Prasad v. Hampton Circuit Court et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION. READ OPINION for details. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 05/31/2018. Copy mailed to Plaintiff as directed.(ccol, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

SUNDARIK.PRASAD,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil Action No.3:17CV204

HAMPTON CIRCUIT COURT,et al..
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sundari K.Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informa pauperis,filed this

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.' The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I. Preliminarv Review

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act("PLRA")this Court must dismiss any
action filed by a prisoner ifthe Court determines the action(1)"is frivolous" or(2)"fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2). The fnst standard includes

claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or claims where the "factual

contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp.417,427(E.D. Va. 1992)(quoting

'The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party iiyured in an
action at law....

42U.S.C.§ 1983.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,327(1989)), qff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994). The second
standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)tests the sufficiency ofa complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits ofa claim, or the

applicability ofdefenses." Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,952(4th Cir.
1992)(citing 5A Charles A. Wright «& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356
(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari,1 F.3d 1130,1134(4th Cir. 1993);see also Martin,980

F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption oftruth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S.662,
679(2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[]only 'a short and plain statement ofthe
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of

what the ...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544,555(2007)(second alteration in original)(quoting Conley v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41,

47(1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and
conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations
omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level," id. (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," id. at 570,

rather than merely "conceivable." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678(citing BellAtl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In
order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,the plaintiff must
"allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of[his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de

Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761,765 (4th Cir. 2003)(citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,309 F.3d
193,213(4th Cir. 2002);lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270,281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly,
while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147,1151 (4th
Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate and develop,sua sponte, statutory and

constitutional claims that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her complaint.
See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243(4th Cir. 1997)(Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City
ofHampton,775 F.2d 1274,1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. Prasad's Complaint

By Memorandum Order entered on October 17,2017,the Court directed Prasad to file a

particularized complaint. (ECF No. 14.) Prasad complied with that order. (ECF No. 16.)

Thereafter, Prasad filed an Amended Particularized Complaint("Complaint," ECF No. 19).^ As
an initial matter, the Court notes that Prasad's Complaint is comprised ofseventeen pages of
rambling allegations and 220 pages ofattached exhibits consisting of additional ramblings and
copies ofcourt documents, correspondence, and statutes. Further, in many instances,Prasad's

Complaint and the attached exhibits are not legible. The Court makes its best attempt to
decipher words and recites the most relevant factual information for each Defendant.

2

The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system to

Prasad's submissions.

Prasad is currently detained pending her trial in the Circuit Court for the City of

Hampton, Virginia. Prasad alleges that the named Defendants^ discriminated against her and
violated her various constitutional rights during her detention and ongoing criminal proceedings,
and during a previous family law matter in which she was involved. (Compl. 10-16). Prasad
requests, inter alia,"attorney's fees and costs, and such additional relief as the Court may deem

just and proper," and "declaratory relief of all violations and injunctive relief as well on all
parties." {Id. at 17.)
III. Analysis

It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion ofPrasad's

theories for relief. See Cochran v. Morris,73 F.3d 1310,1315(4th Cir. 1996)(emphasizing that
"abbreviated treatment" is consistent with Congress's vision for the disposition offrivolous or

"insubstantial claims"(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,324(1989))). Ultimately,
Prasad's Complaint will be dismissed for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and as legally frivolous.
A. Judicial Immunity

Prasad contends that Hampton Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge Deborah
Roe, Hampton General District Court Judge Patrick, and Hampton Circuit Court Judge Hutton
violated her constitutional rights and her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"). (Compl. 3^,8,10,13.)
3

The Defendants named in the caption ofPrasad's Complaint are: the Hampton Circuit
Court; Hampton Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge Deborah Roe; Hampton General
District Court Judge Patrick; Hampton Circuit Court Judge Hutton; Circuit Court Clerk Elizabeth
Wickline; attorney A.M. Cavanaugh; attorney Shakita Massey-Taylor; attorney Tyrone Johnson;
attorney Thomas Burcher; Hamilton L. Hendrix; Monica L. Vick; David A. Carpenter; Jonathon
D. Headlee; Jane "Justice;" and Sean A. Kam.(Compl. 2-9.) Prasad also names as a Defendant

"John 'Jay''Jim Schezlich' Marshall Henry'Haus of Henna'" in the section of her Complaint
that she titled "Parties." {Id. at 7.)
4

Judges are absolutely immune from suits under § 1983 for acts committed within their

judicial discretion. Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 355-56(1978). "Absolute judicial
immunity exists 'because it is recognized thatjudicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted

must be able to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without apprehension that they
will be subjected to burdensome and vexatious litigation.'" Lesam v. Spencer, No.3:09CV012,

2009 WL 4730716, at *2(E.D. Va. Dec. 8,2009)(citations omitted)(quoting McCray v.
Maryland,456 F.2d 1,3(4th Cir. 1972), overruled on other grounds.Pink v. Lester,52 F.3d 73,

77(4th Cir. 1995)). A judge is entitled to immunity even if"the action he [or she] took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his[or her] authority." Stump,435 U.S. at 356.

Only two exceptions apply to judicial immunity: (1)nonjudicial actions; and(2)those actions
"though judicial in nature,taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco,502
U.S. 9,11-12(1991)(citation omitted). Neither exception applies in this instance.

Prasad alleges that Hampton Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge Deborah Roe,
Hampton General District Court Judge Patrick, and Hampton Circuit Court Judge Hutton

violated her constitutional rights and her rights under the ADA. Specifically, Prasad alleges that
Hampton Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge Deborah Roe "did not perform due
diligence" during a custody case she presided over, and "gave Hendrix a protective order that

removed visitation from...Prasad." (Compl. 3.) Prasad further alleges that Hampton General

District Court Judge Patrick "dealt with warrants in debt that were not processed properly,"(id.
at 8), and that Hampton Circuit Court Judge Hutton "was actually asked via affidavit... to leave

bench but never read the order and was also sent various petitions for writs ofmandamus... but
he ...refused to read any ofthem." (Id. at 3—4.)

Prasad fails to allege that Judge Roe, Judge Patrick, and Judge Button's conduct falls

under either exception to judicial immunity. Prasad does not allege that their conduct amounted

to a nonjudicial action or that any ofthese Defendants acted in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction. Rather,Prasad complains about their judicial actions that were unfavorable to her.

Because Judge Roe,Judge Patrick, and Judge Button are entitled to judicial immunity,Prasad's
claims against these three Defendants will be DISMISSED.
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
1. Court Clerk

Judicial immunity also applies to quasi-judicial officers acting pursuant to court

directives. See Butler v. Johnson, No. l:07cvl 196(GBL/TRJ),2007 WL 4376135,at *3(E.D.
Va. Dec. 12,2007)(citing Lockhart v. Hoenstine,411 F.2d 455,460(3d Cir. 1969)). "[QJuasi-

judicial" immunity shields court officers from the "danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by
the doctrine ofabsolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks,
court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts." Kincaidv. Vail, 969 F.2d 594,601 (7th Cir. 1992)

(quoting Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376,377(7th Cir. 1989)); see McCray v. Maryland,

456 F.2d 1,5 n.l 1 (4th Cir. 1972)(holding that clerks have "derivative immunity" when they act
under the direction ofthe court). Clerks are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when they
perform "judicial act[s]... having an integral relationship with the judicial process." Wymore v.
Green,245 F. App'x 780,783(10th Cir. 2007)(alteration in original)(citation omitted)(internal
quotation marks omitted).

In her Complaint, Prasad lists Elizabeth Wickline, Court Clerk, as a Defendant(Compl.

2,4), and alleges "[Prasad] put in Complaint to court that was ignored by Court [and] Elizabeth

Wickline." {Id. at 11.) In her previous complaint,Prasad faulted Wickline for "allowing]... a

murder [and] assault[and] battery charge to be indicted against [Prasad]," and because Wickline

"signed [the] Grand Jury indictment." (ECF No. 16,at 4.) As a preliminary matter, Prasad's
former and current Complaint fail to allege that Defendant Wickline had any role in Prasad's
indictment, other than signing the form for the court. Further, to the extent that Prasad seeks to
hold Wickline liable, Prasad fails to allege that Defendant Wickline's actions fall outside of her

judicially mandated duties. Thus,she is immune from suit. See, e.g., Wymore,245 F. App'x at
783(finding clerk entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when refusing to file inmate's court

documents); Hutcherson v. Priest, No. 7:10-CV-00060,2010 WL 723629, at *3(W.D. Va. Feb.
26,2010); Butler, 2007 WL 4376135, at *3. Accordingly, Prasad's claims against Defendant
Wickline will be DISMISSED.
2. Commonwealth Attorney

Prasad also names Shakita Massey-Taylor,"the Commonwealth Attorney... that did not
practice due diligence in taking case at all." (Compl.4.) Prasad alleges that,
Proof was submitted to court and to Supreme Court via petitions for writs
ofprohibition and mandamus that should have had case dismissed due to various

issues offalse paperwork,sexual abuse ofjail, etc. police report with "threaten to
kill." All ofthis is due diligence violations of... Shakita Massey-Taylor.
{Id. at 12-13 (internal paragraph number omitted).) To the extent that Prasad seeks to hold

Taylor liable for monetary and injunctive relief, Massey-Taylor is immune from suit.

Prosecutorial immunity bars Prasad's claims against Massey-Taylor for monetary

damages. See Imbler v. Pachtman,424 U.S. 409,430(1976). Prosecutorial immunity extends to
actions taken while performing "the traditional functions ofan advocate," Kalina v. Fletcher,

522 U.S. 118,131 (1997)(citations omitted), as well as functions that are "intimately associated
with the judicial phase ofthe criminal process." Imbler,424 U.S. at 430. To ascertain whether a

specific action falls within the ambit ofprotected conduct, courts employ a functional approach,
7

distinguishing acts ofadvocacy from administrative duties and investigative tasks unrelated "to

an advocate's preparation for the initiation ofa prosecution or for judicial proceedings." Buckley
V. Fitzsimmom, 509 U.S. 259,273(1993)(citation omitted); Carter v. Burch,34 F.3d 257,261-

63(4th Cir. 1994). Absolute immunity protects those "acts undertaken by a prosecutor in
preparing for the initiation ofjudicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of

his [or her] role as an advocate for the State." Buckley,509 U.S. at 273.

In her Complaint, Prasad seemingly faults Massey-Taylor for opposing various "petitions

for writs of prohibition and mandamus"filed by Prasad to have her case dismissed. (Compl. 12.)
Prasad fails to allege, however,that Massey-Taylor's actions in her pending criminal
proceedings were taken outside Massey-Taylor's role as advocate for the Conunonwealth. See

Imhler,424 U.S. at 430(holding that prosecutorial immunity extends to prosecutor's actions "in
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case"). Therefore, Prasad's claims for
damages against Defendant Massey-Taylor will be DISMISSED.
Moreover, given the frivolous nature ofPrasad's claims,Prasad states no basis for

injunctive relief against Defendant Massey-Taylor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(I). Accordingly,
Prasad's claims for injunctive relief against Defendant Massey-Taylor will also be DISMISSED.
C. Persons Not Amenable to Suit Under S 1983
1- The Hampton Circuit Court

Prasad has named the Hampton Circuit Court as a Defendant. However,in order to state

a viable claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of
state law deprived him or her ofa constitutional right or ofa right conferred by a law ofthe
United States. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653,658

(4th Cir. 1998)(citing 42 U.S.C.§ 1983). Neither "inanimate objects such as buildings,
8

facilities, and grounds" nor collective terms such as "staff' or "agency" are persons amenable to

suit under § 1983. Lamb v. Library People Them,No.3:13-8-CMC-BHH,2013 WL 526887, at

*2-3(D.S.C. Jan. 22,2013)(citations omitted)(internal quotations omitted)(explaining the
plaintiffs"use ofthe collective term 'people them' as a means to name a defendant in a § 1983
claim does not adequately name a 'person'"); see Preval v. Reno, No. 99-6950,2000 WL 20591,
at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 13,2000)(citations omitted)(affirming district court's determination that

Piedmont Regional Jail is not a "person" under § 1983). Thus, the Hampton Circuit Court is not
a person amendable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Oliva v. Boyer, 163 F.3d 599,599(4th
Cir. 1998)(concluding "the Defendant court system" is not a person amendable to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983). Accordingly, Prasad's claims against the Hampton Circuit Court will be
DISMISSED.

2. Defense Attorneys

Prasad complains about the various attorneys who have represented her throughout her

pre-trial detention. (Compl. 2-5.) In particular, Prasad faults Thomas Burcher,"an attorney that
was assigned by Judge Hutton,"{id. at 9), A.M. Cavanaugh,a "court appointed attorney after
Thomas Burcher," {id. at 4), and Tyrone Johnson,"the attorney that was hired after A.M.
Cavanaugh was fired by"Prasad. {Id.)
However, private attorneys and public defenders do not act under color of state or federal

authority when they represent defendants in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Polk Cty. v.
Dodson,454 U.S. 312,325(1981)("[A] public defender does not act under color ofstate law
when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding."); Cox v. Hellerstein, 685 F.2d 1098, 1099(9th Cir. 1982)(holding that private

attorneys do not act under color of state or federal law when representing clients). Therefore,
Prasad's claims against Defendants Burcher, Cavanaugh and Johnson will be DISMISSED.

D. Prasad Has Failed to State a Claim against Hendrix, Vick, Carpenter,Headlee,
Jane "Justice," Karn,and "John 'Jay''Jim Schezlich' Marshall Henry'Hans of
Henna'"

Finally, Prasad has listed as defendants Hamilton L. Hendrix, Monica L. Vick,David A.

Carpenter, Jonathon D. Headlee,Jane "Justice," Sean A. Kam,and "John 'Jay''Jim Schezlich'
Marshall Henry'Haus of Henna.'" (Compl.4-8.) Prasad has identified Hendrix as her "ex

boyfriend, drug dealer and addict, rapist and alcoholic" {id. at 8), and Vick as a "stripper at the
Cat Club in Newport News, Va." {Id. at 5.) Prasad further identifies Kam as"a Hampton Roads
tattoo artist and [Prasad's]former boyfriend"{id. at 5), Headlee as a "paranoid schizophrenic,

serial rapist, antisocial, borderline personality disorder ex boyfriend of hers {id. at 6), and "John
'Jay''Jim Schezlich' Marshall Henry 'Haus ofHenna'" as her "ex boyfriend" whose "father is

in exile in Mexico." {Id.stl.) Finally, although Prasad does not individually identify
Carpenter in her list of parties, she does identify Jane "Justice" as"David A. Carpenter's ex wife
possibly and girlfriend." {Id. at 6.)''

Prasad's allegations fail to plausibly suggest that Defendants Hendrix, Vick, Carpenter,
Headlee, Jane Justice," Kam,and "John 'Jay''Jim Schezlich' Marshall Henry 'Haus of
Henna acted under color ofstate law. Therefore, these Defendants are not state actors

amenable to suit under § 1983. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,526 U.S. 40,50(1999)
fi A in this Court, and she has named Carpenterdefendants in the forty-plus civil suits she has
repeatedly named the same as a defendant in at least three ofthose civil
filed s
suns: Prasad V. Flynt, No. 3:16CV899(E.D. Va. filed May 25,2017),ECF No. 12; Prasadv

Fic^ Na 3:1^6CV40(E.D. Va. filed Oct. 28,2016), ECF No.69; and,Prasad v. Wells Fargo,

No. 3:17CV76(E.D. Va. filed June 21,2017), ECF No. 10. In Prasad v. Flynt,Prasad identified
Carpenter as her "ex boyfriend." Part. Compl. 2,Prasad v. Flynt, No. 3'16CV899 CE D Va
filedMay25,2017),ECFNo. 12.
v • • va.
10

("mhe under-color-of-state-law element of§ 1983 exeludes from its reach 'merely private
conduct,no matter how diseriminatory or wrongful.-(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky.457 U.S.991,
1002(1982))). Accordingly, her claims against Hendtix, Vick, Carpenter, Headlee,Jane
Justice," Kam,and "John 'Jay''Jim Schezlich' Marshall Henry'Haus ofHenna'" will be
DISMISSED for feilure to state a claim and as legally frivolous.'
IV. Conclusinii

For the foregoing reasons, Prasad's claims will be DISMISSED for feilure to state a

claim and as legally frivolous. The action will be DISMISSED. The Clerk will be DIRECTED
to note the disposition ofthe action for the purposes of28 U.S.C.§ 1915(g).
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

M. Hannah!

Date:

H/|y 3 \ 2018

United Stated D\^1rilt Judge

Richmond, Virginia

JTrgrmo,982 F. SuppM132.7^

See Cain v.
11