Ames v. Gujral et al
Filing
49
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 10/31/2019. Copy to Plaintiff as directed. (jsmi, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
CHAPPELL L. AMES,
Plaintiff,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:16CV781
ROBIN SIDI,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chappell L. Ames, Sr., a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se
and ^ forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983 action.^
The
matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by Robin Sidi, R.N.^
Ames has not responded.
For the reasons set
forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46) will be
granted.
I.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDOdENT
Summary judgment must be rendered "if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P.
^ The matter is proceeding on Ames's Amended Complaint. (ECF
No. 22-2.)
The Court corrects the capitalization, spelling, and
punctuation in the quotations from the parties' submissions.
2 The Amended Complaint also named Nurse Edwards and Dr.
Gujral as Defendants. Because Ames failed to timely serve Edwards
and Gujral, by Memorandum Order entered on May 24, 2019, the Court
dismissed without prejudice all claims against them. (ECF No. 45.)
56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the responsibility
to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify
the parts of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). "[WJhere the nonmoving party will bear the burden
of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion
may
properly
be
made
in
reliance
solely
on
the
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file."
Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted).
properly
supported,
the
nonmoving
party
When the motion is
must
go
beyond
the
pleadings and, by citing affidavits or "'depositions, answers to
interrogatories,
and
admissions
on
file,'
designate
'specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"
Id.
(quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 56(e) (1986)).
In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court "must draw
all justifiable
inferences
in
favor
of the
nonmoving
party."
United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 835 (4th
Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,
255 (1986)).
However, a
preclude summary judgment.
mere
scintilla of evidence
Anderson, 477
will not
U.S. at 251 (citing
Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1871)).
"'[TJhere is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether
there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which
a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party . .
. upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.'"
81 U.S. at 448).
Id. (quoting Munson,
Additionally, "*Rule 56 does not impose upon the
district court a duty to sift through the record in search of
evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.'"
Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Skotak
V. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992));
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) ("The court need consider only the
cited materials
. . . .").
In support of her Motion for Summary Judgment, Nurse Sidi
submitted her declaration ("Sidi Decl.," ECF No. 47-1), and Ames's
medical records ("Medical Records," ECF No. 47-2).
Although Ames
did not respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, his Amended
Complaint
appears
to
be
verified.
(ECF
No.
22-2,
at
19.)
Accordingly, the following facts are established for the Motion
for Summary Judgment.
The Court draws all permissible inferences
in favor of Ames.
II.
PERTINENT, XJNDISPUTED FACTS
In 2014, Nurse Sidi worked as a charge nurse at Sussex II
State
Prison ("SUSP").
(Sidi
Decl. 5 4.)
SUSP is a "high
security prison that houses approximately 1500 offenders."
(Id.)
One of Nurse Sidi's "administrative duties was to triage emergency
grievances submitted by offenders."
"ta]s
a
registered
nurse, [she]
(Id.)
work[s]
Nurse Sidi notes that
exclusively
under
the
supervision of a physician and [does] not have the independent
authority to order referrals for treatment."
(Id. SI 10.)
On Friday, September 19, 2014, at approximately 9:00 a.m.,
Ames injured his knee while playing basketball at SUSP.
Compl. SI 1.)
Ames was taken to the infirmary where he was examined
by Nurse Street.
(Id. fSI 4-7.)
Ames told Nurse Street that he
was in a lot of pain and wanted to go to the hospital.
Nurse
(Am-.
Street told
Ames that
only
Dr.
Gujral
could
(Id. SI 7.)
authorize
emergency treatment outside of SUSP and he was not currently at
SUSP.
(Id. SIS! 8-9.)
Nurse Street contacted
informed him of Ames's injury.
(Id. SI 12.)
approve Ames for outside emergency care.
Dr. Gujral and
Dr. Gujral refused to
(Id. SI 13.)
Dr. GujraJ.
ordered Nurse Street to schedule Ames for x-rays and an appointment
with Dr. Gujral on Monday.
(Id.)
Nurse Street wrapped the knee
in an ace bandage (Medical Records 1), and provided Ames with
crutches and pain reliever.^
On
Monday,
September
(Am. Compl. SI 15.)
22,
2014,
Ames
asked
Correctional
Officer Weatherby to check whether Ames was on the list to see the
doctor.
(Id. SI 24.)
Nurse Sidi received a call from Weatherby
and informed him that Ames was not on the list and directed Ames
3 Ames contends that he was provided with ibuprofen.
Compl. SI 15.)
(Am.
Ames medical records reflect that he was given 600
milligrams of Motrin for 10 days.
(Medical Records 1.)
to submit a sick call request if he would like to be assessed.
(Sidi Decl. 5 6.)
Thereafter, Weatherby informed Ames that he was not on the
list to see the doctor.
(Am. Compl. 5 25.)
Ames showed Weatherby
his injured knee and asked Weatherby to call the medical department
so that they would provide emergency care.
seeing
Ames's
disbelief
injured
and
department
in
knee,
concern,
[Ames's]
and
Weatherby's
Upon
eyes "bulged . . . in
immediately
presence."
(Id. f 26.)
(Id.
called
SI
the
27.)
medical
After
the
conclusion of the phone call, Weatherby told Ames, "that he had
just spoken with . . . Nurse Sidi, and that she said he was not oh
the list for medical, she would not call him over, and that he
needed to submit a sick call slip."
(Id. 1 31.)
Weatherby told Ames to submit a Medical Emergency Grievance
Slip and he would deliver it to the Medical Department.
SI 32.)
At
Grievance
1:30
Slip,
p.m.,
which
Ames
submitted
explained
that
his
he
Medical
had
been
(Id-.
Emergency
"seriously
injured" and had been told he would see the doctor on Monday and
have x-rays taken.
(Id. SI 33.)
Upon receipt of the Medical
Emergency Grievance Slip in the medical department, "Ames's chart
was brought to Dr. Gujral, who was advised about the emergency
grievance and the injury assessment done by the nurse on September
19, 2014."
(Sidi Decl. SI 7 (citation omitted).)
Ultimately, given
the non-life threatening nature of Mr. Ames's complaint,
the emergency grievance was deemed 'non-emergent' and
the grievance was returned to [Ames] indicating that his
chart
had
been
left
for
the
doctor
to
review.
Thereafter,
Dr.
Gujral
signed
off
on
the
chart
indicating that he had reviewed the injury assessment
and noted an x-ray was ordered with no additional orders
at that time.
(Id. (citation omitted).)
Ames was placed on the list to be seen
by the doctor, once the x-rays results came back.
(Id.)
According to Nurse Sidi:
Later that same day, Mr. Ames submitted a second
emergency grievance seeking medical attention for his
injured knee. Because this was non-threatening, [Nurse
Sidi] again deemed the grievance as "non-emergent" and
advised Mr. Ames that the doctor had already ordered an
x-ray and prescribed medication for pain. At no time on
September 22, 2014, or thereafter, did Mr. Ames submit a
sick call request to be seen by medical.
(Id. 5 8.)
Nurse Sidi had
no further contact with
Ames
with
On September 24, 2014, x-rays of Ames's knee were taken.
(Am.
respect to the issues in this lawsuit.
Compl SI 39.)
(Id. f 9.)
Thereafter, Ames received an MRI of his knee (id.
SI 56), and eventually surgery on his knee (id. SI 76.)
However,
before he received surgery, Ames fell and injured his knee and
back.
(Id. SI 59.)
III.
To
survive
a
EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
motion
for
summary
judgment
on
an
Eighth
Amendment claim, Ames must demonstrate that Nurse Sidi acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
V. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001).
See Brown
A medical need is
"serious" if it "has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention."
Iko v.
Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Henderson v.
Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The
subjective
prong
of
a
deliberate
indifference
claim
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a particular defendant
actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious
harm to his person.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994). "Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing
of mere negligence will not meet it."
Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d
692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1976)).
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions
of
confinement
unless
the
official
knows
of
and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Farmer teaches "that general knowledge
of facts creating a substantial risk of harm is not enough.
The
prison official must also draw the inference between those general
facts and
the
specific
risk
of
harm
confronting
the
inmate."
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Thus, to survive a motion for summary
judgment under the deliberate indifference standard, a plaintiff
"must show that the official in question subjectively recognized
a substantial risk of harm . . . . [and] that the official in
question
subjectively
recognized
that
^inappropriate in light of that risk.'"
his
actions
were
Parrish ex rel. Lee v.
Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rich v..
Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997)).
In evaluating a prisoner's complaint regarding medical care,
the Court is mindful that, "society does not expect that prisoners
will have unqualified access to health care" or to the medical
treatment of their choosing.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04).
circumstances,
Absent exceptional
an inmate's disagreement with
medical personnel
with respect to a course of treatment is insufficient to state a
cognizable
constitutional
deliberate indifference.
claim,
much
less
to
demonstrate
See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849
(4th Cir. 1985) (citing Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d
Cir. 1970)).
Nurse Sidi's interaction with Ames was limited to responding
to
a
phone
call
submitted by Ames.
from
Weatherby
and
two
emergency
grievances
Upon receiving the phone call, she informed
Weatherby that Ames was not on the list to be seen by the doctor
and that Ames should submit a sick call slip if Ames wished to be
8
assessed.
Instead,
Ames
submitted
complaining about his knee injury.
the
emergency
Street's
grievance
assessment,
to
and
emergency
grievance
Nurse Sidi promptly brought
Ames's
Dr.
an
medical
Gujral.
chart
Upon
with
review
Nurse
of
that
information. Dr. Gujral concluded, given the pain medication and
crutches provided, and the scheduling of x-rays, Ames did
require
emergency
medical
care.
Absent
not
extraordinary
circumstances not present here. Nurse Sidi is entitled to rely
upon the medical judgment of a doctor as to the proper course of
treatment for an inmate.
See Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850
F.3d 526, 539 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding nurse did not act with
deliberate indifference by following doctor's orders); Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F. 3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)
(observing that "a medical care system requires nurses to defer to
treating physicians' instructions and orders in most situations,
that deference may not be blind or unthinking, particularly if it
is
apparent
patient").
with
that
the
physician's
order
will
likely
harm
the
Thus, Ames fails to demonstrate that Nurse Sidi acted
deliberate
indifference.
Accordingly,
Ames's
Eighth
Amendment claim for monetary damages will be dismissed.
The Court notes that Ames seeks injunctive relief in the form
of "an order from the Court requiring the Defendants to send him
out for corrective/surgery treatments for his back and hip."
Compl. 18.)
(Am.
To survive summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment
claim for injunctive relief, an inmate "must come forward with
evidence from which it can he inferred that the defendant-officials
were at the time suit was filed, and are at the time of summary
judgment, knowingly and unreasonably disregarding an objectively
intolerable risk of harm, and that they will continue to do so."
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 84 6.
Ames has not come forward with any
evidence that Nurse Sidi was or is "disregarding an objectively
intolerable risk of harm" with regard to the need for the medical
care for Ames's back and hip.
Id.
Accordingly, Ames demand for
injunctive relief from Nurse Sidi will be dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Nurse Sidi's Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 46) will be granted.
Ames's claim and the action
will be dismissed.
The
Clerk is directed to send
a
copy of this
Memorandum
Opinion to Ames and counsel of record.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Date;
10
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