Anderson II v. Armor Health Care Services et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. on 2/1/2018. Copy mailed to Pro Se Plaintiff. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

WILLIAM LEE ANDERSON, H,

Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No. 3:16CV945

ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

William Lee Anderson, II, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.' The matter is before the Court on Defendant Phillips's
Motion to Dismiss, the Court's own review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and several other

motions filed by Anderson. For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19)
will be GRANTED.

I. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any

action filed by a prisoner ifthe Court determines the action (1) "isfrivolous" or (2) "fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or claims

' The statute provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law....

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

where the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D.

Va. 1992) (quoting A^e/7z/:e v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir.
1994). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;

importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356

(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 1 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980
F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'"

Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations

omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,

rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell All. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must

"allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d

193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly,
while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th
Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and
constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See

Brock V. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. SUMMARY OF PERTINENT ALLEGATIONS

In November of 2014, Anderson was confined in the Augusta Correctional Center

("A.C.C."). (Compl. 4-5, ECF No. 1.)^ Anderson was lifting weights, when an accident
occurred and his elbow was crushed. {Id. at 4.) Thereafter, Anderson received some medical
care and was transferred to Greensville Correctional Center ("G.C.C."). {Id. 4-5.) Anderson

contends that, "[i]f surgery had been done in an appropriate time line, it would have reduced the
amount of damage done to both the nerves and the cartilage." {Id. at 4.)
Defendant Phillips is a human resource assistant at G.C.C.

(ECF No. 1-1, at 3.)

Anderson contends that he exhausted "his administrative remedies through all grievance

^ The Court corrects the capitalization, punctuation, and spelling in the quotations from
Phillips's submissions. The Court omits the emphasis from the quotations. The Court employs
the pagination assigned to Anderson's submissions by CM/ECF docketing system.

processes until ... intentional [and] complete denial of grievance process once [he] arrived at
G.C.C. by Ms. Phillips

" (M) Specifically, Defendant Phillips "refused to release first filed

grievances filed at A.C.C. prior to transfer to G.C.C. on Jan. 13, 2016, where plaintiff sent for
those grievances filed at A.C.C.. .{Id.)

Anderson alleges that Defendant Phillips is

"harboring the grievance documents regarding his health and well-being, prolonging redress in
order to get surgery now going on 24 months

" {Id.) Phillips contends that such actions

violate his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. {Id.)

Although hardly clear, review of the documents attached to the Complaint suggests that
Anderson's claims are predicated on Defendant Phillips's failure to provide him with free copies
of some medical records and a grievance pertaining to Anderson's elbow injury. For example,

on September 3, 2016, Anderson wrote an informal complaint wherein he complained:
Ms. Phillips in Grievance Office came to me 3 weeks ago in regards to my
records of my fractured right elbow from A.C.C. where I have yet to receive
them, "delay and hindering," obstructing justice, denied access to the court,
interfering with court proceeding, where I [have been] without surgery for over 20
months and Ms. Phillips is the one person to have acknowledged that these
records were here. This is an 8th Amendment violation ....

(ECF No. 1-6, at 3.) In response, Ms. Phillips informed Anderson that she would provide
Anderson with the pertinent copies if he paid for them and provided her with a receipt reflecting
the same. {Id.)

Anderson did not like that response and on September 19, 2016, wrote an Offender

Request demanding copies of the records. {Id. at 4.) In response, another prison official, S.
Tapp, informed Anderson, "You were told on 9/13/16 that you had not provided any receipt for
the copies. That even though you may be indigent, you must still go through the Business

Office. Your lawyer, if you have one, can obtain them through writing to the Mrs. L Talbott. Is
this now clear?" {Id.)

Thereafter, on October 18, 2016, Anderson wrote an Offender Request wherein he stated:

Before you try to quote the rules, laws and rights of the courts, you need to learn
them (look up). Pro se litigant it means [I'm] my own attorney in my civil case
against you and Talbott along with Ms. Phillips for harboring court documents
... my grievances regarding my Eighth Amendment rights to health care where
to you all will be charged with obstruction of justice, interfering with court
proceeding, gross negligence by prolonging my surgery for broken elbow. See ya
in court.

(ECF No. 1-6, at 7 (alteration in original).)
III. ANALYSIS

Anderson's pro se status entitles him to some leniency. Nevertheless, "[p]rinciples
requiring generous construction ofpro se complaints are not, however, without limits." Beaudett

V. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). "Even in the case of pro se litigants,
they cannot be expected to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments ... ." Id. Here,
Anderson contends that Defendant Phillips violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Neither Anderson nor the Complaint suggest how Phillips's conduct

implicated, much less violated, the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly, Anderson's Fourth

Amendment claim against Defendant Phillips will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A. Alleged Violation of the Eighth Amendment

To state an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts that indicate (1) that

objectively the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted "was 'sufficiently serious,' and (2) that
subjectively the prison officials acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Johnson v.

Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991)). "These requirements spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality,
a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be called 'punishment,' and absent severity,

such punishment cannot be called 'cruel and unusual.'" Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th

Cir. 2008) (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-300). "What must be [alleged] with regard to each

component 'varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.'" Williams v.
Benjamin, 11 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5
(1992)).

When an inmate challenges his conditions of confinement, he must allege "(1) ^ serious

deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the

part of prison officials." Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal citation
omitted) (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 301-03), Deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to

allege facts suggesting that a particular defendant actually knew of and disregarded a substantial
risk of serious harm to the plaintiffs person. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
"Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet

it." Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
105-06(1976)).

[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a substantial

risk of harm is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference between those

general facts and the specific risk of harm confronting the inmate." Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
same). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the deliberate indifference standard requires a

plaintiffto assert facts sufficient to form an inference that "the official in question subjectively

recognized a substantial risk of harm" and "that the official in question subjectively recognized

that his actions were 'inappropriate in light of that risk.'" Parrish ex rel Lee v. Cleveland, 372
F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rich, 129 F.3d at 340 n.2).

Here, Anderson suggests that Defendant Phillips subjected him to a substantial risk of

harm by failing to provide him with free copies of old grievances and medical records.
Anderson fails to articulate facts that plausibly suggest that Defendant Phillips perceived such a

failure exposed Anderson to a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. Although Anderson
vaguely suggested to Defendant Phillips that provision of copies of his medical records and or

grievances could somehow expedite Anderson's medical care, he failed to coherently articulate
to Defendant Phillips how this was so. "If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . , a

nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable
hands." Iko, 535 F.3d at 242 (omission in original) (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236

(3d Cir. 2004)). As Anderson has failed to allege facts that plausibly suggest that Defendant

Phillips acted with deliberate indifference, Anderson's Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendant Phillips will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
B. Alleged Violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment

Anderson vaguely suggests that Defendant Phillips violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments by failing to provide him with free copies of grievances and medical
records from A.C.C. and somehow that affected Anderson's ability to utilize the prison grievance

procedure. Nevertheless, "the Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or
access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state." Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75

(4th Cir. 1994) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991)).' Although not entirely

' Anderson does not allege that Defendant Phillips somehow retaliated against him for filing a
grievance. See Booker v. S.C. Dep't ofCorr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017) ("That a prison
is not required under the Constitution to provide access to a grievance process does not mean that

Although not entirely clear, the tone of some of Anderson's submissions suggests that he
believes that the failure to provide him with free copies of medical records or grievances

automatically translates into a claim for denial of reasonable access to the courts. As explained
below, this is simply not so.

Inmates have a constitutional right to reasonable access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 351-53 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 838 (1977). Of course, the right of
access to the court ''is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have

suffered injury by being shut out of court." Christopher v. Harhury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).

Thus, in order to plead a backward looking denial of access to the courts claim, a plaintiff must
identify, with specificity, a non-frivolous legal claim that the defendant's actions prevented him

from litigating. Id. at 415-16; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n.3. Accordingly, "the complaint should
state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), just as if it
were being independently pursued." Christopher, 536 U.S. at 417 (internal footnote omitted).

"[T]he predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the 'nonfrivolous' test and to
show that the 'arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than hope."

Id. at 416.

Anderson completely fails to identify what claim, if any, he was prevented from
prosecuting by Defendant Phillips's actions. Anderson
must come forward with something more than vague and conclusory allegations
of inconvenience or delay in his instigation or prosecution of legal actions... .
The fact that an inmate may not be able to litigate in exactly the manner he desires
is not sufficient to demonstrate the actual injury element of an access to courts
claim.

prison officials who retaliate against inmates for filing grievances do not violate the
Constitution.").

Godfrey v, Washington County, Va, Sheriff', No. 7:06-cv-00187, 2007 WL 2405728, at *13
(W.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2007) (citing Lems, 518 U.S. at 351). Accordingly, Anderson's First and
Fourteenth Amendment claims WILL BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IV. CONCLUSION

Defendant Phillips's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) will be GRANTED. Anderson's
Fourth Amendment claim against Phillips WILL BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,

Anderson's First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant Phillips WILL
BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

On June 5, 2017, the Court received from Anderson a Motion for Injunction.

(ECF

No. 15.) On July 24, 2017, the Court received from Anderson a Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction (ECF No. 22) and Motion to Incorporate Newly Obtained Exhibits into Official
Record (ECF No 25).

In the Eastern District of Virginia, "[a]ll motions... shall be

accompanied by a written brief setting forth a concise statement of the facts and supporting
reasons, along with a citation of the authorities upon which the movant relies." E.D. Va. Loc.
Civ. R. 7(F)(1). The above motions do not comply with the above requirement. Accordingly,

Anderson's Motions (ECF Nos. 15, 22, 25) will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.'*
An appropriate Order will accompanythis Memorandum Opinion.

Date:

Richmond, Virginia

JohnA.Gibney.fc

United States District Ji

The exhibits attached to Anderson's Motion to Incorporate Newly Obtained Exhibits into
Official Record have been electronically filed. The Court is neither obliged nor inclined to sift
through the exhibits in the first instance to discern any purported relevance to any matter before
the Court. Should Anderson wish to rely on these exhibits in the future, he must direct the Court
to the specific exhibit and explain why it is relevant to any matter before the Court.