Taylor v. Royal Ahold NV

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 1/20/2017. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRIGNIA
Richmond Division

JACQUELINE LENORLIA TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

V.

Civil Action No.

3:16cv241

ROYAL AHOLD NV,

KONINKIJIJKE AHOLD (AHony)
AHOLD USA/GIANT MARTINS
FOOD & PHARMACY,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter

PLAINTIFF'S

is

before

COMPLAINT

BY

the

Court

DEFENDANT

on

the MOTION TO DISMISS

GIANT FOOD

STORES,

LLC FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED

No.

5)

filed

("Ahony")

by

Defendant

Royal

Ahold

NV

Koninkijke

(ECF

Ahold

Ahold USA/Giant Martins Food & Pharmacy's Motion to

{''Giant Food Stores") . For the reasons stated below, the motion

will

be

granted

and

this

action

will

be

dismissed

with

prejudice.
INTRODUCTION

The Complaint filed by Jacqueline Lenorlia Taylor

(ECF No.

3) , even when read generously, presents largely incomprehensible
assertions

and

no

cognizable

construed

as

coherence.

See Estelle v.

required

by

claims.
precedent,

Gamble,

Thus,
the

429 U.S.

97,

even

liberally

Complaint
106

lacks

(1976).

The

level

as

of

incoherence

is

such

that

this

containing only "fanciful factual

frivolous

490

under

U.S.

319,

28

325

U.S.C.

§

(1989)

("§

applied to a complaint,
conclusion,

but

Nevertheless,

also

the

case

could

be

dismissed

allegation [s]," making it

1915(d).

See

1915(d) 's

Neitzke

term

v.

Williams,

"frivolous,"

when

embraces not only the inarguable legal
the

fanciful

Defendant

has

factual

responded

allegation.")

to

the

perceived

substance of the Complaint in its motion to dismiss

(ECF No.

and

unreasonable

its

one.

the

construction

of

the

Complaint

is

not

an

5),

Adopting the liberal construction used by the Defendant,

Complaint

nonetheless

relief can be granted.

fails

to

Therefore,

state

a

claim upon which

the Defendant's motion will

be granted.

DISCUSSION

By its own terms,

the Complaint alleges

(1)

violation of

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)

seq. ;

(2)

violation of Title VI,

violation of the
(4)

42

U.S.C.

§

Pennsylvania and Massachusetts

2000 (d);

et

(3)

Constitutions;

violation of the Virginia Human Rights Act, Va. Code § 2.2-

3900 et. seq.;

(5) violation of the Defendant company's internal

ethics policy;

(6) violation of the Defendant company's internal

policy against retaliation; and

(7)

Amendment.

complaint

Read

liberally,

the

violation of the Fourteenth
also

may be

read

to

assert
of

state

law

emotional

claims

for
and

distress,

defamation,
assault.

intentional

All

of

these

infliction
claims

or

potential claims are legally defective.

A.

Count I: Title II, Title VI, and the Fourteenth Amendment

Taylor's first claim seeks to recover damages under "Title
II and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1964
Accommodations

42

USC 2000 (A) (B) .

Fourteenth Amendment

to

the

(Complaint

liberally read,

fails

Act)

6) .

plausibly

Even
to

state

et

al.,

Constitution of the

a

claim

Count
upon

I

and

(Public

The

[sic]

United States."

of the Complaint

which

relief

may

be

granted.
Title

To

establishes

a

prima

accommodation discrimination,

facie

to

full

accommodation;
(4)

benefits
(3)

and

case

of

Title

II

Taylor must show that she:

a member of a protected class;

right

II

(2)

enjoyment

of

a

place

of

favorably

390

U.S.

400,

Additionally,

402

plaintiff brings an action under that Title,
damages.")

and

than similarly situated persons

injunctive relief is available under the act. Newman v.
Inc.,

is

public

was denied those benefits and enjoyment;

was treated less

Enterprises,

(1)

attempted to exercise the

who are not members of the protected class.

Park

public

only

Piqqie

(1968)("When

a

he cannot recover

Plaintiff fails to plausibly state a prima facie case under
Title II. Although she contends that she was discriminated and
harassed
social

^''on

and

the

basis

financial

of

race

color,

statuses[,

and]

sex/sexual

more

orientation,

explicitly those who

are homeless and unemployed," her complaint fails

allege

that

the

discrimination,

Defendant

was

to plausibly

responsible

and otherwise alleges

facts

for

this

so "fanciful" that

they are "frivolous" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1915(d).^
Moreover,

the

"retaliation

Complaint

against

discrimination,

[sic],

the

with

that

the

Plaintiff

stalking,

complaints

Department."

avers

and

alleged

for

her

sexually

Defendants

treatment

filing

filed

numerous

offensive/harassing

Corporate

Customer

Service

(Compl. SI26) . By her own admission, therefore, the

Defendant's conduct was motivated by the "numerous"
she

was

with

customer

service,

and

not

because

complaints
of

Taylor's

race.

^ Among other implausible claims, Taylor's complaint includes
allegations that the Defendant was responsible for enlisting
other

customers

to

attack

her

arranging "proxy stalking teams

with

[that]

shopping

carts

and

for

were established in the

community, malls, and other shopping centers." In her own words,
Taylor claims that the allegedly actionable discrimination "a
great majority of the time, were by way of staged public routine
enactments

within

and

outside

accommodations utilizing Defendant,

Defendant's

patrons,

places

of

community members

and the person who stalks Plaintiff on a daily basis." (Pi.
Reply 3). The Court notes that "[t]he person who stalks
Plaintiff on a daily basis" is not identified further by the
Complaint as an employee of, or anyone otherwise associated
with,

the Defendant.

The

Title

conduct

II

alleged

connected

any

Defendant.

in

and

welcome

in

is

the

actual

Taylor

threats

charge

Complaint

person

claims

sexual

or

has

she

and

place

deficient

not

employee

that

assaults"

Defendant's

further

of

been

told

she

accommodation,"

her

Complaint,

statement

that

Taylor

offers

"Defendant did

disclosing his presence."

so

only

the

the

death

was

not

but

cannot

(Compl.

identify who allegedly said any of these things.
In

with

''several

that

the

plausibly-

associated

received

''was

because

120).

incomprehensible

in an unidentifiable manner by

Even in her reply, which purported

to respond to the Defendant's argument that it was not tied to
any of the alleged conduct,
of

the

voices

threat
which

Defendant's

male

shift

within

the

These

and

sounded

second

10).

[sic]

Taylor could offer only that "some
warnings

alike

[sic]

Managers,

employees

vicinity

and

and

where

statements

I

do

were
the

some

routinely

of

in

other

with

two

Defendant's

the

of

the

first

and

accommodations

reside."

plausibly

alleged conduct to the Defendant. Thus,
must be

voices

of

workers

not

intermeshed

(Pi.

connect

Reply

any

of

at
the

Taylor's Title II claim

dismissed.
T i t l e VI

Title

shall,

on

VI

provides

the

ground

that

of

"[n]o person

race,

color,

or

in

the

United

national

States

origin,

be

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected

to

discrimination

under

any

program

or

activity

receiving Federal financial assistance.

42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d.

The

two

pled are

therefore

(1)

elements

of

Title VI

that

that

the

Defendant

engages

that

the

Defendants

receive

Ramsay,

must

in

be

racial

federal

41 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592

discrimination,

funds.

(D. Md.

See,

e.g..

and

(2)

Farmer v.

1999).

Taylor fails to plausibly satisfy either element of a Title
VI

her

claim.

She

Title

allegedly

cannot meet

II

claim

the

first

fails—because

discriminatory

conduct

element

she

to

for

has

the

not

the

same

reason

connected

Defendant

the

or

his

employees; moreover, and she has not even attempted to plead the
second

element—that

the

Defendant

is

a

recipient

of

federal

funds. Therefore, her Title VI claim must be dismissed.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Taylor's also alleges that her rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment have been violated.

its very terms,

^^the Fourteenth Amendment,

by

prohibits only state action." United States v.

Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
if there is a

But,

621 (2000). State action is present only

"close nexus between the State and the challenged

action," such that the action ''may be fairly treated as that of
the

State

351

(1974) .

teaches
case.

itself."

that

Jackson v.

Taylor

the

alleges

state

Metro.

no

action

such

Edison Co.,

nexus,

requirement

is

and

419

U.S.

common

not met

345,

sense

in this

The Fourteenth Amendment therefore does not apply to the

conduct

alleged,

dismissed.

For

and

the

her

same

claim

under

reason,

the

Taylor's

Amendment
Fourteenth

must

be

Amendment

claims contained in Count VII will also be dismissed.

B.

Counts

II

Counts

Defendant

and I I I

II

and

violated

Massachusetts

III

of

the

Complaint

Taylor's

rights

under

constitutions.

Those

allege

the

that

the

Pennsylvania

constitutions

do

not

and

apply.

''Virginia applies the lex loci delicti^ the law of the place of

the wrong,

to tort actions." Milton v.

F.3d 519,
Assoc. ,

521

246

(4th Cir.
Va.

3,

1998);

5

IIT Research Inst.,

s ^ also Jones v.

(1993) .

Even

accepting

R.S.

every

138

Jones

&

fanciful

allegation pled in the Complaint as true, the place of the wrong
in this case is exclusively Virginia. Thus,
of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts

the substantive law

(or any other state)

does not

apply, and Taylor has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may

be

granted.

Counts

II

and

III

of

the

Complaint

will

therefore be dismissed.

C.

Count IV: Virginia Human Rights Act

Count IV of the Complaint alleges violation of the Virginia
Human

Rights

claim is

Act,

Va.

barred by

Code

the

§ 2.2-3900

express

et.

language

of

seq. ,
that

but

Taylor's

statute.

The

statute provides that ''[n]othing in this chapter or in Article 4
(§

2.2-520

et

seq.)

of

Chapter

5

creates,

nor

shall

it

be

construed to create,
to

enforce

its

subsections

applies

B

only

provides

a

an independent or private cause of action

provisions,
and

to

C."

Va.

Code

employers

with

(C)

action

2.2-3903{A),

less

than

in

Subsection

employees,

20

(B)

and

Va.

Code §

2.2-

provides the procedures for the cause of

provide
under

Subsection

the

(D)

exclusive

the Act.

alleged that she is,

be,

§

specifically provided

and confirms that it is available only to employees. Va.

Code § 2.2-3903{C).

and

as

cause of action only to employees.

3903(B). Subsection (C)
action,

except

Va.

Code

confirms that subsections

basis
§

has ever been,

an employee of the Defendant.

for

2.2-3903

a

private

(D) .

cause

Taylor

has

(3)

of
not

or has ever even applied to

Count IV therefore fails

present a claim upon which relief may be granted,

to

and will be

dismissed with prejudice.

D.

Count V: Violation of Company Code of Ethics^
Count

Defendant's

V

of

the

internal

Complaint

''Code

of

alleges

Ethics."

violation

Neither

federal

of

the

law

nor

the Commonwealth of Virginia recognizes an independent cause of
action in such circumstances,

a

fact that has not changed since

the Plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted this same claim in May of

this year.

See Taylor v. Ahold,

USA, Civ. Action No.

Identified as a second ''Count IV" in the Complaint.

3:16cv248,

ECF

No.

2,

(May

2,

2016) .

Therefore,

Count

V

will

also

be

dismissed with prejudice.

E.

Count VI: Retaliation^

Count VI,
violation

entitled Count V in the Complaint,

of

Retaliation,"

an
In

the

policy,

namely

noted

the

analysis

Taylor has not alleged that she is,

has ever

addition

of Count IV above,
been,

internal
to

company

also alleges

the

defects

in

''No

or has ever applied to be an employee of the Defendant. To

extent

this

portion

of

the

Complaint

can

conceivably

be

interpreted as asserting a retaliation claim under Title VII, it
therefore fails

to state a

claim

(independent of Count I)

upon

which relief may be granted. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.

For that

reason and for the reasons outlined in Counts

Count VI

I

and IV,

will also be dismissed with prejudice.

F.

Count VII: Fourteenth Amendment Claim^
Count VII, entitled Count VI in the Complaint,

factual

allegations

(especially Count I)
the

Defendant's

contained

earlier

in

restates the

the

complaint

and repackages them as a second claim that

conduct

violated

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.

the reasons already stated in the discussion of Count

^ Identified as count ''Count V" in the Complaint.
contains

two

"Count

I,

For

this

The Complaint

IVs".

^ Identified as count "Count VI" in the Complaint. The Complaint
contains

two

"Count

IVs".

claim

must

satisfy

also

the

be

dismissed

state-action

{because

it

fails

requirement

of

to

the

plausibly

Fourteenth

Amendment).

G.

Unentimerated Claims Conceivably Raised in Complaint

Although

provided

the

above,

conceivably

Complaint

its

raise

factual

many of the

(1)

and

defects

(2)

only

the

(liberally

unenumerated

assault,

(3)

asserts

allegations

additional

These claims include:

emotional distress,

itself

state

counts

construed)

law

claims.

intentional infliction of

defamation. These claims suffer from

already noted in the

Plaintiff's

federal

claims, especially those associated with Count I. Nevertheless,
those

defects

need not

be

rehashed.

Because

each

asserted in the Complaint will be dismissed,

adjudication
remain

of

exists.

§ 1367(c)(3),

any

remaining

Pursuant

the

Court

to

thus

state-law claims

discretion

elects

claim

no basis for the

(unenumerated)
its

federal

under

not

to

28

U.S.C.

exercise

its

supplemental jurisdiction over any of those claims because there
is no basis to do so.
Inc.,

556 U.S.

635,

636

See also Carlsbad Tech.,

Inc.

v.

HIF Bio,

(2009).

CONCLUSION

For

the

PLAINTIFF'S

FAILURE TO

reasons

COMPLAINT

outlined
BY

STATE A CLAIM

above,

DEFENDANT

UPON

WHICH

the

GIANT

MOTION

FOOD

RELIEF MAY

TO

STORES,

BE

DISMISS
LLC

GRANTED

FOR

(ECF

No.

5)

will

be

GRANTED,

and this

action will

be

DISMISSED with

prejudice.
The

Clerk

is

directed

to

send

a

copy

of

the

Memorandum

Opinion to the plaintiff.

It

is

so ORDERED.

/s/
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia
Date:
January
,

2017