Buholtz v. Carroll et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION (Denying Rule 59(e) Motion). See for complete details. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 03/14/2016. Clerk mailed copy to pro se Plaintiff. (nbrow)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
KENNETH LEO BUHOLTZ
Plaintiff,

v.
BART CARROLL, et al.,
Defendants.

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MAR I A 20l6
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHMOND, VA

Civil Action No. 3:15CV520-HEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Denying Rule 59(e) Motion)
By Memorandum and Order entered January 15, 2016, the Court dismissed
Kenneth Buholtz's civil action for failure to state a claim and as legally frivolous.
Buholtz v. Carroll, No. 3:15CV520, 2016 WL 204474, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 15, 2016).

On February 11, 2016, 1 the Court received from Buboltz, a "MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND TO VACATE JUDGMENT," that the Court construes as a
motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) ("Rule 59(e) Motion," ECF
No. 17). See MLC Auto., LLC v. Town ofS. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citing Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized three
grounds for relief under Rule 59(e): "(1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076,
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This is the day Buholtz swears he placed his motion in the prison mail system for mailing to
this Court. The Court deems the motion filed as of that date. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.
266, 276 (1988).

1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406,
1419 (D. Md. 1991); Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D.
Miss. 1990)). Although Buboltz fails to identify on what ground he seeks relief, he
apparently argues that Rule 59(e) relief should be granted to correct an error of law or to
prevent manifest injustice.
Buboltz argues that because he paid the full $400.00 filing fee he "does not fall
under the same criteria as an inmate filing informa pauperis as indicated in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)." (Rule 59(e) Mot. 4.) Thus, he argues that the Court should not have
dismissed his action as frivolous. Buholtz is incorrect. At the time Buholtz filed his civil
action, he was incarcerated. Buholtz also named government employees as Defendants.
Thus, he falls under the ambit of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") and 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. That statute provides:
(a) Screening.--The Court shall review ... a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity
or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint-(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relied may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).
Tied to the incorrect assertion that his action should be treated differently because
he paid the full filing fee, Buholtz requests that the Court "vacate its judgment of denial
and dismissal, and transfer this case [along with the$ 400.000 filing fee] to the Eastern

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District of Texas, allowing that Court to determine the merits anew ." (Rule 59( e) Mot.
4.) Buboltz argues that jurisdiction would be appropriate in the Eastern District of Texas.
Buboltz fails to explain and this Court fails to discern why the Court should transfer an
action that states no claim for relief and is frivolous.
The Court dismissed the action in part, because Buboltz failed to allege a federal
claim, and because the Court could exercise no jurisdiction over any potential state law
claims because Defendants were residents of Texas. Any potential Texas state law claim
was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Buboltz is free to
refile those state law claims in the appropriate court. Buboltz fails to identify any clear
error of law or any other basis for granting Rule 59(e) relief. See Williams v. Virginia,
524 F. App'x 40, 41 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'! Fire Ins. Co., 148
F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)) ("The reconsideration of a judgment after entry is an
extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly."). Accordingly, Buholtz's Rule
59(e) Motion (ECF No. 17) will be denied.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

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Isl

HENRY E. HUDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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l'i 2.ol'
Date:
Richmond, Virgi~ia

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