Coleman v. Fountain et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 05/08/2018. Copy mailed to Jerome Coleman.(tjoh, )
?
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGIN:
Richmond Division
I
E
MAY °° 8 2018
JJ
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHMOND. VA
JEROME F. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
V.
Civil Action No. 3:17CV266
FRANCES M. FOUNTAIN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jerome F. Coleman, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.^
The
matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I.
Preliminary Review
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this
Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court
determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state
^ The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute
. . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person
within
the
jurisdiction
thereof
to
the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
a
claim
on
which
§ 1915(e)(2).
relief
may
be 'granted."
28
U.S.C.
The first standard includes claims based upon "an
indisputably
meritless
legal
theory,"
or
"factual contentions are clearly baseless."
claims
where
the
Clay v. Yates, 809
F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994).
The
second
standard
is
the
familiar
standard
for
a
motion
to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A
motion
to
dismiss
under
Rule
12(b)(6)
tests
the
sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses."
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin,
980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the
complaint
plaintiff.
is
viewed
in
the
light
most
favorable
the
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th
Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952.
applies
to
only
to
factual
considering
a
motion
identifying
pleadings
to
allegations,
dismiss
that,
because
however,
can
choose
they
are
This principle
and
"a
to
begin
no
more
court
by
than
conclusions,
are
not
entitled
to
the
assumption
of
truth."
Ashcroft V. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled
to relief,
' in order to 'give
the
defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'"
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard
with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a
"formulaic
recitation
of
Id. (citations omitted).
the
elements
of
a
cause
of
action."
Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,"
id.
"plausible
(citation
on
its
"conceivable."
Id.
omitted),
face,"
id.
at
stating
570,
a
claim
rather
that
than
is
merely
"A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
In order for a claim or complaint to
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff
must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his
or] her claim."
Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d
761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309
F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); lodice v. United States, 289 F.3d
270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).
construes
pro se
Lastly, while the Court liberally
complaints,
Gordon
v.
Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147,
1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it will not act as the inmate's advocate
and
develop,
sua
sponte,
statutory and
constitutional claims
that the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or
her complaint.
Cir.
1997)
See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th
(Luttig,
J.,
concurring);
Beaudett
v.
City
of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II.
Coleman's Complaint
By Memorandum Order entered on March 12, 2018, the Court
advised
Coleman
that
his
complaint
failed
to
identify
a
particular constitutional right that was violated by a nonimmune defendant's conduct.
directed
Coleman
to file
(ECF No. 20, at 2.)
a
particularized
Coleman filed his Particularized Complaint.
The Court then
complaint.
(Id.)
(ECF No. 22.)
In his Particularized Complaint, Coleman has named Frances
M.
Fountain,
Clerk
of
the
General
District
Court
of
Sussex,
Virginia,^ and Doris Worley, Deputy Clerk, as Defendants.
Part. Compl. 6.)^
(See
Coleman alleges as follows:
^ The Court notes that Coleman did not identify at which
district court Defendant Fountain was employed as a clerk in his
On November 11, 2014, [Coleman] wrote a letter
address[ed] to Mrs. Francis M. Fountain . . . to ask
two questions:
If [the] Court
has
jurisdiction
to
hear
a
warrant in detinue and.
If bond if required? Also, [Coleman] stated
[he had] no job, no money to pay for service
of warrant.
On or about December 2014, Mrs. Fountain answered
and said, "Can file, no bond necessary in detinue
cases. Must file in forma pauperis."
On May 3, 2015, [Coleman] filed a warrant in
detinue
with
12
months
accounting
statements
as
requested by Mrs. Fountain, Clerk of the Court.
[Coleman] filed in forma pauperis with statements.
On May 27, 2015, Mrs. Doris Worley, Deputy Clerk,
answered
[Coleman's]
letter and
said
[Coleman]
would
have to pay $56.00 for service of warrant, or request
an in forma pauperis.
On June 24, 2015, Mrs. Fountain, Clerk, granted
[Coleman's] in forma pauperis status per 8.01-691.
However, in the same letter, Mrs. Fountain said
[Coleman] must pay $5.00 per month to pay for service
of warrant.
In or about June
2015,
[Coleman]
sent a second
set of accounting statements, showing [Coleman] is
indigent [and] has no money to pay for [the] service
of warrant.
On August 2, 2015, [Coleman] wrote to said Court
to inquire about [the] status of [his] case.
[There was] no answer from [the] Court.
[Coleman] wrote [a] second letter to
inquire
about [his] case.
Particularized
Complaint.
(See
Part.
Compl.
1.)
However,
because Coleman named Frances M. Fountain, Clerk of the General
District Court of Sussex, Virginia, in his original Complaint,
the Court assumes that he intends
Particularized Complaint as well.
to
name
the
same
in
his
^ The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF
docketing system to Coleman's submissions.
The Court corrects
the spelling, capitalization, and punctuation in the quotations
from Coleman's Complaint.
5
(Part.
Compl.
1-2.
(paragraph
labels
omitted)
(internal
citations omitted).)
From what the Court can discern,^ Colman's sole claim for
relief is:
Claim One
As
clerks
of
[the]
Court,
Defendants
[Fountain and Worley] knew or should
have known, when they granted [Coleman]
poor person status, Va. Code. 8.01-691,
but
in
the
same
letter
denied
him
the
right
to
use
that
status,
[that
Coleman] would lose his property," (id.
at 4), and that their conduct violated
the
First^
and
Fourteenth®
Amendments
(id. at 3, 5).
Coleman requests the Court award compensatory damages in an
unstated amount, and award punitive damages in the amount of
$2,000.
(Id. at 7.)
III.
Analysis
It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an
extended
Cochran
discussion
v.
Morris,
of
73
Coleman's
F.3d
theories
1310,
1315
for
relief.
(4th
Cir.
See
1996)
^ Contrary to the Court's March 12, 2018 Memorandum Order
directing Coleman to file a particularized complaint, Coleman
did not set out in separate paragraphs his claims for relief.
® "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the
right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
U.S. Const, amend. I.
® "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . ."
U.S. Const,
amend. XIV, § 1.
6
(emphasizing
Congress's
that
vision
"insubstantial
319,
324
"abbreviated
for
claims"
(1989))).
the
(citing
treatment"
is
disposition
Neitzke
Ultimately,
consistent
of
v.
frivolous
Williams,
Coleman's
with
490
Complaint
or
U.S.
will
be
dismissed for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and as legally frivolous.
Judicial immunity applies to quasi-judicial officers acting
pursuant
to
court
directives.
See
Butler
v.
Johnson,
No. I:07cvll96 (GBL/TRJ), 2007 WL 4376135, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec.
12, 2007) (citing Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d
Cir. 1969)).
"Quasi-judicial" immunity shields court officers
from "the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the
doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly,
will
vent
their
wrath
on
judicial adjuncts . . . ."
(7th Cir. 1992)
clerks,
court
reporters,
and
other
Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 n.ll (4th Cir.
1972) (holding that clerks have "derivative immunity" when they
act under the direction of the court).
quasi-judicial
having
process."
immunity
an
Wymore
when
integral
v.
Green,
they
Clerks are entitled to
perform
relationship
245
F.
"judicial
with
App'x
the
780,
act[s]
judicial
783
(10th
Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In
his
Particularized
Complaint,
Coleman
faults
Frances
Fountain, Clerk of the District Court of Sussex, Virginia, and
Doris Worley, Deputy Clerk, for granting him
forma pauperis
status, but still requiring him to pay $5.00 per month for his
detinue case.
(See Part. Compl. 1-2.)
Coleman further argues
that Defendants Fountain and Worley are not immune from his suit
because they "impede[d the] filing of
[Coleman's]
warrant in
detinue" (id. at 4), that this was "in direct violation of their
statutory duties" (id. at 5), and that their actions violated
Coleman's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 3-5.)
Contrary to Coleman's assertion. Defendants Fountain and
Worley's actions of assessing a small filing fee for Coleman
despite being granted
forma pauperis status were not contrary
to their statutory duties."' Virginia's ^ forma pauperis statute
states,
"[a]ny
prisoner
granted
leave
to
proceed
in
fomna
pauperis shall nonetheless make payments, in equal installments
as the court directs, towards satisfaction of the filing fee and
costs."
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-691 (West 2018).
Thus, Coleman
fails to allege that Defendants Fountain and Worley's actions
It appears that had Coleman not been granted ^ forma
pauperis status, he would have been required to pay a $56.00
filing fee for the warrant in detinue.
8
fall outside the scope of their judicially mandated duties and
thus they are immune from suit.
See, e.g., Wymore, 245 F. App'x
at 783 (finding clerk entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when
refusing
to
file
inmate's
court
documents);
Hutcherson
v.
Priest, No. 7:lO-CV-00060, 2010 WL 723629, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb.
26, 2010); Butler, 2007 WL 4376135, at *3.
Coleman's claims
against Defendants Fountain and Worley will be dismissed.
IV.
For
the
foregoing
Conclusion
reasons,
Coleman's
claims
will
be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim and as
legally frivolous.
The action will be dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk will be directed to note the disposition of the action
for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
It is so ORDERED.
/s/
t
Date: /(A/kt S)
Richmond, Virginia
Robert E. Payne
Senior United States District Judge
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?