Prasad v. Flynt et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 09/04/2018. (Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff) (smej, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

SUNDARI KARMA PRASAD,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No.3:16CV899

LARRYFLYNT,e/a/.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sundari Karma Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, submitted this action. For
the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed for Prasad's failure to follow the
directives of the Court.

L Prasad*s Historv of Abusive Litigation

In the last two years, Prasad has submitted over fifty civil actions. Prasad's actions have
been dismissed as frivolous and malicious, or for failure to state a claim, or because she has

failed to follow the directives of the Court. Prasad's many actions have strained the resources of
the Court,

Litigants have an obligation to "'Stop, Think, Investigate and Research' before filing

papers either to initiate a suit or to conduct the litigation." Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479,
482(3d Cir. 1987). Prasad has ignored this obligation and flooded the Court with her inchoate
claims for relief.

Additionally, Prasad has engaged in a consistent pattern of disregarding the directives of
the Court. For example, the Court has informed Prasad that she may not tack on allegations or

defendants to a complaint through partial amendments, but must file a comprehensive amended

complaint. Prasad has ignored that directive. Moreover, because of the nature of her rambling

complaints, it has been necessary for the Court to direct Prasad to file a particularized complaint
in each action she has filed. Those particularized complaints are often no better than the original
complaint. Even after filing a particularized complaint, and despite being repeatedly directed not
to do so, Prasad has continued to submit mere amendments to tack on claims or defendants

which she may not do. As the Court has explained to Prasad ad nauseum, although Prasad'spro
se status makes her "entitled to some deference," it does not relieve her of her duty to abide by
the rules and orders of this Court. Bollard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93,96(4th Cir. 1989)(citation

omitted). Prasad has refused repeatedly to comply with the Court's directives. Further, many of
the claims in Prasad's cases are repetitive of claims made in prior actions.

More recently, because Prasad has not liked the disposition of her actions, Prasad has

begun to name the undersigned as a defendant, simply because ofthe adverse decision. Prasad
believes that naming the undersigned as a defendant requires recusal ofthe undersigned.

However,that is simply not the case. An unfavorable ruling fails to constitute a valid basis for

recusal or a judicial bias claim. United States v. Williamson, 213 F. App'x 235, 237-38 (4th Cir.
2007)(citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,555 (1994)). Rather, Prasad's addition ofthe

undersigned as a defendant in both pending and closed civil actions is both abusive and done in
bad faith. Another judge of this Court has also found that Prasad's attempt to have the

undersigned recuse herselffor this reason was taken in bad faith. See Prasad v. Gothic Beauty
Magazine, No. 3:17CV446(E.D. Va. May 4,2018), ECF Nos. 15, 16.

By Memorandum Order entered on June 28,2018, the Court directed Prasad, within

fourteen(14)days ofthe date of entry thereof, to submit a certificate of compliance in order to
assist the Court in monitoring Prasad's repetitious and multiplicitous litigation. The certificate of
compliance was required to contain in separately numbered paragraphs:

1.

2.

A brief summary, not to exceed two (2) pages, explaining why the
interests ofjustice warrant consideration of her current complaint.
A list by style, case number, and current status of all cases filed by Prasad
within one year preceding the date of entry of this Memorandum Order
that names each and every defendant that Prasad has named in this civil
action.

3.

A certification that the claims that she brings in this complaint are not

raised in any other pending or closed action and set forth why each claim
could not have been raised in one of her previous actions.
4.

A certification that the claims that she has brought in this action have not
been dismissed with prejudice.

5.

A statement from Prasad under penalty of perjury that the statements made
in the certificate of compliance are true.

(ECFNo. 16, at 2-3.)
II. Prasad's Response

On July 12, 2018, Prasad filed her response to the June 28, 2018 Memorandum Order,
wherein she largely ignored the directives of the Court. (EOF No. 17.) For example,the
response fails to contain:

3.

A certification that the claims that she brings in this complaint are not

raised in any other pending or closed action and set forth why each claim
4.

5.

could not have been raised in one of her previous actions.
A certification that the claims that she has brought in this action have not
been dismissed with prejudice.
A statement from Prasad under penalty of perjury that the statements made
in the certificate of compliance are true.

(EOF No. 16, at 3.) Instead, Prasad derides the Court's attempt to sort out her frivolous or

repetitive litigation and states: "(sections 3-5 listed in case compliance blah blah blahs) was
certified in the complaint form from the state or in the amended revision that I took so
LOVINGLY and dedicatedly long to craft...." (ECF No. 17, at 1.) Prasad is incorrect.

Neither the Complaint(ECF No. 1), nor the Particularized Complaint(ECF No. 12), nor the
Amended Particularized Complaint(ECF No. 13), contains the requested information. Indeed,
Hamilton Hendrix, who is named as a defendant in each of these complaints, has appeared in a

number of Prasad's prior actions that the Court has dismissed for failure to state a claim, as

legally frivolous, and malicious. See, e.g., Prasad v. James-Woods, No. 3:18CV80,2018 WL
3130406, at *3(E.D. Va. June 26, 2018)("Prasad once again names Hamilton Hendrix as a

Defendant. In a previous case, Prasad described Hendrix as her 'ex boyfriend, drug dealer and
addict, rapist and alcoholic.'"(quoting Prasad v. Hampton Circuit Court, No. 3:17CV204,2018
WL 2452956, at *5(E.D. Va. May 31, 2018))); Prasad v. Fed. Trade Comm'n,No. 3:17CV224,
2018 WL 2248599, at *5(E.D. Va. May 16, 2018). Prasad also fails to tender any coherent

explanation as to why the interests ofjustice warrant the Court's review of her current complaint.
Given Prasad's history of abusive litigation, her failure to abide by the directives of the
Court, her contumacious response to the June 28, 2018 Memorandum Order, and the Court's

explicit warning that the failure to submit a proper response would result in the dismissal ofthe
action, dismissal with prejudice would be an appropriate sanction. See Ballard v. Carlson, 882
F.2d 93,95-96 (4th Cir. 1989)(affirming dismissal with prejudice for failure to abide by the

court's order where the court explicitly warned the plaintiff that his case would be dismissed if
he failed to obey the court's order); Dove v. Codesco,569 F.2d 807, 810(4th Cir. 1978)

(observing "that the dismissal power should be exercised 'only on the face of a clear record of
delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff"(quoting Dunham v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 385
F.2d 365, 368(5th Cir. 1967))). Nevertheless, in this instance, the Court concludes the lesser

sanction of dismissal without prejudice will appropriately address Prasad's failure to abide by the
directives of the Court. Accordingly, the action will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Prasad's Motion for the Appointment of Counsel(ECF No. 14) will be DENIED.

An appropriate order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
fsl

M. Hannah Lauck

Mr

United States District Judge

Date: SEP "4 2018
Richmond, Virginia