Yarid v. Brennan

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 07/10/2015. Copy mailed to plaintiff on 7/10/15.(tjoh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

GEORGE YARID,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:15cv326

SHON BRENNON,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff George Yarid's Motion for

Reconsideration. (ECF No. 7.) Yarid moves the Court to reconsider its June 29,2015
Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing his action for failure to comply withthe Court's

previous order granting him leave to file an amended complaint byJune 24, 2015, The Court
will construe Yarid's Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 59(e).' For the reasons that follow, the Court grants
Yarid's Motion.
I. Procedural History

On June 10, 2015, the Courtgranted Yarid leave to proceed in formapauperis; found that

Yarid failed to state a claim uponwhich reliefmay be granted; and, dismissed his complaint

' Thatrule states: "(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or

amend ajudgment must befiled no later than 28 days after the entry ofthe judgment." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e).

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2).^ {See ECF Nos. 2, 3.) The Court granted
Yarid an opportunity to file an amended complaint, provided he did so within fourteen (14) days
ofthe entry ofthe Memorandum Opinion and Order. (June 10, 2015 O. 1, ECF No, 3.) The
Court warned Yarid thatfailure to comply with the Court's directives would result in dismissal

ofthis action. {Id.) On June 29, 2015, after Yarid failed to file an amended complaint within the
constraints of the June 10, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court dismissed Yarid's

action without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).^ {See ECF Nos. 5, 6.)
On July 1, 2015, Yarid filed his handwritten, one-page Motion. (Mot. Reconsideration 1,

ECF No. 7.) Yarid's Motion essentially asks the Court to reconsider its dismissal ofhis action
for his failure to file a complaint within the time constraints as ordered by the Court in its

June 10,2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Mot. Reconsideration 1.) In support of his

request, he states that "he did not receive the ruling until the 13th day ofthe 14 days to cite case

^The statute reads, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that: (A) the

allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim onwhich reliefmay be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary reliefagainst a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

^The rule states, in pertinent part:

(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. Ifthe plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or

any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under
this subdivision (b) and any dismissal notunder this rule-except one for lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, orfailure tojoina party under Rule 19-operates as
an adjudication on the merits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

law or perhaps obtain legal counsel." {Id.) He requests that the Court "give [him] more time for
preparation to prove [his] case." (Jd)
11. Standard of Review; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)

The Court treats Yarid's Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion to Alter or Amend a

Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 59(e), because he filed his motion on

July 1, 2015, two days after the Court's June 29,2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Fed.
R, Civ. P. 59(e).

"[R]econsideration of ajudgment after its entry is anextraordinary remedy which should
beused sparingly." Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'IFire Ins. Co.f 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Wright et al, Federal Practice andProcedure § 2810,1, at 124 (2d ed. 1995)).
Rule 59(e) itselfprovides no standard by which a district court may grant a motion to alter or
amend a judgment, but"courts interpreting Rule 59(e) have recognized three grounds for
amending anearlier judgment: (1)to accommodate anintervening change in controlling law;

(2) to account for new evidence notavailable at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or

prevent manifest injustice," Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). Such
motions may not be used, however, "to raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the
issuance of thejudgment, nor may theybe used to argue a caseunder a novel legal theory that

the party had the ability to address in the first instance." Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403.
Moreover, "[a] party's mere disagreement with the court's ruling does not warrant a Rule 59(e)
motion." Wadley v. Park at Landmark LP, No. I:06cv777, 2007 WL 1071960, at *2 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 30, 2007). Indeed, Rule 59(e) does not "give an unhappy litigant one additional chance to

sway the judge." Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879, 889 (E.D. Va. 1977) (stating that

plaintiffs brief insupport ofhis motion to alter oramend the judgment was "no more than an

expression ofa view ofthe law contrary to that set forth inthe Court's opinion," and thus the
courthad no properbasis to alter or amend its previous order).
III. Analysis

Although alteration ofthis Court's judgment would be an "extraordinary remedy," Pac.
Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403, the Court finds thatthese circumstances warrant vacating its prior

order and granting Yarid leave to file an amended complaint. Yarid's Motion does not speak to
the Rule 59(e) standard. Yarid cites no change in the intervening law requiring accommodation;
he raises no new evidence or any clear errors of law. However, construing Yarid'spro se

Motion liberally, heappears to argue that manifest injustice exists due to his lack of timely
notice of the opportunity to file an amended complaint. See Hutchinson^ 994 P.2d at 1081.
Yarid's Motion argues that"he did notreceive theruling until the 13th day of the 14days to cite
case lawor perhaps obtain legal counsel. (Mot. Reconsideration 1.)

Because Yarid proceeds pro se\ because he filed his Motion onlytwo days following the
June 29 decision dismissing his case; and, because the Court originally dismissed this case

without prejudice, the Court will grant Yarid's Motion for Reconsideration. Yarid will have one
moreopportunity to file an amended complaint.
The Court notes that it will not consider any document or contact with this Court beyond

a formal motion or pleading filed in accordance with the Court's orders, the appropriate Federal

Rules ofCivil Procedure, and the Local Civil Rules ofthe Eastern District ofVirginia."^ Any
further requests for extensions oftime will be looked upon with disfavor. E.D. Va. Loc. Civ.
R. 7(1).

Although Yarid's pro se status makes him "entitled to some deference," it does not
relieve him of his duty to abide by the rules and orders of this Court. Ballardv. Carlson, 882
F.2d93,96(4thCir. 1989.)

IV, Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court will grant Yarid's Motion (ECF No. 7) and vacate the June 29,
2015 Memorandum Order and Opinion (ECF Nos. 5, 6). The Court reopens this case. The

Court grants Yarid leave to file an amended complaint. Should Yarid desire to file an amended

complaint, the Court orders him to do so within fourteen (14) days of the date of entry hereof.
Failure to comply strictly with the requirements ordered by the Court will result in dismissal of
this action. See Fed. R, Civ. P. 41(b),

An appropriate Order will follow.
M.

United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia