. 537, 540 (E.D. Va. 1995); see also Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th
Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009).
The plaintiff bears the burden to establish and preserve jurisdiction. Kerns, 585 F.3d at
194; see also Richmond, Fredericksburg & PotomacR.R. Co. v. UnitedStates, 945 F.2d
765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The United States argues that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and
dismissal of Plaintiffs suit is appropriate because (1) the state court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction so this Court acquired none following removal, and (2) Plaintiffs claim is
barred because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity as to claims of
defamation, libel, and slander.
Plaintiffs Warrant in Debt seeks monetary damages for the alleged torts of
defamation, slander, and libel,1 resulting in his termination as an employee ofUSPS,
effective April 25, 2013. (Attach, for Warrant in Debt, Notice of Removal Ex. 1, ECF
No. 1-1.) Actions sounding in tort against the United States, including those arising from
activities of the USPS, must be brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the
"FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, et seq. 39 U.S.C. § 409(c); Dolan v. United States Postal
Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006). The FTCA gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction
over tort claims against the United States for the wrongful acts or omissions of federal
employees acting within the scope of their employment. Levin v. United States,
U.S.
_, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) ("[T]he district courts .
.. shall have exclusivejurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages,... [or] for injury or loss of property."). Such claims, therefore, cannot
originate in the state courts. Moreover, "[t]hejurisdiction of the federal court on removal
is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the
1This Court, asrequired, construes pleadings filed bypro se litigants liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89,94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007). Although Plaintiffcites to the criminal statutes for slander and
libel in the Codeof Virginia, the Court construes theseclaims as causes of action in tort. Plaintiff, as a private party,
is not entitled to bring criminal charges. For the samereason, the Courtdisregards Plaintiffs claim for making false
statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
subject-matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although it might in a like
suit originally brought there have had jurisdiction." Bullock v. Napolitano, 666 F.3d 281,
286 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S.
377,382(1922)).
Plaintiff originally filed this matter in state court, and the United States
subsequently removed his case to this Court. Because Plaintiffs claim falls within the
purview of the FTCA, the state court—the General District Court for the City of
Richmond, Virginia—lacked subject-matterjurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim.
Consequently, when the case was removed, under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction,
this Court acquired no jurisdiction. Lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, dismissal is
appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1).
Even if Plaintiffs claim had originated in this Court, dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1), nevertheless, would remain appropriate, as Plaintiffs claim is barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the
United States for many torts; however, this waiver is limited and is subject to exceptions
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n). See Levin, 133 S. Ct. at 1228. The exception
relevant in this case is § 2680(h), which preserves the United States' immunity from suit
as to certain intentional torts, including "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(emphasis added). The exception of libel and slander from this waiver by implication
includes defamation. See Shirvinski v. U.S. Coast Guard, 673 F.3d 308, 316 (4th Cir.
2012); see also Talbert v. United States, 932 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1991).
The attachment to Plaintiffs Warrant in Debt indicates that his claim is for
defamation, libel, and slander, based on "[fjhe exact defamatory statement[s], 'Mr.
Woodson became upset and said I'll lay in the bushes and kill your ass.... Then Mr.
Woodson said I'll kill all of yall to get to Palmer[,]'" which Plaintiff alleges was made by
his former USPS coworker. Accordingly, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) would also be
appropriate, as this Courtlacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the United States has
not waived sovereign immunity for claims of defamation, libel, and slander.
Additionally, the Court has carefully considered Plaintiffs arguments in, and the exhibits
attached to, Plaintiffs response to the Motion to Dismiss, and is not persuaded that
subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim exists.
In sum, the Court finds that it never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs claim following removal from state court under the doctrine of derivative
jurisdiction. Even if Plaintiff had originally filed suit in this Court, subject-matter
jurisdiction would still be lacking as the FTCA constitutes a limited waiverof sovereign
immunity, which excludes the torts of libel, slander, and defamation. The United States,
therefore, could not be held liable for Plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Defendant United States of America will be granted.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
4&
/s/
Henry E. Hudson
Date: \r*\ 2-20l-f
Richmond, Virginia
United States District Judge
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