Fields v. Sprint Corporation et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 9/9/2016. (jsmi, ) (Main Document 27 replaced on 9/9/2016) (jsmi, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

NEALK. FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
V,

Civil Action No. 3:15cv618

SPRINT CORPORATION et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This mattercomes before the Courtsna sponte on the Court's consideration of its subject

matter jurisdiction overthe state law claims remaining, PlaintifFNeal K, Fields brings this

action in this Court invoking jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,' 1343,^ and 1367.^
Fields enumeratesfifteen counts in his Amended Complaint. Following the filing of two

' "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

^Section 1343 bestows original jurisdiction in theUnited States district courts for actions
alleging deprivation of civil rights under color of state law:

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:

(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
securedby the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States[.]
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).

^"[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over allother claims that areso related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy

" 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fields voluntarily dismissed his case against one

defendant and conceded certain claims against the others. At Fields's request, the Court will
dismiss the conceded claims, which include the lone remaining federal claim upon which this

Court's original jurisdiction rests. Only seven state law claims will remain.
The Court must next decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those

claims for which it does not have original jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, the Court will

decline to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over Fields's state law claims, and the Court will
dismiss the action without prejudice.
I, Procedural Background

This dispute arises from Fields's December 2014 visit to a Sprint Store in North

Chesterfield, Virginia, which ultimately led to Fields's arrest by the Chesterfield County Police
Department. As a result of his arrest. Fields alleges, among other things, to have received an

unpaid suspension from his then-employer and suffered ridicule from the conmiunity at large.

Fields now brings suit against three defendants: Sprint Corporation, a corporation incorporated
in Delaware with a principal place of business in Kansas; Mariano Almonte, an individual
employed by Sprint in Virginia, whom Fields alleges has since left the Commonwealth; and,
Kevin P. Gruarin, an officer with the Chesterfield County Police Department who is domiciled in

Virginia. Fields's First Amended Complaint'* states the following counts:
(1) Count I: Malicious prosecution against Sprint Corporation and Almonte;
(2) Count 11: Negligence against Sprint Corporation;
(3) Count III: Negligence against Sprint Coiporation and Almonte;

(4) Count rV: Gross negligence against Sprint Corporation;

Fields amended his initial Complaint as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B), (ECF No. 11), after Gruarin filed a motion to dismiss that
complaint, (ECF No. 8).

(5) Count V: Gross negligence against Almonte;
(6) Count VI: False arrest against Sprint Corporation and Almonte;
(7) Count VII: Intentional infliction of emotional distress against Sprint Corporation and
Almonte;

(8) Count VIII: Slander and slander per se against Sprint Corporation and Almonte;

(9) Count DC: Malicious prosecution (state law) against Gruarin;
(10) Count X: Malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Gruarin;
(11) Count XI: False arrest against Gruarin;
(12) Count XII; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Gruarin;

(13) Count XIII: 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against Sprint Corporation and Almonte;
(14) Count XIV: Punitive damages against Sprint Corporation and Almonte; and,
(15) Count XV: Punitive damages against Gruarin.

Fields seeks $5,000,000 in compensatory damages, togetherwith costs, pre- and post-judgment
interest, and $5,000,000 in punitive damages.

Sprint Corporation and Almonte (collectively, the "Sprint Defendants") jointly movedto

dismiss Fields's FirstAmended Complaint, alleging that Fields failed to stateany claim upon
which relief can be granted. (SprintCorp. and Almonte Mot. Dismiss First Am. Compl. 1, ECF
No. 13.) Gruarin likewise moved to dismiss the claims against him for failure to state a claim.
(Gruarin Mot. Dismiss First Am. CompL, ECF No. 15.) Fields responded to both motions to
dismiss, (ECF Nos. 20,21), and the defendants replied, (ECF Nos. 22,23).
Before the Court ruled on Gruarin's Motion to Dismiss, Fields sought to dismiss all

claims against Gruarin—^the state actor giving rise to Field's § 1983 claims. (Not. Voluntary
Dismissal, ECF No. 25.) The Court then dismissed all claims against Gruarin. (Voluntary
Dismissal 0., ECF No. 26 (dismissing Counts IX, X, XI, XII, and XV).) Although

Fields originally asserted a § 1983 claim against the Sprint Defendants, Fields has correctly
conceded that claim in briefing on the Sprint Defendants' motion to dismiss. (PL's Mem. Opp'n
to Defs. Sprint Corp. and Almonte's Mot. Dismiss 23, ECF No. 21 ("Upon due consideration of
the authorities, Mr. Fields acknowledges that his Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual
particulars to sustain a Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim against Defendants."); see First Am.

Compl. IfK 178-83 (Count XIII).)^ The Court will dismiss Count XIIL Inhis response, Fields
also fittingly conceded his slander and slander per se claims against the Sprint Defendants. (PL's
Mem. Opp'n to Defs. Sprint Corp. and Almonte's Mot. Dismiss 17; see First Am. Compl.
fit 129-40 (Count VIII).) The Court will dismiss Count VIIL Finally, Fields recognized that he

could not seek punitive damages as a separate cause ofaction.^ (PL's Mem. Opp'n to Defs.

^Even ifFields did not concede his § 1983 claims against Sprint and Almonte, those
claims would have failed. Private parties can be liable under § 1983 if they conspire to commit,
or jointly engage in, prohibited actions with state officials. See Adickes v. S. H Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144,152 (1970). To establish a conspiracy under § 1983, the non-state actor must act
in concert with the state official and overtly act in furtherance of the conspiracy, resulting in the
deprivation of another's constitutional right. See Hinkle v. City ofClarksburg, 81 F.3d 416,421
(4th Cir. 1996); see also Mathis v. McDonougK No. ELH-13-2597,2014 WL 3894133, at *19
n.l 1 (D. Md. Aug. 7,2014) ('"[UJnder § 1983, a plaintiff must establish not only that a private
actor caused a deprivation of constitutional rights, but that the private actor willfully participated
with state officialsand reached a mutual understanding concerning the unlawful objectiveof a
conspiracy.'" (quoting Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 950 (8th Cir. 2005))).
Fields's conclusory allegations merely suggest that the private actors caused the
deprivation of his constitutional rights. Nothing in the First Amended Complaint evinces that the
Sprint Defendants reached a mutual understanding with Gruarin (the state actor) to achieve the
unlawful objective of the conspiracy. Fields's allegations lack reference to the necessary
"common objective" among actors that must be pleaded to articulate a conspiracy claim. See
Davis V. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP., No. 3:15cv387,2016 WL 1464563, at *9 (E.D. Va. Apr.
13, 2016).

^Fields has requested that the Court dismiss his slander and slanderperse claims without
prejudice. Because the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Fields's
state law claims without reaching the merits, the Court will dismiss all claims, including Fields's
slander and slander per se claims, without prejudice.

sprint Coip. and Almonte's Mot. Dismiss 23; see First Am. Compl.

184-89 (Count XIV).)

The Court will dismiss Count XIV,

Only seven counts will remain, all ofwhich articulate causes ofaction under Virginia

law: Count I: malicious prosecution against the Sprint Defendants; Count II: negligence against
Sprint Corporation; Count III: negligence against the Sprint Defendants; Count IV: gross
negligence against Sprint Corporation; Count V: gross negligence against Almonte; Count VI:
false arrest against the Sprint Defendants; and, Count VII: intentional infliction ofemotional
distress against the Sprint Defendants.
II. Analysis

United States district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims so long
as those claims "fomi part ofthe same case or controversy" as claims over which the Court has

original jurisdiction, such as federal claims. 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). By concedmg his federal
claims here. Fields abandoned the claims that initially permitted him to file this predominantly
state-law-action in this Court. As a result, this Court may now, inits discretion, decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Id. §1367(c)(3). For the
reasons stated below, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will
dismiss the case for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction.
A.

Standard for Supplemental Jurisdiction After Federal Claims Are Dismissed

Federal district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that '*form

part ofthe same case or controversy" as afederal claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Adistrict court,
however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims ifthe district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see
also United Mine Workers ofAm, v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (generally, iffederal
claims are dismissed before trial, state claims should be dismissed as well).

"The doctrine ofsupplemental jurisdiction is one offlexibility, and there is no
^mandatory rule' requiring dismissal when the federal claim is disposed ofbefore trial." Peter

FarrellSupercars. Inc. v. Monsen, 82 F. App'x 293,297 (4th Cir. 2003); jee also Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIFBio, Inc.^ 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) ("A district court's decision whether to

exercise [subject-matter] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original

jurisdiction is purely discretionary."); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995)
("The doctrine ofsupplemental jurisdiction indicates that federal courts generally have discretion

to retain or dismiss state law claims when the federal basis for an action drops away."). Among
the factors that mform the Court's discretionary determination are "convenience and fairness to

the parties, the existence ofany underiying issues offederal policy, comity, and considerations
ofjudicial economy." Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110.

The Court Lacks Original Jurisdiction Over the Remaininpr niflimjg
The remaining seven claims allege causes ofaction under Virginia law over which the

Court does not have original jurisdiction.^ In the First Amended Complaint, Fields does not,
because he cannot, allege that any ofthe remaining claims provide a basis for federal question
jurisdiction. The parties' briefs rely exclusively onthe application ofVirginia law. Fields

likewise has not alleged that this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332^ after

As indicated above, the claims still atbar are: Count I: malicious prosecution against
the Sprint Defendants; Count II: negligence against Sprint Corporation; Count III: negligence
against the Sprint Defendants; Count IV: gross negligence against Sprint Corporation; Count V:
gross negligence against Almonte; Count VI: false arrest against the Sprint Defendants; and,
Count VII: intentional infliction ofemotional distress against the Sprint Defendants.
8

•
Section 1332 confers subject matter jurisdiction when the parties are diverse and the
amount incontroversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

the dismissal ofGruarin.' Thus, the Court may consider the remaining state law claims only ifit
exercises supplemental jurisdiction.

C.

All Factors Informing the Court's Discretionary Determination Favor
Dismissal

Although the court has unbridled discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction in this case, Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 556 U.S. at639, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit advises that the Court should consider "convenience and fairness

to the parties, the existence ofany underlying issues offederal policy, comity, and considerations

ofjudicial economy," Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at HO. An evaluation ofthese four factors uniformly
favors dismissal.

The Court quickly dispenses with its consideration ofthe federal policy factor. No issues

offederal policy underlie Fields's remaining claims. All remaining counts allege causes of

action under Virginia law. Fields has laudably conceded that the First Amended Complaint did
not state aclaim against Sprint and Almonte under 42 U.S.C. §1983, which provides a private

' Even ifFields had invoked diversity jurisdiction under §1332, the allegations in the

First Amended Complaint would still fail to plausibly show that this Court has original
jurisdiction. When a party seeks to invoke diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, he orshe bears
the burden ofdemonstrating that the grounds for diversity exist and that diversity is complete.
See Kimble v. Rajpal, 566 F. Apjp'x 261,263 (4th Cir. 2014). While the Court presumes
diversity between Fields, aVirginia resident, and Sprint, acorporation incorporated in Delaware
with its principal place ofbusiness in Illinois, Fields does not allege diversity between himself
and Almonte. The First Amended Complaint provides only a conclusory statement that Almonte
"has left the Commonwealth ofVirginia." (First Am. Compl. H7.) Even iftrue, such a
conclusory statement does notallege that diversity jurisdiction exists.
A party s citizenship is based upon his or her state of domicile. SeeNew RiverLumber

Co. V. Graff, 889 F.2d 1084,1989 WL 134584, at *1 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that, for diversity
purposes, "citizenship is the equivalent ofdomicile"). As the United States Court ofAppeals for

the Fourth Circuit has stated, "[d]omicile requires physical presence, coupled with ... intent to
make the State ahome." Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 937 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Pertinent here, "[a] person can have only one domicile at a
time, and will keep an existing domicile until anew one is established." Bagheri v. Bailey, No.
1.14cv77, 2015 WL 6738306, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 4, 2015) (citation omitted). Thus, even if
Almonte has left Virginia, the First Amended Complaint does not allege complete diversity
among the parties.

nght ofaction for aviolation ofconstitutional rights by persons acting under the color ofstate
law. Neither the First Amended Complaint nor the parties' briefmg on the motion to dismiss

indicate how this case, absent the §1983 claims, implicates federal policy.
The Court's consideration ofcomity and judicial economy likewise favors

Fields's remaining claims rely entirely upon Virginia law, and the parties' arguments rest
pnmanly on decisions ofVirginia courts. It would be imprudent for this Court, one oflimited

junsdiction, to suggest that it could more readily decide matters ofVirginia law than Virginia
courts could. For the same reason, allowing astate court to address state law matters would best
serve judicial economy.

Fairness and convenience to the parties also weigh in favor ofthe Court declining
supplemental jurisdiction. This case remains in an early stage oflitigation. Fields has filed a
First Amended Complaint, and the remaining two defendants have jointly moved to rii»m;.=c that
pleading. The Court has not decided any disputed state-law-based claims, and Fields conceded
the federal claims. The Court has not entered any discovery orders, and no matters will remain

under consideration after this Court issues its decision. Were Fields to subsequently file his
claims macourt ofappropriatejurisdiction,'" the parties would, for all intents and puiposes,
begin at the same stage ofthe litigation process. Accordingly, the Court's consideration ofthe
convenience to the parties also fevors Hkmicciii

were

giving rise to Fields's clauns atwo-year statute oflimitations the charges
dropped mMy 2015. Virginia hasbegan in late-December 2014, andfor general

personal injury claims. Va. Code §8.01-243(A).

in. Concliisinn

For the foregoing reasons, the Court sua sponte declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. Tlie Court will dismiss this case for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction.
Anappropriate Order shall issue.

United State#District Judge
Richmond, Virginia

SEP 09 2018