Haas et al v. City of Richmond et al
Filing
50
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 08/10/2018. Copy mailed to pro se plaintiff. (tjoh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
Aaron Haas, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-260
City of Richmond, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants the City of
Richmond, Selena Cuffee-Glenn, Timothy Burnett, William Davidson,
and Randall Masters' MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) (EOF No. 24); Defendants Jeremy L. Nierman
and Alice Snell's MOTION
TO
DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) (EOF No. 36); Defendant Aaron Grayson's
MOTION
TO
DISMISS
THE
SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT
PURSUANT
TO
RULE
12(b)(6) (EOF No. 41); PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
COMPLAINT (EOF No. 27); and Plaintiffs' MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND TO
ALL DEFENDANTS/ DISMISS THE PRIOR MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND (EOF No.
48). For the following reasons. Defendants' motions to dismiss (EOF
Nos. 24, 36, 41) will be granted; PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT (EOF No. 27) will be denied as moot; and
Plaintiffs' MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND TO ALL DEFENDANTS/ DISMISS THE
PRIOR MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND (EOF No. 48) will be granted in part
and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
I.
Procedural Con'tex't
Plaintiffs
Aaron
and
Lena
Haas,
proceeding
pro
se,
sue
Defendants on a variety of grounds under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985
(and perhaps other provisions of law).
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (EOF No. 1) on April 4, 2017.
On April 20, 2017, Plaintiffs moved to amend the Complaint (and a
corrected version of the motion was filed on April 28, 2017). On May
18, 2017, the Court signed an ORDER (EOF No. 6), which advised that
the Complaint and proposed amendments were inadequate and required
Plaintiffs to replead their claims. Plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 7) on June 19, 2017, and several Defendants moved
to dismiss the Amended Complaint on November 28, 2017. On November
29, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20)
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), and the Court by ORDER (ECF
No. 23) dated December 11, 2017 denied as moot the motion to dismiss.
Several
Defendants thereafter filed
motions to dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint. After the first of these motions was filed.
Plaintiffs moved for leave to file
a Third Amended
Complaint.
Plaintiffs later filed a second motion for leave to amend. In that
second motion. Plaintiffs requested that the previous motion to amend
be dismissed.
II.
Relevant Factual Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint lists several dates on
which various Defendants engaged in unspecified improper conduct.
Second Am. Compl. 8. Davidson did something on June 11, 2007; Burnett,
Wiggins,
and
Davidson
did
something
on
November
24
(year
unspecified); Burnett and Nierman did something on January 4, 2011;
Burnett and Wiggins did something on January 5, 2011; Burnett and
Grayson did something on September 2, 2011; Burnett and Cooper did
something on December 8, 2011; Davidson did something on September
18, 2013; and Masters, Snell, and Davidson did something on January
28, 2018. Second Am. Compl. 8.
The Second Amended Complaint then proceeds to enumerate a series
of wrongs in which the aforementioned Defendants were involved on
the listed dates. Second Am. Compl. 8-9. These wrongs include:
"violating the
4th
amendment and initiating searches
without
probable cause"; "interfering with Mr. and Mrs. Haas [sic] rights
and the defendants refusing to leave the private property and
continue
their
searches"; "[hjarassing Mr.
and/or
Mrs. Haas";
"conspired (constructive and Actual) with other defendants to
deprive constitutional rights under 18 USC §241"; "discriminating
against Mr. and Mrs. Haas because they voiced their civil rights and
because of property at 6001/6007"; "deprived constitutional rights
under 18 USC 242"; "threatened"; "illegally seize property/unlawful
conversion
of
6001/6007
Hull
Street
Road";
"violated
the
5th
amendment of the United States"; "violated of [sic] the right to
privacy, the 9th amendment of the United states"; "violated of [sic]
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th amendment of the
United States"; and "violated civil rights." Second Am. Compl. 8-9.
Plaintiffs also allege that, from 2007 to 2017, "[t]he Chief
Administrative Officers, Mr. Marshal and/or Ms. Cuffee-Glenn" were
"directly responsible for the [City of Richmond's] day to day
municipal operations and had a duty to protect civil rights, by having
proper management, training, written formal policies and procedures
in compliance with the city's authority, and compliance of [sic] all
laws, including federal laws" but failed to protect Plaintiffs "by
not having a [sic] clear written formal policies, procedures and
proper management for the Planning Department and/or its units."
Second Am. Compl. 9. They claim that "[t]he city audits during
2007-2017 had recommendation [sic] to establish written policies and
without the policies or proper management, the ^city' and the
defendants failed to catch the repeated customs" that caused the
above-listed wrongful conduct. See Second Am. Compl. 10. According
to Plaintiffs, the City of Richmond "failed to prevent and/ or redress
customs of the department by the defendants" that caused the listed
conduct, even after receiving complaints from Plaintiffs on February
29, 2012 and thereafter. See Second Am. Compl. 10.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motions
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defs. Br. 1 (ECFNo. 26); Defs.'
'
Br. 1 (ECFNo. 38); Def.'sBr. 1 (ECFNo. 43). Defendants raise several
arguments, but, importantly, they assert that the Second Amended
Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to support a claim.
Defs.' Br. 9 (ECFNo. 26); Defs. Br. 8 (ECFNo. 38); Def.'s Br. 8
'
(ECF No. 43). The Court agrees.
A.
The Standards Governing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motions
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions are evaluated under the
following standards:
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must
contain
sufficient
factual
matter,
accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'" We accept as
true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and
construe them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.
As
for
pro
se
complaints,
we
"liberally construe" them.
Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations
omitted). Notwithstanding those basic principles, however:
We do not . . . "accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation."
Nor
do
we
accept "unwarranted
inferences,
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." We can
further put aside any "naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement."
SD3, LLC V. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir.
2015) (citations omitted).
B.
Analysis
Here, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint contains no factual
allegations that could establish a plausible claim for relief. The
alleged wrongs are described in a conclusory manner and constitute
"naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." See SD3,
801
F.3d at 422 (citations omitted). Accordingly,
Defendants'
motions to dismiss will be granted.^
II.
The Motions to Amend the Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs have moved, twice, to amend the Second Amended
Complaint. Plaintiffs' request to amend shall be denied.
A.
Withdrawal of the First Motion to Amend the Second Amended
Complaint
As a threshold matter, the Court must resolve the issue of
Plaintiffs' two motions to amend the Second Amended Complaint. As
noted above. Plaintiffs moved to amend the Second Amended Complaint
and then, thereafter, again moved to amend the Second Amended
Complaint and to dismiss the first motion to amend. The Court will
^ Plaintiffs present additional allegations in their Oppositions to
Defendants' motions to dismiss. See Pis.' Opp'n4 (ECFNo. 28); Pis.'
Opp'n 2-23 (ECF No. 44). However, allegations that appear only in
a brief are not considered on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Blaise
V. Harris, 3:16-cv-23, 2016 WL 4265748, at *3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 11,
2016); Neal V. Patrick Henry Cmty. Coll., 4:15-cv-4, 2015 WL 5165278,
at *6 (W.D. Va. Sept. 3, 2015); Campbell ex rel. Equity Unit Holders
V. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 86 F. Supp. 3d 464, 472 n.9 (E.D. Va. 2015),
aff d, 616 F. App'x 74, 75 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
permit Plaintiffs to dismiss, i.e., to withdraw, their first motion
to amend. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND TO ALL
DEFENDANTS/ DISMISS THE PRIOR MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND (EOF No. 48)
will be granted to that limited extent and PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT (EOF No. 27) will be denied as moot,
having been
withdrawn. The following analysis pertains to the
remainder of the second motion to amend the Second Amended Complaint.
B.
Whether
to
Permit
Amendment
of
the
Second
Amended
Complaint
1.
The Standards Governing Amendment of a Complaint
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)
Plaintiffs have already amended a complaint pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). S^ ORDER (EOF No. 23). Accordingly, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2) governs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The standards
applicable to such an amendment are as follows:
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
15(a)(2)
provides that a court "should freely give leave"
to amend a complaint "when justice so requires."
Despite this general rule liberally allowing
amendments, we have held that a district court
may deny leave to amend if the amendment "would
be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has
been bad faith on the part of the moving party,
or the amendment would have been futile."
United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d
451, 461 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has further instructed that amendment may be
denied after "repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The
Fourth Circuit appears to consider this element to be part of the
"prejudice" factor. See Abdul-Mumit v. Alexandria Hyundai, LLC,
F.3d
, 2018 WL 3405474, at *6 (4th Cir. 2018) ("Prejudice to the
opposing party
^will often be determined by the nature of the
amendment
its
and
timing.' . . . We
look
to
the
^particular
circumstances' presented, including previous opportunities to amend
and the reason for the amendment." (citations omitted)).^
In that vein, the Fourth Circuit has permitted dismissal of
complaints after plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to take advantage
of opportunities to present a claim. For example, in United States
ex rel. Nathan, the Fourth Circuit observed:
Relator has amended his complaint three
times. A decision granting him leave to amend
yet again would have resulted in a fifth
complaint filed in this case. We also observe
that two years have elapsed between the filing
of the original complaint and the district
court's
dismissal
of
the
amended
complaint
currently before us in this appeal. The granting
of leave to file another amended complaint, when
Relator was on notice of the deficiencies before
filing the most recent amended complaint, would
undermine the substantial interest of finality
in litigation and unduly subject Takeda to the
^ There is also case law indicating that repeated pleading failures
suggest futility and bad faith. See Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239,
247
(4th
Cir.
2017)
("Such
repeated,
ineffective
attempts
at
amendment suggest that further amendment of the complaint would be
futile."); Wilkins v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 320 F.R.D. 125, 127
(E.D. Va. 2017) ("Bad faith includes . . . seeking leave to amend
after repeated "pleading failures." (citations omitted)).
continued time and expense occasioned by
Relator's pleading failures. In view of the
multiple
opportunities
Relator
has
been
afforded to correct his pleading deficiencies
and the deference due to the district court's
decision, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying him
leave to file a fourth amended complaint.
United States ex rel. Nathan, 707 F.3d at 461.
Likewise, in Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., "Plaintiffs had an
unprecedented thirteen months of unilateral pre-complaint discovery
under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and had already set forth four iterations
of their complaint." Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 480
{4th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Circuit, accordingly, held that "the
district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
plaintiffs' many opportunities to present their claim warranted
denial of the motion to amend." Id.
Additionally, in Abdul-Mumit, the Fourth Circuit noted:
Reviewing the record here, we discern no
abuse of discretion. The circumstances of the
litigation below compel our conclusion that the
nature
and
timing
of
the
amendment
would
prejudice Hyundai. Throughout the litigation
below, Hyundai repeatedly challenged the
sufficiency
of
Appellants'
complaints—specifically on the ground that the
complaints failed to plead facts pertinent to
individual plaintiffs and defendants. These
pleading
status
deficiencies
reports,
were
the
meetings, and
subject
of
eventually a
motion to dismiss. . . .
All of this time and energy, largely
focused on the deficiency of the complaints,
spanned the entirety of the 2016 calendar year.
In June 2016—in the heat of this litigation
concerning
the
sufficiency
of
the
complaints—the district court twice granted
Appellants leave to amend and explained "that
the complaints may now be stale and in need of
updating." . . .
And
still,
even
after
status
reports,
opportunities to amend, dispositive motions,
dismissal with prejudice, and a post-judgment
motion for leave to amend. Appellants have not
once provided the district court with a proposed
amendment purporting to cure the deficiencies.
Faced
with
such
resolute
adherence
to
deficient complaints, the district court's
decision to dismiss with prejudice was well
within its discretion under the facts of this
case.
Abdul-Mumit, 2018 WL 3405474, at *6-7 (citations omitted).
2.
Analysis
In the Court's view, allowing further amendment would be
prejudicial. It therefore refuses to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend.
Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on April 4, 2017.
Quickly thereafter, they moved to amend. The Court, by ORDER
(ECF No. 6), advised Plaintiffs in no uncertain terms that their
Complaint was severely flawed and ordered them to correct the
deficiencies:
[F]inding that the COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1) and the
proposed amendments (ECF Nos. 2 and 5) are
simply not understandable and that they offend
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) which requires that a claim
for
relief
must
contain . . . "a
short
statement of the claims showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief;" . . .
it is hereby
ORDERED that, by June 19, 2017, the plaintiffs
10
shall file an Amended Complaint that: . . . (2)
complies with the short and plain statement
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
ORDER (ECF No. 6). Additionally, the Court stated:
Further, the plaintiffs are advised that
their scatter shot approach to pleading by
bringing complaints by all people with whom they
have dealt in the City of Richmond in connection
with the matters about which they apparently
complain, the plaintiffs risk the imposition of
sanctions for filing vexatious and frivolous
lawsuits and they are therefore further advised
that, in their Amended Complaint, they should
name, as defendants, only the person or entity
they [sic] actually violated their rights and,
in that regard, the plaintiffs are advised that,
if any named defendant is required to respond
to any Amended Complaint, and if the Court later
finds that that person should not have been
named as a defendant, the plaintiffs run the
risk of being assessed with the costs and
attorney's fees incurred by any such defendant
in connection with the defenses of any action
found to be lacking in merit. The foregoing
admonitions are given because a review of the
COMPLAINT and the proposed amendments shows
that . . . (2) the claims asserted to date (to
the extent those claims can be understood) are
dubious at best (and, in fact, appear to be
fanciful and delusional which, if found to be
the case, necessitates dismissal).
ORDER (ECF No. 6)
In response. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. It was
largely unintelligible and replete
with legalistic gibberish.
Indeed, by ORDER (ECF No. 9), the Court again admonished Plaintiffs
^ The omitted language relates to the Court's conclusion that the
Complaint and proposed amendments failed to show jurisdiction. That
language has been removed because jurisdiction is not at issue here.
11
that their claims were "dubious" and suggested that those claims were
difficult for the Court to understand. Several Defendants then moved
to dismiss the Amended Complaint and included detailed briefing in
support of their motion. That motion to dismiss, however, was denied
as moot because Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on
the day after Defendants filed their motion. See ORDER (ECF No. 23).
The Court construed the filing of the Second Amended Complaint as
an amendment as a matter of course pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)
and hence permitted it without further analysis. See ORDER (ECF No.
23)
The Second Amended Complaint, however, was even more deficient
than the first two complaints in this case. It omitted the numerous,
albeit largely indecipherable, descriptions of events as well as the
many exhibits that appeared in previous iterations. It contained
essentially no factual allegations to support the wrongs asserted
^ The filing of the Second Amended Complaint was hardly a "normal"
use of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). That provision permits a party to
"amend its pleading once as a matter of course" within certain time
limits and is typically relied upon early in the proceedings and
before other amendments have been allowed. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1). Here, however. Plaintiffs had previously moved to amend
the Complaint at the outset of the case. The Court rejected the
proposed amendments because of their severe deficiencies, and it
therefore did not treat Plaintiffs as using up their "free shot"
amendment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). See ORDER (ECF No. 6); ORDER
(ECF No. 23). Thus, as to the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
were relying on Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) to support a second
opportunity to replead their claims, and they were doing so after
having received clear notice of the pervasive flaws in their
pleadings.
12
by Plaintiffs. Consequently, Defendants again moved to dismiss, and
they proffered analytically thorough briefs in support.
Plaintiffs moved to amend to file a Third Amended Complaint on
December 28, 2017. They attached a proposed Third Amended Complaint
(and several exhibits) to their motion. On April 23, 2018 (after
Defendants had responded to that motion), Plaintiffs moved to dismiss
the
previous motion to amend and to amend the Second Amended
Complaint. The second motion to amend did not include a proposed Third
Amended Complaint (or any exhibits).
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that further amendment
would be prejudicial. Plaintiffs have filed three complaints in this
action and, therefore, have had three opportunities to produce a
complaint that satisfies federal pleading requirements. They were
placed on notice by the Court, after filing the first complaint in
this action, that they had not satisfied these requirements. Indeed,
they were ordered to produce a pleading that cured the first
complaint's
inadequacies.
Yet,
the
Amended
Complaint
was
unintelligible and the Second Amended Complaint was devoid of factual
allegations (and, accordingly, was the worst complaint of the bunch).
Plaintiffs
have
clearly
demonstrated
"resolute
adherence
to
deficient complaints." See Abdul-Mumit, 2018 WL 3405474, at *7.
Furthermore, Defendants have expended considerable time and
effort
in
responding
(quite
diligently)
13
to
Plaintiffs'
many
pleadings. After
Plaintiffs filed their largely indecipherable
Amended Complaint, Defendants produced thoughtful and comprehensive
briefing in support of their motion to dismiss. Defendants did the
same after Plaintiffs filed their
woefully insufficient Second
Amended Complaint. To force Defendants to continue to respond to
Plaintiffs' pleadings would impose an unacceptably onerous burden
upon them.^
That conclusion is underscored, moreover, by the fact that the
Court has little way of ascertaining whether allowing amendment would
cure the inadequacies in Plaintiffs' pleadings. Although the first
motion to amend included a proposed Third Amended Complaint and
exhibits, these were omitted from the second motion to amend, which
is now the operative motion. And, given Plaintiffs' track record,
it is highly likely that the Third Amended Complaint would suffer
from faults similar to those of its predecessors.®
Enough
is
enough.
Allowing
amendment
would
be
highly
prejudicial to Defendants. Denying leave to amend is appropriate and
warranted. Cf. United States ex rel. Nathan, 707 F.3d at 461 ("The
® It is worth noting that Defendants have also shouldered the burden
of responding attentively to other of Plaintiffs' (at times improper)
filings.
® That is true notwithstanding that, in the second motion to amend.
Plaintiffs describe, in general terms, their proposed changes. Given
the previous complaints in this case, the Court is not willing to
rely on Plaintiffs' generalized characterizations.
14
granting of leave to file another amended complaint, when Relator
was on notice of the deficiencies before filing the most recent
amended complaint, would undermine the substantial interest of
finality in litigation and unduly subject Takeda to the continued
time and expense occasioned by Relator's pleading failures.").
The Court is mindful of Plaintiffs' pro se status. The law is
complex, and pro se litigants often face an uphill battle, given that
they must familiarize themselves quickly with concepts that their
opponents have often had years, or decades, to master. Consequently,
the Court treats pro se parties with a certain leniency. But, pro
se parties are still persons seeking action by a Court of the United
States and must satisfy the requirements of doing so. That is
especially so where the failure to comply with those requirements
would
harm
or
prejudice
a
defendant.
Here,
Plaintiffs
have
steadfastly refused to discharge their obligations and have done so
in a way that severely burdens Defendants. As Defendants aptly
observe, "Plaintiffs continue to file pleading after pleading with
no apparent understanding of what they are doing, what they are
demanding of the various Defendants, or the imposition they continue
to impose upon the Court and Defendants' resources and time." Defs.'
Opp'n2 (ECFNo. 30). That is not acceptable, even for pro se parties.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND TO ALL
DEFENDANTS/ DISMISS THE PRIOR MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND (EOF No. 48)
15
will be denied as to the request to amend the Second Amended
Complaint.''
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Defendants the City of Richmond,
Selena Cuffee-Glenn, Timothy Burnett, William Davidson, and Randall
Masters' MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) (EOF No. 24) will be granted; Defendants
Jeremy L. Nierman and Alice Snell's MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) (EOF No. 36) will be
granted; Defendant Aaron Grayson's MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) (EOF No. 41) will be
granted; PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT (EOF
No. 27) will be denied as moot, having been withdrawn; and Plaintiffs'
MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND TO ALL DEFENDANTS/ DISMISS THE PRIOR MOTION
TO LEAVE TO AMEND (EOF No. 48) will be granted as to Plaintiffs'
request to withdraw PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
^ Plaintiffs also seek to add a Defendant, Anthony Jones, in the Third
Amended Complaint. Although Jones has not yet expended resources on
responding to Plaintiffs' many deficient pleadings, the Court
concludes that it would be improper to allow amendment even as to
him, given Plaintiffs' "repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed" and their failure to show that their
proposed changes to the Second Amended Complaint would correct the
deficiencies. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Those failures, moreover,
are suggestive of bad faith and futility, which also support denying
leave to amend. See Martin, 858 F.3d at 247; Wilkins, 320 F.R.D. at
127.
16
COMPLAINT (EOF No. 27) and will otherwise be denied.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia
Date: August jV, 2018
17
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