Hawkins v. Davis
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION. See Opinion for details. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 06/09/2016. (ccol, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
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JUN -•
JAMES WILLIE HAWKINS, JR.,
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9 2016
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CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHMOND, VA
Petitioner,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:15CV145
KEITH W. DAVIS,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Willie Hawkins, Jr. ("Petitioner"), a Virginia state prisoner originally proceeding
with counsel, brought this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 2254 ("§ 2254 Petition"). In his
§2254 Petition, Petitioner challenged his convictions in the Circuit Court ofthe City ofVirginia
Beach for abduction; conspiracy to commit abduction; malicious wounding; conspiracy to
commit malicious wounding; and useof a firearm in the commission of a felony. By
Memorandum Opinion and Order entered onJune 10,2015, the Court dismissed the § 2254
Petition. See Hawkins v. Davis, No. 3:15-CV-145,2015 WL 3646654, at *10 (E.D. Va. June
10,2015). The matter is before the Court onPetitioner's pro se Motion for Relief from
Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) ("Rule 60(b)(6) Motion," ECF
No. 21.) Forthereasons set forth below, the Rule 60(b)(6) Motion will be DENIED.
I. Pertinent Procedural History
The facts underlying Petitioner's convictions are as follows:
On June 12, 2012, Latoya Hawkins ("Ms. Hawkins") and her boyfriend,
Zack Bradford ("Bradford") were at Ms. Hawkins' home in Virginia Beach. Ms.
Hawkins was married to the Petitioner during the relevant time period, but the
couple was separated. Ms. Hawkins had a protective order against Petitioner.
Beginning around 5:00 p.m. on June 12, Petitioner repeatedly called Ms.
Hawkins and left threatening messages. That same afternoon, Jimmy Bufkin
("Bufkin"), an acquaintance of Petitioner, paid a visit to Ms. Hawkins' home.
Using racial slurs and abusive language, Bufkin told Ms. Hawkins that Petitioner
was onhisway to the home and she should ensure Bradford was not present when
Petitioner arrived.
Around 6:00 p.m., Bradford stepped out onto Ms. Hawkins' front porch to
take a telephone call. At approximately the same time, Petitioner arrived,
carrying a gun. Petitioner approached Bradford and said, "Come here," while
pointing the gun at him. He then forced Bradford at gunpoint to walk through the
neighborhood towards a green pickup truck Petitioner had borrowed from a
friend. An individual wearing a ski mask was in the truck's driver seat. When
Petitioner told Bradford to get in the truck, Bradford refused and attempted to
escape. As Bradford tried to get away. Petitioner shot him multiple times.
Bradford survived the shooting.
Hawkins v. Davis, No. 3:15-CV-145,2015 WL 3646654, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 10,2015).
In his § 2254 Petition, Hawkins sought relief onthe following grounds:
(1) The petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in violation of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when:
A. Counsel failed to properly conduct adequate pre-trial and trial
investigation, ultimately leading counsel to fail to properly preserve
several essential evidentiary issues for review.
B. Counsel was ineffective for failing to terminate his representation of the
Petitioner as counsel was running for a political office which not only
distracted counsel from giving the Petitioner's case the attention required,
but created a conflict of interest with counsel's position as the Petitioner's
defense attorney.
(2) The Petitioner was unconstitutionally denied due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution when he was convicted
based upon evidence insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
A. The Commonwealth failed to prove the Petitioner and co-defendant
formed an express agreement to commit the crimes of abduction and
malicious wounding beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. The Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence establishing
the element of "Malice" but instead established the defendant acted in the
"Heat of Passion" and thus the Commonwealth failed to prove the
defendant maliciously wounded Bradford.
C. The evidence was legally insufficient to convict Petitioner of abduction
because the Commonwealth failed to offer sufficient evidence of force or
prove any movement of Bradford from one location to another was other
than incidental to the unlawful wounding.
(3) The Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when appellate counsel failed
to properly investigate the Petitioner's case in order to determine viable issues on
appeal, and ultimately counsel only raised issues that had not been preserved for
appellate review in the trial court record.
(4) The prosecutor engaged in misconduct that ultimately prejudiced the
petitioner.
Id. at *3 (citation omitted). Indismissing Hawkins's § 2254 Petition, the Court found that
Hawkins had procedurally defaulted Claims 2(AHC) by failing to comply with Virginia
Supreme Court Rule 5:17(c)(l)(iii). Id. at *5 (citation omitted).' Furthermore, the Court found
that Hawkins had procedurally defaulted Claims 1,3, and 4 because he did not present them to
the Supreme Court of Virginia and they would now bebarred under Virginia Code Ann. § 8.01654(B)(2). Id. at *7. The Court further found thatClaims 1(A), 1(B), and 3 lacked merit. Id at
*8-9.
II. Hawkins's Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
Hawkins contends that the Court should not have found any of his claims defaulted
because any defaults were attributable to his counsel or lack of competent counsel and counsel's
failure to advance "theholding in Martinez v. Ryan,... which establishes the cause needed to
' Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:17(c) requires that a petition for appeal include
"assignments of error" and specifically notes,
An assignment of error that does not address the findings or rulings in the trial
court or other tribunal from which an appeal is taken, or which merely states that
the judgment or award is contrary to the law and the evidence, is not sufficient.
An assignment of error in an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court which recites that "the trial court erred" and specifies the errors in the trial
court, will be sufficient so long as the Court of Appeals ruled upon the specific
merits of the alleged trial court error and the error assigned in this Court is
identical to that assigned in the Court of Appeals. If the assignments of error are
insufficient, the petition for appeal shall be dismissed.
Va. Sup.Ct. R. 5:17(c)(l)(iii).
excuse my default...(Rule 60(b) Motion 11 l.f "To receive Rule 60(b) relief, the movant
must make a threshold showing oftimeliness, 'a meritorious claim ordefense,' and lack ofunfair
prejudice to the opposing party, in addition to one ofthe grounds for relief enumerated under
Rule 60(b)." Coleman v. Jabe, 633 F. App'x 119,120 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting
v. Ingram,
652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011)). After a party satisfies this threshold showing, "he [or she]
then must satisfy one of the six specific sections ofRule 60(b)." Dowell v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46,48 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204,207
(4th Cir. 1984)).
Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved "only [for] truly extraordinary circumstances."
Aikens, 652 F.3d at 501 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[Rule 60(b)(6)]
has been described as the 'catch-all' clause because it provides the courtwith a 'grand reservoir
of equitable power to dojustice ina particular case' and 'vests power in courts adequate to
enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice'
where relief might not be available under any other clause in 60(b)." Eberhardt v. Integrated
Design &Const., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 872 (4th Cir. 1999) (alteration inoriginal) (quoting
Compton V. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 106-07 (4th Cir. 1979)). Furthermore, "if the reason
^InMartinez, the Supreme Court concluded that a federal habeas court could find cause
to excuse
a defendant's procedural default, where (1) the claim of"ineffective assistance of
trial counsel" was a "substantial" claim; (2) the "cause" consisted of there being
"no counsel" or only "ineffective" counsel during the state collateral review
proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the "initial" review
proceeding in respect to the "ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim"; and
(4) state law requires that an"ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim]... be
raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding."
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911,1918 (2013) (alterations and omissions in the original)
(quoting Ma/'/'/nez V. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318-1319, 1320-1321 (2012)).
asserted for the Rule 60(b)(6) motion could have been addressed on appeal from thejudgment,"
thenRule 60(b)(6) reliefis not available. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 501 (citations omitted).
Here, the alleged errors complained of by Petitioner could have been addressed on
appeal, therefore relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is not appropriate. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover,
as a threshold matter. Petitioner fails to demonstrate he has a meritorious claim for relief for the
reasons discussed in the June 10,2015 Memorandum Opinion and, as explainedmore fully
below, he cannot demonstrate prejudice.
The record reflects that Petitioner's guih as to eachcharge was simply overwhelming.
Ms. Hawkins testified thaton theday of the shooting, Mr. Bufkin, a friend of Petitioner's had
come to her home. (Jan. 8,2013 Tr. 321.) Mr. Bufkin told Ms. Hawkins that he had justspoken
with Petitioner andthatMs. Hawkins ought to get Bradford out of the house because Petitioner
was coming over. (Jan. 8,2013 Tr. 293.) Ms. Hawkins further testified that immediately prior
to the shooting, Petitioner made multiple harassing phone calls. (Jan. 8,2013 Tr. 296.)
Bradford unequivocally identified Petitioner asthe individual who abducted him at gun
point and then shot him. (Jan. 8,2013 Tr. 128-32.) Melody Irene Frink, who was familiar with
Petitioner, also sawPetitioner escort Bradford away from Ms. Hawkins's building, shortly before
Bradford was shot. (Jan. 8,2013 Tr. 200-06.)
Juan Wright testified that, the day before the shooting. Petitioner had borrowed Wright's
green. Dodge pickup truck. (Jan. 8, 2013 Tr. 244-46.) Multiple witnesses testified to seeing the
shooterfleeing the crime scenein a similarvehicle .
Petitioner testified at his trial. Previously, Petitioner had repeatedly denied to the police
thathe was in thevicinity of Ms. Hawkins's residence on theday of the shooting. (Jan. 9,2013
Tr. 375.) Nevertheless, at trial. Petitioner admitted that he had accompanied Bradford away from
Ms. Hawkins's residence shortly before the shooting. (Jan. 9,2013 Tr. 409-10.) Petitioner
testified that he walked overto the pickup truck where Mr. Bufkin was waiting, wearing a mask.
(Jan. 9,2013 Tr. 411-13.) According to Petitioner, Mr. Bufkin then unexpectedly shot Bradford.
(Jan. 9,2013 Tr. 413.)
Petitioner's testimony was palpably incredible given Petitioner's numerous prior lies and
Bradford's account of the incident. Moreover, the prosecution introduced a letter written by
Petitioner wherein he admitted to beingpresentat the scene of the crime with a gun. (Jan. 9,
2013 Tr. 425.) Additionally, the prosecution introduced a letter written by Petitioner wherein he
stated,"I shot Mr. Zack Bradford, Jr. because he violated my marriage." (Jan. 9,2013 Tr. 431.)
Given the foregoing evidence. Petitioner cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced by any omission
or error by counsel. As Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he has a meritorious claim that would
entitle him to relief, Coleman, 633 F. App'x at 120 (quoting ^4/few, 652 F.3d at 501), theRule
60(b)(6) Motion (ECF No. 21) will beDENIED. The Court will DENY a certificate of
appealability.
An appropriate Final Order shall issue.
/S/
James R. Spencer
Date: ^
^
Richmond, Virginia
Senior U. S. District Judge
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