United States of America v. Woody et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 04/29/2016. (tjoh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
CLERK, U.S DISTRICT COURT

Richmond Division

R1CHM0!-'D. VA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
Civil Case No.

V.

3:16-cv-127

C.T. WOODY, JR., SHERIFF, CITY
OF RICHMOND, in his official
Capacity, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This

DISMISS

No.

matter

is

before

PURSUANT

TO

FED.

9) .

For the

reasons

the

R.

Court

CIV.

herein,

P.

on

DEFENDANTS'

12(b)(1)

AND

MOTION

12(b)(6)

TO

(ECF

the motion will be granted in

part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff,

the United States of America,

on March 2,

2016,

of Richmond

(''Sheriff Woody'') ,

and

the

alleging that C.T.

Richmond

''Defendants")
Disabilities

City

violated
Act

The Complaint alleges

that

Jr.,

Sheriff's
I

Office

around

September

2012,

Sheriff,

City

of

(Complaint

Emily Hall

the

(collectively,
Americans

("Compl.,")

("Hall")

Defendants from 2003 to 2013 as a deputy sheriff.
or

Complaint

acting in his official capacity,

Title

("ADA").

Woody,

filed a

Hall

was

diagnosed

ECF

was

No.

with
1) .

employed by

Id. 1 10.
with

In

familial

dilated

cardiomyopathy

affected

her

many of

and

cardiovascular

her

daily

limitations.

Hall

Therefore,
of

position

was

Sheriff

2012,

Woody

civilian
human

while

no

longer

position

resources

became

aware

for

a

receive

the

reassignment

Hall

her

that

and

Id.

vacant

position,

within

Id.

SISI

26-27.

SI

and

July

discrimination

C'EEOC"),

SI

7.

of

her

these

regular

October

her

to

Id. H
be

able

and

another

16,
to

18.

find

a

discuss

the

matter

with

17.

Shortly

thereafter.

Hall

Technician

Id. SI 20.
in

March

position,

and

Hall ultimately did
2013

organization.

again

requested

Id. Sli

24-25.

transfer or reassignment to

and terminated her employment in May of 2013.

The

31,

reason

the

alleging that

offered

for

EEOC

Hall's

termination

was

Id. SI 27.

2013,

with

The

limited

would

Hall

Equal

filed

Employment

a

timely

Opportunity

charge

investigated

of

Commission

Defendants discriminated against

violation of the ADA by denying her a
Id.

in

reassign

would

Payroll

Defendants'

''organizational need."
On

perform

surgery

to

he

Defendants declined to offer Hall a

a vacant position,

Because

organization.

applied for it in February 2013.
not

to

from

asked Woody

staff.

of

significantly

8-9.

able

substantially

Id. SISl 12-14.

Defendants'

assured

which

and

Id.

recovering

Hall

within

function

activities.

duties as Deputy Sheriff.

November

tachycardia,

her

in

reasonable accommodation.
Hall's

charge

and

found

reasonable

cause

to

believe

that

Defendants

discriminated

against her in violation of the ADA.

Id. SI 8.

conciliation efforts failed,

referred the matter to the

the EEOC

United States Department of Justice.

seeks

to

ensure

enjoin

Defendants

compliance

with

to

the

Id.

The United States now

implement

ADA,

as

measures

well

reinstatement and compensatory damages,

as

Civ.

P.

filed

12(b)(1)

a

and

motion

to

seeking

to

Hall's

Id. at 7-8.

dismiss

12(b)(6).

designed

including back pay with

interest and damages for pain and suffering.
Defendants

After the EEOC s

(ECF

pursuant

No.

to

10).

Fed.

R.

Defendants

contend that the Richmond City Sheriff's Office is not sui juris
because

the

''Richmond

City

independent legal entity.
Motion

12(b)(6)

to

Dismiss

C'Def.

Office"

is

not

an

(Memorandum in Support of Defendants'

Pursuant

Mem.,"

Sheriff's

to

ECF

Fed.

R.

Civ.

11)

at

6).

No.

P.

12(b) (1)

Defendants

and

next

contend that all claims against Sheriff Woody must be dismissed
because

the

Commonwealth

meaning

of

Defendants'

Complaint
of

the

does

Virginia

ADA.

motion

will

not

was

Id.
be

at

adequately

Hall's

7-11.

granted

''employer"

For
as

allege

to

the
the

that

the

within

the

reasons

below.

claim

brought

against the Richmond City Sheriff's Office, and denied as to the
claims brought against Sheriff Woody.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard^
Fed. R.
of a

Civ.

P. 12(b)(6) permits a party to move for dismissal

claim if the complaint fails

relief can be

granted."

Fed.

''to state a

R.

Civ.

P.

claim upon which

8(a)(2)

requires

''a

short and plain statement of the claim" showing that the pleader
is

entitled

to

complaint

must

true,

relief.

'state

to

face.'"

''To

contain
a

Ashcroft

sufficient

claim
v.

to

Iqbal,

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
Courts

should

allegations

in

dismiss

where

assume

the

survive

motion

factual

relief
556

a

is

662,

veracity

Complaint,

and

Id.

at

67 9.

(2009)

on

a

as
its

(quoting

(2007)).

of

should

all

well-pleaded

deny

those well-pleaded allegations

claim for relief.

accepted

plausible

678

550 U.S. 544, 570
the

dismiss,

matter,

that

U.S.

to

a

state

motion
a

to

plausible

A claim is "plausible" when the

plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to allow the court to draw the
reasonable

inference

alleged misconduct.

that

the

defendant

is

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

liable

for

the

The court should

^ Initially, Defendants also sought dismissal of Hall's claims
against Sheriff Woody on the ground that, to the extent that the
United States seeks compensatory damages on Hall's behalf.
Sheriff Woody enjoys sovereign immunity.
(Def. Mem. at 7) .
However, Defendants have since withdrawn that argument.
(ECF
No. 14) .
Therefore, to the extent Defendants initially sought
dismissal

grounds,
further

under

the

Fed.

R.

motion

is

herein.

The

Civ.

P.

denied
remainder

12(b)(1)

as

moot
of

on

and

sovereign

is

not

Defendants'

dismissal pursuant only to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

immunity

addressed

motion

seeks

grant

a

motion to
more

nothing

dismiss,
legal

than

however,

where

conclusions,

or

the allegations
where

they

permit

court to infer no more than a possibility of misconduct.
556 U.S.

at

are
a

Iqbal,

678-79.

Although courts generally do not consider extrinsic evidence
in

deciding

motions

consider...documents

documents

the

Nutritionals,

(E.D. Va.
396,

LLC

12(b)(6),
a

claim,

and

into one for summary judgment,

so long

documents

Dornoch

the

may

without

the

in

court

complaint

of

to

is

Ltd.,

667

Fed.

396 {4th Cir.

''a

plaintiff's

(citing Witthohn v.

2009)

v.

to

referred

[motion]

authenticity

Rule

central

sufficiently

converting the
as

under

not
F.

Ins.

disputed."

Supp.

Co.,

2d

PBM

621,

626

164 F. App'x

2006)).

B. The Richmond City Sheriff's Office is not Sui Juris.
Defendants contend that
Sheriff's

Office

should

all claims against
be

dismissed

the Richmond City

because

there

is

no

independent legal entity known as the "Richmond City Sheriff's
Office,

and

Office is not

does

not

that,
sui

oppose

accordingly,
juris.

the

(Def.

dismissal

the
Mem.

of

Richmond
at

the

6) .

City

Sheriff's

The United States

Richmond

City

Sheriff's

Office as a party, to the extent that a suit brought against the

Richmond City Sheriff's Office is legally indistinct from a suit
brought against Sheriff Woody in his official capacity.
States'

Response to Defendants'

(United

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint

C'Gov.

Resp.,"

ECF

No.

11)

at

1).

The

Court

agrees

with

parties that the Richmond City Sheriff's Office is not a
entity

with

the

dismissed as

''An

a

is

not

sui

and

municipality

to

be

sued,

and

therefore

legal

will

be

defendant.

entity

Woolums,

capacity

the

not

a

2008

WL

juris

if

separate

2149911,

at

(internal citation omitted).

it

is

legal

*4

And,

an

agency

entity."

{E.D.

Va.

of

Corbin

May

20,

the

v.

2008)

a number of courts have held

that a "Sheriff's Office is not a properly named party defendant

because the

not

a

[]

Sheriff is an independent constitutional officer;

legally

recognized

entity

separate

himself and the county government."
1442015,

Beasley,

at

*6

2004

also

Revene

Cir.

1989)

(E.D.

Va.

WL 3222732,

v.

Charles

May

at

*4

County

from

22,

2009)

(E.D.

Va.

Comm'rs,

July 8,

882

F.2d

official
'office'

capacity

Office.

and

separate

the

from

county

2004));

870,

874

v.

see
(4th

'office'

the

government

Sheriff
of

is not a

in

which

his
this

is simply an agency.").

Therefore,
dismissal

entity

Clark

'Office of Sheriff

was rightly dismissed on the basis that this

legal

2009 WL

(quoting

("The separate claim against the

cognizable

Sheriff

Woody,

Francis v.

the

of

the motion is granted to the extent that it seeks
all

claims

against

the

Richmond

City

Sheriff's

C. Claims Against the Sheriff in his Official Capacity

1. The Complaint Adequately Alleges that Sheriff Woody,
Official Capacity, was Hall's Employer.
Title I

of the ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified

individuals
42

U.S.C.

employer,

in his

on
§

the

basis

12112(a).

of
A

''covered

employment agency,

management committee."

disability

by

''covered

entity"

is

entities."

defined

as

"an

labor organization or joint labor-

The ADA defines an "employer"

to limited exceptions inapplicable here)

(subject

as "a person engaged in

an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current

or

person[.]"

preceding

42

calendar

U.S.C.

§

year,

12111(5);

and

42

any

U.S.C.

agent

§

of

such

2000e.

To

determine whether an entity acted as an "employer," courts look
to

whether

the

entity

exercised

means of the employee's work.

control

over

the

manner

and

See, e.g., Sutherland v. Michigan

Dept. of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 611-12 (6th Cir. 2003).^
Sheriff Woody, acting in his official capacity, satisfies this
^

Several

of

interpretation

the

of

decisions

Title

VII

of

cited

the

herein

Civil

refer

Rights

Act

to

the

of

1964

("Title VII"), rather than the ADA.
As the Court has previously
noted,
"[t]he
ADA'S
definition
of
^employer'
mirrors
the
definitions
of
'employer'
in
Title
VII
and
in
the
Age
Discrimination

routinely
three

apply

statutes

in

Employment

arguments

Act,"

and

therefore,

concerning

this

definition

interchangeably.

Stephens

v.

Kay

courts

to

Mqmt.

all
Co.,

Inc. , 907 F. Supp. 169, 179 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(quoting United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
AIC Security
Investigations
Ltd.,
55
F.3d
1276,
1279
(7th
Cir.
1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

definition.
that

The Virginia Constitution,

Sheriffs

in

Virginia

are

Art.

VII

constitutional

§

4,

officers

independently of both municipal and state governments.
Code Ann.

fire

§

15.2-1603 gives

deputies.

provides
serving

Virginia

the Sheriff discretion to hire and

Accordingly,

courts

within

this

Circuit

have

repeatedly held that a Virginia sheriff in his or her official
capacity is subject to suit as an ''employer" within the meaning
of federal employment discrimination laws.
McMillan,

2006 WL 2126279,

Briggs v.
Wiatt V.

Waters,
Marrs,

Therefore,

455

at *2

Supp.

F.

n.3

2d

2005 WL 552563,

Sheriff

Woody,

(W.D.

508,

at *1

in

his

See,
Va.

July 28,

513

{E.D.

{W.D. Va.

official

e.g..

King v.
2006);

Va.

Feb.

2006);

22,

2005).

capacity,

is

an

adequate

to

"employer" within the meaning of the ADA.
Moreover,

the

Complaint

contains

allegations

support the inference that Sheriff Woody was

Hall's employer.

The Complaint alleges that the Sheriff in his official capacity
hired and fired Hall.

Compl. 11 10, 27.

The Complaint further

alleges that Hall ''notified Defendants" that she would need to
take

medical

Woody, Jr.,

leave.

SI

13.

that

her[.]"

'^met

with

Sheriff

C.T.

and requested that he transfer her" to a different

division within his department,
Hall

Hall

he

Id.

would

1

be

16-17.

Sheriff Woody multiple

able

and "Sheriff Woody assured Ms.

to

Finally,

times

find

a

Hall

by way

of

civilian

also

position

corresponded

e-mail

concerning

for

with

job

opportunities within his office.

Complaint ^'allege [s]
relationship
Hous ♦

V.

Aug.

26,

and Woody]

Of Baltimore City,

contend

Sheriff Woody
Commonwealth

in
of

his

employer.

that,

Therefore,

is

plausible[.]"

2015 WL 5083502,

because

official

Virginia,"

Commonwealth,

the

Harris

at *4

(D.

claim

rather

"Plaintiff's

capacity is

the

United

than

(Def. Mem. at 11) .

Defendants,

Hall's

25.

Md.

against

2015).

Defendants

the

18,

sufficient facts showing that an employment

[between Hall

Auth.

Id.

a

claim against

States

Sheriff

must

Woody,

allege
was

The catch, however,

the
that

Hall's

according to

is that the ''Commonwealth of Virginia. . .was not Ms.

employer,"

and

therefore

the

United

States

cannot

adequately allege that Hall was employed by a ''covered entity"
as required by Title I of the ADA.

Accepting this reasoning would effectively prevent any federal

employment

discrimination

constitutional

officer.

Commonwealth of Virginia,
those who work
as

such

in the

because

supervises the

the

action
As

not

against

Defendants

the

would

Sheriff,

Sheriff's department,
Sheriff,

not

Sheriff's employees.

and contrary to well-settled law.

the

any

is
but

have

the

it,

cannot

result

the

employer of

Commonwealth,

That

local

is

be

sued

directly

illogical

As

the

Court

sheriff's

2d at

has

previously

office must

514.

Complaint

In

this

work

case,

contains

demonstrating

that

noted,

for

someone."

that

someone

numerous
Sheriff

Woody

including

Virginia

did not,

Sheriff,

exercise

Hall.

separate
any

supervisory

F.

factual

Supp.

and

exercised

the

Commonwealth

from the

authority

actions

over

Hall

of
or

Sheriff

employment decisions,

Woody

has

the

authority

to

of
the
have

In light

of the relative roles of the Sheriff and the Commonwealth,

that

The

allegations

any discretion to alter the terms of her employment.

clear

a

and reassignment of his

Moreover,
and apart

455

in

Sheriff Woody.

retained

firing,

working

Briqqs,

is

specific

discretion regarding the hiring,

deputies,

''persons

make

i t is

key

and exercises control over the manner and

means of his employees' work, while the Commonwealth of Virginia
does not.

Therefore,

Sheriff Woody,

the Complaint has plausibly alleged that

acting in his official capacity,

was Hall's sole

employer, and Defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied as to
Sheriff Woody.

10

CONCLUSION

For

the

DEFENDANTS'

12(b)(1)

reasons,
MOTION

TO

AND 12(b)(6)

and

to

the

DISMISS

(ECF No.

extent,

PURSUANT

9)

will

set

TO

be

FED.

granted

forth

above,

R.

CIV.

P.

in

part

and

denied in part.
It

is

so ORDERED.

/s/

Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia
Date:
April 29, 2016

11