Hawkins v. City of Richmond et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 09/16/2016. Copy mailed to Plaintiff on 9/16/2016.(tjoh, )
IP
p
L.
•:
-
IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HAWKINS,
RICHMOf-i-: V/,''
SR.
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.
V.
CITY OF RICHMOND,
3:16cv216
et al. ,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This
matter
TO DISMISS
is
before
PURSUANT
TO RULE
the City of Richmond,
TO RULE
Police
12(b) (6)
Court
on
12(b)(6)
Earl
33),
the
DEFENDANT'S
(Docket
the DEFENDANTS'
(Docket No.
Department,
Mocello,
the
No.
R.L.
the AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS
Gary
Woolbridge,
COMPLAINT
reasons
TO
RULE
DISMISS
(Docket
stated below,
12(b)(6)
of
TO
Richmond
Woolbridge,
TO
will
on
42),
the
(Docket
PURSUANT
AMENDED MOTION
City
No.
and
RULE
DISMISS
Jamison,
(Docket No.
MOTION
filed
by
15),
FOR
the
the
12(b)(6)
(Docket
granted,
No.
and
37),
LEAVE
DISMISS
No.
37),
filed
the MOTION
filed by
PURSUANT
and
TO
the
Defendants
Bishop,
FOR
the
MOTION
33),
by
AMEND
For
DEFENDANTS'
Martesha
Michael
TO
Plaintiff.
(Docket
Office,
and
by
Martesha Bishop,
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
Magistrate
be
the
No.
filed
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
Defendants City of Richmond Magistrate Office,
and
15),
MOTION
filed by the City of Richmond
Fernandez,
1i.i
CLERK, U.S DiSTRirr
Richmond Division
RONALD E.
16
u
LEAVE
and
Gary
TO AMEND
Jr.
COMPLAINT
(Docket
No.
42),
filed
by
the
Plaintiff,
will
be
denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Ronald
on August
29,
when
officers,
two
(''Jamison") ,
2014,
Plaintiff's
(''Hawkins")
not
officer.
one
unnamed
and
one
named
(Compl.
produce
a
13-20,
warrant
(Compl.
Earl
unnamed
Officer
H
or
Docket
inform
girl
Michael
Fernandez
partner
Hawkins
and
would
be
showing
"cleared"
[about]
incriminate
the
and also
himself
to
girl
gun,
it
(Compl.
prove
The
of
the
of
a
could
H
30-37).
the
that
be
he
to
didn't
shoot
a
unnamed
insinuated
was
have
produce
an
determined
charge,
to
23-29).
selling
Hawkins,
an
21-22).
(Compl.
and
and
to
alleged
declined
about
if
nature
the
Jamison
Hawkins
is
Hawkins
that
for
3).
Hawkins
(Compl.
("Mocello")
room,
questioned
gun had not been fired.
misled
Jamison
No.
("Fernandez"),
transported
Mocello
interrogation
allegedly
drugs
that
16-20). With the assistance of a
warrant or state the charges against Hawkins.
Mocello
R.L.
"a warrant downtown
interrogation room in a police department.
entered the
alleges
he was on the porch at his mother's house
arrest."
did
Jamison's
Sr.
because there was
charges against him.
third
Hawkins,
approached and informed Hawkins that he would "have
to go with them"
officers
E.
that
that
this
"after being
compelled
to
anyone,"
in
the
process
''giving
[away the]
location
aware of belonging to his brother."
Although Hawkins
fact,
sought
However,
and
Hawkins
insufficient
[Hawkins]
officer
of
not
obtained
argues
to
had
was
that
establish
committed
reasonable
for
facts
Hawkins's
cause
offense,"
(Compl.
would
SI 81).
to
omitting
information
finding of probable cause.
Magistrate
Judge
Martesha
with Mocello to issue this warrant.
After
that
the
the
firearm
was
SI
charge
against
him was
convicted felon.
(Compl.
SI 38).
That
yet
day,
October
8,
controlled
returned an
however,
(Compl.
2014,
charging
substance,
and
attempting to distribute a
"no
that
deliberately,
or
to
the
alleges
that
acted
in
concert
informed
Hawkins
SI 82) .
Mocello
of
a
firearm
by
a
That charge was nolle prosequi'd
was
him
(2)
that
concluded
Hawkins
possession
unspecified
Hawkins
were
that
material
("Bishop")
by the City of Richmond on October 9,
had not
was
83) .
retrieved,
in
Hawkins further alleges
which
(Compl.
Bishop
was
arrest.
believe
and
have
that Mocello obtained the warrant by knowingly,
recklessly
he
and circumstances
criminal
a
that
Mocello had,
probable
competence
probable cause existed."
gun
warrant,
warrant
''the
a
(Compl. SI 37).
shown a
a
of
2014 because a
report.
shown
with
(Compl.
two
(1)
possession
laboratory
SISI
42-49).
indictments
dated
distribution
of
a
controlled substance.
of
firearm
(Compl.
a
while
SI
50).
Hawkins alleges that the evidence supporting the indictments was
taken from the August 29,
November
5,
2014,
charge"
that
had
(Compl.
SI 52).
2014 interrogation.
Hawkins
been
was
nolle
indicted
(Compl.
""on
prosequi^d
the
on
i
51) .
same
October
On
firearm
9,
2014.
The evidence supporting that indictment was also
allegedly taken from the August 29,
2014
interrogation.
(Compl.
II 52) .
Following the October and November indictments,
represented by Christopher Bradshaw
57).
Hawkins
(Compl.
and
Bradshaw
SISI 57-60).
to suppress,
attorney
frivolous.
disagreed
Particularly,
while Bradshaw,
Davis
Powell,
(Compl.
SI1I
C'Bradshaw") .
on
Hawkins was
(Compl.
litigation
SISl 53-
strategy.
Hawkins wanted to file a motion
after discussions with prosecuting
believed
60-65,
such
72-77).
On
a
motion
April
3,
would
2015,
be
Judge
Bradford Cavedo allowed Hawkins to change counsel,
and appointed
David
61-65).
P.
Cavedo
Baugh as
recused
Hawkins's
himself
attorney.
from
Hawkins's
transferred to Judge Beverly Snukals.
A
suppression
(Compl.
SISI
77-78) .
hearing
was
Hawkins
(Compl.
case
which
Judge
was
then
(Compl. Sli 66) .
scheduled
''wanted
SISI
to
in
go
Hawkins's
forward
case.
with
the
hearing," but received ''a message through his attorney David P.
Baugh
from
Plaintiff
(Compl.
not
SISI
a
to
Richmond
accept
79).
the
''Hawkins
Police
plea
felt
Office[r]
deal"
which
Fernandez
was
intimidated and
being
felt
informing
offered.
that
he
was
receiving Due Process and had no other choice but to take a
[p]lea
deal."
distribution
(Compl.
of
80).
cocaine
in
Hawkins
violation
of
was
and sentenced to ten years of incarceration,
three
months
suspended
for time served.
Hawkins
for
a
(Docket No.
filed
this
period
35-1,
action
against the City of Richmond
Police
Department
(''the
police
officers
official
Mocello,
capacities
("the
pro
§
of
18.2-248(c)
with nine years and
ten
years,
with
credit
1).
se
and
("the City");
Police
Richmond's Magistrate Office
of
Ex.
Code
Va.
convicted
in
forma
pauperis
the City of Richmond
Department") ;
the
City
(''the Magistrate Office");
Fernandez,
and
individual
Jamison
officers");
of
Richmond
in
and
their
Richmond
Magistrate Judge Martesha Bishop and Chief Magistrate Judge Gary
Woolbridge
("the
Magistrate
Judges"),
also
capacities.
Plaintiff presents six claims:
in
(1)
their
Count One alleges
that Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause;
of
the
Fourth
and
Fourteenth Amendments;
malicious prosecution;
false
imprisonment;
Process,
alleges
in
and
right
Equal
Amendment.
of
Count
the
Four
Fifth
(6)
alleges
Amendment;
Hawkins
seeks
in
false
arrest and
denial
(5)
alleges
of
Count
Due
Five
Sixth
violation of plaintiff's
violation
declaratory
unspecified equitable relief,
Two
in violation of the
Count Six alleges a
Protection,
in violation
Count
Count Three alleges
of effective counsel,
Amendment;
to
(4)
violation
denial
(3)
(2)
official
and
of
the
Fourteenth
injunctive
and compensatory damages.
relief,
Between
June
filed motions
2016,
to
to
8,
2016
dismiss.
and
June
24,
(Docket Nos.
2016,
15,
33,
all
37).
Defendants
On June
30,
Hawkins filed a motion for an extension of time to respond
these
motions.
No.
40).
On
July
1,
Hawkins's
granted
(Docket
request
and
ordered
that
Hawkins
motions
by
responses
Rather
to
than
the
file
a
reply,
amend his Complaint.
July
26,
Hawkins
(Docket No.
2016.
filed
42).
a
2016,
the
submit
(Docket
motion
Court
No.
for
his
41) .
leave
to
Defendants have not filed
responses to Hawkins's motion for leave to amend.
LEGAL
In
all
dismiss
civil
under
sufficiency
Corp.,
to
Fed.
of
a
dismiss
(4th
2009) .
Cir.
pleader's
can
accept
Old
338
v.
be
P.
otherwise,
12(b) (6)
v.
a
motion
challenges
the
Alternative
favor
a
of
court
the
must
Inc.,
591
However,
court
'Mraw
''will
while
what
drawn
facts."
Charles
Practice and Procedure
Co.,
L.L.C.,
the
happened"
therefrom,"
and
the
encompassing the
A.
§
legal
Resources
plaintiff."
Consumeraffairs.com,
of
to
2006). When deciding a motion
12(b)(6),
in
reasonably
Sec.
or
Jordan
conclusory allegations
Dominion
se
{4th Cir.
Rule
description
pleaded
Federal
Civ.
inferences
Ltd.
pro
complaint.
under
Chevrolet,
the
R.
458 F.3d 332,
reasonable
that
cases,
STANDARD
Wright
1357
No.
(3d
&
F.3d
ed.l998);
3:13CV820,
2014
250,
253
the
conclusions
court
Arthur
Nemet
accept
""any
legal
all
""need
effects
R.
not
of
Miller,
Chamblee
v.
WL 1415095,
*4
a
(E.D.
Va.
legal
The court is not required to accept as true
conclusion
556 U.S.
As
2014).
at
a
unsupported
by
factual
threshold matter,
e.g.,
omitted);
Erickson v,
Gordon v.
Nevertheless,
vision for
the Court
Pardus,
Leeke,
recognizes
for
WL
551 U.S.
574
89,
F.2d 1147,
(2007)
1151
(citations
{4th Cir.
1978).
recognize Rule
8's
allow for the preparation of a basic
at
*2
F.R.D.
of
(E.D.
Va.
26,
(S.D.N.Y.
construction ''does not mean that
Sewraz
v.
Guice,
(quoting
1972)).
The
2008
Prezzi
v.
requirement of
the court
can ignore a
in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a
claim cognizable
in
a
2009 WL 2191981,
at
*2
of Soc.
Servs.,
Fed.
R.
federal
(D.S.C.
July 16,
901 F.2d 387
Civ.
pleading
district
P.
only
with
when justice so requires."
when
the
court."
2009)
(4th Cir.
15(a) (2)
consent or the court's leave.
only
and provide a means
2008)
liberal
its
151
Aug.
57
clear failure
149,
sham claims.'"
Berzak,
denied
94
narrow the issues to be litigated,
3926443,
amend
Hawkins's
^a system of simplified pleadings that give notice of
quick dispositions
Dept.
that
liberal construction.
''[e]ven pro se plaintiffs must
the general claim asserted,
defense,
Iqbal,
678-79.
pro se status entitles his pleadings to a
See,
allegations.
the
provides
Skelton v.
EPA,
(citing Weller v.
1990)).
that
opposing
''a
party
party's
may
written
The court should freely give leave
"Leave to amend a pleading should be
amendment
would
be
prejudicial
to
the
opposing
moving
party,
there
party,
or
has
the
been
Dep't of Justice,
*1
Aug.
Cir.
404,
426
(4th
178,
182
(1962) .
appear
the
to
be
motions
3,
Cir.
at
to
2016)
2006));
At
this
issue.
is
given
the
necessary
the
futile."
at
Harvey,
438
F.3d
Davis,
371
U.S.
v.
nor bad
issues
to
of
2016 WL 4120669,
v.
Foman
part
been
neither prejudice
However,
it
Laber
also
the
have
16-6085,
(quoting
see
on
would
No.
time,
dismiss,
amendment would be
faith
amendment
Djenasevic v.
(4th
bad
faith
presented by
assess
whether
any
futile.
ANALYSIS
OF LAW
The claims asserted by Hawkins in the Complaint are clearly
barred
by
judicial
immunity,
municipal
liability under
Humphrey,
512 U.S.
must
be
futile,
granted.
477,
For
§
487
the
the
1983,
(1994).
same
limitations
and the
Thus,
reasons,
on
doctrine
vicarious
of
Heck v.
the motions to dismiss
any
amendment
would
be
necessitating denial of the motion for leave to file an
amended complaint.
A.
Claims Against
Magistrate
Judges'
Judicial Immunity
the Magistrate
Judges
and the
Office
Are
Clearly
Barred
by
It is beyond dispute that judicial officers may not be held
liable for
within
543
an award of money damages
their
(1984);
jurisdiction.
Pressly
v.
See
so long as
Pulliam v.
Gregory^
8
831
F.2d
Allen^
514,
they have acted
466
517
U.S.
522,
(4th
Cir.
1987)
(^'As
absolute
judicial
immunity
officers,
for
capacity.");
Murphy v.
*3
Apr.
(E.D.
There
Va.
is
also
officers, Va.
no
acts
Ross,
15,
magistrates
2015)
performed
No.
are
in
3:14CV870,
entitled
their
to
judicial
2015 WL 1787351,
at
(collecting circuit court opinions).
question
Code § 19.2-119
that
magistrates
are
(''Vudicial officer'
or that a
state magistrate has authority and jurisdiction under
to
issue
search
warrants,
Va.
the
unless
indicated,
law
serving
means,
otherwise
state
any magistrate
judicial
jurisdiction''),
Code
magistrate shall have the following powers
...
§
To
19.2-45
(''A
issue search
warrants in accord with the provisions of §§ 19.2-52 to 19.2-60
of the Code[.]").
Judicial
immunity
"is
vitiated
only
when
the
judicial
officer acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Pressly^
831 F.2d at 517
(citing Stump v.
The fact
judicial officer has acted erroneously does not
mean
that a
that
Griffin
the
v.
(W.D.N.C.
judge
judicial
Thornburg^
June 19,
will
not
be
Sparkman^ 435 U.S.
officer has
No.
2008).
acted without
1:08CV222,
2008
WL
349
(1978)).
jurisdiction.
2512901,
at
The Supreme Court explained that
deprived
of
immunity
took was in error,, was done maliciously,
because
the
*4
''[a]
action
he
or was in excess of his
authority;
rather,
he will be subject to liability only when he
has
acted
in
'clear
435
U.S.
at
the
356-5.
absence
of
all
jurisdiction.'"
Stump^
"A judge is absolutely immune from liability
for
his
flawed
359.
judicial
by
the
Instead,
''dealt
with
Because
acts
even
commission
of
the relevant
the
judge
Magistrate
his
grave
his
-
she
acted
of
procedural
judicial
Bishop
authority
errors."
within
capacity."
performed
performed by a magistrate in her
warrant
exercise
Id.
is
at
inquiry relates to whether the party
in
Judge
if
a
Id.
function
judicial capacity -
his
at
jurisdiction
362.
normally
issuing a
regardless
of
whether any errors attended the exercise of this jurisdiction.
With
judicial
immunity
serving as
such a
broad
shield for
Magistrate Judge Bishop's actions in issuing the arrest warrant,
there is no plausible construction of the Complaint under which
relief
state
it
can
a
is
be
granted.
claim against
equally
Magistrate
impossible
her alleged supervisor.
employer.
37),
Therefore,
filed
Martesha
Additionally,
by
for
claims against
and
Judge
Hawkins
Bishop
to
state
Hawkins
for
a
her
cannot
actions,
claim against
Chief Magistrate Judge Woolridge,
the AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants
Bishop,
because
City
of
Richmond
Gary Woolbridge,
will
(Docket
Magistrate
be
or her
Office,
granted,
the City of Richmond Magistrate Office,
No.
and
all
Martesha
Bishop, and Gary Woolbridge, will be dismissed.
There
is
no
amendment
that
Hawkins
might
make
that
could
state a viable claim for relief against Magistrate Judge Bishop.
Leave
to
amend
the
would
accordingly
be
Complaint
futile.
against
Magistrate
Therefore,
10
Hawkins's
Judge
Bishop
motion
for
leave to amend will be denied as it pertains to Magistrate Judge
Bishop,
Chief
Richmond
Magistrate
Magistrate's
Judge
Office
Woolrich,
or
any
and
the
reasonably
City
of
equivalent
entity.^
B.
Claims Against the City of Richmond and the City
of Richmond Police Department are Clearly Barred by
Limitations on Vicarious Liability of Municipalities
Hawkins's
City
is
predicated
respondeat
Monell V.
(1978) .
where
claim
superior
upon
a
that
the
Mitchell,
or
custom
F.
Supp.
2d
a
U.S.C.
of
§
1983
vicarious
legally
municipal
or
causes
a
statutory
615,
629
658,
deprivation
Va.
694
only
undertaken
an
of
the
Brown
rights."
(E.D.
or
theory.
436 U.S.
has
the
liability
liability arises
municipality/
which
against
cognizable
Of City of N.Y.^
qua
constitutional
327
not
''under Monell^
policy
42
theory
Serv.
municipality,
plaintiff's
to
is
Dep't of Soc.
However,
official
pursuant
v.
2004).
Thus,
in
order to state a claim against the City,
Hawkins must set forth
a
finding
sufficient
City had
a
deprivation
violated;
factual
basis
policy or
of
and
the
(2)
to
support
custom of deliberate
constitutional
this
a
policy or
right
that:
indifference
alleged
custom caused,
to
or
(1)
the
to
the
have
been
contributed
^ Defendants state that "there is no such legal entity entitled
^City of Richmond Magistrate's Office," and that magistrates are
instead supervised by the Office of the Executive Secretary.
(Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mtn. to Dismiss, Docket No. 25, 11).
Because Hawkins cannot state a claim against Magistrate Judge
Bishop's employer, whoever that employer is, the Court will not
discuss
the matter
further.
11
to
cause,
F.
Supp.
Tuttle^
the
67,
complained of
75
471
(E.D.
U.S.
Independence^
Va.
808,
445 U.S.
injury.
1995)
823
Westmoreland
Brown,
883
(citing City of Oklahoma City v.
(1985));
622,
v.
see
also
Owen
v.
City
of
(1980).
Hawkins has not pled the existence of any policy that would
entitle
him
Therefore,
to
pursue
Hawkins's
a
claim
claims
based
against
on
the
municipal
City must
liability.
be
dismissed
as legally insufficient.
Moreover,
the
plausible
basis
would
viable
be
dismiss
will
be
for
Complaint
makes
amendment
under
that
Monell.
clear
would
Thus,
that
state
the
granted and the motion
for
there
a
City's
leave
is
claim
motions
no
that
to
to amend will
be denied.
The
fail
claims
under
the
against
same
the
analysis
City of
because
Richmond
the
Police
Police
Department
Department
for the purposes of a suit against it, a part of the City.
'"In Virginia,
an operating division of a
governmental entity cannot be sued unless
the
legislature has vested the
operating
division
with
the
capacity
to
be
sued." Muniz
v.
Fairfax
Pep't. No. 1:05CV466 (JCC),
at
V.
County
Police
2005 WL 1838326,
*2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2005) (citing Davis
City of
Portsmouth^ 579
F.Supp.
1205,
1210
(E.D.
(4th
Cir.
Va.
1983),
1984)).
aff'd,
The
742
F.2d
[Richmond
1448
Police
Department] has not been vested with such a
capacity. Dance v. City of Richmond Police
Dep't. No. 3:09CV423 (HEH), 2009 WL 2877152,
at *4
(E.D. Va. Sept. 2, 2009). The Court
will therefore treat all claims against the
12
is,
City
Burnley
(E.D.
v.
and
Norwood,
Va.
Aug.
Police
RPD
No.
4,
dismissal against
the
the
as
against
3:10CV264-HEH,
2010).
The
the
City
2010
only.
WL 3063779,
principles
which
at
would
*5
make
the City of Richmond inevitable also apply to
Department,
and that
inevitability renders
amendment
against the Police Department futile.
For
DISMISS
the
foregoing
PURSUANT
Defendants
City
R.L.
Jamison,
that
it
TO
of
RULE
reasons,
the
12(b)(6)
Richmond
seeks
a
dismissal
(Docket
Police
and Michael Mocello,
DEFENDANTS'
No.
Department,
MOTION
33),
Earl
filed
TO
by
Fernandez,
will be granted to the extent
against
the
City
of
Richmond
Police
Department,^ and all claims against the City of Richmond Police
Department will be dismissed with prejudice.
C.
V.
Finally,
Claims Against All Defendants are Barred by Heck
Humphrey
to
the
extent
that
Hawkins
intended
to
assert
a
claim for a defect in his legal proceedings that would implicate
the
validity of
his
confinement,
those
claims
are barred as
to
all Defendants^ by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 487.
^ Claims against the individual officers will be assessed and
dismissed in the following section.
^ The
Court notes that claims against the
individual officers
would
face
the
additional
hurdle
of
overcoming
qualified
immunity. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see
also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009); Henry v.
Purnell,
501
F.3d
374,
376-78
(4th
Cir.2007);
Danjczek v.
Spencer, 156 F. Supp. 3d 739, 744 (E.D. Va. 2016).
13
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness
would
render
a
conviction
or
sentence
invalid, a
§ 1983 plaintiff
must
prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal
authorized
determination,
federal
or
court's
corpus,
damages
to
called
issuance
make
into
of
a
such
question
writ
of
by
a
habeas
28 U.S.C. § 2254.
A
claim
for
bearing
that
relationship
to
a
conviction
or
sentence
that
has
not
been
so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in
a
§
1983 suit,
the
district
court
must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff
would
necessarily
imply
the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if
it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Heck,
any
512 U.S.
form
of
at
486-87.
relief
The Supreme Court
that
implicates
the
reads Heck to cover
constitutionality
of
criminal procedures related to a plaintiff's criminal case.
[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred
(absent prior invalidation) — no matter the
relief sought (damages or equitable relief),
no matter the target of the prisoner's suit
(state
conduct
leading
to
conviction
or
internal prison proceedings)
that
the
— ^
success in
action
would
necessarily demonstrate
invalidity
of
confinement
or
its
duration.
Wilkinson
Griffin
2015);
v.
v.
Dotson,
Bait.
Via v.
544
Police
Fahey,
No.
U.S.
74,
Dep't,
CIV.A.
81-82
804
(2005);
F.3d
3:07CV778,
14
692,
see
697
also,
(4th
2009 WL 223113,
e.g..
Cir.
at
*2
(E.D.
Va.
Jan.
termination
at 486-87;
a
29,
encompasses:
requirement
malicious
e.g..
ineffective
Driscoll,
The
prosecution.
of
favorable
Heck,
512
No.
Miller,
assistance
CIV.A.
475
of
98-1449-AM,
Va. Apr. 18, 2002), aff'd,
F.3d at
627-28
counsel,
2002
WL
e.g.,
31962249,
46 F. App'x 724
(4th Cir.
Blaney
at
*2
admission,
Hawkins
pled
guilty.
v.
(E.D.
(4th Cir. 2002).
Hawkins's proceedings were not favorably terminated.
own
U.S.
false imprisonment and false imprisonment pursuant to
deficient warrant,
2007);
2009).
(Compl.
^
By his
80).This means
that Hawkins cannot state a claim for any form of relief against
any Defendants, and all such claims must be dismissed.
Moreover,
require
dismissal
amendment
P.
there
is
is
no
under
possible
28
amendment
U.S.C.
§
that
would
1915(e) (2) (i) .
futile and accordingly improper under Fed.
not
Thus,
R.
Civ.
15(a)(2).
For
the
DISMISS
PURSUANT
DEFENDANTS'
No.
Earl
33) ,
RULE
TO
DISMISS
the
12(b)(6)
DEFENDANT'S
(Docket
PURSUANT
TO
RULE
MOTION
No.
15),
12(b)(6)
TO
the
(Docket
filed by Defendants City of Richmond Police Department,
Fernandez,
of
reasons,
TO
MOTION
AMENDED MOTION
City
foregoing
R.L.
TO
Richmond
^ Hawkins
appears
Jamison,
DISMISS
(Docket
Magistrate
to
presently incarcerated.
be
and
E.g.,
No.
Office,
under
a
Michael
37),
filed
Martesha
suspended
Docket No.
15
Mocello,
35,
by
and
Defendants
Bishop,
sentence,
Ex.
1.
the
and
but
Gary
not
Woolbridge,
will
be
granted,
and
all
claims
against
all
Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For
the
DISMISS
PURSUANT
DEFENDANTS'
No.
reasons
33),
MOTION
and
the
stated
above,
TO
RULE
TO
DISMISS
AMENDED
the
12(b)(6)
(Docket
PURSUANT
MOTION
TO
DEFENDANT'S
TO
RULE
DISMISS
MOTION
No.
15),
12(b)(6)
(Docket
TO
the
(Docket
No.
37),
filed by Defendants City of Richmond Magistrate Office, Martesha
Bishop,
all
and Gary Woolbridge,
will be granted. All claims against
Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.
LEAVE
TO
Plaintiff,
IT
IS
AMEND
COMPLAINT
(Docket
No.
42),
The MOTION
FOR
filed
the
by
will be denied.
SO
ORDERED
Robert E.
/s/
Payne
mi-
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond,
Virginia
Date: September ^ , 2016
16
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