Mullins v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 3/29/2017. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

KOBI J. MULLINS,
Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:16cv841

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A.'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (ECF No. 3), the
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed by the plaintiff {ECF No. 5),
DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO DEEM THE PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED {ECF No. 7)
AFFIDAVIT OF FACT {ECF No. 13) .

I

and DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE
I

For the reasons set forth below,

the DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. 'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT (ECF No. 3) will be granted; the MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(ECF No. 5) will be denied; DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N .A.' S MOT_ION
TO DEEM THE PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED {ECF No. 7) will be
denied as moot; and DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF FACT
(ECF No. 13) will be granted.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Kobi J. Mullins, filed a document entitled "Quiet
Title Compliant" [sic] (ECF No. 1-4, pp. 13-15) in the Circuit Court
of Chesterfield County to which was attached a document entitled
"AFFIDAVIT OF FACT"

(ECF No.

1-4,

pp.

14-17) .

Together those

documents will be referred to as the "Quiet Title Complaint."
The action arises out of a promissory note as to which Mullins
is in default and a foreclosure on the mortgaged property.

Mullins

attached to the Quiet Title Complaint over 100 pages of documents,
a few of which pertain to the loan and most of which are nonsensical,
concocted by Mullins (such as "Demands for Validation of Subscribed
Oath of Office" and similarly irrelevant documents)

of no legal

import.
The Quiet Title Complaint names as defendants: (1) Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.

("Wells Fargo"), the holder of the promissory note;

(2)

Samuel I. White, PC ( "SIWPC") , the trustee on the Deed of Trust; ( 3)
the law firm of Shuttleworth, Ruloff, Swain, Haddard

&

Morecock (the

"Shuttleworth Firm"), as to whom no allegations are made in the Quiet
Title Complaint 1 ; and (4) Fidelity National Title Insurance Company
("Fidelity"), which has not been served and as to which no allegation
is made in the Quiet Title Complaint.

1

Indeed, the Shuttleworth Firm is mentioned only in the caption.
2

The allegations of the Quiet Title Complaint are conclusory,
garbled,

and nonsensical.

Like many pro se complaints,

these

statements use flowery and meaningless phrases apparently thought
by Mullins to have some legal import, but which, in reality, serve
to obscure whatever claims are being made.
Nonetheless, the defendants have sought to determine what they
think this matter is about (to the extent that can be discerned) .
To some extent, the defendants have presented contextual information
based on their dealings with Mullins through the course of a lengthy
history of substantial defaults on his loan payments.
As the defendants set it, Mullins seeks to quiet title to the
mortgaged property by attacking the validity of a foreclosure sale
that Wells Fargo and SIWPC initiated.

In particular, Mullins seems

to claim superior right to the mortgaged property under three
theories:

(1) that Wells Fargo "split" the promissory note from the

Deed of Trust, thereby rendering the Deed of Trust null and void;
(2) that there are defects in the securitization of the note that
relieve Mullins of the obligation to repay his loan; and (3) the
so-called "show me the note" theory, arguing that the inability of
Wells Fargo to produce the original note relieves Mullins of the
obligation to pay it.

3

Mullins seems to agree that the defendants have accurately set
out the bases for his "quiet title" claim.

Hence, the Court will

consider that to be the case.
Also, the Quiet Title Complaint vaguely mentions a "fraudulent
scheme"

{Quiet

Title

~

Compl.

3)

and

alludes

to

representations" (Quiet Title Compl., Aff. of Fact~ 9).

"false
However,

it is not possible to discern from the pleadings either the nature
of

the

"fraudulent

scheme"

or

the

substance

of

the

"false

representations."
Finally,
language,

the Quiet Title Complaint alleges,

that Wells

in conclusory

Fargo and SIWPC violated several

statutes, namely the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S. C.
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
Settlement Procedures Act, 12

u.s.c.

u.s.c.

§

1601, the Fair

§

1692(e), the Real Estate

§

2605(e), the Dodd-Frank Wall

Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
Freedom of

Information Act,

Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
9-203(b)

and 9-210.

factual

allegations

§

federal

5 U.S. C.

552,

§

§

5533, the

the Federal Trade

45, and the Uniform Commercial Code §§

The Quiet Title Complaint is devoid of any
regarding how those

federal

statutes

were

violated.
On September 2, 2016, Mullins filed an Amended Petition To Quiet
Title To Realty (the "Amended Petition")

(ECF No. 8-2, pp. 2-3) in

which he proposed to add "Fannie Mae" as a defendant.
4

The Amended

Petition, however, makes no allegation that Fannie Mae acted either
wrongfully or unlawfully.

In fact, the Amended Petition makes no

factual allegation about Fannie Mae's conduct except to state that
"Fannie May claims ownership of my land and real estate."
8-2, p. 2).

{ECF No.

Nothing in the record shows that Fannie Mae has been

served.
This action was timely removed to this Court on October 14, 2016
(ECF No. 1).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 1, 2008, Mullins entered into a loan agreement with
Wells

Fargo

for

the

property

located

Chesterfield, Virginia (the "Property").
Ex. A; Aff. of

Fact~~

2-5).

at

Meadoway

Road,

(Quiet Title Compl. ~ 3,

The loan is evidenced by a promissory

note (the "Note") in the amount of $285, 150. 00.
by a Deed of Trust.

5346

The Note is secured

The Note, the Deed of Trust, and the accompanying

documents collectively are referred to as the "Loan Documents" . (Mot.
to Dismiss, Ex. A, Ex. B) . 2

SIWPC, on behalf of Wells Fargo, is the

2

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b) (6), the Court
may consider documents referenced in the complaint. Am. Chiropractic
Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004).
If a plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent document as part of
his complaint, the defendant may attach the document to a motion to
dismiss the complaint and the Court may consider that motion without
converting it to one for summary judgment. Gasner v. County of
Dinwiddie, 162 F.R.D. 280, 282 (E.D. Va. 1995). Here, Mullins' Note
and Deed of Trust are referenced in the exhibits to the Complaint
and are central to his claims. Furthermore, both documents are
5

trustee on the Deed of Trust.
According to Mullins, he made mortgage payments to Wells Fargo
from April 1, 2008 through April 2016. (Quiet Title Compl., Aff. of
Fact

~

6).

It appears that Wells Fargo scheduled a foreclosure sale,

but the Quiet Title Complaint makes no mention of Mullins defaulting
on his loan. See {Quiet Title Compl.

~

3).

Nonetheless, it can be

inferred that Mullins went into default by not making payments
required by the Loan Documents and that Wells Fargo scheduled a
foreclosure sale on the Property.
all the other briefing papers.

That inference is supported by

This litigation, an apparent effort

to forestall the foreclosure, ensued.
LEGAL STANDARD

In all civil cases, pro se or otherwise, a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) challenges the legal sufficiency of
a Complaint. Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332,
338

(4th Cir.

2006) . Courts should assume the veracity of all

well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint, and should deny a motion
to dismiss where those well-pleaded allegations state a plausible
claim for relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A

claim is "plausible" when the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to
allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

publicly available at the Chesterfield County Circuit Court Clerk's
Office.
6

is liable for the alleged misconduct. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U. s. 544, 555 (2007} . The court should grant a motion to dismiss,
however,

where

the

allegations

are

nothing

more

than

legal

conclusions, or where they permit a court to infer no more than a
possibility of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Although courts must typically construe a prose plaintiff's
pleadings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007},
a court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's legal
conclusions that are presented as factual allegations, Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.

Nor should accept, as facts, "unwarranted inferences,

unreasonable conclusions, or arguments."

E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v.

T.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000}.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2} provides that "a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the
court's leave.

Courts should freely give leave when justice so

requires." "Leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the
amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been
bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would
have been futile." Dj enasevic v. Dep' t of Justice, No. 16-6085, 2016
WL 4120669, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2016) (quoting Laber v. Harvey,
438 F. 3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006)}; see also Fernan v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962).

7

DISCUSSION

At the outset, it is essential to keep in mind that the Quiet
Title Complaint is devoid of any understandable factual allegations
that would permit a finding that any of the claims alleged therein
as against any defendant (Wells Fargo, SIWPC, the Shuttleworth Firm
or Fidelity} are plausible within the meaning of Twombly and Iqbal.
Thus, the Quiet Title Complaint, in its entirety, can be dismissed
against all defendants for that reason alone. 3
Nonetheless, as explained above, Wells Fargo and SIWPC have
sorted through the Quiet Title Complaint and have identified therein
the perceived rationale for the quiet title claim.

And, Mullins,

in his various papers, seems to agree that Wells Fargo and SIWPC have
correctly identified his theories for that claim.

Therefore, the

Court will assess that claim as the parties have posited it even
though, on the face of the Quiet Title Complaint, the quiet title
claim fails the rule of Twombly and Igbal.
assess the fraud claims.

Next, the Court will

Then, the Court will address the several

federal statutory claims. 4

3

The Amended Petition is irrelevant to the motion to dismiss for its
only purpose was to add Fannie Mae as a defendant, and it presents
nothing of substance that affect the defendants originally named in
the Quiet Title Complaint.
4

Because the Quiet Title Complaint asserts federal statutory claims,
there is subject matter jurisdiction over the action under 2 8 U.S. C.
§ 1331.
There is also subject matter jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c.
§ 1332 because the citizenship of the plaintiff and Wells Fargo is
8

I.

Virginia Common Law Quiet Title Claim

Mullins attempts to quiet title to the Property by attacking
the validity of the foreclosure sale initiated by Wells Fargo and
SIWPC by claiming superior right to the Property based on three
separate theories:

{l} the "splitting" of the Note from the Deed

of Trust; (2) defects in the securitization of his loan; and (3) the
failure of the defendants to show him the Loan Documents. 5

None of

these three theories are viable under Virginia law.
A.

"Split-the-Note"

Mullins first attacks the enforceability of the Deed of Trust.
He argues that separation of the Deed of Trust from the Note makes
the Deed of Trust "null, deficient, and illegal.
~~

11

{Quiet Title Compl.

7, 9} . According to Mullins, separation of the Note from the Deed

diverse, the citizenship of SIWPC, as trustee and nominal party to
the suit, is to be disregarded, see Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446
U.S. 458, 460-61 {1980}, and the defendants, the Shuttleworth Firm
and Fidelity, are fraudulently joined, there being no allegation made
against either, in the Quiet Title Complaint.
5

Mullins also alludes to a claim against Wells Fargo based on a
Consent Order issued to Wells Fargo by the Federal Reserve Board on
April 13, 2011. {Quiet Title Compl. ~ 7}. However, Mullins is not
a party to the Consent Order, nor are his rights and obligations
affected by the Order. See Pena v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 1:14cv1018,
2014 WL 5684798, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 4, 2014}. Furthermore, the
Consent Order states that "[n]othing in . . . this Order, express
or implied, shall give to any person or entity, other than the parties
hereto, and their successors hereunder, any benefit or any legal or
equitable right, remedy, or claim under the Stipulation and Consent
of this Order. Cagle v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3: 13cv807, 2015 WL
2063990, at *3 n.8 {E.D. Va. May 1, 2015}. Accordingly, the Consent
Order does not furnish Mullins with a claim of any sort.
11

9

of Title makes the Loan Documents a legal nullity.
Mullins provides no support in the law for the proposition that,
in Virginia, separation of the Note from the Deed of Trust nullifies
the enforceability of either document.

6

To the contrary,

this

District recognizes that separation of the Note from the Deed of Trust
"does not render the Deed unenforceable nor does it leave the Note
unsecured. Under Virginia law, when a note is assigned, the deed of
trust securing that debt necessarily runs with it." Ruggia v.
Washington Mut., 719 F.Supp.2d 642, 646-47 {E.D. Va. 2010) (citing
Williams v. Gifford, 139 Va. 779, 784 (1924)). 7

At least, where, as

here, there is no conflict between the Note and the Deed of Trust,
the two documents

"may be viewed together as representing the

complete agreement of the parties." See Va. Housing Dev. Authority

6

To support his "split-the-note" theory, Mullins cites Carpenter v.
Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872) which holds that "[t]he note and
mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an
incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it,
while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity." That language,
however, is inapplicable because the Court was addressing Colorado
Territorial law and federal common law. That decision has nothing
to do with Virginia law pertaining to this case.
7

With respect to the separation of deeds of trust from their
underlying notes, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted "
. . in
appropriate circumstances, we have recognized that 'notes and
contemporaneous written agreements executed as part of the same
transaction will be construed together as forming one contract.' So
long as neither document varies or contradicts the terms of the other,
terms of one document which clearly contemplate the application of
terms in the other may be viewed together as representing the complete
agreement of the parties." Va. Housing Dev. Authority v. Fox Run Ltd.
P'ship, 255 Va. 356, 364-65 {1998).
10

v. Fox Run Ltd. P' ship, 255 Va. 356, 365 (1998).

Thus, Mullins' first

theory fails as a matter of law.
B.

Securitization of the Loan

Mullins raises unarticulated problems with the securitization
of the loan, and asserts that those problems (whatever they may be)
relieve him of his obligation to repay the loan.
Fargo Home Mortg., 822 F.Supp.2d 877, 880

(E.D.

In Jesse v. Wells

Va. 2012), the court

recognized that Virginia is a non-judicial foreclosure state, and
that "there is no legal authority that the sale or pooling of
investment interest in an underlying note" - the "securitization
process" - "can relieve borrowers of their mortgage obligations or
extinguish a
property." 8

secured party's

rights

to

foreclose

on

secured

Therefore, Mullins' attack on the securitization of the

loan fails as a matter of law.
C.

ushow Me the Noten

Mullins lastly argues that the foreclosure sale is invalid based
on "show me the note" arguments that are made in paragraphs 11, 12,
13, and 14 of the Affidavit of Fact. The "show me the note" theory
has been widely rejected as "contrary to Virginia's non-judicial
foreclosure laws." See,

8

~'

Pham v. Bank of New York, 856 F. Supp. 2d

In any event, Grenadier v. BWW Law Group, No. 1:14cv827, 2015 WL
417839, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2015) holds that the borrower on
a loan lacks standing to challenge any defects in the securitization
process for the Note. Thus, if that is what Mullins is alleging,
he lacks standing to assert that theory.
11

804, 810 {E.D. Va. 2012). Virginia law allows a trustee to foreclose
on a loan in default, even if the original note cannot be found,
without first seeking a court order. See id. To accept a "show me
the note"

argument would "compel judicial intervention in any

foreclosure proceeding where a deed of trust has changed hands or
a substitute trustee has been appointed." Id. Therefore, this theory
too must be rejected.
In sum,
predicate.

Mullins'

quiet title action fails

for lack of a

In that regard, it must be remembered that, to quiet a

title 9 in Virginia, a plaintiff must assert that he has superior
rights to the adverse claimant. Squire v. Va. Housing Dev. Authority,
287 Va. 507, 519 {2014).
In Tapia v. U.S. Bank, 718 F. Supp.2d 689, 700 (E.D. Va. 2010),
aff'd, 411 F. App'x 166 (4th Cir. 2011), the court rejected the
plaintiffs' quiet title claim because the plaintiffs did not allege
that they fully satisfied their obligations under the note, or that
their debt was otherwise cancelled or forgiven.

In Gallant v.

Deutsche Bank Nat' 1 Trust Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 721 {W. D. Va. 2011),
the court dismissed the plaintiff's quiet title claim because the
complaint contained no facts supporting the plaintiff's claim to
superior title.
9

"[A]n action to quiet title is based on the premise that a person
with good title to certain real or personal property should not be
subjected to various future claims against the title." Main v. Adams,
277 Va. 230, 238 {2009).
12

Like the plaintiffs in Tapia and Gallant, Mullins alleges no
facts that plausibly suggest that he has superior rights to the
Property. Mullins only alleges in conclusory fashion that "the claims
of said [d]efendants are without any right whatsoever, and said
defendants have no legal or equitable right, claim, or interest in
~

said property." {Quiet Title Compl.

6) .

Legal conclusions of this

kind are not entitled to the presumption of truth.

Nor are they

sufficient for a court to infer that the quiet title claim is at all
See Iqbal, 556 u. S. at 678-79.

Indeed, the Court cannot

find that such a claim is even possible.

Because Mullins' quiet

plausible.

title claim fails as a matter of law, an effort to amend the claim
would be futile.
II.

Virginia Common Law Fraud Claims

In his "Affidavit of Fact", Mullins asserts that Wells Fargo
made

"false

representations

deceptively to influence

intentionally,

fraudulently,

and

[Mullins]

into the mortgage contract."

Fact~

8). He further alleges that he

{Quiet Title Compl., Aff. of

relied on those false representations and pledged a security interest
in the Note to Wells Fargo.

(Id.

~

9).

Wells Fargo argues that

Mullins' claims for fraud are not pled with sufficient particularity
to state a claim under Virginia common law. Wells Fargo notes that
any claim of fraud in the initiation of Mullins' loan is barred by
the statute of limitations in Virginia.
13

The elements of a fraud claim under Virginia law are:

(1) a

"false representation of a material fact, made intentionally and
knowingly, with intent to mislead";

( 2} that Mullins reasonably

relied on the false representation; and (3) that his reliance led
to damages. 10 Sales v. Kecoughtan Hous. Co., Ltd., 274 Va. 475, 481
(2010} (internal citations omitted}.

Federal law, not Virginia law,

establishes the pleading prerequisites for a fraud claim.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 (b}, a party "must state
with particularity the circumstances cons ti tu ting fraud."

"The

circumstances required to be pled with particularity under Rule 9 (b)
are the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as
well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and
what [it] obtained thereby." Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River
Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999} (internal quotations omitted}.
Mere allegations of "fraud by hindsight" are insufficient to meet
the

Rule

9(b}

particularity requirement.

Id.

(citing Hillson

Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 208 (4th Cir.
1994}} .
Mullins alleges that Wells Fargo committed fraud by inducement
in the months leading up to Mullins signing the Loan Documents. (Quiet
Title Compl.

10

~

4, Aff. of Fact

~

8). He does not, however, allege

Mullins has not sought to advance a negligent misrepresentation
predicate for the fraud claim. Hence, it is not necessary to assess
such a claim.
14

facts specifying the fraud perpetrated by the defendants. Nor does
Mullins plausibly plead that any false representations made by the
defendants were intentional or knowing. Mullins simply recites the
elements of fraud without alleging any supporting facts. The fraud
claim is therefore legally insufficient.
pled

under

Rule

9(b)

nor

legally

It is neither properly

sufficient

under

Virginia

substantive law.
The statute of limitation for fraud in Virginia is two years
and accrues when the fraud ''is discovered or by the exercise of due
diligence reasonably should have been discovered." Va. Code Ann.
8.01-243, 8.01-249.

§§

Mullins signed the Loan Documents on February

1, 2008. (Def. Motion to Dismiss, Ex. A, B) .
Mullins now claims fraud.

Over eight years later,

As Wells Fargo correctly argues,

a

diligent person would have reviewed the documents he signed and been
aware of his obligations with the execution of the Loan Documents.
Mullins could have investigated his obligations under the Loan
Documents

and

determined

that

Wells

Fargo

misrepresented their terms if that had been the case.
years to do so and file a claim but did not.

fraudulently
He had two

And, there is nothing

in the Quiet Title Complaint to suggest that the tolling doctrine
would save Mullins' claim.

Accordingly, Mullins' fraud claims are

time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations.

Because that

bar appears on the face of the Quiet Title Complaint, any amendment
15

would be futile.
III. The Federal Statutes
The claims that are based on the federal statutes are mere
conclusory allegations that the statutes were violated.

Not one

fact is alleged to support any violation of any federal statute.
Therefore, all of those claims fail to satisfy the requirements of
Twombly and Igbal, and they must be dismissed.

There is no claim

under the Uniform Commercial Code because it is not the law of
Virginia and there is no fact alleged to raise a plausible claim under
Virginia's version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
IV.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 5)
For the reasons set forth in Section I through III above, there

are no viable claims asserted in the Quiet Title Complaint or the
Amended Petition.

Therefore, Mullins is not entitled to summary

judgment and his motion will be denied.
V.

Wells Fargo's Motion to Deem the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
Filed (ECF No. 7)
The record shows that Mullins filed the Amended Petition well

before removal.
a defendant.

However, its only purpose is to add Fannie Mae as
On its face,

the Amended Petition states no claim

against Fannie Mae and thus the amendment is a futility.

16

The Amended Petition does not change the claims against the
other three defendants.

Hence,

there is no reason to warrant a

finding that it is deemed filed in this removed action.

Therefore,

DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO DEEM THE PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED (ECF No. 7) will be denied as moot.
VI.

The AFFIDAVIT OF FACT (ECF No. 12)
The AFFIDAVIT OF FACT (ECF No. 12) that Wells Fargo seeks to

have

stricken

is

nonsensical

gobbledygook.

The

motion

is

well-taken, and it will be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,

the DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK,

N.A.'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (ECF No. 3) will be
granted; the MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 5) will be denied;
DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO DEEM THE PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED (ECF No. 7) will be granted; and DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF FACT (ECF No. 13) will be granted.
Also, the action will be dismissed as against the defendants,
Shuttleworth Firm and Fidelity because no claim is made against them.
Finally, Mullins has filed numerous documents that are of no
legal import and are simply nonsensical.

They are:

DISCOVERY (ECF

No. 15); REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS OATH OF OFFICE & PROOF OF
INSURANCE

(ECF No.

16); DEMAND FOR OATH OF OFFICE (ECF No. 17);

AFFIDAVIT OF FACT (ECF No. 18); Letter "Re: FOIA Request - Demand
17

of Oath of Office" (ECFNo. 19); AFFIDAVIT OF FACT (ECFNo. 20); CHOICE
IN

ACTION:

Terminate

unlawful

foreclosure/sale

by

special

proceeding, return of title deed ( s) , escrow ( s) , cost and damages ( ECF
No. 22); and CHOICE IN ACTION: Terminate unlawful foreclosure/sale
by special proceeding, return of title deed(s), escrow(s), cost and
damages (ECF No. 23).

In one way or another, these documents demand

from the defendants or from the Clerk of this Court something that
they have no obligation to do.

Indeed, not one of these documents

is an appropriate pleading in a federal court.
all denied

Therefore, they are

and the Clerk shall mark them terminated.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion
to Kobi J. Mullins.
It is so ORDERED.

/s/

gz/l

Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia
Date: March~' 2017

18