Conyers v. Virginia Housing Development Authority et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. See for complete details. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. on 09/19/2017. (mailed copy to pro se Plaintiff) (nbrow)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

NICOLLE CONYERS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-690-JAG

V.

VIRGINIA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY, and
MCGUIREWOODS, LLC,
Defendants.
OPINION

The pro se plaintiff, Nicolle Conyers, filed this action against McGuireWoods, LLC and
the Virginia Housing Development Authority ("VHDA") (collectively "the defendants") to
vacate a 2013 judgment. Conyers claims that the defendants committed fraud on the court by

lying about the VHDA's legal business classification. The defendants have moved to dismiss.
The Court grants the defendants' motion because Conyers' alleged facts do not plausibly show
that the defendants engaged in the kind of egregious conduct required to constitute fraud on the
court.

I. BACKGROUND

The VHDA terminated Conyers in December 2010. Conyers then filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in February 2011.

The VHDA

declared itself a state agency in its EEOC position statement.

In 2012, the EEOC issued Conyers a "Notice to Sue." Conyers then filed her complaint
in this district claiming that the VHDA violated Title VII. Relevant here, Conyers did not bring

a due process claim at that time, and the complaint classified the VHDA as a state agency. See

Conyers v. Va. Hous. Dev. Autk, 927 F. Supp. 2d 285, 292 (E.D. Va. 2013). The VHDA,

represented by McGuireWoods, denied being a state agency in its answer to the 2012 complaint.
In late 2012, the VHDA moved for summary judgment. In support of the motion, the

VHDA submitted an allegedly perjured affidavit from its HR Director that classified the VHDA
as a non-profit organization. Conyers now claims that the VHDA and the HR Director knew that
the VHDA was a state agency, rather than a non-profit, because the VHDA refers to itself as the
"Virginia State Housing Authority, a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia."
(PL's Compl. at H 12, Dk. No. 1.) Conyers also says that McGuireWoods knew that the VHDA
was a state agency because McGuireWoods had represented the VHDA in prior litigations where
it stated that the VHDA was a state agency.

The Court granted the motion for summary judgment. See Conyers^ 927 F. Supp. 2d at
292.

In the opinion granting the motion, the Court stated that the VHDA was a non-profit

organization in the background section, but it did not rely on this classification in any part of its
analysis. Id.

Conyers now alleges that the defendants committed fraud on the court when they
submitted inconsistent statements in the 2011 EEOC position statement, the 2012 answer to the

complaint, and in support of the 2012 motion for summary judgment (collectively the "2012

misrepresentations"). Conyers seeks relief from the Court's 2013 judgment upholding summary
judgment under Rule 60(d)(3) and, alternatively. Rule 60(d)(1).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The VHDA and McGuireWoods have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion gauges the sufficiency of a complaint
without resolving any factual discrepancies or testing the merits of the claims. Republican Party

ofN.C. V. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering the motion, a court must

accept all allegations in the complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.
2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). The principle
that a court must accept all allegations as true, however, does not apply to legal conclusions.

Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a

complaint must state facts that, when accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face." Id. (quoting 5^//^/*/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The Court understands that a pro se litigant presents claims differently from a trained

attorney. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Accordingly,
courts construe pro se complaints liberally. Id. This principle of liberal construction, however,
has its limits. Id. Courts do not need to discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff or to

conjure up issues on the plaintiffs behalf. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir.
2006); Beaudett, 11S F.2d at 1276.
III. DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 sets forth the procedure for seeking relief from a

judgment or order. Where a party waits more than a year after a court has entered a judgment, a
party may only seek relief under Rule 60(d). The Court liberally construes the pro se plaintiffs

complaint to assert two claims under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) and 60(d)(1).
A, Rule 60(d)(3) Claim

Under Rule 60(d)(3), a party may seek relief from a prior judgment by asserting that the
opposing party committed fraud on the court. To prevail, a party must show that the opposing

party engaged in an intentional scheme to defraud the court and that the fraud touched the public

interest in a way that fraud between parties does not. UnitedStates v. Conrad, 675 Fed. App'x.
263, 264 (4th Cir. 2017). Only egregious conduct which impinges the court's ability to function

impartially constitutes fraud on the court. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. ofTeamsters,
675 F.2d 1349, 1356 (4th Cir. 1982), Typically, courts limit egregious conduct to the bribery of

a judge or juror or an attorney exerting improper influence over the court. Id. Egregious
conduct may also include a conspiracy between an attorney and his client to defraud the court.
Cleveland Demolition Co., v. Azcon Scrap Corp., Div. of Gold Fields Am. Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d

984, 986 (4th Cir. 1987). Fraud between parties, however, does not constitute fraud on the court,
even if the alleged fraud involves perjury of a party or witness. Meindl v. Genesys Pac. Techs.,
Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 2000).

Here, the 2012 misrepresentations do not rise to fraud on the court because the facts do

not support an inference that the defendants conspired to deceive the Court. See Conrad, 675
Fed. App'x. at 264-265 ("Without a concerted effort by both a witness and opposing counsel to
commit and conceal fraud, the adversarial process is ordinarily sufficient to uncover the fraud.").

Conyers alleges that the VHDA lied in its answer to the 2012 complaint, that the
VHDA's HR Director committed perjury in an affidavit, and that McGuireWoods knew the
VHDA lied about its legal status based on prior legal representation. Submission of a fraudulent

affidavit and inconsistent statements, however, amount to mere evidentiary conflicts, not fraud
on the court. Cleveland Demolition, 827 F.2d at 987 ("If a routine evidentiary dispute, which

occurs in virtually all trials, could justify an action for fraud on the court, then any losing party

could bring an independent action to set aside the verdict.").' These facts do not support an
inference that McGuireWoods and the VHDA somehow conspired to commit fraud on the court.

' Meindl v. Genesys Pac. Techs., Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2000).
4

and the submissions merely present an evidentiary conflict. Further, as discussed in the next
section, the VHDA's status had no bearing on the Court's 2013 determination that Conyers

failed to make a prima facie showing of employment discrimination and retaliation under Title
VII. Because the defendants lacked a motive to defraud the Court and because Conyers has not

otherwise alleged a conspiracy between the defendants in the prior proceeding, the Court
dismisses the 60(d)(3) claim.
B. Rule 60(d)(1) claim

Under Rule 60(d)(1), "[a] court has the power to entertain an independent action to

relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding." Liggins v. Clarke County School Bd,
Civil Action No. 5:09cv00077, 2014 WL 6460776, at *5 (W.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2014). For a

plaintiff to prevail on a Rule 60(d)(1) claim, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that the judgment in favor of the defendant ought not, in equity and good
conscience, be enforced; (2) that she had a good claim; (3) that fraud, accident, or
mistake prevented her from obtaining the benefit of her claim; (4) the absence of
fault or negligence on her part; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at
law.

Id. Conyers' claim fails to meet the second and third elements of a 60(d)(1) claim.
The 2012 misrepresentations did not prevent Conyers from obtaining the benefit of her
2012 claims because the VHDA's legal classification did not matter to her Title VII

discrimination case. In 2013, the Court dismissed Conyers Title VII claim because she had not

met the prima facie elements of discrimination, and the Court did not rely on the VHDA's legal
classification in making that determination. See Conyers, 927 F. Supp. 2d at 291-96. In the
present case, Conyers argues that she could have brought a Virginia Personnel Act claim in 2012

had the plaintiffs not lied about the VHDA's legal classification. This argument fails, however,

because Conyers simply did not bring that claim in 2012, so the alleged fraud did not prevent her

from obtaining the benefit of that claim. (Conyers v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth. et al., Case No. 3:12CV-297-JRS, Amended Complaint, Dk. No. 6.) Conyers fails to show that the alleged fraud

prevented her from obtaining any benefit of her Title VII claim at the time the alleged fraud
arose in 2012. Liggins, 2014 WL 6460776, at *5. The Court therefore denies her claim under
Rule 60(d)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION

Conyers has not shown a plausible claim of fraud on the court because she has alleged a
conspiracy between the VHDA and its attorneys in the 2012 litigation and because she has not
shown that any alleged fraud affected her Title VII claims in that case. Accordingly, the Court
grants the defendants' motion to dismiss.
The Court will enter an appropriate final order.

Let the Clerk send a copy of this Opinion to all counsel of record and the pro se plaintiff.

Date:,

"7/
iTvA

Richmond

JohnA.Gibney,Jr.

United States Distii(/t J