Hinton v. Finch et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr on 01/18/2017. Copy mailed to pro se plaintiff. (tjoh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

DONALD LEE HINTON,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No. 3:15CV626

SERGEANT FINCH, et al..
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Donald Lee Hinton, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, filed this

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.' In his Particularized Complaint ("Complaint," ECF No. 22), Hinton
contends that Defendants Sergeant Finch, Recreation Supervisor Walker, Unit Manager C.

Townes, Sergeant Malone, Ombudsman C. Jones, and Doctor Mililani committed various
constitutional violations with regard to Hinton's fall from a broken bench during his
incarceration at the Lawrenceville Correctional Center ("LCC"). The matter is before the Court

for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any

action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state

' The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
first standard includes claims based upon "'an indisputably meritless legal theory,"' or claims

where the "'factual contentions are clearly baseless.'" Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427

(E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is
the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;

importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v, Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356
(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded

allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 1 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'"

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,

rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In

order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the

plaintiffmust "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.L
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft

Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th
Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construespro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing

statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint.
See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City

ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS

Hinton's initial Complaint ("Initial Complaint," ECF No. 1) repeated the following

unhelpful statement of his claims: "gross negligence, deliberate indifference, and reckless
disregard for [Plaintiffs] health and safety" in violation of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Initial Compl. 2 (capitalization corrected).) The Court noted that Hinton's

allegations were extremely repetitive, conclusory, and failed to provide each defendant with fair
notice of the facts and legal basis upon which his or her liability rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Accordingly, by Memorandum Order entered on August 17, 2016, the Court directed Hinton to
particularize his Initial Complaint.

On August 29, 2016, the Court received another Complaint ("Second Complaint," ECF
No. 20) from Hinton. This Second Complaint was nearly identical to the Initial Complaint that

Hinton previously filed and that the Court determined was deficient.

Hinton repeated the

identical repetitive, conclusory, and unhelpful statement of his claims. Hinton failed to correct

any of the deficiencies identified in the Court's Memorandum Order and disregarded the Court's
directives almost entirely. Nevertheless, the Court allowed Hinton one final attempt to correct
the deficiencies in his Second Complaint. In his latest Particularized Complaint ("Complaint"),

Hinton mostly complied with the Court's directives; however, he lacks a section containing a
comprehensive statement of the facts giving rise to his claims. Instead, the facts are scattered
throughout the Complaint making it difficult for the Court to provide a concise summary.
Moreover, the Complaint is long on legal conclusions and short on facts. Accordingly, the Court

has parsed the Complaint and makes a list ofpertinent facts as follows: ^
1.
On "June 25, 2016, after a 'work order' for bolts missing from the bench
was entered, Donald Lee Hinton sat on the bench and fell back injuring his head,
neck, and back needing immediate medical treatment." (Compl. ^ 27.)

2.
"Sergeant Malone . . . was there and saw the incident. Because Hinton
complained of head, neck, and back pain, Malone took him to medical." {Id.
nil 69-70 (paragraph numbers omitted)).

3.

"Sergeant Finch admitted he knew the bolts were missing from the bench

before Hinton fell because he filed a 'work order'." (Jd. H 14.)

4.
"Walker, Recreation Supervisor had actual knowledge the bolts were
missing because Sergeant Finch had filed a 'work order'." {Id. ^ 28.)
5.
"After the bench caused Hinton to fall, Sergeant Malone took Hinton to
medical. Nurse Moody RN referred Hinton to Dr. Mililani. Nearly a month
passed before Dr. Mililani saw Hinton. ... Dr. Mililani immediately ordered Xrays and pain medication; meaning Hinton had no medication to ease the pain for
twenty-six (26) days." {Id. 9-12 (paragraph numbers omitted).)

6.
"Hinton is a diabetic and suffers from hypertension magnifying the head,
neck, and back injury suffered in the fall. Dr Mililani knows about this." {Id.
1146.)

^The Court corrects the punctuation, capitalization, spelling, and omits the emphasis in
the quotations from the Complaint.

7.
C. Townes, Unit Manager "lied in her response of July 1, 2015 to Hinton's
Informal Complaint #01855, saying: 'It was Hinton's fault he was injured.'
Townes again lied in her response of July 26, 2015 to Hinton's Informal
Complaint #02185, saying, "Staff could not verify the bench was broken.'" {Id.
55-56 (paragraph numbers omitted).)
8.
"Townes failed to follow the Rules of Operating Procedure 866.1
requiring an investigation." {Id. H63.)

9.

"Hinton sent a request to Malone asking for a copy of the 'incident report'

that is required when an incident of this nature occurs. Malone never responded.
Because Malone did not respond on July 12, 2015, Hinton filed an Informal
Complaint #02068. Malone refused to respond .... {Id.
71-72 (paragraph
numbers omitted).)

10.
"Hinton filed Regular Grievances for both Informal Complaints but C.
Jones refused to give them a tracking number denying the Facility Unit Head
(warden) or his designee to respond per OP 866.1
" {Id. ^ 97.)
Hinton raises the following claims for relief:

Claim One:

"SergeantFinch is liable for the physical injury suffered by Donald Hinton
because Finch admitted he knew the bolts from the bench were missing
because he filed a work order and violated Hinton's Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." {Id. at 2.)

Claim Two:

"Recreation Supervisor Walker has overall responsibility of all recreation
equipment including but not limited to the benches on recreation yard 'B'
and is liable for the physical injury suffered by Donald Lee Hinton a
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." {Id. at 3.)

Claim Three: "Twenty-six days Hinton endured in pain because Doctor Mililani refused
to see him following his physical injury falling from a bench with missing
bolts an Eighth and FourteenthAmendment violation." {Id. at 4.)
Claim Four:

"C. Townes, Unit Manager, who has been terminated, lied in response to
Hinton's timely filed Informal Complaint LVCC-01855 and #02185
violating the First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." {Id. at 6.)

Claim Five:

"Sergeant Malone refused to respond to Hinton's timely request and
Informal Complaint violating Hinton's First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments." {Id. at 7.)

Claim Six:

"C. Jones refused to allow Sergeant Malone to respond to Hinton's timely
filed Informal Complaint and Warden, Ed Wright to respond to Hinton's
timely filed grievance violating Hinton's First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments." {Id. at 8.)

Hinton requests monetary damages. For the reasons stated below, Claims One, Two, Four, Five,
and Six will be DISMISSED. Claim Three will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
III.

A.

ANALYSIS

Claims Pertaining to Grievance Procedures

In Claims Four, Five, and Six, Hinton faults Defendants Townes, Malone, and Jones for

lying during or hindering his ability to utilize the grievance procedures. Hinton claims this is a
violation of his First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Contrary to Hinton's
assertions, "there is no constitutional right to participate in grievance proceedings." Adams v.

Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991)).

Because Hinton enjoys no constitutional right to participate in grievance proceedings, his

allegations that Defendants Townes, Malone, andJones lied in an Informal Complaint, refused to

respond to Hinton's Informal Complaint, or hindered the grievance process are legally frivolous.
See Banks v. Nagle, NOS. 3:07CV^19-HEH, 3:09CV14, 2009 WL 1209031, at *3 (E.D. Va.

May 1, 2009) (citation omitted). Moreover, simply "[r]uling against a prisoner on an
administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the [constitutional] violation." George
V. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Claims Four, Five, and Six will be
DISMISSED.

B.

Eighth Amendment Claims

As a preliminary matter, Hinton complains in Claims One through Three that Defendants
Finch, Walker, and Mililani violated both his Eighth Amendment rights and his Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights.

"[I]t is now well established that the Eighth

Amendment 'serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners,' and
the Due Process Clause affords a prisoner no greater substantive protection 'than does the Cruel

and Unusual Punishments Clause.'" Williams v. Benjamin, 11 F.3d 756, 768 (4th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). Accordingly, to the extent Hinton
challenges the conditions of his confinement or the deliberate indifference to his medical care in
Claims One, Two, and Three, the Court will evaluate those claims under the Eighth Amendment.
Moreover, while Hinton includes Eighth Amendment language such as "deliberate

indifference" in his Complaint, the majority of Hinton's language is tailored to state law

negligence. However, Hinton does not allege state law claims in his Complaint.^ As explained
below, negligence does not amount to a constitutional violation.

To allege an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts that indicate (1) that

objectively the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted "was 'sufficiently serious,' and (2) that
subjectively the prison officials acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Johnson v.

Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991)). Under the objective prong, the inmate must allege facts to suggest that the deprivation
complained of was extreme and amounted to more than the "'routine discomfort'" that is "'part
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" Strickler v.
Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380 n.3 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). "Only

extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment

claim regarding conditions of confinement." De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate such extreme deprivation, Hinton "must allege 'a

serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.'" Id.
at 634 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381).

^ For example, Hinton provides allegations about duty, breach, causation, and harm. He
defines negligence, discusses what a "prudent person" would have done, explains that
Defendants failed to warn him of the danger, and explains that he cannot be faulted in the inquiry
because "he had no way of knowing the bolts were missing." (Compl. TIH 29-30, 34.)

The subjective prong requires the plaintiff to allege facts that indicate a particular
defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

"Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet

it." Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1976)).

[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a substantial

risk of harm is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference between those

general facts and the specific risk of harm confronting the inmate." Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
same). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the deliberate indifference standard requires a

plaintiff to assert facts sufficient to form an inference that "the official in question subjectively
recognized a substantial risk of harm" and "that the official in question subjectively recognized
that his actions were 'inappropriate in light of that risk.'" Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372
F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rich, 129 F.3d at 340 n.2).
1.

Defendants Finch and Walker

In Claim One, Hinton contends that Defendant "Finch is liable for the physical injury

suffered by Donald Lee Hinton because Finch admitted he knew the bolts from the bench were

missing because he filed a work order and violated Hinton's Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." (Compl. 2.) Hinton contends that Defendant Finch "breached security by not

following through on the immediate repair, removal, or notifying Hinton the bench was

dangerous." {Id. ^ 19.) Presumably, Hinton argues that this purportedly unsafe condition
violates the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual living conditions.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). However, "individuals do not have a constitutional
right (1) to be free from a government employee's negligence, even if it causes an injury, or (2)
to have the government protect them from such an injury." Ball v. City of Bristol, Va., Jail,
No.7:10CV00303, 2010 WL 2754320, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 12, 2010) (citing Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). Courts have routinely held that slip and fall cases fail to state a
claim of constitutional dimension under § 1983. See Bacon v. Carroll, 232 F. App'x 158, 160

(3d Cir. 2007) (holding that failure to warn of slippery floor stated a claim of mere negligence
and not a constitutional violation); Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2004)

(finding that slippery conditions arising from standing water in shower was not a condition that
posed a substantial risk of serious harm, even where inmate was on crutches and warned
employees that he faced a heightened risk of failing); Beasley v. Anderson, 61 F. App'x 242, 242
(5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (holding slip and fall claim sounded in negligence and was
insufficient to allege a constitutional claim). Similarly, Hinton's "failure to warn" claim states a

claim of negligence, not an Eighth Amendment violation. Cf. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (holding
inmate's claim that he was injured when he fell down stairs after tripping on pillow left by

deputy sheriff amounted to negligence and was not a constitutional violation).

Moreover,

Hinton's allegation that Defendant Finch knew that the bench was broken because he placed a
work order for its repair fails to indicate that Defendant Finch was aware that the bench posed a
substantial risk of harm to Hinton or that he responded unreasonably. See Ball, 2010 WL

2754320, at *2 (explaining that the "mere fact that the leak in Ball's cell was not fixed in time to

prevent the puddle in which Ball slipped indicates, if anything, that officers may have been

negligent in not calling the plumber a few days earlier"). Hinton fails to state an Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendant Finch and Claim One will be DISMISSED.

Similarly, in Claim Two, Hinton contends that "Recreation Supervisor Walker has

overall responsibility of all recreation equipment including but not limited to the benches on
recreation yard 'B' and is liable for the physical injury suffered by Donald Lee Hinton a

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." (Compl. 3.) Hinton argues that "Walker,
Recreation Supervisor had actual knowledge the bolts were missing because Sergeant Finch had
filed a 'work order'." {Id.

28.) To the extent that Hinton argues that Walker should have

known about the broken bench and should have properly maintained it, for the same reasons
stated above, Hinton fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. The mere fact that the bench
remained broken after a work order had been entered establishes nothing more than negligence.

Cf. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328; Ball, 2010 WL 2754320, at *2. Accordingly, Claim Two will be
DISMISSED.

2.

Defendant Mililani

With respect to the denial of adequate medical care, "a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."
Estelle V. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A medical need is "serious" if it "'has been

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).
In the context of delayed medical care, the objective-prong analysis does not end there.

In addition to demonstrating that a medical need that was objectively serious, a plaintiff must
also establish that the delay in the provision of medical care "'resulted in substantial harm.'"

Mata V. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272,
10

1276 (10th Cir. 2001));

Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 F. App'x 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2008). "[T]he

substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or
considerable pain." Shabazz v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:10CV190, 2012 WL 442270, at

*5 (E.D. Va. 2012) (quoting Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001)).
With respect to the subjective prong, "[t]o establish that a health care provider's actions
constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the treatment must be so grossly

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to
fundamental fairness." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Rogers v.

Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986)). Absent exceptional circumstances, an inmate's

disagreement with medical personnel with respect to a course of treatment is insufficient to state

a cognizable constitutional claim, much less to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Wright
V. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d
Cir. 1970)).

In Claim Three, Hinton contends that "[t]wenty six days Hinton endured pain because
Doctor Mililani refused to see him following his physical injury falling from a bench with

missing bolts an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violation." (Compl. 4.) Hinton provides

little pertinent factual support for this claim. He states: "After the bench caused Hinton to fall.
Sergeant Malone took Hinton to medical. Nurse Moody RN referred Hinton to Dr. Mililani.
Nearly a month passed before Dr. Mililani saw Hinton.... Dr. Mililani immediately ordered Xrays and pain medication; meaning Hinton had no medication to ease the pain for twenty-six (26)

days." (Id

9-12 (paragraph numbers omitted).) Hinton further provides: "Hinton is a

diabetic and suffers from hypertension magnifying the head, neck, and back injury suffered in
the fall. Dr Mililani knows about this." (Id. H46.)

11

From Hinton's bare allegations, it is clear that Hinton was promptly taken to the medical

department and was seen by the nurse and was scheduled to see the doctor. Hinton apparently

disagrees with the timing of seeing the doctor and faults Dr. Mililani for the delay in his
treatment. However, Hinton fails to demonstrate any deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need by the delay in seeing Dr. Mililani. Further, Hinton fails to allege facts that plausibly

suggest that Dr. Mililani was aware of Hinton's condition priorto actually seeing Hinton.

Hinton fails to allege facts to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment."^
While the failure to treat injuries from a fall could result in sufficiently serious harm under the

Eighth Amendment, Hinton fails to allege such injuries here. Hinton fails to describe with any

specificity what injuries he suffered from his fall from the collapsed bench. Moreover, Hinton
does not allege facts indicating that Dr. Mililani failed to provide him with any treatment, just
that he was seen by Dr. Mililani twenty-six days after Hinton desired to have an appointment.

Hinton fails to allege facts indicating that he suffered any injury, much less a serious or

significant physical injury from Dr. Mililani's delayed appointment. See Strickler v. Waters, 989
F.2dl375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1983).

In his Complaint, Hinton vaguely asserts that, based on his hypertension and diabetes. Dr.
Mililani should have known that his head, neck, and back injury would be "magnif[ied]."

(Compl. U46.) Hinton fails to allege with any specificity what complications he experienced as a
result of Dr. Mililani's purported inattention. At most, Hinton states that he was forced to go
without "medication to ease the pain for twenty-six (26) days." (Compl. ^ 12.) Hinton's bare

allegation that he suffered from "pain" is insufficient to satisfy the requisite level of seriousness
^ While Hinton also fails to allege facts indicating that Dr. Mililani knew of and
disregarded 2in excessive risk of harm to Hinton, and thus fails to satisfy the subjective
component of the Eighth Amendment, no need exists to extensively examine that here. Hinton's
claims may be readily dismissed because he fails to demonstrate any injury from Dr. Mililani's
actions.
12

for an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Mililani. See Hanrahan v. Mennon, 470 F. App'x

32, 33 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that a condition is sufficiently serious of it is "a condition of

urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain" (quoting Hathaway v.
Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996))); Strickler, 989 F.3d at 1381.

Hinton also alleges no injury from the delay in being seen by Dr. Mililani. Hinton does

not allege facts that plausibly suggest that he suffered any adverse effects from the twenty-six-

day delay. See Mata, 427 F.3d at 751. Furthermore, Hinton fails to allege facts indicating that
the delay substantially harmed his treatment. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334-

35 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that delay of "several days" in fixing a broken shoulder did not
harm treatment, "considering that the only remedy immediately available was a prescription for

painkillers"). Thus, Hinton fails to allege facts that plausibly indicate thatthe delay in seeing Dr.
Mililani itself caused him substantial harm. See Webb, 281 F. App'x at 166. Because Hinton

alleges no injury from Dr. Mililani's actions, he fails to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth
Amendment. Accordingly, Claim Three will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Claims One, Two, Four, Five, and Six will be DISMISSED. Claim Three
will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The action will be DISMISSED.

An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date:

lh^//~7
/

JohnA.Gibney,Jr.
United States DistrfctJ^go

Richmond, Virginia

13