Almarode v. Newton et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 01/12/2017. (tjoh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

TIMOTHY W. ALMARODE,
Plaintiff,

V.

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Civil Action No. 3:16CV637-HEH

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JEFFERY L. NEWTON, Superintendent,
MAJOR DOUGLAS UPSHAW, and

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MAJOR DAWN FLIPPIN,

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Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss)

This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an array of purported
constitutional violations arising from what Plaintiffperceives to be his unlawful detention

by officials at the Riverside Regional Jail in Prince George, Virginia. Hiswide swath of
claims includeviolations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The

circumstances underlying Plaintiffs claims are difficult to discern solely from the face of
his inartful Complaint. It appears, however, that the crux of his grievance is his

contention that personnel at the Riverside Regional Jail held him in custody beyond his
court ordered release date. In support, he states that "the judge made clear my time was

done." (Compl. ^ 12, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff, who ispro se, seeks $1,000,000 in damages.
This case is presently before the Court on the Defendants' collective Motion to

Dismiss, accompanied by a memorandum supporting theirposition, and an appropriate
notice articulating the admonitions required nndQv Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309

(4th Cir. 1975) (ECF Nos. 4, 5, 6, respectively). Plaintiffhas filed no response to the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. This Court, nevertheless, is obligated to ensure that

dismissal is proper even when a motion to dismiss is unopposed. See Stevenson v. City of
Seat Pleasant, Md, 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014).

In addition to challenging the sufficiency of Plaintiffs claim under the traditional
Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the Defendants also contend that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction or, alternatively, that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Because Plaintiffs claims are grounded in constitutional violations, the Complaint

facially satisfies the federal question requirement for subjectmatterjurisdiction. This
Court need not reach the issue of whether the Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity since Plaintiffs claims founder at the starting gate. Plaintiffs claims are
predicated on his misunderstanding of boththe underlying facts and applicable law.
Because of the stream of conscious nature of Plaintiffs marginally decipherable

Complaint, this Courtis constrained to reconstruct the relevant events by referring to the
certified public records appended to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. "Ordinarily, a
court may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly

incorporated therein, on a motion to dismiss." Clatterbuck v. City ofCharlottesville, 708
F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 559 n.l (4th Cir.
2011)). However, the court may consider documents attached or incorporated into the

complaint, "as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral
to the complaint and authentic." Philips v. Pitt County Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180
(4th Cir. 2009).
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Central to Plaintiffs claims is his contention that the Riverside Regional Jail

misconstrued orders of the Chesterfield County General District Court in requiring him to

remain confined beyond his release date. Furthermore, these documents are certified as

accurate by the clerk of that court. Because these documents are integral to his claim and
have not been objected to by the Plaintiff, they will be considered by the Court in
evaluating the plausibility of his constitutional claims.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiffwas arrested on February 3, 2014 for driving
while intoxicated, assault on a police officer, and operating a motor vehicle with an open
container of alcohol. (Compl. ^ 4; Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Exs. 1, 2, 8, ECF

Nos. 5-1, 5-2, 5-8.) He was released on bond on February 5,2014. On April 11, 2014,

the Chesterfield County General District Court issued a capias (attachment of the body)

requiring the Plaintiffto be taken into custody for failing to obey the conditions of
pretrial release. (Compl. ^ 4; Defs,' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 5.) Following his
arrest on May 3, 2014, on that capias, he appeared again in the Chesterfield County
General District Court. At that time, he was ordered held without bond. (Defs.' Mem.

Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 6.) On May 7,2014, he was transferred from the Chesterfield
County Jail to Riverside Regional Jail. (Compl. 14.)
On July 31, 2014, the Plaintiff appeared again before the Chesterfield County
General District Court. The Plaintiff pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol and was sentenced to twelve months in jail, all of which was

suspended for three years, and fined $1,000 with payment of $750 suspended. (Defs.'
Mem, Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 2.) That same day, the charge of assaulting a law
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enforcement officer was amended to simple assault, to which Plaintiff pled guilty. He

was immediately sentenced to twelve months of confinement with the execution of six
months suspended for a period of three years on that charge. {Id. at Ex. 1.)
With respectto the capias, on which Plaintiffwas then being held in custody, the

court on July 31, 2014 ordered the underlying charge dismissed. {Id. at Ex. 5.) This
discharged Plaintiff from any further obligation on that charge. {Id. at Ex. 7.)
Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that he was advised by the court on July 31, 2014

that he was receiving "time served." (Compl. H5.) He bolsters this contention by stating
that several of the officials at the Riverside Regional Jail concurred that he should have

been released. {Id, fl 6-7.) The named Defendants, however, disagreed and the court's

records support their position.^ Plaintiffs claims are the product ofuninformed
confusion.

This Court's review of a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) is both informed and constrained by the well-pleaded facts contained
in the complaint—and here, official public records integral to Plaintiffs claims. In

considering a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true, and

' Ordinarily, a court may notconsider any documents that are outside the complaint in deciding a
motion to dismiss, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment. Witthohn v.

Fed. Ins. Co., 164 Fed. App'x 395, 396-97 (4th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, "a court may consider
official public records, documents central to plaintiffs claim, and documents sufficiently
referred to in the complaint [without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary
judgment] so long as the authenticity of these documents is not disputed." Id. at 396. Some
district courts in the Eastern District of Virginia have gone so far as to conclude that they may
take judicial notice of public documents, such as court records, even when the documents are
neither referenced by nor integral to the plaintiffs complaint. See Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins.
Co. V. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 628 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678-79 (E.D. Va. 2009); Gasner v. Cty. of
Dinwiddie, 162 F.R.D. 280, 282 (E.D. Va. 1995).

the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. T.G. Slater &
Son, Inc, V. Donald P. & Patricia A. Brennan LLC, 385 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 2004).

Important to the task at hand, legal conclusions, however, enjoy no such deference bythe
reviewing court. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint
for facial sufficiency, the court must parse out legal conclusions and enriching

commentary. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pointed out in
Francis v. Giacomelli, "naked assertions of wrongdoing necessitate some factual

enhancement within the complaint to cross the linebetween possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief." 588 F.3d 186,193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing BellAtl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] court
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth."

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, a complaint must allege facts
sufficient"to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555, stating a claim that is "plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim has facial
plausibility "when the plaintiffpleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, it will not act as the
inmate's advocate. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). "Principles

requiring generous construction ofpro se complaints are not... without limits."
Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
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The authenticated records of the Chesterfield County General District Court—on

which Plaintiffs claims turn—conclusively demonstrate the implausibility of his

allegations. Plaintiff, in effect, received "time served" on the violation of theterms of his
pretrial release, nothis conviction for simple assault. The sixmonths' sentence about
which he now complains was imposed on that separate offense. (Defs.' Mem. Support

Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1.) No credit was given toward the satisfaction of that sentence for the
time served for violating the terms of his pretrial release.
The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff fails to plead a plausible claim that the
Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Because no legal or factual amendment

can resuscitate his stillborn claims, the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/

Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge

Date: Jkn It 20/7
Richmond, VA