Coleman v. Clarke
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roderick C. Young on 6/15/2016. Copy mailed to Pro Se Petitioner. (jsmi, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
MELVIN A. COLEMAN,
Petitioner,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:15CV691
HAROLD W. CLARKE,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Melvin A. Coleman, a Virginia state prisoner proceeding pro se^ brings this petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereinafter, "§ 2254 Petition," ECF No. 1) challenging the
execution of his sentence.
Specifically, Coleman contends the Virginia Department of
Corrections "incorrectly failed to subtract the 2 years which the court suspended" from his
sentence. {Id. at 6.) Therefore, Coleman argues that he "will be illegally and unconstitutionally
incarcerated for 2 years past his correct release date." {Id.) Respondent has moved to dismiss on
the ground that Coleman's claim lacks merit. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 11) will be GRANTED.
1. Procedural History
Following a jury trial, on December 5, 2013, in the Circuit Court of King George County
("Circuit Court"), Coleman was found guilty of Driving on a Revoked License, Driving After
Declared an Habitual Offender, and Driving Under the Influence. (ECF No. 12-1, at 11.) For
the offense of Driving on a Revoked License, the Circuit Court sentenced "the defendant to
Incarceration in the Virginia Department of Corrections for a term of 3 years." {Id. at 12.)' For
the offense of Driving After Declared an Habitual Offender, the Circuit Court sentenced "the
' The Court omits the emphasis inthe quotations from the parties' submissions. The Court
employs the pagination assigned by CM/ECF for all citations.
defendant to 3 years" of incarceration. {Id.) For the offense of Driving Under the Influence, the
Circuit Court sentenced "the defendant to a jail term of 12 months ...{Id.) The Circuit Court
further stated that "[a]n additional term of 2 years is suspended, pursuant to Virginia Code 19.2
-295.2." (/(c/. (emphasis added).) That statute provides, in pertinent part:
At the time the court imposes sentence upon a conviction for any felony
offense... [the court] shall, in addition to any other punishment imposed if
such other punishment includes an active term of incarceration in a state or local
correctional facility, except in cases in which the court orders a suspended term of
confinement of at least six months, impose a term of postrelease supervision of
not less than six months nor more than three years, as the court may determine.
Such additional term shall be suspended and the defendant placed under
postrelease supervision upon release from the active term of incarceration. The
period of supervision shall be established by the court; however, such period shall
not be less than six months nor more than three years. Periods of postrelease
supervision imposed pursuant to this section upon more than one felony
conviction may be ordered to run concurrently. Periods of postrelease supervision
imposed pursuant to this section may be ordered to run concurrently with any
period of probation the defendant may also be subject to serve.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-295.2(A) (West 2016) (emphasis added). Thus, as reflected in the Circuit
Court's sentencing order, Coleman was sentenced to "6 years and 12 months" of incarceration,
plus an additional 2-year term of postrelease supervision. (ECF No. 12-1, at 12.)
On March 27, 2015, Coleman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with Supreme
Court of Virginia wherein he complained that the Virginia Department of Corrections was
incorrectly requiring that he serve "6 years and 12 months." {Id. at 6.) Coleman asserted that he
only had "an active sentence of 4 years and 12 months," because the Circuit Court had
suspended two years of his total sentence. {Id.). The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this
claim on the ground that "petitioner's sentences have been accurately calculated." {Id. at 32.)
II. The Applicable Constraints Upon Federal Habeas Review
In order to obtain federal habeas relief, at a minimum, a petitioner must demonstrate that
he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,"
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996
further circumscribed this Court's authority to grant relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus.
Specifically, "[s]tate court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and may be rebutted
only by clear and convincing evidence." Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 228 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may
not grant a writ of habeas corpus based on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state
court unless the adjudicated claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an xmreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the question "is not whether a
federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550
U.S. 465,473 (2007) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,410 (2000)).
III. Analysis
Here, as he did on state habeas, Coleman insists that VDOC has incorrectly calculated his
sentence because he only received an active sentence of 4 years and 12 months as the Circuit
Court suspended two years of his total sentence.
The record plainly reflects that the Circuit
Court sentenced Coleman to "6 years and 12 months" of incarceration, plus an additional 2- year
term of postrelease supervision. (ECF No. 12-1, at 12.) The Circuit Court did not suspend any
of the term of active incarceration it imposed upon Coleman.^ As Coleman fails to demonstrate
that the Supreme Court of Virginia made any unreasonable application of law or fact in rejecting
his claim, Coleman's claim will be DISMISSED.
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) will be GRANTED. The action will be
DISMISSED. A certificate of appealability will be DENIED.
An appropriate Final Order shall issue.
/s/
Date: June
2016
Richmond, Virginia
Roderick C. Young
United States Magistrate Judge
^ Contrary to Coleman's suggestion, the 2-year term of postrelease supervision is not subtracted
from the other sentences of imprisonment imposed by the Circuit Court.
Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 98,100 (Va. 2005).
See Williams v.
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