Thompson v. Wiedemann et al

Filing 52

MEMORANDUM OPINION. SEE OPINION for complete details. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Hudson on 12/13/2017. Copy of Memorandum Opinion was mailed to Plaintiff this day as directed.(ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

L

Richmond Division

S

r\

I

DEC I 4 2017

ANTHONY L. THOMPSON,

clerk, U.S. DiSTfiiCT COURT

Plaintiff,

RIGHMOND. VA

Civil Action No. 3:16CV834-HEH

V.

DR. WIEDEMANN, et. al.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Granting Motion to Dismiss)

Anthony L. Thompson, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informa

paiiperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. §1983 action.' Thompson contends that Defendants^
denied him adequate dental care during his incarceration in the Greensville Correctional
Center ("GCC"). The matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21)

filed by Defendants Dr. Wiedemann, DDS, and Dr. Barnwell, DDS ("Defendants").
Thompson has responded. (ECF No. 26.) For the reasons stated below, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

' The statute provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

^Thompson names as Defendants: Dr. Wiedemann, DDS; Dr. Plapp, DDS; R. Allen, a Dental
Assistant; Dr. Velma Barnwell, DDS; K.L. Whitehead, Ombudsman; C. Parker, Assistant
Warden; H.C. Ray, Health Services Director; S. Tapp, Ombudsman; and D.Y. Kinsley, Law
Librarian.

i!)

I.

STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;

importantly, itdoes not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits ofa claim, or
the applicability ofdefenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,952
(4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5ACharles A. Wright &Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th
Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual

allegations, however, and "acourt considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin

by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption oftruth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant
fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" BellAtl. Corp.

V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints

containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a
cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiffmust allege facts sufficient

"to raise a right to reliefabove the speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a

claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content thatallows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or
complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the plaintiff must
"allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.L DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,

309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. UnitedStates, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th

Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua

sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on
the face of his complaint. SeeBrockv. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig,

J,, concurring); Beaudettv. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS

In his Complaint (ECF No. 1),^ Thompson alleges that Defendants denied him
adequate dental care during his incarceration in the GCC, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment."* As relevant to the Motion to Dismiss, Thompson alleges:^

^ Thompson did not place his claims on the standardized form, but instead attached a document
to the complaint form that contains all of his allegations and claims. ("Compl. Attach.," ECF
No. 1-1.) The Court employs the pagination assigned to the Complaint and its attachments by
the CM/ECF docketing system. The Court omits the numbering and corrects the punctuation,
spelling, and capitalization in quotations from the Complaint and attachments.
^ "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, amend. VIII.

^The Court only provides the allegations pertaining to Defendants Wiedemarm and Bamwell in
the summary of the relevant allegations. The Complaint contains many more allegations against
the remaining defendants.

Plaintiff arrived at Greensville Correctional Center in December

2013. There was no oral exam performed by dental upon arrival. Violating
dental operating procedure 720.6.
On September 08, 2014, after submitting numerous requests, and
grievance forms for pain. Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Wiedemann who
performed S.O.A.P. procedure according to dental operating procedure
720.6. He then had Plaintiff scheduled to have #31 restored.

On October 20, 2014, Dr. Wiedemann partially restored #18, #19.
These teeth were not causing pain. He applied a desensitizing agent to #31.
He did not restore it as scheduled.

On June 21, 2015, Plaintiff submitted [an] informal complaint to

address pain due to not being scheduled accordingly.
On June 30, 2015, Dental Assistant R. Allen responded, "You were
Dr. Wiedemann's patient, who is no longer here ...."

On August 17, 2015, Plaintiff submitted [an] informal complaint
about pain from ear and headaches caused by infected tooth.
On August, 20, 2015, Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance
(#82535) because of the constant pain and lack of appetite. Was later
treated as a non-emergency.

(Compl. Attach. 3-4.)

On January 21, 2016, Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance.
On the same day, Plaintiff was diagnosed as having an abscess. Plaintiff
was placed on antibiotics, and Ibuprofen, and was scheduled for [an]
extraction.

On March 24, 2016, Plaintiff submitted emergency grievance (see

exhibit C) and complained of pain coming from the abscess diagnosed by
defendant Dr. Brown.

Response: Does not meet the definition of an emergency, "We will
bring you over today for an evaluation." If not an emergency, why have
Plaintiff over to evaluate a problem already diagnosed?
On April 26, 2016, Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance
because of pain from abcess [sic]. Defendant Dr. Brown prescribed a lower
dosage of the same prescription and was told I was approved for oral
surgery.

{Id. at 6-7.)

Thompson seeks declaratory judgment and monetary damages. {Id. at 11.)

The Court construes the Complaint as raising the following claims for relief:^
Claim One:

Defendant Wiedemann denied Thompson adequate medical
care by:

(a) restoring two different teeth that were not causing him
pain;

(b) not performing a restoration of tooth #31 on the date
it was scheduled to be restored. {Id. at 8-9.)
Claim Two:

Defendant Bamwell denied Thompson adequate medical care

by "sign[ing] off on the emergency grievance as a nonemergency" when Thompson had "inform[ed] her of the pain
he was experiencing and why" and if she had "checked [his]
dental chart, she would have seen the history of previous
infections." {Id. at 9.)
Claim Three:

Defendant Plapp denied Thompson adequate medical care
for his tooth. {Id.)

Claim Four:

Defendant Whitehead denied Thompson adequate medical
care when she "generated the report for the grievance

concerning the infected tooth" without investigating his
dental history. {Id. at 9-10.)
Claim Five:

Defendant Parker denied Thompson adequate medical care
when she denied a grievance as unfounded without any
investigation. {Id. at 10.)

Claim Six:

Defendant Ray denied Thompson adequate medical care by
denying a Level II response as unfounded. {Id.)

Claim Seven:

Defendant Tapp denied Thompson adequate medical care by
signing a grievance Thompson submitted. {Id.)

^Thompson raises seven claims for relief in his Complaint, all pertaining to purported deliberate
indifference to his pain in Tooth #31. Only Claims One and Two against Defendants
Wiedemann and Bamwell are set forth completely here as they are the only claims before the

Courtwith regard to the Motion to Dismiss. Claims Three through Seven are set forth in a
summary fashion because they are not presently beforethe Court.

III.

A.

ANALYSIS

Defendant Barnwell

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that

a person acting under color ofstate law deprived him orher ofa constitutional right or of
a right conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. Total Action Against

Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, "[b]ecause
vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must [allege] that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution." Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). "Where a

complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the
complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the
complaint is properly dismissed, even under the liberal construction to begiven pro se

complaints." Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing U.S. ex rel
Brzozowski v. Randall, 281 F. Supp. 306, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1968)). In his "FACTS" section,

Thompson alleges no facts pertaining to Defendant Barnwell's purported violation of
Thompson's Eighth Amendment rights. The only place that Thompson mentions
Defendant Barnwell is in his statement of "LEGAL CLAIMS." Here, Thompson states.
m

sum:

Defendant Barnwell received an emergency grievance from the
Plaintiff informing her of the pain he was experiencing and why. The

Defendant signed off on the emergency grievance as a non-emergency. If
the Defendant would have checked the Plaintiffs dental chart, she would

have seen the history of previous infections. The Defendant neglected to
see the Plaintiff knowing what an infection can lead to.

Defendant

Bamwell's

actions

violated

Plaintiffs

rights

under

the

Eighth

Amendment....

(Compl. Attach. 9.) As mentioned above, in the body of his Complaint, Thompson did
not allege that Defendant Bamwell responded to any of the three emergency grievances
that he claims he filed. For the first time in his Reply to the Motion to Dismiss,
Thompson states:

The only fact of Defendant was that Defendant Bamwell stated it was not
an emergency. At this time, the Plaintiff was on antibiotics for some time
and was not treated while on them. The Complaint does in fact identify Dr.
Bamwell signing off on an emergency grievance on September 9, 2015.
Dr. Bamwell saw the issue and failed to call Plaintiff in the clinic to be

taken care of This is negligence.

(Reply 3, ECF No. 26.) Contrary to Thompson's suggestion in his Reply, the Complaint
contains no reference to Defendant Bamwell responding to an emergency grievance

except for in the "LEGAL CLAIMS" section. Even if the Court considers this as a newly

alleged fact against Defendant Bamwell, Thompson fails to allege sufficient facts to
show that Defendant Bamwell was deliberately indifferent to his Eighth Amendment
rights.

In sum, Thompson alleges that he submitted an emergency grievance "informing
her of the pain he was experiencing" and that Defendant Bamwell denied the emergency

grievance as a non-emergency. (Compl. Attach. 9.) Thompson fails to allege that
Defendant Bamwell had any direct involvement in the decisions about Thompson's
dental care. Thus, he fails to show that she possessed personal knowledge of

Thompson's dental treatment or particular dental needs. Thompson's brief mention of
Defendant Bamwell alleges that Defendant Bamwell received Thompson's one

emergency grievance about his "pain he was experiencing and why." {Id.) While an
inmate's letters to prison administrators may establish a basis for § 1983 liability, the

plaintiff must allege facts that suggest "that the communication, in its content and manner
of transmission, gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to 'an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.'" Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir.
1996) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Thompson must allege
that because of the purported grievance, Defendant Barnwell "knew of a constitutional

deprivation and approved it, turned a blind eye to it, failed to remedy it, or in some way
personally participated." Id. at 994 (citing Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th
Cir. 1995)). Thompson's Complaint lacks any detail about the content or manner of
transmission of his one alleged communication to Defendant Barnwell. Thus,

Thompson's vague allegations fall short of permitting the conclusion that his one
emergency grievance placed Defendant Barnwell on sufficient notice of an excessive risk

to Thompson's health or safety. See id. As such, Thompson's limited factual allegations

against Defendant Barnwell fail to "produce an inference of liability strong enough to
nudge the plaintiffs claims 'across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683). Thompson fails to allege sufficiently that Defendant Barnwell
actually perceived that Thompson faced a substantial risk of serious harm from merely
"signing off that Thompson's grievance was not an emergency. (Compl. Attach. 9.)

Accordingly, Thompson insufficiently states an Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendant Barnwell.

8

In addition, for the first time in his Reply, Thompson claims that Defendant

Bamwell's actions amount to "negligence." (Reply 3.) The Eighth Amendment protects
prisoners from cruel and unusual living conditions. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
345 (1981). However, "individuals do not have a constitutional right (1) to be free from a
government employee's negligence, even if it causes an injury, or (2) to have the
government protect them from such an injury." Ball v. City ofBristol, Va., Jail,

No. 7:10CV00303, 2010 WL 2754320, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 12, 2010) (citing

v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). Thompson's assertion that Defendant Bamwell's
actions amount to negligence does not state a claim of constitutional dimension. See

Deavers v. Diggins, No. 3:13-CV-821, 2015 WL 692835, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2015)

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 836); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).''
As Thompson has failed to state a claim against Defendant Bamwell, Claim Two will be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
B.

Defendant Wiedemann

To allege an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts that indicate
(1) that objectively the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted 'Svas 'sufficiently serious,'

and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state of
mind.'" Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v.

' Thompson alleged no negligence claim in his Complaint. To the extent that Thompson now
desires to bring a state law claim of negligence against Defendant Bamwell, his claim would be

barred by Virginia's one-year statute of limitations for such actions. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01243.2 (West 2017). Thompson contends that Defendant Bamwell indicated that his grievance
was not an emergency on September 9,2015; thus, in order for his negligence claim to be timely,
he needed to file his Complaint by September 9,2016. Thompson's complaint was received in
the prison mail room on October 5,2016, nearly a month after the time limit expired. (ECF
No. 1-3, at 2); see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).

Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). With respect to the denial of adequate medical care, "a
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. A medical need is

"serious" if it "has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's

attention." Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,241 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Henderson v.
Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).

In the context of delayed medical care, in addition to demonstrating that a medical

need was objectively serious, a plaintiff must also establish that the delay in the provision
of medical care "'resulted in substantial harm.'" Mata v. Satz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 2001)); see
Webb V. Hamtdullah, 281 F. App'x 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2008). "[T]he substantial harm

requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain."
Shabazz v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:10CV190, 2012 WL 442270, at *5 (E.D. Va.
2012) (quoting Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001)).

The subjective prong requires the plaintiff to allege facts that indicate a particular
defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "Deliberate

indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it."

Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) {c\X\ng Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06),
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

10

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a
substantial risk of harm is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference
between those general facts and the specific risk of harm confronting the inmate."
Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d

336, 338 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating same). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the
deliberate indifference standard requires a plaintiff to assert facts sufficient to form an
inference that "the official in question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm"

and "that the official in question subjectively recognized that his actions were
'inappropriate in light of that risk."' Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303
(4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rich, 129 F.3d at 340 n.2).
"To establish that a health care provider's actions constitute deliberate indifference

to a serious medical need, the treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or
excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness."

Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d

1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986)). Absent exceptional circumstances, an inmate's
disagreement with medical personnel with respect to a course of treatment is insufficient
to state a cognizable constitutional claim, much less to demonstrate deliberate

indifference. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing
Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970)). Furthermore, in evaluating a
prisoner's complaint regarding medical care, the Court is mindful that "society does not

11

expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care" or to the medical

treatment oftheir choosing. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citing Estelle,
429 U.S. at 103-04). In this regard, the right to medical treatment is limited to that

treatment which is medically necessary and not to "that which may be considered merely
desirable." Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). Moreover, "[i]t may not
be seriously contended that any prisoner detained for however short aperiod is entitled to
have all his needed elective medical care performed while in custody

" Kersh v.

Bounds, 501 F.2d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1974).
According to Thompson, on September 8, 2014, Doctor Wiedemann decided that

Thompson needed tooth #31 restored and scheduled him for a restoration. (Compl.
Attach. 4.) However, on October 20, 2014, the day ofthe scheduled restoration. Dr.
Wiedemann restored two different teeth that were "not bothering" him, and did not
restore tooth #31, butinstead placed a desensitizing agent on it. {Id. at 4, 8.) After

October 20, 2014, Thompson did not submit an informal grievance "to address pain due
to not being scheduled accordingly," until June 21, 2015. {Id. at 4.) Thompson received
a response to his grievance by Defendant Allen on June 30,2015, informing him that

Defendant Wiedemann was no longer working at GCC. {Id.) In essence, Thompson
faults Defendant Wiedemann because he disagrees with the course of treatment he

received for his teeth. Specifically, the Court construes Thompson to argue that
Defendant Wiedemann denied Thompson adequate dental care when he restored two

teeth that were not bothering Thompson (Claim One (a)) and that he denied him adequate

12

medical care by notrestoring tooth #31 during the scheduled appointment (Claim One

(b)).®
Thompson's allegations make clear that he received significant medical care for
his teeth, including tooth #31. Thompson alleges that Defendant Wiedemann examined
and treated him on two occasions. The first visit was a dental exam and assessment

where Defendant Wiedemann determined that Thompson needed to have a restoration of

tooth #31. While Defendant Wiedemann initially scheduled Thompson to have tooth #31
restored, Thompson's allegations make clear that on the date of the scheduled restoration,

Defendant Wiedemann instead, restored two different teeth, and placed a desensitizing
agent on tooth #31 during that appointment. It is unclear from the record before the
Court why Defendant Wiedemann determined that he would not restore tooth #31 that

day, but he nevertheless provided Thompson with dental care for that tooth and others.

Thompson fails to allege facts indicating that Defendant Wiedemann knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk of harm to Thompson's health by restoring two different
teeth and not restoring tooth #31 duringthe second appointment. Defendant Wiedemann
treated three of Thompson's teeth on October 20, 2014, including the tooth that

Thompson alleges was causing him pain. In response to Thompson's allegations of pain.

Defendant Wiedemann placed a desensitizing agent on that tooth to ease Thompson's
pain. Thompson fails to plausibly allege that Defendant Wiedemann's treatment was "so
A

Priorto Thompson's discussion of Defendant Wiedemann's involvement in his dental care,
Thompson indicates that he was not seen for a dental exam upon his admission to GCC in
violation of operating procedure. (Compl. Attach. 3; see Reply 2.) Thompson alleges no
plausible personal involvement by Defendant Wiedemann in the failure to schedule a dental
exam upon his admission to GCC.
13

grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience." Miltier, 896

F.2d at 851 (citation omitted). Moreover, "whether and how pain associated with
medical treatment should be mitigated is for doctors to decide free from judicial
interference, except in the most extreme situations." Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592

(7th Cir, 1996). Thompson alleges no extreme circumstances here. See, e.g., Martinezv.
Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1970) (granting relief when prison doctor forced

prisoner plaintiff, without hospital ordered pain medication, to walk out of hospital and
stand for meals after plaintiff had leg surgery for which hospital specialist had ordered
plaintiff to lie flat and not to walk). Despite Thompson's desire to have tooth #31
restored that day, Thompson simply lacks entitlement to the medical care of his choosing.
See Wright, 766 F.2d at 849 (citation omitted); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (1992) (citation
omitted). Thompson states nothing more than a disagreement with Defendant

Wiedemann's professional medical opinion about the appropriate course of treatment,
and thus fails to state a cognizable constitutional claim, much less deliberate indifference.

See Wright, 766 F.2d at 849 (citing Gittlemacker, 428 F.2d at 6).
Additionally, in assessing a claim of deliberate indifference, the Court must also

consider the totality of the medical care provided, rather than simply what additional

treatment the inmate was denied. See Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2000)
{cWmg Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999)). During September and
October 2014, Defendant Wiedemann examined Thompson, restored two different teeth,

and then placed a desensitizing agent on tooth #31 in response to Thompson's complaint
of pain. Given these circumstances, Thompson fails to allege facts indicating that
14

Defendant Wiedemann acted with deliberate indifference on October 20, 2014, when he
restored two teeth that were not bothering Plaintiff and declined to restore tooth #31.

Thus, Thompson fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant
Wiedemann, and Claims One (a) and (b) will be dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21) will be
granted. Claims One and Two will be dismissed.

An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

^
HENRY E. HUDSON

Date:1^*«.t3^gon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Richmond, Virginia

15