Harris v. Burnette et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION. See for complete details. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 01/20/2017. Clerk mailed copy to pro se Plaintiff. (nbrow)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
JAN 2 3 2017
BRYANTIE ANN HARRIS,
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHMOND, VA
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Case No. 3:16cv490
DR. ZENIA BURNETTE,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This
matter
is
before
the
Court
on
several
motions
to
dismiss filed by the Defendants: a MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 9)
(Woody Mot. )
filed by Defendants
Dr.
Sarah Huggins
Scarbrough
and Sheriff C.T. Woody, Jr., appearing in his official capacity,
and a MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY
OF RICHMOND AND DR. MICHELLE BOYD
filed on behalf of the
Richmond and Defendant
(ECF No.
13)
(Sch.
Bd. Mot.)
Defendant School Board of the City of
Dr.
Michelle Boyd.
For the reasons
set
out below, the Defendants' motions will be granted.
BACKGROUND
A.
Procedural Posture
The
Complaint
(ECF
No.
1)
names
Defendants
Boyd,
Zenia
Burnette, Richmond Justice Center Jail, Richmond Public Schools,
and Scarbrough as Defendants,
and was filed timely,
having been
filed within sixty days of the
right
to sue
letter issued to
Harris by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") .
(Compl. 2). At the direction of the Court, the City of Richmond
School
Board
official
"School
capacity,
Board"
were
and
Sheriff
substituted
as
C.T.
the
Woody,
in
properly
his
named
defendants in place of Richmond Justice Center Jail and Richmond
Public Schools
( ECF Nos.
12,
16) . A motion to dismiss
( ECF No.
9) was filed by Woody and Scarbrough. Boyd and the School Board
later filed their own motion to dismiss.
(ECF Nos
17,
18),
and Woody
Harris filed responses
submitted a
Harris filed a supplemental response
reply
(ECF No.
20).
(ECF No. 16). The substance
of the allegation is the same against each of these Defendants,
and the facts
favorable
to
at this stage must be viewed in the light most
the
Plaintiff;
the
Complaint
must
also
be
read
liberally in light of Harris's status as a pro se litigant. See
Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S.
97,
106 (1976);
see also Coleman v.
Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010).
B.
Factual Background.
Sometime in late August of 2015,
School Board as
("the
Jail")
inmates.
the
Jail
to
a
teacher
assigned to
provide
educational
Harris was hired by the
the
Richmond City Jail
services
to
eligible
Harris's employer remained the School Board; however,
is
operated by the Sheriff of the City of Richmond,
2
C.T.
Woody
("Woody").
While
assigned
to
teach
at
the
Jail,
Harris worked under the chain of command headed by Woody,
apparently,
the
Sheriff's
director."
hired,
Jail
she reported to Scarbrough,
Office
who
who was an employee of
served
as
the
"jail
during
became
an
concerned about
emergency
of stairs
(which
her
ability to
required
that
concern
to
Scarborough,
Harris
wrote
that,
the
down
six
operational),
and
In
Scarborough.
"[d] ue
exit
walking
if the elevators were not
communicated
to
an
health
3).
available,
The
full
because
content
Harris
of
the
attached
email
to
the
email
to
issues,
number of stairs that I can walk down is limited."
Attach.
program
(Sch. Bd. Memo. at 2). Sometime shortly after she was
Harris
flights
and
and,
the
(ECF No.
exchange
Complaint
is
1,
not
only
a
screenshot of her inbox, which shows only the first few words of
each correspondence. Id.
Scarbrough
requesting
a
responded
meeting
that
to
Harris's
day.
At
expressed
that
concerns
meeting,
by
Scarbrough
allegedly described Harris as a "liability" before requiring her
to surrender her security access badge and keys to the office.
(Compl. 3). Scarbrough also allegedly had deputies escort Harris
back
to
her
off ice
belongings and leave.
where
she
was
required
to
pack
up
her
Id. This action seems to have amounted to
the effective termination of Harris' s
3
service as a
teacher at
the Jail, but the logistics remain opaque; however,
it seems as
if Harris's employment with the City was also terminated.
As
briefs,
was
best
can
be
determined
from
the
Complaint
and
the
the particular educational program through which Harris
employed is
Sheriff's
in the nature of a
off ice
and
the
joint venture between the
School
Board.
The
program
organizationally falls under the umbrella of the School Board,
but it serves inmates and is thus functionally dependent on the
Sheriff's
Office
According
to
for
Woody's
access
motion
pursuant to Virginia law
incarcerated
individuals
provided
educational
"the
apparently
incarcerated
dismiss,
under
18)
had
and
(Woody Mot.
meeting
environment."
Scarbrough
to
the
this
students.
arrangement
is
(which mandates education for eligible
between the two entities.
Woody
to
Id.
the
the
written
agreement
4) . Under that agreement,
space
As
a
and
security
for
the
"jail program director,"
authority
to
deny
access
to
Harris, an employee chosen by the School Board to teach in that
program. However, there is no allegation that either Scarborough
or Woody had the authority to hire or fire Harris.
The Complaint provides that,
the
Jail
by
Scarbrough,
through
the
Justice
Center
that,
when
Richmond
were
after being
"[e]fforts
Public
School
unsuccessful."
Scarbrough
"revoked"
4
her
to
forced to
resolve
[sic]
(Compl.
access
and
3) .
to
this
The
matter
Richmond
Harris
the
leave
states
Jail,
her
employment
was
effectively terminated because
the access that Scarbrough had revoked.
current motions
to dismiss,
three months my employer,
get Dr.
Id.
her
job
required
In her reply to the
Harris provides
further
that,
"for
Richmond Public Schools attempted to
Scarbrough to meet with them to discuss how to get me
back into the building to continue my position as Jail Teacher"
and that
Scarbrough responded by asking
candidate to fill the position.
further
alleges
that
and her employer,
"physical
Public
sent."
when
out
provides
for
Id.
Harris's
actually terminated,
filled
for
the name of a
new
(Harris Reply 2). Harris' s reply
correspondence between
Scarbrough
Scarbrough indicated that there would be new
requirements
School
indicate
in this
for
the
any
new
Neither
Jail
the
employment
Teacher
Complaint
with
the
that
nor
School
Richmond
the
Reply
Board
was
but the "Intake Questionnaire" that Harris
EEOC,
11/10/2015
as
which
the
is
"Date
attached
to
the
Complaint,
(Compl.
Quit/Discharged."
Attach. 1-1).
Harris
to
Dr.
maintains
alleges
that
Scarbrough's
that
she
her
quasi-termination was
perception
is
that
"physically
perform the duties of that position".
tension with
EEOC,
how
Harris
filled
out
and
Id.
her
I
was
disabled,"
mentally
(Compl. Attach.
1-2).
5
qualified
and
to
This statement is in
questionnaire
in which she checked the box indicating that,
a disability."
solely "due
with
"Yes,
the
I have
In their Motion to Dismiss
(ECF
No.
9),
Woody
and
terminated because " [she]
Scarbrough
confirm
that
Harris
was
presented a safety and security risk
for the jail," while Harris continues seemingly to assert that
she has no disability.
(Harris Reply 1,
ECF No.
21).
However,
Harris told Scarborough and the EEOC that she was disabled. The
advice
to
the
Complaint.
dismiss,
EEOC
is
Therefore,
and in
incorporated
in,
and
attached to,
for purposes of deciding the motions
any future
amended Complaint,
Harris must
the
to
be
treated as alleging a disability.
Based on these
Scarbrough,
Woody
facts,
(Scarbrough's
(Harris' s employer).
their
roles
Michelle
"Intake
immediate
Boyd
in
Harris filed a timely suit against
complaint,
Zenia
Questionnaire"
supervisors.
Harris
Burnette
with
the
(Compl.
in
(ECF No.
her
Attach.
5),
must be dismissed on that ground.
also
EEOC
longer employed by the School Board,
served with process
and
School
Board
(Compl. 1). Although she has not specified
her
and
employer),
named
Defendants
Complaint,
listed
1-1).
them
Burnette
and
her
as
her
is
no
has not been successfully
and the Complaint against her
The Complaint also makes no
discernable claim against Boyd.
ANALYSIS AND LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
The Claims Against Scarbrough, Boyd, and Burnette
Under any view of the facts,
Boyd,
the suits against Scarbrough,
and Burnette must be dismissed.
6
Beyond the fact that the
Complaint makes no discernible claims against Boyd or Burnette
(and that the latter was never served) ,
indi victual supervisors
are not liable under the ADA for the delegable decisions they
make on behalf of their employers.
Corp.,
Co.,
§
30 F.3d 507,
907 F.
510
(4th Cir.
Supp.
169,
Such
delegable
12111 (2).
discriminatory
172
conduct
contained
include
in
the
allegedly
Complaint,
the
See Stephens,
is
Kay Mgmt.
1995); see also 42 U.S.C.
decisions
("After Birkbeck, there
Marvel Lighting
1994); Stephens v.
(E.D. Va.
decisions to terminate employees.
173-74
Birkbeck v.
no personal
907 F.
i.e.
Supp. at
liability
under
either the ADEA or Title VII for individuals making a decision
to
terminate
liability
on
employment.") .
individual
Because
supervisors
the
ADA
under
does
the
not
impose
circumstances
alleged in this case, further amending of the Complaint would be
futile.
The
Complaint
will
therefore
be
dismissed
with
prejudice against Scarborough, Boyd, and Burnette.
B.
The Claims Against the School Board and Woody
The Complaint must also be dismissed as to the School Board
and Woody.
only
for
"employer"
As relevant to this case,
the
discriminatory
the ADA imposes liability
employment
§§
But,
as
liberally,
made
by
an
(as provided in the def ini ti on of "covered entity")
against an "employee." See 42 U.S.C.
even
decisions
accepting
Harris' s
the
actual
Complaint
employer was
7
12112(a), 12111(4)-(5).
true
the
and
School
reading
Board,
it
not
Woody.
by
Moreover,
Scarbrough,
Harris.
each
Put
an
discriminatory action allegedly taken was
employee
together,
entity.
Board has
the
Because
of
Woody
Harris's
Harris
but
claims
has
not
not
the
therefore
alleged
employer
fail
that
against
the
taken any discriminatory action against her,
of
School
she has
not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against the
School Board.
Office
And,
because
not
Harris' s
the
under
is
ADA
against
(as presently alleged)
employer,
Woody
she
either.
has
not
Thus,
the Sheriff's
stated
the
a
claim
Complaint
must
also be dismissed against the School Board and Woody.
The
dismissal
against
Woody and the
School
Board will
be
without prejudice and with leave to amend on the basis of the
"joint employer" doctrine if,
support such a theory.
Inc.,
does
793 F.3d 404,
not
currently
School Board,
present
facts
and only if,
See Butler v.
409
(4th Cir.
state
a
there are facts that
Drive Auto.
Indus.
of Am.,
2015). Although the Complaint
claim against
either Woody
or
the
it is conceivable that an amended complaint could
indicating
that
the
Sheriff's
Office
and
the
School Board should be treated as "joint employers" as provided
by
that
doctrine.
Therefore,
the
dismissal
of
the
Complaint
will be without prejudice as to Defendants Woody and the School
Board.
8
CONCLUSION
For the
(ECF
Nos.
9,
reasons
13)
set
will
forth
be
above,
granted,
the motions
and
the
to
action
dismiss
will
be
dismissed with prejudice as the individual Defendants Michelle
Boyd,
Sarah Huggins,
and Zenia Burnette. The motions to dismiss
will also be granted as to Woody and the School Board, but the
matter will be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend
on the basis of the
joint employer doctrine if,
and only if,
there are facts that support such a theory.
It is so ORDERED.
Isl
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Date: January 1-1>, 2017
9
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