Burrell v. Doss et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION. See Opinion for complete details. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 03/21/2017. Copy mailed to Plaintiff as directed.(ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

L

Richmond Division

MftR 2220B

TROY LAMONT BURRELL,

clerk. U.S. DiSTfliCT COURT
^
RICHMOND. VA

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 3:16CV212-HEH

V.

,✓

u

MR. T. DOSS, et ai.
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Denying Motion for Reconsideration)

By Memorandum Order entered on October 13,2016, the Court directed Troy
Lamont Burrell to file a particularized complaint. By Memorandum Order entered on
November 16,2016, the Court denied Burrell's motion for appointment of counsel and
instructed Burrellthat he had eleven days to file his particularized complaint or else the
Court would dismiss the action. Burrell failed to file a particularized complaint.

Accordingly, by Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on December 23,2016, the
Court dismissed Burrell's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

On January 11, 2017, Burrell filed a Notice of Appeal. In his Notice of Appeal,
Burrell indicates that he "did send the particularized complaint as requested," but that he

"sentit to the wrong Court." (ECF No. 31, at 2.) Burrell provides a letter from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that indicates that he did indeed
send his document titled, "the filing of an Particularized Complaint" ("Particularized

Complaint"), to the Fourth Circuit and it was received by that court on December 6,

2016, (ECF No. 31-3, at 1; ECF No. 31-2, at 1.) The Court construes Burrell's Notice

of Appeal as a motion requesting reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) ("Rule 59(e) Motion," ECF No. 32), because it was filed within twenty-

eight days of the December 23,2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order. See MLCAuto.,
LLC V. Town ofS. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Dove v. CODESCO,
569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978)).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized three
grounds for relief under Rule 59(e): "(1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a

clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076,
1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., Ill F. Supp. 1406,

1419 (D. Md. \99\y, Atkins v. MarathonLeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D.
Miss. 1990)). Although Burrell fails to identify on what ground he seeks relief, he
apparently argues that Rule 59(e) relief should be granted to correct an error of law or to
prevent manifest injustice. Despite the fact that Burrell mistakenly filed his
Particularized Complaint with the wrong court, reopening the action would not prevent

manifest injustice. Not only does Burrell's Particularized Complaint fail to correct the
deficiencies identified in the October 13,2016 Memorandum Order, it also wholly fails
to comply with the Court's directives in that Memorandum Order.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp.

V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Burrell's Particularized Complaint fails to satisfy that
standard. As an initial matter, Burrell's Particularized Complaint is in the form of a letter

addressed to the Clerk. (Part. Compl. 1-4, ECF No. 31-2.) Burrell identifies no

Defendants, provides no caption, fails to identify how any defendant's conduct violated
his constitutional rights, and has noprayer for relief. Instead of listing claims, Burrell

recounts the factual allegations and procedural history oftwo other actions he has filed in
this Courtboth which have been dismissed. Notably, Burrell's action that contained the

underlying factual allegations he again recounts here was dismissed as frivolous. See
Burrell v. Anderson, No. 3:15CV710, 2016 WL 5243397, at *1-4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 20,

2016) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation from observing an officer choke another
inmate). Burrell's Particularized Complaint fails to satisfy general pleading requirements
to make it past the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Bass v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that in orderfor a claim or

complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiffmust "allege facts
sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." (citing Dickson v. Microsoft

Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th
Cir. 2002))).

Thus, even if Burrell had timely filed his Particularized Complaint with this Court,

he fails to show thatreopening the action would prevent manifest injustice. Nordoes
Burrell demonstrate any other basis for granting Rule 59(e) relief. See Williams v.

Virginia, 524 F. App'x 40,41 (4th Cir. 2013) ("The reconsideration of ajudgment after

entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly." (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v.

Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396,403 (4th Cir. 1998))). Accordingly, Burrell's Rule
59(e) Motion (ECF No. 32) will be DENIED.

An appropriate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/

^
Date: tua.fek
Richmond, Virginia

I*7

Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge