Monroe v. Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr on 6/30/2017. Copy to Pro Se Petitioner. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

ANTONIO C. MONROE,
Petitioner,
V.

Civil Action No. 3:16CV856

DIRECTOR OF THE VIRGINIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Antonio C. Monroe, a Virginia state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("§ 2254 Petition," ECF No. 1). Respondent moves to dismiss.
Monroe has responded, and has also filed a Motion to Strike Respondent's Rule 5 Answer

("Motion to Strike," ECF No. 12). For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF

No. 7) will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART, and
Monroe's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 12) will be DENIED AS MOOT.
1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 3, 2014, in the Circuit Court for the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia ("Circuit

Court"), Monroe pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute cocaine; possession of a
firearm by a non-violent felon; conspiracy to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute cocaine; and
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, second or subsequent offense. (ECF No. 2-1, at

2.) On October 2, 2014, the Circuit Court entered judgment against Monroe and sentenced him
to a total of 42 years of imprisonment, with all but seven years and six months suspended.
Commonwealth v. Monroe^ No. CRl 3-3506, at 2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 2, 2014). Monroe did not
appeal.

On January 15, 2014, Monroe filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit
Court. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, Monroe v. Dir. ofthe Dep 7 ofCorr, No. CL15-

132 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 2014). On April 23, 2015, Monroe filed a Motion for Nonsuit.
Petitioner's Motion for Nonsuit at 1, Monroe v. Dir. of the Dep't of Corr., No. CL15-132 (Va.

Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 23, 2015). On April 28, 2015, the Circuit Court granted Monroe's motion and
nonsuited his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Monroe v. Dir. of the Dep't of Corr..,
No. CL15-132, at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 28, 2015),

On September 28, 2015, Monroe filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, Monroe v. Clarke^

No. 151451 (Va. filed Sept. 28, 2015). In his petition, Monroe raised the following claim for
relief:

Claim One:

"The defense attorney did not adequately communicate with him
or investigate his case. The fact that the officers had no search
warrant or affidavit at the time of entry was not argued by his
attorney, therefore overlooked by the courts." {Id. at 8.)

On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Monroe's habeas petition. (ECF
No. 9-1, at 2.)

Thereafter, Monroe filed his § 2254 Petition, in which he raises the following claims for
relief:'
Claim One:

"The petitioner has offered a valid reason why he should not be
bound by his representation at trial that his counsel's performance
was adequate." {Id. at 5.)

Claim Two:

"The search upon which the prosecutor relied exclusively for
physical, damning evidence violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution [and] their Virginia

' The Court employs the pagination assigned to Monroe's submissions by the CM/ECF
docketing system. The Court corrects the punctuation and capitalization in quotations fi-om
Monroe's submissions.

counterparts based upon the facial invalidity of the search
warrant." {Id. at 6.)

Claim Three:

"The chain of custody of the items of evidence eventually alleged
to have been seized at the residence was clearly, unambiguously,
and unequivocally broken when other individuals were in the
residence for long periods immediately prior to the search when
the defendant was not present." (Jd. at 8.)

Claim Four:

"Monroe was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
when counsel failed and refused to raise the issues set forth herein

above and argue them before the state court." {Id. at 10.)
II.

A.

ANALYSIS

Claim One

In Claim One, Monroe asserts that he "has offered a valid reason why he should not be

bound by his representation at trial that his counsel's performance was adequate." (§ 2254

Pet. 5.) Respondent contends that Claim One does not provide any basis for federal habeas relief
because "Monroe is challenging in this claim the habeas ruling of the Virginia Supreme Court,
not the judgment in the state criminal case that has resulted in his incarceration." (Br. Supp.
Mot. Dismiss 13, ECF No. 9.) In essence. Respondent believes that Monroe is challenging the
following conclusion by the Supreme Court:

In another portion of claim (1), petitioner contends he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to adequately communicate
with petitioner or investigate his case. Specifically, petitioner alleges he advised
counsel of the defects in the search warrant, but counsel refused to challenge the

validity of the warrant on the ground that it was not supported by probable cause
and was not properly filed.
The Court rejects this portion of claim (1) because petitioner failed to offer
a valid reason why he should not be bound by his representation at trial that his
counsel's performance was adequate. Anderson v. Warden, 222 Va. 511, 516,
281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1981).
(ECF No. 9-1, at 2.)

To the extent that Monroe is challenging the Supreme Court of Virginia's conclusion.

Respondent is correct that Claim One does not provide any basis for federal habeas relief.
"[C]laims of error occurring in a state post-conviction proceeding cannot serve as a basis for
federal habeas corpus relief." Bryant v. Maryland^ 848 F.2d 492, 493 (4th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted). This is so because Monroe is detained as a result of the underlying state convictions,
not the state collateral proceedings. See Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 717 (4th Cir. 2008),
Accordingly, to the extent Monroe raises this challenge, he is not entitled to any relief.
However, generously construing Claim One, Monroe is also asserting that his guilty plea
was involuntarily entered because he was subjected to "coercive tactics" by counsel. (§ 2254
Pet. 5.) Monroe contends that "counsel overcame his will to plead not guilty and insist upon a

jury trial by false representations that Monroe would definitely receive a life sentence in the
event he opted to try the case." (Mem. Supp. § 2254 Pet. 10-11, ECF No. 2.) Respondent has
not addressed the merits this aspect of Monroe's claim. Accordingly, Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Respondent's right to file a further
response which addresses the portion of Claim One that alleges that his guilty plea was not
knowing and voluntary due to ineffective assistance from counsel.
B.

Claim Two

In Claim Two, Monroe contends that the search of his apartment violated the Fourth
Amendment because the search warrant upon which officers relied was facially invalid. (§ 2254
Pet. 6.) Respondent argues that "[b]ecause [Monroe] was afforded a full and fair opportunity to
litigate Fourth Amendment challenges in state court, he is precluded from litigating such claims

in federal habeas corpus." (Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 14 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976)).)

The United States Supreme Court has held that "where the State has provided an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 (footnote omitted). "The

rationale for the [Supreme Court's ruling in Stone\ was that, in the context of a federal habeas

corpus challenge to a state court conviction, 'the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the substantial societal costs of the

application of the rule persist with great force.'" United States v. Scarborough, 111 F.2d 175,

182 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-95).^ Therefore, in a habeas proceeding,
when a federal district court is faced with Fourth Amendment claims, it should "first inquire as

to whether or not the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment

claims under the then existing state practice'' Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1265 (4th Cir.

1978) (capitalization corrected) (emphasis added). Whether the petitioner was afforded such an
opportunity "may be determined... from the relevant state statutes, the applicable state court
decisions, and from judicial notice of state practice by the district court." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, it is well established that the Commonwealth of Virginia provides criminal defendants,

such as Monroe, with "an opportunity to present [their] Fourth Amendment claims by a motion

to suppress both at the trial court level and thereafter to assign as an error, an adverse ruling
thereon, on appeal." Id. (citations omitted).

When, as here, the state has provided the petitioner with an opportunity to raise his
Fourth Amendment claims at trial and on appeal, this Court need not inquire further "unless the

^ The exclusionary rule "deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty,"
Stone, 428 U.S. at 490; therefore, it "has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 486-87 (quoting United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).

[petitioner] alleges something to indicate that his opportunity for a full and fair litigation of his
Fourth Amendment claim or claims was in some way impaired." Id. (citation omitted).
Because Virginia provided Monroe with an opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment
claims at trial and on appeal, this Court need not inquire further unless Monroe demonstrates
"that his opportunity for a full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim or claims was
in some way impaired." Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
admonished that "the burden of pleading and proof is upon [the petitioner] to indicate in the

petition ... the reasons he has, and the facts in support thereof, as to why he contends he did not
receive an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claims."

Id. at

1266 (capitalization corrected). Monroe fails to indicate in either his § 2254 Petition or his

Response to the Motion to Dismiss that his opportunity for a full and fair litigation of his Fourth
Amendment claim was in some way impaired. At best, he vaguely faults counsel for failing to

take advantage ofthis opportunity.^ Accordingly, Claim Two will beDISMISSED.
C.

Claim Three

In Claim Three, Monroe contends that "[t]he chain of custody of the items of evidence
eventually alleged to have been seized at the residence was clearly, unambiguously, and

unequivocally broken when other individuals were in the residence for long periods immediately
prior to the search when the defendant was not present." (§ 2254 Pet. 8.) Monroe argues that his
"co-defendant's girlfnend and [his] girlfriend were in, and in control of, the residence during

times immediately prior to the alleged time of the alleged execution of a search warrant. They
undoubtedly had sufficient time and opportunity to plant evidence and/or tamper with existing
•>

In Claim Four, Monroe argues that "[c]ounsel did absolutely nothing to procure
evidence to show the facial and internal validity of the search warrant." (Mem. Supp. § 2254
Pet. 24.) He asserts that he "did, in fact, communicate his desire to litigate these issues formally
before the court, and counsel, despite Monroe's wishes, chose to litigate a motion to suppress
based solely upon a perceived lack of probable cause." (Jd.)

evidence." (Mem. Supp. § 2254 Pet. 17-18.) The Court construes Claim Three to assert that the

evidence was not sufficient to support Monroe's convictions because the prosecution failed to
establish that Monroe possessed the items seized from his residence.

Respondent argues that this Court should defer to the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling

regarding Claim Three. (Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 15.) The Supreme Court of Virginia applied
the rule set forth in Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (Va. 1969), and refused to
consider Claim Three on habeas review because a "voluntary and intelligent guilty plea waives

all non-jurisdictional defenses antecedent to a guilty plea."

(M; ECF No. 9-1, at 1-2.)

However, as discussed supra in Part II.A., the Court has generously construed Claim One to

assert that Monroe's plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered into because it
was coerced through false representations made by counsel. Thus, at this time. Respondent fails
to demonstrate that Peyton, or any corresponding federal jurisprudence, bars Claim Three from
review here. Accordingly, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to Respondent's right to file a further response which addresses the merits of Claim
Three.
D.

Claim Four

Respondent argues that with respect to Claim Four, Monroe's ineffective assistance
claim, this Court should defer to the Supreme Court of Virginia's conclusion that the rule in
Anderson v. Warden, 281 S.E.2d 885 (Va. 1981), precluded review of Monroe's claim because

his allegations contradicted his representations at his guilty plea colloquy. (Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss 16.) Respondent fails to adequately explain why the Court should enforce that bar under
the present circumstances. See Davis v. Mitchell, No. 3:09CV37, 2010 WL 1169956, at *5 (E,D.
Va. Mar. 24, 2010) (citing Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 247-48 (4th Cir. 1999); Slavek v.

Hinkle, 359 F. Supp. 2d 473, 490-91 (E.D. Va. 2005)) (noting that "the rule in Anderson is not
considered an adequate and independent ground for procedural default"). Thus, the Court cannot

grant the Motion to Dismiss based on Respondent's argument that Monroe's guilty plea
precludes review of this claim. Accordingly, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Respondent's right to file a further response which addresses the
merits of Claim Three.

III.

OUTSTANDING MOTION

In his Motion to Strike, Monroe asserts that Respondent's "answer and motion to dismiss

wholly and totally fail to address the allegations in Claim 2." (Mot. Strike 2.) Monroe also

alleges that Respondent has "neither admitted nor denied the allegations set forth in Claims 2, 3,
and 4 of the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief" {Id.) The Court has already
determined that Monroe is precluded from litigating Claim Two. Moreover, the Court has

concluded that Respondent has not adequately addressed Claims Three and Four and will direct
Respondent to file a further response regarding those claims. Accordingly, Monroe's Motion to
Strike (ECF No. 12) will be DENIED AS MOOT.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) will be
GRANTED with respect to Claim Two and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with respect to
Claims One, Three, and Four. Claim Two will be DISMISSED. Monroe's Motion to Strike

(ECF No. 12) will be DENIED AS MOOT. Respondent will be DIRECTED to file, within thirty

(30) days of the date of entry hereof, a further response, which may raise any procedural
defenses and must address the merits of Claims One, Three, and Four.

An appropriate Order will accompanythis Memorandum Opinion.

M.

Date:

^7

Richmond, Virginia

John A. Gibney, Jr.
United States Distrfbt ^ge