Liton v. Ramos et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge James R. Spencer on 3/9/2016. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

MOHAMMED ALILITON,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No. 3:15CV368

MR. RAMOS, et aL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mohammed Ali Liton, a federal inmate proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, filed
this civil action. The matter is before the Court for screening pxirsuantto 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the action will be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
1.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any
action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
first standard includes claims based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,'" or claims

where the "'factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427
(E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is
the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.

1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356
(1990)). In consideringa motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 1 F.3d 1130,1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980

F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require [] only 'a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,

rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the
plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft
Corp, 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th

Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing

statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint.
See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City
ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
IL

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

In his Complaint,^ Liton alleges, in sxmi:
I Mohammed Ali Liton . . . filing the Complaint.. . against my unit team
at Petersburg-Low and Coleman-Low on: K. Williams (Unit Manager); M.
Campbell (Case Manager); K. Callahan (Counselor) and Ramos, Jones &
Chambers, accordingly.
I was sent to Petersburg-Low in July 2014. My legal paperwork never
made it to my property. My sister tried to call and speak to Mr. Ramos and
Chambers to mail me my paperwork. They lied about sending and later wouldn't
answer my sister's call. Similarly, Jones, my case manager at Coleman never
filed my clemency and address relocation which I have requested. When I asked
my Petersburg team unit to retrieve my legal paperwork from my legal locker at
Coleman they were very unwilling. When I asked to start the grievance
procedure, they told me it's not needed. Later on, they sent e-mail and left phone
msgs but no reply from Coleman. That's when I complained to this Court.
Recently, I was denied . . . my halfway house request. BOP reasoned it's
my charge. However, under 2nd Chance Act, every inmate supposed to be able to
be recommended for up to 12 months of halfway house and/or 10% of sentence in
home confinement. In addition, my request for relocation was never filed by my
Petersburg team up until 4/14/15. When I pointed it out, my acting case manager
had an attitude with me. I think these are all part of the retaliation because of my
Complaint to the Court.
(Compl. 6.) Liton asks for $600 in damages.

' The Court employs the pagination assigned to the Complaint bythe CM/ECF docketing
system. The Court corrects the punctuation, spelling, and capitalization in quotations from the
Complaint.

III.

ANALYSIS

Because Defendants are federal officers, Liton apparently invokes Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents ofFed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) despite his characterization of
his Complaint as one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "In order to state a viable Bivens
claim, a plaintiff must allege facts which indicate that a person acting under color of federal
authority deprived him or her of a constitutional right." Williams v. Burgess, No. 3:09cvl 15,
2010 WL 1957105, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 13, 2010) (footnote omitted) (citing Goldstein v. Moatz,

364 F.3d 205, 210 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004)). In his Complaint, Liton fails to identify the particular

constitutional right, much less any constitutional right, that was violated by the Defendants'
conduct. At most he alleges that Defendants Ramos and Chambers provided his sister false
information and failed to return his sister's phone call, and that Defendant Jones never filed

certain paperwork for Liton. Even under the generous construction affordedpro se complaints,
the Court fails to discern a constitutional violation on the face of Liton's complaint. See

Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274,1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that "[pjrinciples
requiring generous construction ofpro se complaints are not... without limits."). For this
reason alone, Liton's Complaint will be dismissed.
Even if Liton had stated a claim of constitutional dimension, he fails to name Defendants

Williams, Campbell, and Callahan in the body of his Complaint except to indicate that they are
named as defendants in the action. "Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.'''' Ashcroft
V. Iqhal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (citations omitted). "[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution." Id. Liton fails to explain how Defendants Williams, Campbell, and Callahan

were personally involved in the events for which Liton seeks relief. "Where a complaint alleges

no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the

defendantexcept for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed,
even under the liberal construction to be given pro se complaints." Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d
1206,1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing U.S. ex rel. Brzozowski v. Randall, 281 F. Supp. 306, 312
(E.D. Pa. 1968)). Thus, Liton has also failed to state a claim against Defendants Williams,
Campbell, and Callahan.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Liton's claims will be DISMISSED.

The action will be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

hi

James R. Spencer
Date:

Richmond, Virginia

Senior U. S. District Judge