Jenkins v. Woody et al

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Read Opinion for details. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 12/11/2015. (ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

VIRGINIA PAIGE JENKINS,
ADMINISTRATRIX of the

ESTATE OF ERIN JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No. 3:15cv355

SHERIFF C.T. WOODY, et al..
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on two motions to dismiss specific counts of Plaintiff

Virginia Paige Jenkins's^ First Amended Complaint: Defendant Sheriff C.T. Woody's Motion to
Dismiss Count VIII to the extent it alleges a claim against him (ECF No. 26); and, Correct Care

Solutions, LLC's ("CCS") Motion to Dismiss Count VI^ (ECF No. 31). Both motions have been

filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).^ Plaintiff did not respond to Sheriff
Woody's Motion to Dismiss Count VIII and has agreed to dismiss the count as it relates to

Sheriff Woody/

' Because the plaintiff in this matter, Virginia Paige Jenkins, Administratix ofthe Estate
of Erin Jenkins, has the same last name as Erin Jenkins, the subject of this case, the Court refers
to Virginia Paige Jenkins as "Plaintiff" and Erin Jenkins as "Jenkins" throughout this
Memorandum Opinion.

^Count VI is the fifth count listed in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. To avoid
unnecessary confusion, the Court refers to it as it is identified in the First Amended Complaint.

^Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek dismissal for "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted."

Count VIII alleges negligence by Nurse Crissy Royall, Nurse Aikysah Paige, Khairul
Bashar Mohammed Emran, M.D., (collectively, the "Medical Defendants"^ and, through the

Plaintiffhas responded to CCS's Motion to Dismiss Count VI, and CCS has replied.
(ECF Nos. 35, 36.) On December 2, 2015, the Court heard oral argument. Accordingly, the
matters are ripe for disposition. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331^
and 1367.^

For the reasons that follow, the Courtwill: (1) deny as moot Sheriff Woody's Motion to

Dismiss Count VIII; (2) dismiss Count VIII as it pertains to SheriffWoody; (3) grant CCS's
motion to dismiss Count VI; and, (4) grant Plaintiffs oral motion to amend the First Amended
Complaint.
I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Standard

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th
Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a

plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true, and the complaint is viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993);
see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and
"a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Sheriff Woody. Based on the parties'
positions at oral argument, the Court dismisses the allegations in Count VIII to the extent they
pertain to Sheriff Woody.

^"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ofall civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The First Amended
Complaint alleges a Fourteenth Amendment violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

^The Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law negligence and
medical malpractice claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ("[I]n any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy ,...").

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft
V. Iqbah 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009),

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of

what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (omission in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

omitted). Instead, a plaintiffmust assert facts that rise above speculation and conceivability to

those that"show" a claim that is "plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Fed. R. Civ, P. 8(a)(2)). "A claim has facial plausibility whenthe
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
II. Procedural and Factual Background
A.

Procedural Background

On June 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed in this Court a Complaint alleging, on behalf of

Jenkins's estate, violations ofthe Fourteenth Amendment,^ state law negligence, and medical
malpractice. (ECF No. 1.) SheriffWoody moved to dismiss Count VIII of the Complaint to the
7

.w.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:

All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.

extent it alleged a claim against him ("First Motion to Dismiss"). (ECF No. 16.) On August 10,

2015, after the parties fully briefed the First Motion to Dismiss, but before this Court issued a

ruling, Plaintiff moved to amend her Complaint. (ECF No. 22.) On August 11, 2015, the Court
granted the motion to amend, denied Sheriff Woody's First Motion to Dismiss as moot, and
directed the defendants to file new responsive pleadings. (ECF No. 24.) On August 18,2015,
Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 25.)
CCS has filed its Motion to Dismiss Count VI of the First Amended Complaint. (ECF
No. 31.) Count VI alleges a violation of Jenkins's Fourteenth Amendment right to the provision
of medical care as an inmate in need. CCS seeks to dismiss Count VI on the grounds that:

(1) any claim arising from the first custom or policy is "uncorroborated by factual allegations to

demonstrate the requisite causal link and is purely speculative"; and, (2) the second custom or
policy allegedly giving rise to the deliberate indifference claim is "too broad ... to be considered
actionable under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983." (Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss Count VI First Am.

Compl. ("CCS Mem. Supp.") 1-2, ECF No. 32.) Plaintiff responded to CCS's Motion to

Dismiss Count VI, and CCS has replied. (ECF Nos. 35, 36.) The Court heard oral argument on
December 2, 2015.
—

B.

Q

Summary of Allegations in the First Amended Complaint

The facts of this case arise out of Jenkins's incarceration at the Richmond City Justice

Center (the "Justice Center"). Because Plaintiff brings a claim against CCS alleging a "Policy or
Custom of Deliberate Indifference to the Serious Medical Needs of Inmates," the Court outlines

the relevant policies and customs of CCS as alleged in the First Amended Complaint.

^For purposes ofa motion to dismiss, the Court will assume the well-pleaded factual
allegations in the First Amended Complaint to be true and will view them in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff Matkari, 1 F.3d at 1134.

1-

Jenkins's Incarceration at the Richmond City Justice Center

On July 25, 2014, Jenkins became incarcerated at the Justice Center. The Justice

Center's records indicate that Jenkins did not suffer from "major medical problems" upon entry.
(First Am. Compl. ^ 26.) Further, Jenkins was "not apparently under influence ofalcohol or

drugs," and her mental state was "alert, appropriate, logical, etc." (First Am. Compl. 128.)
Jenkins had a prescription for Mobic and Percocet^ and "was referred to 'Chronic and Mental.'"

(First Am. Compl.

27-28.) The Justice Center placed her on an opiate withdrawal protocol.

In turn, Jenkins's Percocet prescription was discontinued.

On July 30, 2014, amember ofCCS's^^ health care staffreclassified Jenkins as mentally
unstable and transferred her to isolation. CCS purportedly reclassified Jenkins in the absence of
evaluation, documentation, or explanation. No planwas set forth for a mental health
professional to evaluate Jenkins.

On July 31, 2014, Dr. Emran visited Jenkins and suggested that she be transferred to

medical and housed on the bottom bunk. Dr. Emran noted that Jenkins: (1) had a history of
Percocet abuse; (2) was "oriented, but also hallucinating"; and, (3) was "thirsty." (First Am.
Compl. K32.) Dr. Emran provided Jenkins a Gatorade beverage, and shewas relocated to

"2 MED FEMALE," with an indication of"Medical/Mental Health," (First Am. Compl. ^ 33.)
Dr. Emran failed to determine the extent ofJenkins's dehydration orher hallucinosis. In spite of

^The First Amended Complaint does not allege why these medications were prescribed
to Jenkins.

CCS is a limited liability company thatcontracted with SheriffWoody to provide
medical care at the Justice Center. The contract requires thatCCS: (1) fully staffthe medical
department at the Justice Center; and, (2) comply with standards established bythe American
Correctional Association, the National Commission onCorrectional Health Care, the Virginia
Department of Corrections, and all federal and Virginia statutes and regulations pertaining to the
delivery of health care at "[c]ommunity [sjtandards." (First Am. Compl. ^ 69.)

Jenkins's dehydration, she was—at atime unspecified in the First Amended Complaint—given
meclizine, which Plaintiffcontends contributes to dehydration and delirium. In six days, Jenkins
lost three pounds. Plaintiff contends "it should have been obvious" atthis time that Jenkins

suffered from a perforated ulcer. (First Am, Compl. 136.) Nonetheless, Dr. Emran noted

Jenkins's examination as "unremarkable." (First Am. Compl.

32, 35-36.)

The following day, August 1, 2014, Nurse Royall evaluated Jenkins for apunch to the
face, but no trauma was noted. Plaintiffalleges that such behavior was abnormal for Jenkins.
Nurse Royall subsequently completed an opiate withdrawal evaluation. Jenkins's "Clinical

Opiate Withdrawal Scale rose from "0" to "6," which, on the seventh day ofopiate withdrawal,
purportedly reflects an unexpected outcome. (First Am. Compl. ^ 38.) Nonetheless, neither Dr.
Emran nor the CCS staff evaluated Jenkins further.

OnAugust 2,2014, deputies of the Justice Center encountered Jenkins in obvious distress

on numerous occasions.' ^ On one occasion, Defendant Deputy E. Beaver observed that Jenkins
"urinated on the floor and bed ofher cell." (First Am. Compl. 141.) Beaver asked Jenkins

whether there was an issue, but "couldn't understand" Jenkins's "jumbled" response. (First Am,
Compl. 141.) Beaver then reported the incident to Nurse Paige. On a subsequent round. Beaver

noted that Jenkins had "no chest movement." (First Am. Compl. ^ 42.) Beaver reported

Jenkins's condition to her superiors, but Beaver—trained as a "first responder"—did not perform

Plaintiffalleges that "[t]here is.., a long history ofknown failures by deputies ofthe

Richmond SheriffsOffice in ma^ng necessary security rounds and in responding to inmates in
obvious need of medical assistance," (First Am, Compl, ^ 50.)

cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR")/^ Additionally, Beaver allegedly "tried to call amedical
10-18," but "could not get through." (First Am. Compl. ^ 42.)

At an unidentified time on August 2, 2014, deputies found Jenkins lying partially on her

bed. She was incoherent, incontinent, and not breathing. CPR was not immediately performed.

Further, the deputies did not initially call for an "emergency medical 10-18." (First Am. Compl.
K39.) After an emergency call was "finally" made, nurses arrived and administered CPR, noting
the absence ofa pulse and breathing sounds. (First Am. Compl. K39.) The nurses continued

CPR and applied an automated external defibrillator ("AED") until emergency medical services

("EMS") arrived. EMS then transported Jenkins to the Medical College ofVirginia Hospital,
where she was placed on life support. Jenkins then died as a result ofacute peritonitis, which
was purportedly caused by an untreated perforated duodenal ulcer.
2.

Customs and Policies of CCS

In the years preceding Jenkins's death, Plaintiff contends that CCS either failed to follow

or implement policies for conducting: (1) Continuous Quality Improvement ("CQI"); (2) Critical
Clinical Event ("CCE") investigations; (3) root cause analyses; and, (4) other forms ofmorbidity
and mortality reviews. Such policies aim to control and reduce the occurrence ofnegative
clinical outcomes within CCS's facilities, including the Justice Center.

Inessence, the CCE reporting system requires the reporting of important events to CCS's

corporate headquarters for review by corporate leadership. CCS's CCE reporting system

Plaintiffalleges that"there is a long history of known failures by Richmond Sheriffs
Officedeputies to perform basic CPR and to provide basic first aid for inmates/detainees when
necessary." (First Am. Compl. f 50.)

specifically intends to report: (1) "sentinel events"'^ (2) clinical events with significant

implications; (3) root cause analyses; and, (4) clinical events that are "high risk'' and thus worthy
ofmonitoring or investigation. (First Am, Compl. ^ 57.) An appropriately handled CCE
involves root-cause analyses to determine the cause ofnegative clinical outcomes, which results
in the establishment of criteria for minimizing risk of similar negative outcomes in the future.

CCS's CQI likewise aims to prevent negative clinical outcomes. Notwithstanding the CQI and
CCE reporting system, CCS purportedly discourages the reporting ofnegative clinical outcomes.
IIL Analysis

A.

Sheriff Woody*s Motion to Dismiss Count VIII

At oral argument. Plaintiffs counsel agreed to dismiss Count VIII of the First Amended

Complaint as it relates to Sheriff Woody. Accordingly, the Court dismisses that portion ofCount
VIII ofthe First Amended Complaint and denies as moot Sheriff Woody's Motion to Dismiss
Count VIII. (ECFNo.26.)
B.

CCS^s Motion to Dismiss Count VI

For the reasons stated below, the First Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that
CCS maintained a policy or custom that was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs

of inmates at the Justice Center, including Jenkins. Accordingly, the Court grants CCS's Motion

to Dismiss Count VI. (ECF No. 31.) The Court, nonetheless, recognizes that the allegations of

The First Amended Complaint does not define "sentinel event." This Court has

defined the term as "an occurrence involving death or serious physical orpsychological injury or
riskthereof" Woodson v. City ofRichmond, Va, No. 3:13cvl34, 2015 WL 566780, at *2 n.2
(E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2015).

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the First Amended Complaint make this determination a close one."^ Thus, the Court also grants
Plaintiffs oral motion to amend the FirstAmended Complaint.'^

1.

Standard for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim Against a Municipality Alleging
a Custom or Policy ofDeliberate Indifference

Because Plaintiffs Count VI seeks relief for a violation of Jenkins's constitutional

rights, the Court turns first to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff brings her Fourteenth Amendment
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private right of action for a violation of
constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of state law. "Section 1983 ... Ms not

itselfa source ofsubstantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred'

Hence, to establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show

thatthe defendant, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiffs federal constitutional or

statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained ofinjury." Brown v. Mitchell, 308 F. Supp.
2d 682, 692 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citations omitted).

At oral argument, Plaintiffs counsel acknowledged deficiencies in the First Amended
Complaint. At thattime, Plaintiffs counsel requested that, in lieu of dismissal, the Court
consider affording Plaintiffan opportunity to amend her complaint a second time.
A party may amend its complaint one time as a matter of course before the defendant

files a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Once a defendant files a responsive
pleading, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) states that "a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a)(2). The Rule further provides: "The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires." Id. Inthe Fourth Circuit "leave to amend ... should bedenied only when the
amendment would beprejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith onthe part of the
moving party, or the amendment would have been futile." Laberv. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426
(4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffreadily meets this standard here. At this early stage of litigation, CCS will

experience little prejudice if Plaintiff amends the First Amended Complaint. Additionally, CCS
has not alleged thatPlaintiffacted in bad faith in seeking leave to amend. Finally, this Court
cannot find that the filing of an amended complaint would be futile as a matter of law. As

discussed below. Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a narrow enough theory of causation in
Count VI, but she raises sufficient claimsconnecting CCS's policies and the injuryto allow
amendment.

When a plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, liability attaches

only if"an official policy orcustom" caused the "unconstitutional deprivation ofthe plaintiffs
rights." Id. (citing Monell v. Dep YofSoc. Servs, ofN. K, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four

ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation;
(2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority;
(3)through an omission, suchas a failure to properly train officers, that
"manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens"; or[,] (4) through a
practice that is so"persistent and widespread" as to constitute a "custom or usage
with the force of law."

Lytle V. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463,471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215,217

(4th Cir. 1999)). Importantly, "municipal liability may notbe rested simply upon a failure to

adopt policies that in retrospect can be seen to bea means by which [a] particular [constitutional
deprivation] ... might have been averted." Milligan v. City ofNewport News, 743 F.2d 227,230
(4th Cir. 1984).
2.

Standard for Due Process Violation for Deliberate Indifference to

Serious Medical Needs

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "mandates the provision of

medical care to detainees who require it," Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted); seealso Cnty. ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1998). Thus,
when evaluating the constitutionality of an arrestee's claim, the Court must determine whether

the government was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, Harris,
240 F,3d at 388, Because CCS, a private corporation acting under the color of state law,
purportedly caused the alleged constitutional violation in this case, the Court must determine
whether CCS had "an official policy or custom" of deliberate indifference to the serious medical

needs of inmates at the Justice Center, Mitchell, 308 F. Supp, 2d at 692 (citingMonell, 436 U,S.
at 694).

10

3.

Plaintiff Does Not Plausibly Allege That CCS's Failure to Investigate
the Prior Negative Outcomes of Patients Caused Jenkins's Death

Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege causation with respect to her Fourteenth Amendment

claim of deliberate indifference. In order to plausibly allege a § 1983 claim for municipal
liability, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) CCS had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to

the violation of Jenkins's constitutional rights; and, (2) this policy or custom causedthe
complained of constitutional violation. In this case, no issue exists as to whether Plaintiff

alleged a policy or custom of deliberate indifference. Indeed, it is beyond dispute that Plaintiff

plausibly alleges, at least, that CCS failed to investigate prior negative patient outcomes,'^ (First
Am. CompL

66-67,124.) Thus, the focus of the Court's analysis is whether Plaintiff

plausibly alleges that CCS's policyor custom of failing to investigate prior negative patient
outcomes caused harm to Jenkins. She does not.

A plaintiffseeking to establish municipal liability must plead that the municipality's
custom or policy actually caused the constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 658. Here,

Plaintiffspecifically asserts that CCS's Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Dean Reiger,
admitted under oath that company lawyers discourage investigations in circumstances where
future litigation can be anticipated. (FirstAm. CompL U65.) Plaintifffurther alleges that CCS's
in-house counsel has confirmed this notion. (First Am. Compl. ^ 64.)
To the extent Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations as a result of other, unidentified
policies or customs, however, the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief
can be granted. The Fourth Circuithas held that "municipal liabilitywill attach only for those
policies or customs having a 'specific deficiency or deficiencies ... such as to make the specific

violation almost bound to happen, sooneror later, rather than merely likely to happen in the long
run.'" Carter, 164 F.3d at 218 (quoting Spellv. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987)).
Thus, Plaintiffmust "identify the offending [corporate] policy [or custom] with precision." Id.
at 218; see also Roulhac v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:10CV408,2011 WL 6750559, at *4
(E.D. Va. Dec, 23, 2011) (alterations in original) (dismissing § 1983 claim against a municipality
because the complaint failed to identify a corporate policy with precision), aff'd, Roulhac v.
Janek, 518 F. App'x 160 (4th Cir. 2013). For instance, elsewhere in the First Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff includes allegations regarding the "long history of known failures" at
Richmond jail facilities. (First Am. Compl. ^ 50 (alleging history of failures regarding CPR and
security rounds).) These claims, however, pertain only to the Richmond Sheriffs Office, not
CCS.
11

while Plaintiff alleges that CCS's unconstitutional policy or custom was "a direct proximate

cause of Ms. Jenkins'[s] death," (First Am. Compl. ^ 129), "merely pleading the magic words of
causation is insufficient to pass a complaint through the Rule 12(b)(6) crucible," Mitchell^ 308 F.

Supp. 2d at 694. "[T]he court need not accept as true 'conclusory allegations regarding the legal
effect of the facts alleged.'" Id. (quoting Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Accordingly, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff plausibly alleges that the failure to

investigate the prior negative outcomes of patients was, in fact, a "moving force of the
constitutional violation." Milligan, 743 F.2d at 230 (citing PolkCnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

326 (1981)). The Court concludes that Plaintiffs allegations of causation are conclusory and

require the Court to speculate—^rather than infer—^the causal link between the custom or policy
and the constitutional violation alleged by Jenkins.

In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that CCS failed to classify Jenkins
correctly, evaluate her symptoms, and properly document her condition. (First Am. Compl.
30, 32, 34, 38.) According to Plaintiff, these failures plausibly state a causal link between the

constitutional violation suffered by Jenkins and the custom or policy of deliberate indifference.
Accepting these allegations as true, however, the First Amended Complaint demonstrates only
that CCS failed to investigate negative patient outcomes and adequately treat Jenkins. Plaintiff
neglects to link the two events and, in turn, fails to allege the level of causation that exists
between them.

While recognizing that she need not articulate her theory of the case with pinpoint
precision, to plausibly allege a "moving force of the constitutional violation," Milligan, 743 F.2d

at 230, Plaintiff must include at least some plausible assertions indicating why a failure to
investigate negative patient outcomes resulted in the mistreatment of Jenkins. In particular,

12

Plaintiff must identify some level of action or inaction more directly related to Jenkins's harm.
The First Amended Complaint is bereft of allegations of causation that tie CCS to Jenkins's

injury as a moving force. Indeed, nothing in the First Amended Complaint articulates the

specific effect of CCS's failure to investigate negative patient outcomes that ultimately caused
the mistreatment of Jenkins. Without such allegations. Plaintiffs entitlement to relief is merely
conceivable. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).

Accordingly, with respect to Count VI, Plaintiff does not plausibly state a claim for
which relief may be granted. Thus, the Court grants CCS's Motion to Dismiss Count VI. (ECF
No. 31.) However, for the reasons stated from the bench and in this Memorandum Opinion, the
Court also grants Plaintiffs oral motion to amend the First Amended Complaint.
IV. Conclttsion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: (1) denies as moot Sheriff Woody's Motion to

Dismiss Count VIII; (2) dismisses Count VIII to the extent it pertains to Sheriff Woody;
(3) grants CCS's motion to dismiss Count VI; and, (4) grants Plaintiffs oral motion to amend the
First Amended Complaint.
An appropriate order shall issue.

M,H
United States

Richmond, Virginia

Date: 12-11")$'

13

t Judge