Williams v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION. See Opinion for complete details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roderick C. Young on 05/09/2017. Copy mailed to Petitioner.(ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
MILTONN. WILLIAMS,

w[~AY ~·9 2~17 \lij!
CLERK, U.S. 01.STr~rCT COURl
RICHMOND, VA

Petitioner,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:15CV690

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Milton N. Williams, a Virginia state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("§ 2254 Petition/' ECF No. 9) challenging his convictions in the
Circuit Court of the City of Hampton, Virginia ("Circuit Court").

By Memorandum Order

entered on March 16, 2017, the Court granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, denied
Williams's § 2254 Petition, and dismissed the action. (ECF Nos. 22-23.) On April 17, 2017, the
Court received Williams's "RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO THE U.S. MAGISTRATE
JUDGE'S MEMORANDUM OPINION," which the Court construes as a motion filed pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) ("Rule 59(e) Motion," ECF No. 24). See MLC Auto.,

LLC v. Town o/S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2008) (filings made within twenty-eight
days after the entry of judgment construed as Rule 59(e) motions (citing Dove v. CODESCO,
569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978))). 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized three grounds
for relief under Rule 59(e): "(l) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent
1

Williams indicated that he mailed his Rule 59(e) Motion on April 13, 2017, within twenty-eight
days after entry of the March 16, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and Order, and the Court deems
the motion filed on this date. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).

manifest injustice."

Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing

Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (D. Md. 1991); Atkins v.
Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D, Miss. 1990)).

The Court construes

Wiliiams's submission as a request for relief under Rule 59(e) to correct a clear error of law.
Williams first argues that the Court erred when it found that Claim One (b) was "not

cognizable in federal habeas corpus . . . [because] Williams asserted his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel was violated and he reasserted this fact in (Claim One (b)) for

this Court to decide." (Rule 59(e) Mot. 1-2 (capitalization corrected).) Williams argues that "he

explained how he attempted to have this matter addressed by the STATE authoritys [sic] has

been construed as an attack upon state law, is misplaced." (Id. at 2.) Williams believes that
"[b]efore the Court found Williams['s] Claim One (b)" not cognizable under federal habeas
corpus, "the Court should have asked Williams to clearify [sic], prior to finding his claim not

cognizable." (Id.) In his § 2254 Petition, under Ground One, Williams labeled his claim as
"Involuntary Plea of Guilty." (§ 2254 Pet. 5 (as paginated by CM/ECF).) Williams alleged the
following in support ofhis claim:

Petitioner never wanted to plead guilty. Petitioner told court official (probation
officer) and the psychologist that his lawyer told him if he the Petitioner didn't
plead guilty more charges would be added to Petitioner's case.. .. Also Petitioner
notified the Circuit Court that he wanted to file a complaint on Feb 23, 2012

against his lawyer. The Petitioner had not been sentenced when he was trying to
make the Circuit Court aware of the coercion and intimidating behavior against
him. The Circuit Court didn't act or inquire about his complaint. The Circuit
Court has record of the letter sent to the Court asking for help... . These acts by
counsel is a violation of the Petitioner's constitutional rights.

(§ 2254 Pet. 5-6 (as paginated by CM/ECF) (spelling, punctuation, and capitalization
corrected).) From these terse allegations, the Court construed Williams to raise two claims: that

his plea was involuntary (Claim One (a)) and that the Circuit Court erred by "ignoring his
request to file a complaint, presumably with the state bar, against his counsel." (ECF No. 22, at
2

6-7.) Nowhere in his statement of Ground One does Williams mention that he raises a claim that
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nevertheless, the

Court addressed Williams's contention that counsel pressured him to plead guilty in its lengthy

discussion of Claim One (a). {See id. at 7-10.) The Court found that this claim lacked merit and
that the "record establishes that Williams knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea."
{Id. at 10.) To the extent that Williams believes that the Court should have framed Claim One to
also set forth a separate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his guilty plea,
Williams fails to identify any clear error of law in the Court's categorizationof his claims.

Williams also fails to identify any clear error of law when the Court dismissed this claim
without offering Williams a chance to further expound upon it prior to the dismissal. Williams

points to no authority that requires the Court to seek clarification of a habeas petitioner's claim

beyond what the petitioner has submitted in support of the claim. Moreover, the Court rejected
Williams's argument that counsel pressured him into pleading guilty. Williams fails to offer any

persuasive argument that would have altered the Court's conclusion. Williams is not entitled to
Rule 59(e) relief based on this argument.

Williams also argues that "he was denied his right to appeal his claims, and ineffective
assistance of counsel with regard to his appeal" because his "attorney not only failed to [file an
appeal, but] he abandoned Williams without even letting him know he could appeal." (Rule
59(e) Mot. 2-3.) The Court construes Williams to argue that the Court's conclusion that Claim
Five lacked merit is a clear error. Williams offers no persuasive argument about why the Court's

thorough discussion of and rejection of this claim was in error. Again, Williams is not entitled
to Rule 59(e) relief based on this argument.

Accordingly, for these reasons, Williams's Rule 59(e) Motion (ECF No. 24) will be
DENIED.

An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a judge

issues a certificate of appealability ("COA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COAwill not issue
unless a prisoner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). A petitioner satisfies this requirement only when "reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.'" Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Williams fails to meet this standard. A certificate of appealability will be
DENIED.

An appropriate Final Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Roderick C. Youiig
United States Magistra^Judgi

Date: May ^ . 2017
Richmond, Virginia

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