Bile v. RREMC, LLC Denny's Restaurant et al
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 6/24/2015. (sbea, )
fl
L
JUN 2 4 2015
IN THE UNITED
FOR THE
STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Richmond Division
AMANGOUA J.
RICHMOND, VA
BILE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
V.
No.
3:15CV51
RREMC, LLC,
AND DENNY'S CORPORATION,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This
matter
is
CORPORATION'S FED.
No.
8) .
For
before
R.
the
CIV.
the
P.
reasons
Court
12(b)(1)
stated
on
DEFENDANT
DENNY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
below,
the
motion
(Docket
will
be
granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
On
January
"Plaintiff")
27,
filed a
2015,
Amangoua
civil action against
and Denny's Corporation
("Denny's")
alleging
violations
Title
1964,
U.S.C.
Rights
42
Act
of
§
of
2000e,
1866,
J.
42
et
VII
seq.
U.S.C.
Compl. fSI 1, 4-6 (Doclcet No. 1).
§
Bile
RREMC,
("Bile"
LLC
(collectively,
of
the
Civil
("Title
1981
VII")
or
("RREMC")
"Defendants")
Rights
and
("Section
Act
of
the
Civil
1981").
See
RREMC is a Florida corporation
with restaurants located in the Commonwealth of Virginia doing
business under the trade name "Denny's."
South
Carolina
corporation
that
owns
the
Id. f 5.
franchise
Denny's is a
license
for
"Denny's" operations in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Id.
SI 6.
Bile alleges that the Defendants
failed
to promote him because
of his
id.
45,
race
and national
origin,
56,
and retaliated
against him because of his complaints of discrimination,
49,
50,
60,
id.
61.
DISCUSSION
Denny's moves to dismiss Bile's claims pursuant to Fed.
Civ.
P.
12(b)(1)
"Where,
as here,
the complaint,
matter
for
on its
complaint are true,
Carter
Arlington
(E.D.
Va.
Supp.
1091,
Unlike
2000)
a
evidence
1094
motion
outside
concerning
for
face,
50 F.3d 299,
jurisdiction.
thus providing the plaintiff with the
same
Pub.
a
Sch.
(quoting Lane v.
(E.D.
under
of
Va.
Rule
(4th Cir.
F.
2d
brackets
"courts may
resolve
converting
factual
the
(citing Williams
1995)).
determination.'"
561,
Jacobson & Co.,
however,
to
facts
Supp.
(internal
complaint
Id.
82
David P.
1995))
all
12(b)(6)
Sys.,
12(b)(6),
the
'assume
basis for subject
the
judgment."
304
matter
in
as
must
jurisdiction without
summary
subject
fails to state a
courts
protections
v.
of
a defendant seeks dismissal on the ground that
jurisdiction,
procedural
lack
R.
v.
motion
564
880 F.
omitted).
consider
disputes
into
one
United States,
I.
Plaintiff s
Denny's
T i t l e VII
argues
Claims
that
this
Court
lacks
subject
matter
jurisdiction with respect to Bile's Title VII claims against it
because
Bile
"failed
to
exhaust
his
administrative
remedies
against Denny's Corp. by naming and including this entity during
the
administrative
phase
Opportunity Commission
Law
in Supp.
(Doclcet
No.
of
Fed.
9).
Nat'l
Fairfax
failure
by
concerning
a
Group,
82 F.
Ltd.,
Supp.
Under
155
Def.
Employment
Denny's Corp.'s Mem.
12(b)(1)
and
[Equal
Mot.
Denny's
to
Dismiss,
recognize
available to him.
F.3d
681
VII
435
F.3d
plaintiff
Title
subject matter
the
to
claim
(4th
593
(4th
591,
exhaust
551 F.3d 297,
Cir.
the
2012).
301
(4th Cir.
civil
action
Jones
2009);
a
v.
"[A]
remedies
federal
claim."
2
First
Sydnor
administrative
deprives
jurisdiction over the
1998);
of
exhaust
Tinsley v.
Cir.
at
that
claim of discrimination must first
Va.,
the
P.
Bile
remedies
Bank,
County,
Civ.
Both
the administrative
Union
{"EEOC")]."
R.
plaintiff pursuing a
before
courts
v.
of
Calvert
see also Carter,
2d at 564.
Title
VII,
a
can
only
be
prosecuted
"against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the person
claiming to be aggrieved."
Causey
v.
Balog,
162
389 U.S.
877
U.S.C.
§
795,
F.3d
South Carolina State Empl.
denied,
42
800
(4th
Serv.,
(1967).
377
2000e-5 (f) (1) ;
Cir.
F.2d 239
1998);
see also
Mickel
(4th Cir.),
v.
cert.
"A party not named in the initial charge with
the EEOC, ordinarily, may not be subsequently
sued
for
alleged
discrimination.
This
requirement serves two purposes: (i) notifying
the charged party of the asserted violation
and (ii) bringing the charged party before the
EEOC
to
facilitate
the
goal
of
securing
voluntary compliance with the law."
Carter,
82 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
Here,
Bile
filed
a
singular
Charge
preceding the institution of this action,
his
no
only employer;
reference
to
lists
Denny's
RREMCs
or
its
of
Discrimination
and it names RREMC as
principal
principal
office
office;
address
and
with
complains
of actions taken by RREMC employees without alleging explicitly
or implicitly that
some shape,
form,
Law in Supp.
(Docket No.
Rights,
that
it
RREMCs
[sic]
No.
Denny's was directing the RREMC employees in
or fashion.
of Fed.
9-3).
R.
Civ.
copied only
corporate
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
Similarly,
dated October 31,
was
See Def.
12(b) (1)
Mot.
to Dismiss,
to
Ex.
of
3
the EEOCs Dismissal and Notice of
2014 and issued to Plaintiff,
RREMC s
address.
P.
Denny's Corp.'s Mem.
PI.
12(b)(1)
Human
Resources
Amangoua
Mot.
Bile's
to Dismiss,
Director at
0pp.
Ex.
reflects
to
10
Defs.
(Docket.
16-2).
Bile
"named
disputes
and
this,
identified
Discrimination."
PI.
Def.
to
Denny's
Mot.
claiming
in
Amangoua
Dismiss,
that
Denny's
was,
in
fact,
Plaintiffs
[sic]
Charge
of
Bile's
of
in
to
at
3
Mem.
(Docket.
No.
Law
16-1).
0pp.
That,
however,
use
of
is
the
simply wrong.
"Denny's"
the Charge of
It
label
is
next
to
Discrimination was
Denny's franchisee.
clear
from
the
RREMC that
solely to
parenthetical
the
"naming"
in
identify RREMC as
a
The separate corporate entity of "Denny's,
Corp." is nowhere to be found in the Charge of Discrimination.
Denny's,
to
Plaintiff s
("[A]n
No.
against
a
19);
be
party
also
been
to
was
Carter,
recognized
to
invoke
rule
not
F.
for
cases
the
prohibiting
named
in
Reply,
Supp.
that
2d
at
at
where
the
15
567-68
there
is
identity between the defendant and the party named
satisfy this
that
of
the
interests
party's
interests
named
that,
exception,
party
for
voluntary conciliation and compliance,
be
the
so
"courts
require
similar
to
purpose
it
of
the
obtaining
would be unnecessary
to name the party in the EEOC proceedings."
2d at
reply
Corp.'s
82
To
unnamed
its
the
Denny's
in the charge.").
the
in
attempting
that
Def.
see
has
observes
exception
charge.
exception
substantial
might
identity"
administrative
(Docket
credit,
counsel
"substantial
prosecution
its
Carter,
82 F. Supp.
568.
The substantial identity exception does not apply here for
the
allege
that
there is a substantial identity between RREMC and Denny's.
Nor
does
threshold
the
reason
record or
that
this
the
motion
Complaint
show
that
does
the
not
interests
of
RREMC
and Denny's are "so similar" that "it would be unnecessary"
to
include
matter
Denny's
of
in
law,
the
the
EEOC
proceedings.
relationship
and
between
example,
the relationship that exists "between a
Because
exhausted
subject
Bile's
with
matter
not
similar
a
legal
to,
for
corporation and
Id.
administrative
respect
is
as
separate
of
individual directors."
franchisee
Indeed,
the
entities
its
franchisor
Id.
to
remedies
Denny's,
jurisdiction
this
over
have
Court
Bile's
not
does
Title
been
not
VII
have
claims.
Denny's motion to dismiss will therefore be granted with respect
to Bile's Title VII claims,
II.
Plaintiff s
Counts I
Section 1981 Claims
Denny's
also
argues
that
jurisdiction
over
Bile's
Section
failed
to
and II.
show
that
a
the
"joint
Court
1981
Def.
Supp.
12(b)(1)
Fed.
(Docket
No.
Denny's
are
(Docket No.
R.
Civ.
9) .
P.
Although
distinct
1),
the
corporate
claims
employer"
between RREMC and Denny's.
of
lacks
subject
because
Bile
relationship
Denny's Corp.'s Mem.
Mot.
to
parties
see
has
exists
of Law in
Dismiss,
at
1-2
that
RREMC
and
Compl.
5
& 6
agree
entities,
matter
that does not mean that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.
Denny's cites several cases in which the court examined the
factual
record
whether
a
V.
and
"joint
Gibraltar
determined
employer"
Indus.,
statutory
relationship
Inc.,
307
F.2d
liability
existed.
428
(4th
based
See
upon
N.L.R.B.
Cir.
1962)
(granting
enforcement
substantial
evidence
conclusion"
viewing
petition based on
in
the
employing enterprise");
435
F.2d
1270
based
on
[the
(4th
finding
defendant]
substantial
McDonald^ s
grant
not
of
"employer"
356
F.3d
942
judgment
936
judgment
(9th
Cir.
to
of
the
Title
v.
Hertz
Cir.
of
the
2014)
(granting
summary
defendants
"were
not
employers
Corp.,
(granting
summary
judgment
"failed
to
integrated
1070
(E.D.
present
any
companies");
Tenn.
887
F.
1995)
Evans
franchisor
v.
was
Air
France,
of
grant
leave
v.
(affirming
summary
circumstances
15
F.
Supp.
judgment
or
and
the
with
us
1435
Title
VII
evidence
v.
that
and
the
1240
finding
that
record");
where
Okla.
the
909
of
Scales
1995)
plaintiff
defendants]
Inc.,
summary
1225,
employers
(E.D.
[the
Shoney's,
(granting
3d
joint
Supp.
under
Raines
on
1991)
Plaintiffs" based "[u]pon consideration of the
Inc.,
"determined
should not be considered a joint
Fla.
Indus.,
not
Moreau
still
(M.D.
Sonic
petition
or
that
(affirming
Jerome
V.
single
"whether
was
VII);
employer");
the
of
finding
situation
[the defendant]
a
defendant]");
(10th
on
totality
as
is
Board's
enforcement
issue"
[the
1087
2004)
the
entities
employer"
based
under
"the
reality'
conclusion that
F.2d
"there
Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp.,
"factual
joint
that
support
(granting
adversely
liable
where
^economic
the
to
legal
v.
1970)
a
evidence
summary
"separate
Cir.
is
record
N.L.R.B.
that
Corp.,
the
finding
F.
judgment
are
Supp.
where
plaintiffs
"failed
to
show an
agency
relationship
existed with
the requisite control needed to impose liability");
Comcast
Corp.,
summary
740
judgment
F.
Supp.
based
2d
upon
683
(D.
detailed
Md.
Jacobson v.
2010)
factual
(granting
analysis
and
conclusion that defendant "is not Plaintiff's joint employer").
All
cannot
of
those
be
extended
relationship.
were
decided
course,
cases
in
They
based
the
also
upon
is because the
laden one.
reflect
principle
absence
have
a
the
of
something
developed
a
that
joint
else
factual
in
liability
employment
common:
record.
That,
joint-employer-status inquiry is a
Civ.
has
P.
of
fact-
Denny's has submitted and cited various declarations
in support of its argument that it cannot be considered a
employer.
they
Def.
Denny's Corp.'s Mem.
12(b)(1)
contested
Mot.
the
to
Dismiss,
of Law in Supp.
at
characterization
4-9
of
(Docket
some
of
No.
those
joint
of Fed.
9).
R.
Bile
facts
and
has pointed to his own pleadings and exhibits in support of the
argument that Denny's can be considered a
Amangoua
Bile's
Dismiss,
at
additional
5-8
Mem.
of
Law
(Docket.
discovery
to
in
0pp.
No.
to
16-1).
reinforce
his
the court
observed:
in Tietqen v.
"Defendants'
succeed on a
Def.
Denny's
Moreover,
contention
should be held liable as a joint employer.
As
joint employer.
Mot.
Bile
that
to
seeks
Denny's
Id. at 9.
Brown's Westminster Motors,
argument
here
is
too
motion to dismiss."
921
F.
Supp.
8
PI.
fact
Inc.
dependent
1495,
1504
to
(E.D.
Va.
1996).
find
Bile has alleged sufficient
subject matter
jurisdiction as
to
facts
the
Whether or not Denny's will be liable as a
factual record has been developed is a
for this Court to
Section 1981
claim.
joint employer once a
different question for a
different stage of this litigation.
Based on the current record,
i t appears quite possible that
Bile's joint employer theory could fail on a motion for summary
judgment
based
upon
a
substantially
undisputed
set
of
But, dismissal at the present stage would be premature.
motion
to
dismiss
will
therefore
Bile's Section 1981 claims,
be
denied
with
facts.
Denny's
respect
to
Counts III and IV.
CONCLUSION
For the
FED.
R.
CIV.
foregoing
P.
reasons,
12(b)(1)
MOTION
granted with
respect
to
and
denied
with
II)
claims
It
and
DEFENDANT DENNY'S CORPORATION'S
TO
DISMISS
Plaintiff's Title VII
respect
to
(Docket
claims
Plaintiff's
No.
8)
(Counts
Section
(Counts III and IV).
is
so ORDERED.
/s/
Robert E.
Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Date:
June i-'X 2015
is
I
1981
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