Lewis v. Unknown

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr on 03/09/2016. Copy mailed to Lewis on 3/9/2016.(tjoh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

LAWRENCE DONNELL LEWIS,

Petitioner,
V.

Civil Action No. 3:15CV556

UNKNOWN,

Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lawrence Donnell Lewis, a Virginia prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil action.

By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on January 28, 2016, this Court dismissed the
action without prejudice because Lewis failed to return a consent to collection of fees form and
did not pay the statutory filing fee.

On February 12, 2016, the Court received from Lewis a Notice of Appeal containing
argument that the Court construes as a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) ("Rule 59(e) Motion," ECF No. 15). Lewis claims that he "was confused by the consent
form to collect fees, Petitioner thought that by signing [the] consent form, he would be
compelled to pay the collection fee right away and petitioner doesn't have the money . . . ."
(Rule 59(e) Mot, 1.) Lewis also now returns a completed consent to collection of fees form.
(ECF No. 13.)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized three grounds
for relief under Rule 59(e): "(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent

manifest injustice."

Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing

Weyerhaeiiser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (D. Md. 1991); Atkins v.
Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D. Miss. 1990)).

Lewis's purported

confusion about the purpose of the consent to collection of fees form does not excuse his failure
to return it to the Court. Lewis fails to demonstrate that the Court committed a clear error of law

or that reopening his case is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

Nor does Lewis

demonstrate any other basis for granting Rule 59(e) relief. See Williams v. Virginia, 524 F.

App'x 40, 41 (4th Cir. 2013) ("The reconsideration of a judgment after entry is an extraordinary
remedy which should be used sparingly." (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148
F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998))). Accordingly, Lewis's Rule 59(e) Motion will be DENIED.
Nevertheless, because Lewis has now returned the consent to collection of fees form, it appears

that he desires to continue to pursue his claims. The Court will DIRECT the Clerk to refile
Lewis's "Motion Pursuant to [Rule] Sixty [(b)(B)(4) and (6)]" ("Motion," ECF No. 10) as a new

civil action as ofthe date of entry hereof.'
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Date:

Richmond, Virginia

/g/

John A. Gibney^r.^
United States District Judge

' Lewis initially filed his Rule 60(b) Motion on September 16, 2015. The Court received
the newest version of this Motion from Lewis on December 22, 2015. The newest version of the
Motion supplants the earlier-filed motion.