Conyers v. Virginia Housing Development Authority et al
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 08/11/2015. Copy mailed to pro se plaintiff on 8/11/2015.(tjoh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
NICOLLE L. CONYERS
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:15CV297-HEH
v.
VIRGINIA HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss;
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint)
This action arises from pro se Plaintiff Nicolle L. Conyers's alleged wrongful
termination from her employment at the Virginia Housing and Development Authority
("VHDA") in 2010. Conyers initially filed suit in 2012, naming VHDA, Christine
Cavanaugh, and Mark McBride as defendants, and alleging employment discrimination on
the basis of race and/or sex, and retaliation. See Conyers v. Virginia Housing and
Development Authority, et al, Civil Action No. 3:12CV458-JRS (E.D. Va. filed June 22,
2012). The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision.
Disappointed with the outcome of the 2012 litigation, on July 9, 2014, Conyers,
again, filed suit against VHDA, alleging that VHDA, her former employer, unlawfully
discriminated against her based on her sex and race with respect to her compensation, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. See Conyers v.
Virginia Housing and Development Authority, Civil Action No. 3:14CV489-HEH (E.D. Va.
filed July 9, 2014). VHDA moved to dismiss, arguing that claim preclusion barred
Conyers's wage discrimination claims. The Court granted the motion, finding that because
such claims arose from the same factual circumstances as her initial discrimination and
retaliation claims, claim preclusion barred her action.1
Conyers filed the above-captioned matter on May 15, 2015 (ECF No. 1), and a First
Amended Complaint was filed on June 24, 2015 (ECF No. 6). Conyers's First Amended
Complaint names as defendants VHDA, and three VHDA employees: Barbara Blankenship,
Chris Cavanaugh, and Mark McBride. The First Amended Complaint alleges eight causes of
action: (1) denial of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (2) deprivation of a
property right in employment in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (3) violation of equal
protection under the Fourteen Amendment; (4) fraudulent misrepresentation; (5) negligent
misrepresentation; (6) fraudulent suppression and concealment; (7) breach of duty to
disclose; and (8) breach of implied covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing.2
On July 2, 2015, Conyers filed a Motion for Leave to File to, again, amend her
complaint, attaching a memorandum in support thereof and a proposed Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 7). Through the Second Amended Complaint, Conyers seeks to add as
a defendant Judson McKellar, Jr., who she alleges was the general counsel VHDA when
Conyers's employment was terminated. She also seeks to add a ninth cause of action for
1Conyers did notappeal to the Fourth Circuit.
2The FirstAmended Complaint also requests thatthe Court vacate its prior judgment in her 2012 case:
Conyers v. Virginia Housing and Development Authority, et al, Civil Action No. 3:12CV458-JRS (E.D.
Va. closed February 26, 2013). To the extent that Conyers's First Amended Complaint may be construed
as a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
that motion is untimely and will be denied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) ("A motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of the judgment.").
legal malpractice, alleging that Mr. McKellar engaged in, and concealed, "the fraud" which
ultimately led to Conyers's termination. (Proposed 2d Am. Compl. U88, ECF No. 7-1.)
On July 21, 2015, Defendants VHDA, Barbara Blankenship, Chris Cavanaugh, and
Mark McBride (collectively, "Defendants") jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint with a memorandum in support thereof (ECF Nos. 8, 9), seeking
dismissal of the First Amended Complaint based on the doctrine of claim preclusion and/or
the applicable statutes of limitations. For the same reasons, Defendants urge the Court to
deny Conyers's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, as such an
amendment would be futile. This Court agrees that claim preclusion bars the present
litigation.3
The doctrine of claim preclusion "dictates that there be an end to litigation," and bars
subsequent litigation of the same claim. United States v. Mumford, 630 F.2d 1023, 1027(4th
Cir. 1980). Claim preclusion "bars the relitigation of claims that were raised or could have
been raised in the prior litigation." Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir.
1999). Not only does resjudicata bar claims that were raised and fully litigated, but the
doctrine of claim preclusion also prevents litigation of "all grounds for. .. recovery that
were previously made available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or
determined in the prior proceeding." Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057
(4th Cir. 1991). A finding of claim preclusion, permitting dismissal, requires that: 1) the
prior judgment be final and on the merits, and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
2) the parties be identical, or in privity, in both actions; and 3) the claims in the second
3Because the Court has adequately set forth the relevant facts underlying this action, as well as the
applicable standard of review, in its prior opinions, it will not do so here.
3
matter—or in this case, the third matter—be based upon the same nucleus of operative facts
involved in the earlier proceeding. Pittston, 199 F.3d at 704 (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
In all three matters—the 2012, 2014, and the present litigation—Conyers names
VHDA and/or its employees as defendants. Importantly, each case presents claims arising
from Conyers's same period of employment with VHDA and her 2010 termination
therefrom. Because the claims that Conyers now asserts existed at the time she initially filed
suit in 2012, and that suit was adjudicated on the merits, she cannot now litigate these claims.
Although Conyers may not have thought to bring these additional claims when she first filed
suit in 2012, "[fjor [claim preclusion] purposes,... it is the existence of the claim, not
awareness of it, that controls." Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740 n.5 (4th Cir. 1990)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, claim preclusion bars this suit and
Conyers's First Amended Complaint will be dismissed.
For the same reasons, Conyers's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Complaint will be denied as futile. While Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that parties should "freely" be given leave to amend their pleadings "when justice
so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the Fourth Circuit has explained that "[a] motion to
amend should be denied ... where it would be prejudicial, there has been bad faith, or the
amendment would be futile." Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir.
2008) (citing HCMF Corp. v. Allen, 238 F.3d 273, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2001)). An amendment
is futile when a proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which the Court may
grant relief. U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir.
2008). Such is the case here.
Conyers's proposed Second Amended Complaint seeks to add an additional
defendant, VHDA's then-general counsel, and an additional cause of action for legal
malpractice, relating to events giving rise to Conyers's termination from VHDA in 2010.
Because the alleged actions by the proposed defendant and the malpractice claim, "arise from
the same transaction or series of transactions as the claim[s] resolved" in Conyers's 2012
case, Pittston, 199 F.3d at 704, such claim would also be barred by the doctrine of claim
preclusion. Thus, the proposed amendment is futile, and will be denied.4
Because the eight causes of action presented in Conyers's First Amended Complaint,
and the ninth cause of action set forth in her proposed Second Amended Complaint are
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, this Court will grant Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and deny Conyers's Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint.
Conyers is advised that all claims related to her employment with, and subsequent
termination from, VHDA, regardless of the theory of recovery, must have been joined in her
initial lawsuit, and any future filings related to these same factual circumstances will meet
the same fate—dismissal under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: U\)$ \\ 2ftlT
Henry E. Hudson
Richmond, Virgmia
United States District Judge
4Defendants' Motion to Dismiss also argues that Conyers's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of
limitations, as two- or three-year limitations periods apply to each of the eight causes of action, all of
which accrued when Conyers's employment was terminated on December 9, 2010. Because the Court
finds that claim preclusion bars Plaintiffs suit, further analysis regarding the applicability of the statutes
of limitations is unnecessary.
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