Sirleaf v. Pearson et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION. READ OPINION FOR COMPLETE DETAILS. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 02/16/2017. Copy mailed to Sirleaf as directed. (ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

MOMOLU V.S. SIRLEAF, JR.,

II

FEB I62BIF ^
CLERK U.S. DiSTRiCt COURT
'RICHMOND. VA

Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No. 3:15CV301

EDDIE PEARSON, et aL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Momolu V.S. Sirleaf, Jr., a Virginia inmate proceeding/pro se and informa pauperis,

filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' Inhis Complaint, Sirleafargues that, during his
incarceration at the Greensville Correctional Center ("GCC"), Defendants^ have violated his
right to practice his religion as a member of "theJewish race and... the Jewish religion."

(Compl. tt 2,12 ECF No. 1.)^ The Court construes Sirleafto raise the following claims for
relief:

' That statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereofto the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

^The named Defendants are: Eddie Pearson, the Warden ofGCC (Compl. 13), and
Jarratt, a colonel at GCC {id 14).

^While the Complaint names "Plaintiffs," as previously explained by the Court to Sirleaf,
"Momolu Sirleafis the only individual who signed the Complaint. The action will proceed with
Momolu Sirleafas the soleplaintiff. To the extent anyother inmate wishes to pursue an action
under 42U.S.C. § 1983, hemust submit his own new civil action." (Mem. Order 1,ECF No. 6.)

Claim One:

Defendants placeda substantial burdenon Sirleafs exercise of his religion
in violation of (a) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act ("RLUIPA")'^ and (b) the First Amendment^ right tofree exercise of
his religion by placingSirleafs housingunit on lockdown for a bi-annual
shakedown, wMchprevented Sirleaf from celebrating Rosh Hashanah in

September 2014. (Id.
Claim Two:

5-6,12.)^

Defendants violated Sirleafs Fourteenth Amendment' right toequal
protection of the law by "allow[ing] the KAIROS retreat to be held, but
den[ying] the scheduled Jewish holy day Rosh Hashanah to be held on the
2d and last day" in September 2014. {Id. 13.)

The matter is now before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF

No. 23.) Despite providing Sirleafwith appropriate Roseboro^ notice, Sirleafhas not responded.
This matter is ripe for judgment. For the reasons stated below. Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment will be GRANTED.
1. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment imder Rule 56 is appropriate only when the Court, viewing the record

as a whole and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, determines that there exists no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317,322-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., Ml U.S. 242,248-50 (1986). "A fact is material ifthe existence or non-existence thereof
could lead a jury to different resolutions of the case." Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, No. 3:13cv825,

'^42U.S.C. §2000cc-l(a).
^"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof...." U.S. Const, amend. I.

® Court corrects the spelling inthe quotations from Sirleafs submissions.
The

' "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofthe
laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

®
Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).

October 2014 {id. End. B); (4) a copy ofa September 21,2014 Incident Report regarding GCC

Cluster S3 (id. End. C); and, (5) a copy ofthe 2014 calendar for KAIROS atGCC {id End. D).
While Sirleafdid notrespond to theMotion for Summary Judgment, he has sworn to the
contents of the Complaint under penalty of pequry. (Compl. 5.) Sirleafhas also submitted a

Declaration ofReligious Beliefs, which sets forth an overview ofhis "sincerely held religious
beliefs." (ECF No. 4,at 1.) Because this document makes no reference to Rosh Hashanah, the
Court has notconsidered it for purposes of summary judgment.
In light of the foregoing submissions, the following facts are established for the Motion

for Summary Judgment. The Court draws all permissible inferences in favor of Sirleaf.
II. Pertinent Facts

UnderVirginiaDepartment of Corrections' ("VDOC") guidelines, all institutions that are

classified as Security Level 3, such as GCC, must "complete a facility lockdown search at least

twice per year." (Jarratt Aff. 14.) GCC "consists ofthree Clusters, with each cluster being the
approximate size of a normal correctional facility." {Id.) Therefore, eachcluster conducts a
shakedown twice per year. {Id.)
During a shakedown, "all activities of the Cluster are locked down and cancelled and

offenders arerestricted to theircell[s]." {Id.) Offenders continue to receive basic necessities

such as food, hygiene, and medical services. {Id.

4, 5.) "[M]ost programs and services are

severely curtailed and offenders are not allowed out-of-cell activities." {Id ^ 4.) Religious

services are suspended, but offenders are permitted to practice their faith inside their cells. {Id.
15.) During shakedowns, "regular functions and activities must besuspended in order to

accomplish priority security measures, including searches for contraband." {Id) "Ofparamount

importance during a lockdown isthe preservation ofsecurity and maintaining the safety and
welfare of all offenders and staff." {Id.)

Assistant Warden Jarratt "schedule[s] institutional lockdowns at the beginning ofeach

year." {Id. H6.) When scheduling lockdowns, he"make[s] every effort to avoid known major

holidays and observances. However, it would be essentially impossible to accommodate every
religious holiday observed by offenders at" GCC. {Id.) In September 2014, the shakedown of

Cluster S3 was scheduled tooccur September 21-26,2014. {Id End. A.) Asearch ofHousing
Unit 7 in Cluster S3, to which Sirleaf was assigned, was scheduled for September 22-23,2014.
{Id. 16; id. End. A.)

On September4,2014, an Institutional Chaplainat GCC sent to the Institutional

Programs Manager a memorandum that provided guidance asto when the Jewish High Holy
Days of Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and Sukkoth would beobserved in 2014. {Id. End. B,at
1.) According to the memorandum, adherents of the Messianic Jewish and House of Yahweh

faiths could observe Rosh Hashanah from sundown on September 25,2014, through sundown on
September 26,2014. {Id. at 2.) No special meals were authorized, but group Rosh Hashanah

services for offenders in Cluster S3 were scheduled tooccur on September 26,2014. {Id.) The

Institutional Programs Manager approved the memorandiun on September 23,2014. {Id. at 1.)
The lockdown ofCluster S3 began at 10:45 a.m. on September 21,2014. (Jarratt Afif.
f 9.) "Although offender Sirleafwas unable to participate ina group service during the
lockdown, he was allowed to observe Rosh Hashanah inhis cell." {Id. f 8.) The shakedown of

Cluster S3 was completed on September 25,2014. {Id. End. C, at 1.) During the shakedown,

staffconfiscated five weapons, as well as suspected marijuana and heroin. {Id) Accordingly,

Cluster S3 was placed on modified lockdown "beginning with the breakfast meal on Friday,

September 26,2014 and retum[ed] to normal operations on Saturday, September 27,2014."
{Id.) On September 27,2014, after the modified lockdown concluded, offenders in Cluster S3

who adhere to the KAIROS faith were able to meet for the scheduled reunion. (Jarratt Aff ^ 11;
see also id End. D.)'
Sirleaf requested that GCC provide "analternative day of congregational observance for
Rosh Hashanah." (Compl. |8.) However, the request wasdenied.

The Institutional

Chaplain had advised staffatGCC that "Jewish tenets do not allow its followers to change the
RoshHashanah observance." (Jarratt Aflf. H10.)
111. RLUlPA and Free Exercise Claims

A. RLUlPA

RLUlPA provides, in pertinent part, that:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . unless the government
demonstrates thatimposition of theburden on thatperson—
(1) is in furtherance ofa compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering thatcompelling
governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. §2000cc-l(a). Thus, tobegin, Sirleafmust demonstrate that Defendants' policies
impose a "substantial burden" onhis religious exercise. Indetermining if Sirleaf has met this

standard, the Court must answer two questions: "(1) Isthe burdened activity 'religious exercise,'

and ifso (2) isthe burden 'substantial'?" AdJdns v. Kaspar, 393 F.Bd 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004);
see Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197,200-01 (4th Cir. 2012) (employing similar two-part inquiry).
Sirleafcontends that the KAIROS reunion was allowed to take place on September 26,
2014, the last day ofRosh Hashanah, while the lockdown was still inplace. (Compl. f 9.)
Sirleaf, however, has failed todemonstrate personal knowledge ofthis fact.
Assistant Warden Jarratt contends that, to the best of his knowledge, Sirleaf"did not
submit a request for special consideration or a rescheduling of Rosh Hashanah." (Jarratt Aff.
110.)

1. Whether the Burdened Activity Is a Religious Exercise

"RLUIPA defines the term 'religious exercise' broadly to include 'anyexercise of

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief" Couch, 679

F.3d at200 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-5(7)(A)). Sirleafs claim implicates one activity—^the
celebration of Rosh Hashanah. {See Compl. m 5-6,12.) Given RLUIPA's broad definition of

religious exercise, and Defendants' failure to address this portion ofthe inquiry, the Court
assumes this activity constitutes religious exercise. See Whitehouse v. Johnson, No. I:10cvll75

(CMH/JFA), 2011 WL 5843622, at *3 (E.D, Va. Nov. 18,2011) (assuming inmate's enrollment
in seminary course constituted religious exercise for purposes of RLUIPA).
2. Sirleaf Fails to Demonstrate a Substantial Burden

RLUIPA fails to definethe term substantial burden. See Couch, 619 F.3d at 200. The

United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence interpreting the Free Exercise Clause provides guidance on theissue. See

Lovelace v. Lee, All F.3d 174,187 (4th Cir. 2006). Thus, the Fourth Circuit has explained that a
substantial burden

is one that put[s] substantial pressure onan adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs, or one that forces a person to choose between following the
precepts of h[is] religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one hand,
andabandoning one of theprecepts of h[is] religion ... on the other hand.
Couch, 679 F.3d at 200 (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Lovelace, 472 F.3d

at 187). Inconducting the substantial burden inquiry, the plaintiff "isnot required... toprove
that the exercise at issue is required byoressential tohis [or her] religion." Krieger v. Brown,
496 F.App'x 322,325 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.l3

(2005)). Nevertheless, "at a minimum the substantial burden test requires that a RLUIPA

plaintiffdemonstrate that the government's denial of a particular religious... observance was
more than an inconvenience to one'sreligious practice." Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255,1278

(11th Cir. 2007) (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town ofSurfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th

Cir. 2004));" see Krieger, 496 F. App'x at 326 (affirming grant ofsiramiary judgment where
inmate failed to "show that the deprivation ofan outdoor worship circle and the requested sacred
items modified hisbehavior and violated his religious beliefs" (citing Lovelace, 472 F.3d at

187)). Thus, no substantial burden occurs ifthe government action merely makes the "religious
exercise more expensive or difficult," but fails to pressure the adherent to violate his or her

religious beliefs orabandon one ofthe precepts ofhis religion. Living Water Church ofGod v.
Charter Twp. ofMeridian, 258 F. App'x 729,739 (6th Cir. 2007).

Two recent cases from the Fourth Circuit illustrate a plaintiffs responsibility with respect

to demonstrating a substantial burden. InCouch, the plaintiff"testified that the primary religious
texts of Islam command that he growa beardand that the refusal to maintain a beard is a sin

comparable inseverity to eating pork." Couch, 679 F.3d at200. The VDOC's grooming policy
prohibited inmates from growing beards and VDOC enforced this rule by placing a
noncompliant inmate in a program that "restricted orlimited [the inmate's] access to personal
property, movement rights, the rightto eat and associate with others, recreation time, and

visitation time." Id. at 199. The Fourth Circuit concluded that VDOC's grooming policy and
enforcement mechanism "fit squarely within the accepted definition of 'substantial burden'"

because it placed substantial pressure onthe plaintiffto modify his behavior and violate his

beliefs. Id at 200-01 (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989,995-96 (9th Cir. 2005)).

" In Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277,293 (2011), the Supreme Court abrogated Smithes

ultimate holding that RLUIPA allows for monetary damages against state officials acting intheir
official capacity.

In Krieger, the Fourth Circuit declmed to find an inmate had demonstrated a substantial

burden where prison officials denied "his requests for an 'outdoor worship circle' and certain
'sacred items' related tohis religious practice ofAsatru." Krieger, 496 P. App'x at322. The

plaintiff"asserted that deprivation ofthe outdoor worship circle would require him to pray
indoors, and that the 'Blot' ceremony is

performed outdoors."' Id. at 325 (emphasis

added). The Fourth Circuit concluded that the mere denial ofthe optimal manner for performing
the "Blot" ceremony could not constitute a substantial burden where the plaintiff"failed tooffer

any explanation regarding the reason why indoor worship would compromise his religious

beliefs." Id. Similarly, the inmate failed to demonstrate a substantial burden with respect to tiie
denial of additional sacred items simply by the "blanket assertion" that "the sacred items were
'necessary' to perform 'well-established rituals.'" Id. at 326. The Fourth Circuit noted that

plaintiff"didnot identify those rituals, or explain why the absence of the sacred items hadan
impact on the rituals and violated his beliefs." Id.

Krieger illuminates another consideration in conducting the substantial burden inquiry.

The availability to an inmate, inthe most general sense, ofother means to practice his orher
faith is not relevant to the RLUIPA substantial burden inquiry.'^ Al-Amin v. Shear, 325 F.
App'x 190,193 (4th Cir. 2009). "Nevertheless, courts properly consider whether the inmate

retains other means for engaging in the particular religious activity, such as the "Blot" ceremony,

in assessing whether adenial ofthe inmate's preferred method for engaging that religious

Under First Amendment Free Exercise jurisprudence, in assessing whether a prison
regulation passes constitutional muster,the courts considerwhether an inmate is able to

"participate inother religious observances oftheir faith." O'Lone v. Estate ofShabazz, 482 U.S.

342,352 (1987). Thus, in O'Lone, the Supreme Court concluded that the prison regulation

which prevented Muslim inmates fi-om attending a Jumu'ah prayer service was constitutional

because, inter alia, the inmates "could fireely observe anumber oftheir [other] religious
obligations." Id.

exercise imposes a substantial burden." Shabazz v. Va. Dep't Corr., 3:10CV638,2013 WL

1098102, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15,2013) (citing Krieger, 496 F.App'x at 326; Coleman v.
Governor ofMick, 413 F. App'x 866,875-76(6th Cir. 2011)). Thus, theShabazz Court

recognized an earlier Eighth Circuit ruling under RLUIPA holding that an inmate failed to

demonstrate that the denial ofadditional group study time imposed a substantial burden upon his
religious exercise because prison officials already provided "other means for engaging inthe
particular religious activity:" namely, three hours of group study and w^orship time and time for

aninmate to study in his cell. Id. (citing Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 656-57 (8th Cir.

2009). Similarly, the United States Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that prison
policies which limited the inmates' access to religious radioand television broadcasts failed to

substantially burden the inmates' religious exercise because the inmates "may receive religious
literature via the mail and may receive visitors atthe prison to discuss their religious beliefs."
Coleman, 413 F. App'x at 876.

In Claim One (a), Sirleaf contends that Defendants substantially burdened his free

exercise of religion byplacing his housing unit on lockdown for a bi-annual shakedown, which

prevented Sirleaffrom celebrating Rosh Hashanah inSeptember 2014. (Compl.

5-6,12.)

Defendants, however, have established that, while Sirleaf"was unable to participate ina group
service [during the lockdown], he was allowed to observe Rosh Hashanah in his cell." (Jarratt

Aff. 18.) To the extent that Sirleafalleges that Defendants interfered with his religious exercise
by prohibiting the Rosh Hashanah group services during the lockdown, Sirleafprovides no
evidence to explain the religious significance of a group service for Rosh Hashanah. See Van

Wyhe, 581 F.3d at 656-57; Krieger, 496 F. App'x at 325-26; Peters v. C/arfe,

No. 7:14CV00598,2015 WL 5042917, at *7 (W.D. Va. Aug. 26,2015) (granting summary

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judgment to defendants on plaintiff's RLUIPA claim because plaintiff had failed to provide "any

documentation of the tenets of his Rastafarian faith regarding a regularpractice of groupworship
or whatpurpose groupservices servein an individual's exercise of that faith"). Because Sirleaf
fails to demonstrate that his inability to participate in a groupRosh Hashanah service during the
September 2014 lockdown placed pressure on him to violate his religious beliefs or abandon one

of the precepts of his religion, Living Water ChurchofGod, 258 F. App'x at 739, Claim One (a)
will be DISMISSED.
B. Free Exercise

Similar to RLUIPA, in order for Sirleafto survive summary Judgmentfor his First

Amendment clauu, Sirleafmust demonstrate Defendants' conductsubstantially burdens his

religious exercise. Whitehouse, 2011 WL 5843622, at *5. "RLUIPA provides considerably
more protectionfor an inmate's religiousexercise than does the Free Exercise Clause ofthe

Constitution of the United States." Id. at *5 (citing Lovelace, All F.3d at 186). Thus, "[w]here
an inmate has not put forth sufficient evidence under RLUIPA to demonstrate a substantial

burden on his religious exercise, his claim fails under the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment as well." Van Wyhe, 581 F.3d at 657—58 (citing Patel v. U.S. Bureau ofPrisons,
515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008)). As explainedabove, Sirleafhas failed to demonstrate a

substantial burden on his religious exercise. Accordingly, Claim One (b) willbe DISMISSED.
IV. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment commands that similarly

situated persons betreated alike. See City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,

439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982)). To survive summary judgment,
Sirleafmust demonstrate: (1) "that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is

11

similarly situated"; and, (2) that the differing treatment resulted from intentional discrimination.

Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648,654 (4th Cir. 2001). Tosucceed onan equal protection
claim, a plaintiff must setforth "specific, non-conclusory factual [evidence] thatestablish[es]

improper motive." Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391,405 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Crawford-El v.

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)).'^ Ifa plaintiffsatisfies the above, "the court proceeds to
determine whether the disparity intreatment canbejustified under the requisite level of
scrutiny." Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654 (citations omitted). "Ina prison context," disparate
treatment passes muster so long as "the disparate treatment is 'reasonablyrelated to [any]

legitimate penological interests."' Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726,732 (4th Cir. 2002) (alteration
in original) (quoting Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223,225 (2001)).
In Claim Two, Sirleafcontends thatDefendants violated his right to equal protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment by "allow[ing] the KAIROS retreat tobe held, but den[ying]
the scheduled Jewish holy day Rosh Hashanah to beheld onthe 2d and last day" inSeptember
2014. (Compl. 113.) He alleges that the KAIROS retreat was allowed to take place on

September 26,2014, the last day ofRosh Hashanah, while the lockdown was still inplace. {Id.
19.) Sirleafappears to compare himselfto those inmates in Cluster S3 who participated inthe
KAIROS reunion.

Sirleaffails todemonstrate that he is similarly situated to these inmates. The Equal
Protection Clause does notrequire "things which are different in fact or opinion to betreated in

law as though they were the same." Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686,691 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Plyler, 457 U.S. at216). Instead, "the class to which [an inmate] belongs consists ofthe persons
No evidence exists thatDefendants' cancellation of thegroup Rosh Hashanah service
wasmotivated by an intent or desire to discriminate against Sirleaf because he is a sincere
believer of the Jewish faith.

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confined ashe was confined, subject to the same conditions to which he was subject," Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Koyce v. U.S. Bd. ofParole, 306 F.2d 759,762 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
Here, Sirleafwas unable to attend a group Rosh Hashanah service on September 26,2014,

because Cluster S3 was on limited lockdown following confiscation of several weapons and
suspected drugs. (JarrattAfF. End. C, at 1.) Conversely, Cluster S3 returned to normal
operations on September 27,2014, allowing offenders who adhere to the KAIROS faith to attend

the reimion thatoccurred on that date. Although Sirleafalleges thatthe KAIROS reunion
occurred on September 26,2016, while the lockdown was still in place, he fails to demonstrate

personal knowledge of this or explain his basis of knowledge forhis allegation. Because Sirleaf
fails to demonstrate that he was similarly situated to those iimiates from Cluster S3 who attended

the KAIROS reunion, this alone forecloses Sirleafs equal protection claim. Accordingly, Claim
Two will be DISMISSED.
V. Outstanding Objections

Sirleaf"appeal[s] de novo to the United States District Court Judges... the

Memorandum Order of [the] Magistrate Judge ... denying 'without prejudice plaintiffs motion
for the requesting of the appointment of counsel'

the denying of plaintifif['s] motion for

temporary restraining order... and motion forpreliminary injunction... 'without prejudice'."
(ECFNo. 18,atl.)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a partymay seekreview of

nondispositive pretrial matters by a district court judge. The Rule provides:
When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim or defense is

referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must
promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written
order statmg the decision. A party may serve and file objections to the order
within 14 days after being served with a copy, A party may not assign as error a
defect in the order not timely objected to. The district judge in the case must
13

consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is
clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The Court construes Sirleafs "Appeal" as objections permitted under Rule
72(a) ("Objections").

First, to the extent that Sirleaf objects to the purported denial of his motion for a
temporary restraining order or motion for preliminary injunction, Sirleaf filed no motion for a
temporary restraining order or motion for preliminary injunction in the instant action. Thus, no
order exists against which Sirleaf could lodge an objection.
Second, the Court construes Sirleaf to object to the Magistrate Judge's March 23,2016

Memorandum Order denying without prejudice his Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (See
Mem. Order 1, ECF No. 17.) Sirleaf, however, provides no argument in support of his protest of

the Magistrate Judge's denial of his Motion for Appointment of Coimsel. The Magistrate Judge

determined that counsel need not be appointed for Sirleaf because "[t]his action presents no
complex issues or exceptional circumstances" and because Sirleafs "pleadings demonstrate that

he is competent to represent himself in the action." (Mem. Order 1, ECF No. 17.) The Court
discerns no error in the Magistrate Judge's conclusion. Sirleafs Objections (ECF No. 18) will
be OVERRULED.

14

VI. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) will be GRANTED.
Sirleafs claims will be DISMISSED. Sirleafs Objections (ECF No. 18) will be OVERRULED.
The action will be DISMISSED.

An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandirai Opinion.

M. Hannah Laucfi

United States District Judge

Date: tELLSJOIIRichmond, Virginia

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