Worthington v. Palmer et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM OPINION. READ Opinion for complete details. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 11/24/2015. (ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COXJRT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

' ^

^

Richmond Division

!

NOV212015 Va
XAVIER WORTHINGTON,
I

i".'

"I-!MOI '0. VA

1 '•;
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No.

ROSE PALMER,
BON

3:15cv410

ESQ.,

SECOURS -

ST.

MARY'S

HOSPITAL,
CASTLE REAL ESTATE, INC.,
BONITA WALLACE,
JEWISH FAMILY SERVICES,
MCGRATH & DANIELSON,
MOTORCYCLE LAW GROUP,

TWO UNKNOWN SIGNATORIES/
WITNESSES
GROUP

FROM MOTORCYCLE LAW

TO ALLEGED WILL OF

CLYDE H. SEGEAR,
SARAH BETH KEUKEN,
ELIZABETH C. MOOZ,
TARA A. CRISINATI,
DONSHEA SMITH,

ESQ.,

HENRICO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JUDGE I,

AND

HENRICO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

JUDGE II,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on the MOTION TO DISMISS of
Defendants

Motorcycle
Worthington

Motorcycle

J.

Thomas

Law

McGrath

Group,

Group

t/a

mistakenly

("Worthington")

Law

P.C.

as

("McGrath,

McGrath

named

by

McGrath

P.C."),

&

Danielson

Plaintiff
&

Sarah

Xavier

Danielson

K.

and

and

Rittenberry,

mistakenly

named

Worthington

by

("Keuken/Rittenberry"); Lindsey Norment,
one

of

"Two

Unknown

McGrath,

named

Keuken

Beth

named by Worthington as

Signatories/Witnesses

Group to Alleged Will of Clyde H.
Thomas

Sarah

as

from Motorcycle Law

Segear"

by Worthington

as

("Norment");
one

of

and J.

"Two

Unknown

Signatories/Witnesses from Motorcycle Law Group to Alleged Will
of

Clyde

H.

Segear"

Defendants")
MOTION

TO

DISMISS

(ECF

HOSPITAL,

No.

No.

TARA

7);

(ECF

DISMISS

(ECF

("McGrath")

13);

A.

(collectively,

DEFENDANT

No.

11) ;

DEFENDANT

DEFENDANTS

CRISINATI,

JEWISH

BON

FAMILY

MOTION
ST.

SMITH'S

MARY'S

MOTION

TO

(ECF No.

15); DEFENDANT ROSE PALMER, ESQ.'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS

(ECF Nos.

P.

(b) (1)

TO

(6)

DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED R.S CIV.

12

McGrath

SERVICES'

JUDGES'

SECOURS

DONSHEA

AND

"the

&

26,

27);

DEFENDANT ELIZABETH C.

MOOZ' S MOTION TO DISMISS

No.

35);

and CASTLE DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

FED.

R.

CIV.

P.

12 (b) (1)

12 (b) (6)

&

(ECF No.

(ECF

PURSUANT TO

43).

For

the

reasons set forth herein, Defendants' motions will be granted.

I.

BACKGROUND

In

a

assertions
(sometimes

Complaint
and

that

short

is
on

self-identified

grandson of Clyde

H.

long

on

rhetoric

specificity,
as

Segear

"XW") ,

Xavier

who

( "Segear") ,

and

Worthington

claims

asserts

conclusory

to
a

the

variety of

claims against twelve named, and two unnamed, defendants.

2

be

Those

claims

arise

out

of

the

following

scenario,

recounted

from

paragraphs 16 through 38 of Worthington's Complaint (ECF No. 1).
The facts are recited as they are stated in the Complaint,
best

they

can be

sorted from

the

rather

rambling,

as

conclusory

text.
On or about March 26,
Mary's

Hospital

2013,

complaining

Segear entered Bon Secours-St.

"about

his

leg/foot."

While

hospitalized, Segear was evaluated on March 28 and April 2, 2013
by Dr. Durre Khan to determine whether Segear "had the capacity
to

make

decisions

for

that

Se gear

determined

himself

and

his

"retained

the

wife."

Dr.

Khan

capacity

to

make

decisions."
For

reasons

Complaint,
Circuit

in

and

under

circumstances

"April/May,
of

Court

2013,"
County,

Henrico

Bon

not

recited

in

the

filed,

in

the

Petition

for

Secours

Virginia,

a

Appointment of Guardian and Conservator for Segear.
that result,
(unnamed)

To secure

it is alleged that Bon Secours and its employees

administered

Prednisone

induce

to

symptoms

of

incapacity in Segear.
Mooz,

a

lawyer,

li tern for Segear.
incapacitated,"

was

appointed by Judge

I

as

guardian ad

Mooz interviewed Segear "to have him deemed

notwithstanding

awareness

evaluations made by Dr.

Khan.

manager at Bon Secours,

and Crisinati,

of

the

two

Mooz worked with Smith,

3

previous
a case

a nurse practitioner at

Bon Secours, to arrange a follow-up evaluation of Segear that,
for unarticulated reasons,

14,

2013,

after

Prednisone,

the

Crisinati

is alleged to be illegal.

date

on

prepared

which
an

Segear

had

evaluation

On June

received
reportedly

concluding that Segear "did not retain the capacity to make
decisions."

Palmer,

a

lawyer,

who was appointed by Judge

I

to be

Segear's "Guardian and Conservator," presented the Crisinati
report to Judge I "so that she could be appointed Guardian and
Conservator."

At the time that

Judge

I

held that Segear was

incapacitated and appointed Palmer, he allegedly knew that the
Petition and the diagnosis were false.

There are no facts

alleged to support that conclusory assertion.

Segear died on July 14, 2013, apparently leaving a will
that was authored by employees of the law firm McGrath,

P.O.,

and that was notarized by Keuken (whose correct name is Sarah

Rittenberry), an employee of McGrath, P.C.^
Jewish Family Services is

said to have

falsely claimed

"rights over [Segear's] bank accounts" and is alleged somehow to
have depleted them.

employees),

Castle Realty, Wallace (one of that firm's

and Palmer are

alleged

to

have

illegally

sold

^ Worthington pled that Keuken/Rittenberry is employed as a clerk
of court.
(Compl. SI 9).
There is no factual support for that
conclusion and Worthington no longer appears to take that view
of her employment.

Segear's properties and retained the profits from the sale.

No

facts are offered to support those conclusions.
According to the Complaint,

Palmer at one time represented

to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond that Segear had
died

intestate. 2

It

is

apparently

Worthington rests his central thesis:
intestate

and

that,

under

the

on

that

ground

that

that Segear actually died

Virginia

law

of

intestate

succession, Worthington is entitled to "2/3 of Clyde H. Segear's
estate."

From this string of conclusory assertions, Worthington

tries to fashion several legal claims.
Worthington's

claims are

paragraph in his Complaint.

not

delineated by count,

In paragraph 4 0,

but by

he asserts that

Defendants deprived Worthington, Segear, and Segear's wife:
of their property and property rights by
accelerating and causing the death of Clyde
H. Segear, and generating a false diagnosis
of incapacity/dementia through the unlawful
use of Prednisone, to have Clyde H. Segear
declared incapacitated/demented, all under
color of state law and use of the courts of
Virginia, in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1983
and
the
First
and
Fourteenth
Amendments.
In addition,

paragraph 40 alleges that all defendants conspired

to achieve the alleged foregoing deprivation.
In paragraph

41,

Worthington alleges

that

the

defendants

deprived him:
2

That, says Worthington, occurred when Palmer filed an affidavit
in "Richmond Probate Court."
(Compl. <JI 31).
5

of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights

to Companionship of his grandparents, and
particularly his grandfather,
Clyde H.
Segear, by creating and maintaining false
and

inaccurate

records

that

declared Clyde

H. Segear incapacitated and demented for the
sole purpose of unlawfully taking the
property and property rights of Plaintiff
"XW",
and
to
not
be
deprived
of
companionship of his grandfather and his
property and property rights without Due
Process of

law.

Here too, Worthington alleges that the defendants conspired with
each other to effectuate those deprivations.

In paragraph 42, Worthington alleges that the defendants

deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal
Protection rights "in the same manner as described in paragraph
#41."

This

paragraph

too

has

a

generalized

conspiracy

assertion.

Worthington

also

asserts

two

state

law

claims.

In

paragraph 43 he alleges that each of the defendants committed
medical malpractice and conspired to do so.

In paragraph 44 he

alleges that each of the defendants caused him "Intentional
Infliction

of

Emotional

Worthington

seeks

injunctive

relief,

(Compl.

A-I) .

both

Distress"

and

compensatory

declaratory

relief,

conspired

and

to

punitive

do

so.

damages,

and attorneys'

fees.

All

Defendants

pursuant to Fed.

have

timely

filed

R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6),

Motions

to

Dismiss

claiming that Worthington

has failed to state any claim upon which relief can be granted.
(ECF

Nos.

7,

11,

13,

15,

26,

Palmer

43).

and

Mooz

have

additionally filed motions to dismiss on grounds of insufficient
service of process, pursuant to Fed.
Nos.

27,

35).

Civ. P. 12 (b) (5).

Defendants Jewish Family Services,

Family Services"),
same person,

R.

Judges I and II

"Judge Yoffy"),

Inc.

(ECF

("Jewish

(later discovered to be the

Bon Secours -

St. Mary's Hospital

("Bon Secours"), Crisinati, Donshea Smith ("Smith"), Castle Real
Estate,
also

Inc.

("Castle"),

filed motions

to

and

Bonita

dismiss

on

the

Wallace

("Wallace")

ground

have

that Worthington

lacks standing to pursue several of his claims.

(ECF Nos.

11,

13, 15, 43).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

As

a

threshold

matter,

the

recognizes

Court

that

Worthington's pro se status entitles his pleadings to a liberal
construction.
(2007)

See,

e.g.,

Erickson v.

Pardus,

551 U.S.

89,

94

( citations omitted) ; Gordon v. Leeke, 57 4 F. 2d 114 7, 1151

(4th Cir.

1978).

Nevertheless,

recognize Rule B's vision for

"[e] ven pro se plaintiffs must

'a system of simplified pleadings

that give notice of the general claim asserted,

allow for the

preparation

issues

of

a

basic

defense,
7

narrow

the

to

be

litigated,

and provide

claims.'"

Sewraz v.

Aug.

26,

2008)

mean

Guice,

(quoting

(S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
not

a means

that

for

quick dispositions

2008 WL 3926443,

Prezzi

v.

Berzak,

at

57

sham

(E.D.

Va.

149,

*2

of

151

F.R.D.

The requirement of liberal construction "does

the

court

can

ignore

a

clear

failure

in

the

pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a
federal district court."
(D.S.C.
901

July 16,

F.2d

387

2009)

(4th

Skelton v. EPA,
(citing Weller v.

Cir.

1990)).

Ashcroft

conclusory,

v.

Iqbal,

factually

556

Dept.

Finally,

standards set by Bell Atlantic v.
and

2009 WL 2191981, at *2

the

Twombly,

U.S.

662

unsupported

of Soc.

Servs.,

basic

pleading

550 U.S.

(2009)

claims

544

that

apply

to

(2007)

foreclose
pro

se

litigants.

1.
All

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)

Defendants

have

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)

filed motions

to

for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.
dismiss,

to dismiss pursuant

To

survive

a

Rule 12 (b) (6)

motion to

a complaint must "provide enough facts to state a claim

that

is plausible on its

Co.,

551

F. 3d 218,

U.S.

at

555).

"A

222

face."

Robinson v.

(4th Cir.

claim

has

2009)

facial

Am.

Honda Motor

(quoting Twombly,
plausibility

when

550
the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the

reasonable

inference

misconduct alleged."

that

Iqbal,

the defendant
556 U.S.
8

at

is

678

liable for

the

(citing Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

A

556).

court

"will

accept

the

pleader's

description of what happened ... along with any conclusions that
can

be

reasonably

conclusory

allegations

pleaded facts."
Practice and
Dominion
2014} .

drawn

therefrom,"

encompassing

Charles A. Wright

Procedure §

Sec.

Co.,

1357

L.L.C.,

but

the
&

WL

legal

not

effects

Arthur R. Miller,

(3d ed.

2014

"need

1998);

1415095,

accept
of

Federal

Chamblee v.
at

*4

the

(E. D.

Old
Va.

"Twombly and Iqbal also made clear that the analytical

approach

for

evaluating

Rule

12(b} (6)

motions

to

dismiss

requires courts to reject conclusory allegations that amount to
mere

formulaic

conduct

a

recitation

of

context-specific

well-pleaded
entitlement

elements

analysis

to

allegations

factual
to

the

relief."

Id.

In

of

a

claim and to

determine

plausibly
considering

whether

the

suggest

an

a

to

motion

dismiss, the court may "properly take judicial notice of matters
of public record."

Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp.,

572 F.3d

176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
B.

Claims Against Judge Yoffy

Judge Yoffy argues that all of Worthington's constitutional
and state

law claims

against

him must

fail

because he enjoys

absolute judicial immunity.

(Def. Judges' Mem. of Law in Supp.

of

(ECF

Mot.

to

Dismiss,

at

5

correct.

9

No.

14)).

That

is

clearly

It is well-settled that
suits

judges are absolutely immune from

for damages arising out of their

Pulliam v.

Allen,

466 U.S.

522,

York State Unified Court Sys.,
2011)

("[T]he

solely on

claims

543

442

against

the

(1984);

F.

Hence,

barred by

the

the

claims

doctrine

judge enjoys absolute

of

judicial

588

Defendants

New

(2d Cir.
are

judges

against

See

McCluskey v.

App'x 586,

State

judicial acts performed by

capacity.

judicial actions.

in their

Chief

Judge

based

judicial

Lippman

immunity.").

are

Moreover,

a

judicial immunity for actions within his

judicial capacity even if his actions are allegedly in error or
unconstitutional.
1985) .

A

Chu v.

judge

acts

Griffith,

within

his

771

F.2d 79,

judicial

81

(4th Cir.

capacity

when

the

challenged act is "a function normally performed by a judge" and
the

parties

"dealt

with

the

judge

in

his

judicial

capacity."

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
"Judicial
judge

engaged

taken

in

the

immunity
in

can

be

nonjudicial

judge's

overcome

actions--that

judicial

capacity';

complete lack of jurisdiction."
141,
11-12

145

(4th Cir.

(1991));

2013)

only

(2)
Doe,

(quoting Mireles v. Waco,

see also Stump,

435 U.S.

at 356

(1)

the

'actions

is,

or

Rodriguez v.

where:

not

there

was

a

54 9 F. App' x
502 U.S.

9,

(noting that a

judge is stripped of immunity only when he acts "in the clear
absence of
acted

all

without

jurisdiction.") .
jurisdiction,

Even where
"the

10

scope

a
of

judge may have
the

judge's

jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the
immunity of the judge."

Stump,

435 U.S.

Court clearly has indicated that "[a]

issue is the

at 356.

The Supreme

judge will not be deprived

of immunity because the action he took was in error,
maliciously,
357.

recognized that
is

Id.

or was in excess of his authority."

Similarly,

a

was done
at 356-

sister court within the Fourth Circuit has

judicial immunity applies "even when the judge

accused of acting maliciously and

corruptly ... 'not

protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge,

for

the

but for

the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges
should

be

at

liberty

independence and without
Hutchinson,

to

exercise

fear

2010 WL 35215 64,

their

functions

of consequences.'"

at *7

( S. D.

W.

with

Broessel v.

Va. Aug.

12,

2010)

(internal citations omitted).
Here,

Worthington

Judge

Yoffy

Stump,

435 U.S.

clear

that

entirely

of

"dealt

that

the

allege

clear

in

absence

normally

at 362.

the

performed

judge

in

the

Complaint

of

that

jurisdiction."

because it is entirely

contested actions

with

might

not

Nor could he,

the

"function[s]

435 U.S.

Complaint

"in

at 356.

both

Worthington
Stump,

acted

does

his

by
by

Judge
a

Yoffy

judge,"

judicial

are
and

capacity."

There are no facts to be found in the

allow the

Court

to plausibly infer

that

Judge Yoffy's decision to appoint a guardian for Segear, and the
subsequent

decision

not

to

rescind
11

that

guardianship,

were

matters

outside

Judge

Yoffy' s

jurisdiction as

a

Circuit Court

judge.
Worthington
"abdicated his

argues

in

his

Response

judicial authority,

that

Judge

Yoffy

issued pronouncements based

on this fraud and, therefore, was lacking jurisdiction[.]"
No.

36,

at

3).

(ECF

Worthington also repeats his allegations that

Judge Yoffy "knew that a

fraudulent

document was presented to

the court" and also adds that "his failure to recuse/disqualify
himself []

divested him of

jurisdiction."

these are conclusory allegations

not

credit

only remedy,

these

8.

Accordingly,

the Court simply

unsupported allegations.

Worthington's

if he is dissatisfied with Judge Yoffy's decisions,

was to have appealed those decisions in state court.
do that.

However,

that are entirely unsupported

by specific allegations of fact.
does

Id. at

Therefore,

He did not

all of Worthington's claims against Judge

Yoffy will be dismissed.

C.

Claims in Paragraph 40

In paragraph 40 of the Complaint,
Defendants "conspired to,
Clyde H.

and did,

Segear and Alice B.

property and property

Worthington alleges that

deprive Plaintiff

Segear

["the Se gears"] ,

rights ... in violation

of

1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments."

42

'XW',

and

of their

U.S. C.

Sec.

This paragraph,

which the Court construes as a due process claim, fails to state
a

claim under Section 1983 because,

12

for the

reasons discussed

below,

Worthington

has

not

plausibly

alleged

that

Defendants

Because Worthington fails to

acted under color of state law.

allege a cognizable claim under § 1983, Worthington's conspiracy
claims

under

§

1983 must

fail

as

well.

Furthermore,

to

the

extent that Worthington attempts to bring a constitutional claim
on the behalf of Mr.

and Mrs.

Segear,

he lacks standing to do

so.
Section
rights,'

1983

"'is

not

itself

a

source

of

substantive

but merely provides

'a method for vindicating federal

rights elsewhere conferred.'"

Amato v. City of Richmond, 875 F.

Supp. 1124, 1132 (E.D. Va. 1994)
U.S.

266,

144 n. 3

271

(1994)

(1979))).

(citing Albright v. Oliver, 510

(quoting Baker v.

McCollan,

To state a claim under §

443 U.S.

1983,

137,

a plaintiff

must allege, through specific factual assertions, that:

(1)

"the

defendant

by

the

(2)

"the

has

deprived

him

of

a

right

secured

Constitution and the laws of the United States";

and

defendant deprived him of this constitutional right under color
of any statute,

ordinance,

State or Territory."
150

(1970).

regulation,

custom,

or usage,

of any

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

Therefore, "the first step in any such claim is to

identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed."
Id.

Where

a

plaintiff

fails

to

plead

a

cognizable

constitutional violation, he has no recourse under § 1983.

13

Furthermore,
purposes

for

private persons only act "under color of law"
a

participants

of
in

Section

joint

1983

activity

claim

with

when

they

are

willful
Id.

state officials.

at

152.

This means that a plaintiff has no recourse under Section

1983

for

private

wrongful."
2001)

conduct,

Mentavlos v.

"no

matter

Anderson,

(citation omitted).

how

discriminatory

24 9 F. 3d 301,

Moreover,

310

or

(4th Cir.

"private misuse of a state

statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the
State."
In

Lugar v.

particular,

retained,

Edmondson Oil Co.,

it

is

well-settled

court-appointed,

or a

under color of state law."
*3 (D.S.C. Apr. 10, 2007)

"an

922,

attorney,

public defender,
Knox,

between

state

was

done

whether
not

act

2007 WL 1146344,

and

a

at

in

a

naked assertion of conspiracy

private

parties,"

must

allege that Defendants acted jointly in concert,
act

does

(1982).

conspiracy under Section 1983,

through "more than

overt

941

(collecting cases).

plaintiff,

actor

that

Lilly v.

To successfully plead a

a

457 U.S.

furtherance

of

the

plausibly

and that some

conspiracy

that

resulted in the plaintiff's deprivation of some constitutional
right.
(E.D.

Shooting Point, LLC v. Cumming, 243 F. Supp. 2d 536, 537
Va.

2003).

That

is,

a

plaintiff must

plausibly allege

deprivation of a constitutional right in order to state a claim
for civil conspiracy under
cause

of

action

is

the

§

1983, because "' [t] he gist of the

deprivation
14

and not

the

conspiracy.'"

Id.

(quoting Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 540

n.2

(7th Cir.

Importantly,

1975)).

something more than a

Id. at 421-23.

Worthington's Claims on His Own Behalf

Because the
protection

plaintiff must make

naked assertion of conspiracy between a

state actor and private parties."
1.

"[a]

of

First Amendment
"property

and

is not

the proper source for

property

rights,"

the

Court

construes Worthington's Paragraph 40 claims on his own behalf as
a

Due

Process

Worthington

claim,

has

Defendants

brought

failed

to

acted "under

under

show

color

Section

that

any

state

of

However,

1983.
of

law."

the

remaining

Therefore,

the

claims in Paragraph 40 will be dismissed with prejudice as to
all Defendants.
First addressing Worthington's

claims

against

the McGrath

Defendants, it is clear that McGrath, Norment, and McGrath, P.C.
are

private

actors.

No

allegations

suggest

otherwise.

No

authority holds otherwise.
Nor did the status of Keuken/Rittenberry as a notary public
employed by McGrath, P.C. transform her actions, or those of any
other

defendants,

state."

into

Filarsky

v.

conduct
Delia,

(internal citation omitted).
the

Fourth

privately

Circuit

employed

has
notary

"fairly

132

S.

attributable

Ct.

1657,

to

1661

the

(2012)

Although it does not appear that
specifically
public
15

is

addressed
automatically

whether
a

a

"state

actor" for purposes of § 1983, the Court finds persuasive the
reasoning of the district court in Williams v. Nat'l Notary
Assoc.-Florida, 2008 WL 8122804 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2008).

As

the court in Williams observed, a notary public is not a state

official.

And, although the Code of Virginia refers in passing

to the "office" of notary public, the statute as a whole makes
clear that a notary public merely holds a "commission."
Code Ann. §§ 47.1-21 et seg.

Also, the "statutory powers and

duties given to notaries public are ministerial:
administer

oaths,"

document is

a true

the

Va.

power to

certify that

copy thereof,

to

the power to
a copy of a

certify affidavits

or

depositions of witnesses, and to perform verifications of fact.
Williams,

2008 WL 8122804,

at *4; Va.

Code Ann.

§ 47.1-12.

Such ministerial actions "are not imbued with the imprimatur of
the State, as are those of public officials."

Id.

Moreover,

"the statute recognizes the widely known fact that, [as here,]

notaries public are often employed by private entities."
see also Va. Code Ann. § 47.1-27

notary's employer).

1^/

(detailing the liability of a

As explained in Williams, the employment

"of many notaries public by nongovernmental entities strongly
suggest[s] that a notary public is not a public official, as

public officials are typically employed by the State in an
official

capacity."

addressed the

Id.

issue have

Other

district

reached this
16

same

courts

to

have

conclusion.

S^

Sanders v. the Cty. of Bradford, 2014 WL 10294769, at *5 n.6

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2014); Hall v. Tallie, 2014 WL 9311958, at *8
(N.D. Ala. Mar. 10, 2014); Noonan v. Allen, 2012 WL 6726711, at
*1 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2012).

Here, Keuken/Rittenberry acted in

her capacity as an employee of private actor McGrath, P.C., when
she notarized Segear's will,

and that action is not

fairly

attributable to the state."

Thus,
McGrath,

Worthington's conclusory allegations that Norment,
and

Keuken/Rittenberry

conspired

to

concoct

a

"fraudulent Last Will and Testament" fail to reveal any actions

taken by any state actor under color of state law, as is
required to state a claim under § 1983.

Moreover, although

Worthington

McGrath

repeatedly

asserts

that

the

defendants

conspired with Judge Yoffy, he fails to allege any facts from
which

the

occurred.

Court
There

could
is

infer
no

that

plausible

any

conspiracy

predicate

that

actually
supports

Worthington's conclusory conspiracy claim in paragraph 40.
Second,

with

respect

Castle Real Estate, Inc.,

to

Defendants

Bonita

Wallace

and

("the Castle Defendants"), Worthington

has failed to provide any specific facts showing that the Castle
Defendants were involved with the state court proceedings in any

way.

Indeed, the sole brief mention of the Castle Defendants in

the Complaint reveals only that Worthington spoke by telephone
with Wallace,

a real estate agent,
17

and that Wallace provided

Worthington's contact information to Palmer.
Worthington has

(Compl. 55 25-26).

failed to allege that the Castle Defendants

acted "under color of state law."

Worthington's

reply

brief

contends

that

the

Castle

Defendants must have conspired with Palmer because the two had
offices

in

the

therefore... conspired

taking

with

same

thereafter

Defendants

Rittenberry.(ECF

building,

No.

to

Judge
57,

and

"they/

the

unlawful

Notary

Keuken-

consummate

Yoffy
f

that

and

14).

Fanciful,

conclusory

allegations of that sort simply do not support the existence of
any conspiracy.

Nor do they in any way suffice to make a

plausible case that the McGrath defendants were somehow state
actors.

Thus,

the Complaint

fails

to state a claim against the

McGrath defendants both because of the absence of a plausible

theory

of

state

action

and

because

it

fails

to

meet

the

requirements of Twombly and Iqbal as to the conspiracy aspect of
paragraph 40.

^ Because the Court finds that Keuken/Rittenberry is not a state

actor, the Court devotes no further discussion to Worthington's

arguments that the remaining defendants' alleged conspiracy with
her renders their conduct state action within the meaning of §
1983,
However, even if Keuken/Rittenberry were a state actor,

the Complaint provides no factual basis to support the
conclusory argument that any defendants either in, or outside
of,
McGrath,
P.C.
entered
into
any
agreement
with
Keuken/Rittenberry.
18

Similarly, Worthington offers nothing more than repetitive
legal conclusions to support his contention that Defendants Tara
Crisinati,

Donshea

Defendants")
matter.

Smith,

and

Bon Secours

conspired with Judge Yoffy,

("the

Bon Secours

or anyone,

for that

Indeed, Worthington does not even allege that any of

the Bon Secours Defendants had any contact whatsoever with Judge

Yoffy,

much

less

that

they

reached

any

sort

of

agreement.

Worthington only states, in conclusory fashion, that "Defendant
Jewish

Family Services

(JFS)

and

thus

Bon Secours

and

all

defendants, knew as a matter of fact, and law, that XW visited

his grandfather regularly over the years prior to his demise."
(ECF No. 52, 5 7)

not

allege

how

(emphasis added).

or

why

Jewish

However, Worthington does

Family

Services

might

have

possessed such knowledge, why such knowledge should be imputed
to the Bon Secours Defendants, or how such knowledge shows that
the

Bon

Secours

Defendants

were

"jointly

officials in the prohibited action."

engaged

with

state

Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152

(quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).

In

a document titled "Sur-Reply Affidavit," (which, ironically, is
not notarized or otherwise sworn) Worthington again alleges that

"Bon Secours, Castle Defendants, JFS, Yoffy, Keuken-Rittenberry,

and their other co-conspirator defendants deprived XW of his

right to be his grandfather's guardian/conservator..."
58,

t

18).

The

Court

can

discern
19

no

facts

in

(ECF No.
any

of

Worthington's filings that provide any plausible support for the
allegation that the Bon Secours Defendants had any role in the
alleged conspiracy.

Thus, Worthington has failed to plausibly

allege that the Bon Secours Defendants acted "under color of
state law."

Moreover,

as to those defendants,

the Complaint

fails the test of Twombly and Iqbal as to the conspiracy aspects
of paragraph 40.

The

only

allegations

even

mentioning

Defendant

Jewish

Family Services, found in one of Worthington's many "Affidavits"
filed in response to Defendants'
more conclusory.

motions to dismiss,

are even

Worthington says that "JFS is being sued as a

co-conspirator with two state actors," that "JFS was privy to
all that occurred," and that "JFS was a willing party to the
fraudulent, invalid ^Last Will and Testament.'"
8-9,

17) .

"'naked

These

allegations

assertions'

devoid

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677

present

of

'further

a

(ECF No. 49,

textbook

factual

example

of

enhancement.'"

(internal citation omitted).

Worthington

has failed to offer any facts from which the Court could infer
that Jewish Family Services acted "under color of state law" for

purposes of § 1983 or that
others

who

were

state

it engaged in a

actors.

Thus,

as

to

conspiracy with
Jewish

Family

Services, the Complaint fails to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal both
as

to

its

state

actor

contentions

contentions.

20

and

as

to

its

conspiracy

With

respect

to

Mooz,

Worthington

again

attempts

to

establish a conspiracy by alleging that:
[n]ot only is a
Judge
sued as
a
coconspirator in this action, but also [Ms.
Rittenberry],
the
Notary
Public,
who
produced the
fraudulent ... 'Last Will and
Testament of Clyde H. Segear,' which Ms.
Mooz alludes to in her pleadings ... [Ms.
Mooz] has been using this fraudulent ... 'Last
Will
and
Testament' ... to
claim
disinheritance
of
[Worthington's]
mother
and,
therefore,
no
entitlement
to
inheritance
rights
of
any
kind
for
[Worthington] .
(ECF

No.

~~

55,

"initiated a

for

However,
the

illicit

Thus,

alleges

that

Mooz

Se gear with a

to have him deemed incapacitated."

(Comp!.

'll

Worthington does not provide any factual support

conclusion

that

or otherwise,

reason to

also

number of interviews with Clyde H.

determined idea
18).

Worthington

6-8).

Mooz

with

ever

Judge

think that Segear' s

created

Yoffy,

will was

or

any

sort

that Mooz

fraudulent

or

of

pact,

had any
invalid.

the Complaint is devoid of any plausible basis upon which

Mooz was a state actor.

4

4

Alternatively, even if the Court were to find that Mooz acted
on behalf of the state in her capacity as guardian ad !item, she
would be entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 claims,
"given that the complaint discloses no actions complained of
that occurred outside of the proceedings during which [Palmer]
was acting as guardian ad li tern."
Murphy v. Goff, 2010 WL
2292130, at *4
(W.D. Va. June 7, 2010)
(citing Fleming v.
Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[e]ven if Asbill lied
to the judge in open court,
she was still acting as the
guardian, and is immune from § 1983 liability.")); see also
21

Finally,
noted above,

the

same is

"lawyers do

true
not

for

act

Defendant Rose

Palmer.

*under color of state

merely by making use of the state's court system."
Asbil,

42

F.3d

886,

Sparks,

449 U.S.

Palmer

sought

24,

890
28

(4th

Cir.

(1980)).

appointment

as

1994)

As
law'

Fleming v.

(quoting

Dennis

v.

Worthington has alleged that

Segear's

guardian,

"failed

to

attempt to contact Plaintiff 'XW'" prior to doing so, failed to

provide

Worthington

with

information

concerning

his

grandparents, and subsequently "filed a Real Estate Affidavit in
the

Probate Court

of Richmond City."

(Compl.

SI5

21-22,

None of those assertions establish that Palmer was a

30).

state actor

in failing to do what Worthington alleges that she did not do.
And,

even if she was a state actor

(and she is not), those

allegations posit no wrongdoing by Palmer, because there is no
allegation that she was obligated to contact Worthington before
qualifying as Segear's Conservator or that she was obligated to

give Worthington information about his grandparents.
no

cited authority that such obligations exist,

There is

and the Court

found no authority to that effect.^
Worthington
that

Palmer

Serdah v.

tries

somehow

Edwards,

to

establish

conspired

2011

WL

with

3849703,

state
Judge
at

*3

action
Yoffy
(W.D.

by
to
Va.

alleging
deprive
Aug.

30,

2011) .

^ Nor is there any alleged wrong in the filing of the alleged
Real Estate affidavit, or any basis in law to believe that doing
so was somehow wrongful.
22

Worthington of his inheritance.

However, the Complaint contains

no pleaded facts that plausibly {or otherwise,
posit

a

conspiracy between those two

for

for that matter)

that,

or any other,

purpose.

In sum,
Palmer

was

allegedly

the Complaint provides no

a

state

actor

actionable

as

to

conduct

her

basis

own

with

conduct

Judge

paragraph 40 is directed toward Palmer.
meet

the

Twombly and

Iqbal

to consider that
or

to

the

insofar

Yoffy

as

as

Nor does the Complaint

requirements

as

to

the

conspiracy

aspect of paragraph 40.

Because

Worthington

particularity

that

attributable

to

fail.

any

In

any

the

has

of

state,"

event,

as

failed

to

Defendants'
the

a

claims

sister

allege

conduct
in

"fairly
40

court

must

aptly

"a

under

[his]

grandparents' wills is insufficient or that property

under

those

has

been

allocated

in

a

[his]

any

summarized,

wills

that

is

Paragraph

district

complaint by plaintiff[]

with

manner

inheritance

not

to

[his]

liking does not constitute a cause of action that Section 1983
was intended to address."

Supp.

502,

Therefore,

513

(D.N.J.

Poling v.

2000).

K.

That

Hovnanian Enters.,

certainly

is

so

99 F.

here.

the claims in Paragraph 40 based on the deprivation

of Worthington's own Due Process rights will be dismissed as to
all

Defendants.

23

2.

Claims on Behalf of Mr.

and Mrs.

Segear

In Paragraph 40 of his Complaint, Worthington also alleges

that Defendants deprived Worthington "and Clyde H.

Segear and

t,

Alice

B.

Segear

of

their

violation of the

First

to Worthington's

failure

property

and

property

and Fourteenth Amendments.

to plausibly allege

rights"

in

In addition

state action,

to

the extent that Worthington wishes to bring any claims on behalf
of the Segears, he lacks standing to pursue claims on behalf of
Segear or Mrs. Segear.

The standing requirement is met only where three conditions
are satisfied:

"(1)

the plaintiff must allege that he or she

suffered an actual or threatened injury that is not conjectural

or hypothetical;

(2)

the injury must be fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct; and (3)
to redress the injury."
Cir. 2006)
560-561

a favorable decision must be likely

Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th

(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

(1992)).

Moreover,

the

Supreme

Court

has

established

that a party "generally must assert his own legal rights and
interests,

rights

or

and

cannot

his

claim

to

interests of third parties."

U.S.

490,

499

737,

750

(1984)

litigant

rest

from

(1975);

see

(noting

raising

relief

Warth v.

generally Allen v.

that

another

standing
party's

24

on

rights).

legal

Seldin,

Wright,

doctrine

the

468

422
U.S.

prohibits
As

the

a

party

invoking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing these elements.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.

With respect to third-party standing,

a party may assert

claims on behalf of another only if he can show that:

(1)

the

litigant and the third party suffered the same "injury in fact,"
(2) the litigant must have a "close relationship" with the third

party,

and

(3) there must exist some hindrance to the third

party's ability to bring suit for herself.
U.S.

400,

410-411

(1991).

Powers v. Ohio, 499

Furthermore,

in

Virginia,

constitutional claims on behalf of a decedent must be brought by

the decedent's personal representative.
Cty.

Of Albemarle,

2005 WL 3533428,

See, e.g., Stephens v.

at *9

(W.D. Va.

Dec.

22,

2005); O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F.
Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981).

Worthington does

not

allege,

nor

could he,

Segear's appointed personal representative.

that he

is

Therefore, he lacks

standing to bring any claims on Segear's behalf.

Moreover, with

respect to his claims on behalf of Alice Segear, at a minimum,
Worthington fails the third prong of the Powers test, because he
has alleged no reason why Ms. Segear cannot bring suit on her
own

behalf.

Thus,

Worthington's

claims

Segears will be dismissed for lack of standing.

25

on

behalf

of

the

D.

Claims in Paragraph 41

Worthington claims
Defendants

have

First

Fourteenth

and

grandparents.
to

bring

in Paragraph

violated

his

41

of the Complaint that

constitutional

Amendments

to

the

rights

under

companionship

of

the
his

The Court interprets this paragraph as attempting

both

a

substantive

due

process

claim

under

the

Fourteenth Amendment, and a right of association claim under the
First

Amendment.

However,

support for this assertion,

Worthington

has

offered

no

legal

and because the Court can find no

precedent to support the existence of such rights under either
the First or Fourteenth Amendments, Worthington's constitutional
claims

pertaining

to

the

deprivation

of

his

grandparents'

companionship must be dismissed.
Neither the Fourth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has ever
held,

or

even

implied,

that

adult

grandchildren

have

a

constitutional right to visit and speak on the telephone with
their grandparents under the Fourteenth Amendment.

At most, the

Supreme Court has held that the state may not constitutionally
prohibit

grandparents

grandchildren.
(1977).
and

has

Moore v.

However,
never

companionship.

from

living

with

City of East Cleveland,

their

minor

431 U.S.

494

the context of this right is quite limited,
been

interpreted

to

encompass

As one sister court within the

wisely noted:
26

a

right

to

Fourth Circuit

[The] substantive due process cases do not
hold that family relationships are, in the
abstract,
protected
against
all
state
encroachments, direct or indirect, but only
that the state may not interfere with an
individual's right to choose how to conduct
his or her family affairs.
The emphasis in
these cases on choice suggests that the
right is one of preemption; rather than an
absolute
right
to
a
certain
family
relationship, family members have the right,
when confronted with the state's attempt to
make
choices
for
them,
to
choose
for
themselves.
Willard v. City of Myrtle Beach,
1989).

728 F.

Supp.

397,

402

(D.S.C.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the fundamental

Fourteenth

Amendment

right

of

parents

to

make

child-rearing

decisions allows parents to deny grandparents the companionship
of

their

district

grandchildren,
court's

Worthington's
companionship
Troxel v.
must

be

process
this

in

argument,
is

not

"reluctant
because

Harker Heights,

implying,

assessment

Granville,

uncharted

thus

a

expand

are

503 U.S.

57

for

scarce
115,

(2000).

the

concept

responsible
and

and

with

the

contrary

to

protected

declines to recognize such an interest here.

interest.

Furthermore,
of

courts

substantive

decision-making

open-ended."

125 (1992).

27

accord

grandparent-grandchild

constitutionally

guideposts
area

Willard

that

530 U.S.
to

in

Collins

due
in
v.

Therefore, the Court

Similarly,
grandparental

no court has

recognized such a

companionship

right of association.

claim

under

the

First

Amendment

Supreme Court associational jurisprudence
first, the right of

consists of two distinct doctrinal threads:
association

deprivation of

protects

relationships," and second,

of

kinds

"certain

it provides a

highly

personal

"right to associate

for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the
First Amendment--speech,
grievances,

assembly,

petition for the redress of
Roberts v.

and the exercise of religion."

States Jaycees,

468 U.S.

609,

617-618

United

Concerning the

(1984).

former, the Supreme Court has noted that "the relationships that
might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection are
those

that

marriage;

attend

cohabitation

creation

raising

the

the

and

with

one's

and

sustenance
of

education

a

family-and

children;

Id. at

relatives."

of

619

(citations

omitted).
Unsurprisingly,

given

substantive

due

protections

concerning

family,"

the

process

Court

has

the

close

doctrine

and

"the

creation

been

unable

to

parallels
the

and

First

between
Amendment

sustenance

locate

any

of

a

appellate

decision expanding the First Amendment right of association to
encompass mere companionship.
recognize

such

a

right

The Court therefore declines to

here.

Worthington's

constitutional

claims under the First and Fourteenth amendments concerning the
28

companionship of his grandparents

as asserted in paragraph

41

will accordingly be dismissed as to all Defendants.
E.

Claims in Paragraph 42

In Paragraph 42 of the Complaint,
Defendants

"conspired

herein

their

of

to,

and

Fourteenth

did,

Worthington claims that

deprive

Amendment

Due

Plaintiffs
Process

(sic]

and

Equal

Protection Rights in the same manner as described in paragraph
#41."

(Compl.

~

42).

Worthington's due process claims fail for

the reasons discussed in Part C above, so that analysis will not
be repeated here.

Additionally,

Worthington provides no facts

supporting a claim to relief under the Equal Protection Clause,
and therefore the remaining claims in Paragraph 42 will also be
dismissed as to all defendants.
To plead an equal protection violation based on
valid

laws

that:

or

(1)

he

ordinances,
was

treated

similarly situated; and (2)
or purposeful.
Cir.

2001).

a

plaintiff
differently

from

Garraghty,

others

239 F.3d 648,

"Once this showing is made,

allege

who

are

under the requisite level of scrutiny."
into account

654

(4th

the court proceeds to

the disparity in treatment

even taking

plausibly

that such treatment was intentional

Morrison v.

determine whether

Here,

must

facially

can be

justified

Id.

the more

liberal pleading

standards for pro se plaintiffs, the Court is unable to discern
a

single

allegation

in

the

Complaint
29

tending

to

show

that

Worthington
similarly
matter,
absent

was

"treated

situated.n
"others

from

the

differently

Morrison,

who

are

239

F.3d

similarly

narrative;

the

from

others

at

are

are

For

654.

situated"

Complaint

who

that

altogether

concerns

only

the

alleged mistreatment of Worthington and his grandparents.
single

conclusory

paragraph

claiming

Due

Process

and

This
Equal

Protection violations fails to provide even a "sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully."
Therefore,

Worthington's

claims

in

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Paragraph

42

shall

be

dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants.
F.

Claims in Paragraph 43

In Paragraph 43 of the Complaint, Worthington alleges that
all

Defendants

Malpractice."

"conspired

to,

and

did,

commit

Medical

Defendants argue that Worthington does not have

standing to pursue any medical malpractice claim on behalf of
Segear.

They are correct.

Virginia
decedent's
medical

Code

§

personal

malpractice

discussed in

Part

representative

of

8.01-229(8) (1)

representative
claim

on

C. 2 above,
Segear.

provides

has

behalf

standing
of

Worthington
Thus,

that

the
is

only

a

to

bring

a

decedent.
not

Worthington

the

does

As

personal
not

have

standing to bring any medical malpractice claims on behalf of
Segear,

and

Worthington's

medical

malpractice

dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants.
30

claims

will

be

G.

Claims in Paragraph 44

In Paragraph 44 of the Complaint,

Worthington claims that

all defendants "individually and collectively, conspired to, and
did,

cause

Plaintiff."
for

infliction

was

causally

of

of

conduct

was

outrageous

related

to

emotional

distress,

(1974).

intentional

and

was

or

intolerable;

(3)

type

of extreme emotional distress
could be

White,

(1991).

241 Va. 23

plaintiffs

that

expected to

still

distress
factual

the
was

and

Eldridge,

(4)

215 Va.

is

so severe that

endure

it. "

need

not

comply

with

must

than

enhancement."

the

"bare
Iqbal,

New

Nonetheless,

severity

assertions
556

P.

heightened

Hatf ill v.

(4th Cir. 2005).

substantiate

with more

the

no

Russo v.

However, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

York Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 337

further

that:

(2)

distress;

pleading standard required by Virginia courts.

emotional

plaintiff

The alleged emotional distress must be "the

reasonable person

plaintiff

on

conduct

the

Womack v.

severe.

342

the

a

reckless;

emotional

338,

federal

Distress

in order to prevail on a claim

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's distress

8,

Emotional

and prove by clear and convincing evidence,

defendant's

conduct

Infliction

Under Virginia law,

intentional

must allege,
(1)

Intentional

U.S.

of

his

devoid
at

of

678-79

(internal citation omitted).
Even
three

assuming

elements

of

that
the

Worthington

test

above,
31

he

has
has

satisfied

the

first

pleaded no specific

facts

tending

Indeed,

to

show that

Worthington

psychological

harm

has

his

emotional

alleged

beyond

no

this

distress

physical,

single

is

severe.

reputational,

conclusory

or

paragraph.

Because Worthington has failed adequately to plead the element
of

severe

proved,

distress,
would

Worthington's

he

has

failed

him

entitle
statement

to

to

allege

relief

facts

on

that,

if

claim.

"defendants ... did[]

that

this

cause

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress on Plaintiff" is a
conclusory
Thus,

legal

allegation

Worthington' s

and

claims

not

for

entitled

intentional

to

any

weight.

infliction

of

emotional distress in paragraph 44 will be dismissed as to all
Defendants.
H.

Worthington's Common Law Conspiracy Claims

Although it

is not entirely clear from the Complaint,

it

appears that Worthington asserts a claim against all Defendants
for common law civil conspiracy.
However,
any

(Compl.

~~

31, 33, 35, 40-44).

because Worthington has failed to sufficiently allege

underlying

wrong,

as

is

required

by

Virginia

law,

Worthington's civil conspiracy claims will be dismissed against
all Defendants.
Under

Virginia

law,

a

plaintiff

conspiracy claim must allege facts
agreement

between

two

or

more

asserting

a

sufficient to show:

persons

(2)

to

civil
( 1)

an

accomplish

an

unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful
32

means,

which

(3)

results in damage to plaintiff.

Wiley, 485 F. Supp. 2d 694, 703 (E.D. Va. 2007)
Glass,

228 Va.

39,

47

(1984)).

Importantly,

Firestone v.

(citing Glass v.

where "there is no

actionable claim for the underlying alleged wrong,

there can be

no action for civil conspiracy based on that wrong."

Citizens

for Fauquier County v. SPR Corp., 37 Va. Cir. 44, 50 (1995).
other

words,

"in

Virginia,

a

common

law

claim

of

In

civil

conspiracy generally requires proof that the underlying tort was
committed."

Almy v. Grisham,

237 Va.

68,

81

(2007).

Moreover,

"there can be no conspiracy to do an act which the law allows."
Hechler Chevrolet,

Inc.

v.

Gen.

Motors Corp. ,

2 30 Va.

3 9 6,

4 02

is

not

(1985).
Furthermore,
enough

merely

plaintiff

to

to

must

survive

allege

allege

a

motion

that

facts

the

Va.

2003).

As

explained

in

See

dismiss,

conspiracy

supporting

conspiracy with particularity.
Quality Tobacco Prods., LLC,

to

took

the

place;

existence

261 F. Supp. 2d 483,
the

of

a
a

v.

Bell

499-500

Bay Tobacco,

Bay Tobacco,

it

(E.D.

LLC

plaintiff must

plead agreement in more than mere conclusory language in order
to

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss,

because

"a

conspiracy

claim

asserted in mere conclusory language is based on inferences that
are not fairly or justly drawn from the facts alleged."

33

Id.

Worthington's

allegations

of

conspiracy

fail

that

test.

First, Worthington's claims that Defendants conspired to commit
medical malpractice and intentionally inflict emotional distress
must fail because, for the reasons stated above, Worthington has
failed

to

state

Worthington has
sufficient

a

claim

for

the

underlying

failed to plead his
Even

particularity.

torts.

Second,

claims of conspiracy with
construing

the

complaint

liberally, Worthington did not state any specific facts tending
to show that any Defendants made any agreement among themselves
to

commit

medical

malpractice

or

emotional distress on Worthington.
failed

to

state

a

claim

for

to

intentionally

Therefore,
common

law

inflict

Worthington has
conspiracy,

and

Worthington's conspiracy claims will be dismissed with prejudice
as to all Defendants.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein,

Worthington's Complaint

will be dismissed as to all claims and all Defendants.
It is so ORDERED.

Isl
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia
Date: November "V'f; 2015

34