Cataulin v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roderick C. Young on 12/28/2015. (sbea, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
VONYA CATAULIN,
Petitioner,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:15CV52
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Vonya Cataulin, a former Virginia state prisoner proceedingpro se, brings this petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereinafter, "§ 2254 Petition," ECF No. 1) challenging her
conviction in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia (hereinafter, "Circuit Court").
Respondent moves to dismiss on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations governing
federal habeaspetitions bars the § 2254 Petition. Cataulin has responded. The matter is ripe for
disposition.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cataulin pled guilty to one count of maliciouswounding and, on October 28,2011, the
Circuit Court sentenced her to an active sentence of one year in prison. (ECF No. 10-1, at 1-3.)
On December 15, 2011, the Circuit Court entered final judgment. {Id. at 3.)^ Cataulin noted an
appeal that she later withdrew on January 12,2012. {See § 2254 Pet. ^ 9; ECF No. 10-2, at 1.)
Thereafter, Cataulin filed several unsuccessfiil motions for reconsideration. {See id. II1 l(b)-(c).)
*The Circuit Court entered final judgment by Sentencing Order onOctober 28, 2011. However,
on December 15, 2011, the Circuit Court entered an Amended Sentencing Order. (ECF No. 10-
1, at 1-3.) The parties fail to explain how the Amended Sentencing Order affects the finality of
the conviction. Accordingly, in an abundance of caution, the Court uses the December 15, 2011
Amended Sentencing Order as the date that final judgment was entered.
On January 13,2014, Cataulin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit
Court? (ECF No. 10-2, at 1.) On May 1, 2014, the Circuit Court denied the petition finding it
untimely and barred by the section 8.01-654(A)(2) of the Virginia Code. (ECF No. 10-3, at 1-2.)
On December 8, 2014, the Supreme Court of Virginia found no reversible error in the Circuit
Court's judgment and refused the petition for appeal. (ECF No. 10-5, at 1.)
On January 23, 2015, Cataulin filed the instant §2254 Petition.^ In her §2254 Petition,
Cataulin asserts the following claims for relief:
Claim One
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Claim Two
"Conflict of interest^ias of counsel.""* (§ 2254 Pet. 7.)
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Statute of Limitations
Respondent contends that the federal statute of limitations bars Cataulin's claims.
Section 101 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") amended 28
U.S.C. § 2244 to establish a one-year period of limitation for the filing of a petition fora writof
habeas corpus by a personin custody pursuant to thejudgment of a state court. Specifically, 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d) now reads:
1.
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A)
the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
^Cataulin named this filing a "Motion for post conviction relief," (ECF No. 10-2, at 1), but she
later refers to the filing as a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" (§ 2254 Pet. H11).
^This is the date Cataulin states she placed her § 2254 Petition in the prison mailing system (see
§ 2254 Pet. 15), and the Court deems this the filed date. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276
(1988).
^The Court corrects the capitalization in the quotations from Cataulin's submissions.
2
(B)
2.
the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C)
the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D)
the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
B.
Commencement and Running of the Statute of Limitations
Cataulin'sjudgment became final on Tuesday, January 17,2012, whenthe time to file an
appeal expired. See Hill v. Brcaton, 277 F.3d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he one-year
limitation period begins running when direct review of the state conviction is completed or when
the time for seeking directreview has expired
" (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A))); Va.
Sup. Ct. R. 5A:6(a) (providing no appeal allowed unless notice of appeal filed within thirty days
of final judgment). The limitation period began to run on January 18,2012, and continued to run
for more than two years, with the exception of one day of tolling, until Cataulin filed her state
petition for a writ of habeascorpus on January 23, 2014. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
C.
Statutory Tolling
Cataulin indicates that in December2011, she filed a pro se "motion for reconsideration,"
wherein she informed the Court that her "attorney gave false and misleading statements about
[her] mental illness diagnosis that influenced the outcome of [her] case." (§ 2254 Pet. K11(b).)
Cataulin indicates that the Circuit Court denied the motion in January 2012. (Jd.) Cataulin also
states that her attorney filed a "motion to reconsider," asking for Cataulin's placement in
"'therapeutic housing'" after her release that was denied. (§ 2254 Pet. ^ 11(c)). Cataulin
provides no dates for this purported filing. Respondent fails to address any impact these motions
may have had on the limitation period.
While these motions for reconsideration, filed in her criminal case, doubtfully constitute
collateral applications for relief necessary to toll the limitation period, see Frazier v. Johnson,
No. 3:09CV119, 2010 WL 2553729, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (explaining that "pleas for
leniency" that "do not draw into question the legalityof the underlying conviction and sentence"
fail to qualify as "collateral application for relief (citing Walkowiak v. Haynes, 272 F.3d 234,
236-38 (4th Cir. 2001))), the Court need not reachthat issue here. Even with the benefit of
tolling during the pendency of the motions for reconsideration, Cataulin's § 2254 Petition
remains untimely.
The Circuit Court docket indicates that Cataulin filed motions for reconsideration on
December 2, 2011, and on December 15,2011, and that the Circuit Court denied the motions on
December 15, 2011.^ This is the same day the Circuit Court entered final judgment, so this
motion fails to entitle Cataulin to any statutory tolling. Cataulin apparently filed another motion
for reconsideration on March 26, 2012 that was denied the same day.^ The Court assumes
without deciding that the motion for reconsideration tolled the limitation period for one day on
^See http://www.courts.state.va.us (select "Case Status and Information;" select "Circuit Court"
from drop-down menu; then follow hyperlink for "Case Information;" then select "Norfolk
Circuit Court" from drop-down menu, and then follow "Begin" button; select "Criminal," type,
Cataulin, Vonya," then follow "Search by Name" button; then follow hyperlinks for
"CRl 1000990-00;" then follow "Pleadings/Orders" button (last visited Dec. 28,2015).
^See http://www.courts.state.va.us (select "Case Status and Information;" select "Circuit Court"
from drop-down menu; then follow hyperlink for "Case Information;" then select "Norfolk
Circuit Court" from drop-down menu, and then follow "Begin" button; select "Criminal," type,
Cataulin, Vonya," then follow "Search by Name" button; then follow hyperlinks for
"CRl 1000990-00;" then follow "Pleadings/Orders" button (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
March 26, 2012. Thus, Cataulin had one year, or until Monday, January 21,2013 to file her §
2254 Petition.^ Because Cataulin failed to file her § 2254 Petition until January 27, 2015, the
statute of limitations bars the § 2254 Petition unless she demonstrates entitlement to a belated
commencementof the limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(B)-(D) or equitable
tolling. Neither Cataulin nor the record suggests any plausible basis for belated commencement
of the limitation period or equitable tolling.
D.
Cataulin's Arguments for Timeliness
Cataulin suggests her § 2254 Petition is timely because Martinezv. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309
(2012) allows her to bring an untimely § 2254 Petition. The Supreme Court in Martinez
explained that ineffective assistance of counsel "at initial-review collateral proceedings may
establish cause for a prisoner's procedural defaultof a claim of ineffective assistance at trial."
M at 1315. Cataulin fails to suggest howMartinez entitles her to a belated commencement of
the limitation period under § 2244(d) or entitles her to equitable tolling under the pertinent
analysis. At most shestates that her"petition should move forward since [she is] an indigent,
pro se petitioner with no access to counsel." (§ 2254 Pet. f 18 (emphasis added).) Moreover,
even if Cataulin had sufficiently argued for a belated commencement or equitable tolling,
Martinezhas no applicability to cases barred by § 2244(d). See Couch v. Woodson,
No. 3:13CV146, 2013 WL 5933543, at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2013) (citing Saunders v. Lamas,
No. 12-1123, 2013 WL 943351, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2013); Wielandv. Thompson, No. 3:10CV-00059-MA, 2012 WL 5036820, at *7 (D. Or. Oct. 17, 2012) (explaining that Martinez
provides no relief for an untimely petition under AEDPA)).
^The Court notes thatwhen Cataulin filed herstate habeas petition on January 13, 2014, the
federal limitation period had already expired one year before. Thus, she lacks any entitlement to
statutory tolling for that state habeas petition. Devilie v. Johnson, No. 1:09cv72 (CMH/TRJ),
2010 WL 148148, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2010) (citing Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259
(11th Cir. 2000)).
In her Response, Cataulin also vaguely suggests that she is entitled to equitable tolling.
Petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are subject to equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). The Supreme Court has "made clear that a 'petitioner' is 'entitled
to equitable tolling' only if he shows '(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." Id. at
2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGugliemo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). An inmate asserting equitable
tolling "'bears a strong burden to show specific facts'" that demonstrate he fulfills both elements
of the test. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brown v. Barrow,
512 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Cataulin claimsthat she is entitled to equitable tolling, in sum, because she "has made a
good faith effort to file her petition afterfinally beingableto research and represent her casepro
se; and to make each subsequent deadline that she could after recovering from serious mental
illness." (Resp.l, ECF No. 14 (emphasis added).) Such a vague argument fails to provide an
adequate basis for equitable tolling. See United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted) (observing that pro se status and ignorance of the law fail to warrant equitable
tolling). Cataulin's "bare assertion that [she] suffer[ed] from some mental impairment, 'without
more, is insufficient tojustify equitable tolling.'" Robinson v. Hinkle, 610 F. Supp. 2d 533, 539
(E.D. Va. 2009) (quoting Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005).
Additionally, Cataulin fails to show specific facts thatshe diligently pursued herrights and
extraordinary circumstances prevented her from timely filing her federal habeas petition. See
Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19.
Because Cataulin fails to demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling or a belated
commencement, the statute of limitations bars her § 2254 Petition.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) will be
GRANTED. Cataulin's petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 will be DENIED. A
certificate ofappealability will be DENIED.^ The action will be DISMISSED.
An appropriate Final Order shall issue.
/s/
Roderick C. Young
Date: December ^ , 2015
United States Magistrate Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Q
An appeal may not be taken firom the fmal order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a judge issues a
certificate of appealability ("COA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will not issue unless a
prisoner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). This requirement is satisfied only when "reasonable jurists could debate whether
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Slack v.
McDanieU 529 U.S. 473,484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4
(1983)). Cataulin fails to meet this standard. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability will be
DENIED.
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