Berenyi v. Stolle

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 7/14/2015. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
CHRISTOPHER BERENYI,
Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3: 15CV180

KEN STOLLE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, a Virginia prisoner proceedingpro se, filed this civil action. By Memorandum
Opinion and Order entered on May 29, 2015, this Court dismissed the action without prejudice
because Plaintiff failed to return a consent to collection of fees form and did not pay the statutory
filing fee.
On June 22, 2015, the Court received from Plaintiff a letter that the Court construes as a
motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) ("Rule 59(e) Motion," ECF
No. 9).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized three grounds
for relief under Rule 59(e): "(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error oflaw or prevent
manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (D. Md. 1991); Atkins v.
Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D. Miss. 1990)). Plaintiff indicates that he

"sent the form for informa pauperis" and that he is indigent. (Rule 59(e) Mot. 1 (emphasis
added).) Plaintiff provides no adequate explanation for his failure to return a completed consent

to collection of fees form. Instead, he states, "I give consent to collect fees although I do not
have any at this time." (Id. at 2 (capitalization corrected).) Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the
Court committed a clear error of law or that reopening his case is necessary to prevent manifest
injustice. Nor does Plaintiff demonstrate any other basis for granting Rule 59(e) relief. See

Williams v. Virginia, 524 F. App'x 40, 41 (4th Cir. 2013) ("The reconsideration of a judgment
after entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly." (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v.

Am. Nat'/ Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998))). Accordingly, Plaintifrs Rule 59(e)
Motion (ECF No. 9) will be DENIED. Nevertheless, in light of Plaintifrs desire to continue
with his claims, the Court will direct the Clerk to refile Plaintifr s complaint as a new civil action
as of the date of entry hereof.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Isl
M. Hannah Lauck
United States District

1 ' 2015'

Date: •
Richmond, Virginia

2