Handy v. Johnson & Johnson, et al.

Filing 44

OPINION. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. on 12/12/2017. Copy mailed to Plaintiff. (walk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

ASLAM HANDY,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-274-JAG

V.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON,
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
TOYOTA MOTOR ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING,
MAXIMUS, INC.
Defendants.
OPINION

The pro se plaintiff, Aslam Handy, brings this suit against Johnson & Johnson, the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors ("Federal Reserve"), Toyota Motor Engineering &

Manufacturing North America ("Toyota"), and Maximus, Inc. ("Maximus"). The Court ordered

Handy to submit a particularized complaint, as his original lacked clarity and factual specificity.
The Court instructed him to set forth a statement of facts and to identify his legal claims and the

basis for those claims. Handy failed to follow the Court's instructions and his "particularized

complaint" remains vague. He appears to allege that the defendants discriminated against and
unlawfully terminated him. The defendants moved to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND

Handy's claims apparently arise from his employment with the Federal Reserve' and the
defendant companies. He complains of "continuous harassment" and "bullying and terrorizing"
at the Federal Reserve and "at other places [he has] worked since '07." (Dk. No. 11, at 6.) He

' Handy names the Federal Reserve Board of Governors as a defendant, and not the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, where Handy actually worked. As set forth in detail herein, the
disposition of this case remains the same regardless of the entity against which Handy intended
to bring his claim(s).

alleges that a "mafia like cartel" controls the Federal Reserve, causing "ongoing bullying and
terrorist like activities," such as the deaths of his uncles in India, his cousin in the United

Kingdom, and his wife's sister in the United States. Id. at 6-7.

Handy believes that this

"terrorism" began when he reported compliance issues to his superiors and the Federal Reserve
terminated his employment.

Despite being highly qualified and a "perfect fit" at the companies he applies to, Handy
struggles to find employment. (Dk. No. 11, at 8.) He believes the Federal Reserve induces
companies to either refuse to hire him, or to terminate his employment. He insists no company

would terminate him "unless they were forced" to do so by the Federal Reserve. Id. at 9.

Johnson & Johnson,^ Toyota, and Maximus all terminated Handy. He speculates that
these terminations occur once the "powerful individuals" at the Federal Reserve learn of his
location and "put in place mechanisms to have [him] removed." (Dk. No. 11, at 8.)

To illustrate. Handy describes his most recent employment with Maximus. On May 9,

2017, Handy received an unexpected "warning letter." Id. at 9. His superiors asked him to do
work outside of his job description and to improve his performance. Despite excellent feedback
from customers and a "verbal commitment" to a one-year contract, Maximus terminated Handy's
employment on May 25, 2017. Id. at 15.

Handy also blames the Federal Reserve and its "subcontractors"^ for his wife's health
problems, which were exacerbated during their 2007 relocation to Richmond, Virginia for Handy
to begin working at the Federal Reserve.

He notes that Federal Reserve subcontractors who

^Although it is unclear from the complaint, it appears that Handy's employment with Johnson &
Johnson predates his employment with the Federal Reserve.

^ Handy refers to Federal Reserve "subcontractors" and identifies Johnson & Johnson, Toyota,
and Maximus as such. The defendants contest this label. Handy does not plead facts establishing
them as Federal Reserve subcontractors. Instead, he notes that the defendants are paid in money
printed by the Federal Reserve.

inspected their Virginia home missed mold and leakage problems. He speculates that these
issues were deliberately ignored, and that mold was planted in his home at the behest of the
Federal Reserve.

Handy asks for a monetary award of $9,000,000 from Johnson & Johnson, $60,000 from

Toyota, $60,000 from Maximus, and $11,000,000 from the Federal Reserve.'^
II. DISCUSSION

The defendants have moved to dismiss on a number of grounds. As described in detail

below, the Court dismisses the particularized complaint for the following reasons:

(A) The Court dismisses the complaint against the Federal Reserve for a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity.

(B) The Court dismisses the complaint against Johnson & Johnson and Toyota for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

(C) The Court dismisses the complaint against Maximus because it fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The Court notes that, in additional to jurisdictional
issues, the complaint fails to state a claim against all defendants.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction^
As sovereign, the United States is "immune from suit save as it consents to be sued."
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).

This immunity extends to

"instrumentalities" of the federal government, including the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve. Research Triangle Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 132 F.3d 985,

^ Handy also requests that $600,000,000 of a 2007 grant to the Federal Reserve be used to
implement a remote monitoring system he invented. He believes that this system will collect
evidence needed to put an end to cancer, mental illness, climate change, and terrorism.

^A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) tests the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving proper subject matter jurisdiction as the party asserting jurisdiction,
Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).

987, 990 (4th Cir. 1997). The extent to which the United States has waived sovereign immunity
in any court defines that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Id. at 987.

Handy fails to identify any waiver of sovereign immunity applicable to his claims against
the Federal Reserve. The Court thus dismisses his claims against the Federal Reserve because,

absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it.
B, Personal Jurisdiction^
Johnson & Johnson and Toyota move to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction. A
court can have either general or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). General jurisdiction over a company

exists where that company (1) is incorporated, (2) has its principal place of business, or (3) has
contacts "so continuous and systematic" so as to render them "essentially at home." Daimler AG

V. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 n. 11, 760 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).

Specific

jurisdiction exists in a forum when the suit arises out of a defendant's specific contacts with that
forum. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
1. Johnson & Johnson

Johnson & Johnson is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in

New Jersey. Handy does not allege facts sufficient to show that Johnson & Johnson has contacts

with Virginia continuous and systematic enough to render it essentially at home. Handy's claims

^A Rule 12(b)(2) motion challenges a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating jurisdiction. Grayson v. Anderson, 816 F.3d
262, 267 (4th Cir. 2016). When courts address a challenge to personal jurisdiction by reviewing
the complaint and the parties' motions, accompanying affidavits, and supporting memoranda, the
plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to survive the challenge. Id.
at 268. "In considering a challenge on such a record, the court must construe all relevant
pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the
most favorable inferences for the existence ofjurisdiction." Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676
(4th Cir. 1989).

appear to arise from his employment with Johnson & Johnson in New Jersey. He fails to allege

any Johnson & Johnson conduct that would give rise to specific jurisdiction in Virginia. The
Court thus dismisses Handy's claims against Johnson & Johnson because the Court lacks general
and specific personal jurisdiction over Johnson & Johnson.
2. Toyota

Toyota is a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky.
Handy does not allege facts sufficient to show that Toyota has contacts with Virginia continuous
and systematic enough to render Toyota essentially at home. His claims appear to stem from his

employment with Toyota in Kentucky, and he fails to allege conduct by Toyota that gives rise to
specific jurisdiction in Virginia. The Court dismisses Handy's claims against Toyota because the

Court lacks general and specific personal jurisdiction over Toyota.
C. Failure to State a Claim^
Each defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The

Court reads pro se complaints with "special judicial solicitude" but will not become an advocate

for the plaintiff or recognize "extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel
them." Weller v. Dep't ofSocial Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations
omitted).

^ A Rule 12(b)(6) motion gauges the sufficiency of a complaint without resolving any factual
discrepancies or testing the merits of the claims. Republican Party ofN.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d
943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering the motion, a court must accept all allegations in the
complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) {ciXing Edwards
V. City ofGoldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). The principle that a court must accept
all allegations as true, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must state facts that,
when accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

1. Maximus

Handy demands $60,000 from Maximus. He alleges his termination violated a verbal

commitment to a "1 year contract." (Dk. No. 11, at 15.) Construed liberally, Handy attempts to
assert a breach of contract claim. In Virginia, this claim requires him to show the following: (1)
a legally enforceable obligation; (2) a breach of that obligation; and (3) that the breach caused his
injury. Filak v. George, 161 Va. 612, 619, 594 S.E.2d 610, 614 (2004). Handy fails to plead

facts establishing the contract's existence, Maximus' obligations under it, or how Maximus
breached it by terminating him. The Court therefore grants Maximus' motion because the facts
alleged are not enough to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555.

2. Federal Reserve, Johnson & Johnson, and Toyota

Although claims against the Federal Reserve, Johnson & Johnson, and Toyota are
dismissed on other grounds, the Court notes that Handy also fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted against any defendant.

His complaint identifies "issues" such as job

discrimination and Americans with Disabilities Act violations, but fails to plead facts sufficient
to move any of his claims "above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Handy complains of discrimination generally but fails to describe any discrimination. He

speculates that the Federal Reserve in Richmond terminated his employment because he reported

compliance issues, not because of his membership in a protected class. He argues that his other
employers terminated his employment due to Federal Reserve influence, not because of his
membership in a protected class. He asserts that no competent employer would terminate him
absent an ulterior motive, but does not allege facts showing a discriminatorv motive.

Handy also attempts to bring an ADA claim on behalf of his wife, who allegedly suffered
physical injury when their family relocated in 2007. To have standing to bring a claim on behalf
of his wife. Handy needs to plead facts showing (1) an injury-in-fact; (2) a close relationship
between himself and his wife; and (3) a hindrance to his wife's ability to protect her own rights,
Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2002). Handy has not
pled facts to establish standing to bring a claim on his wife's behalf
Finally, Handy's complaint refers to a general grievance that attempts to hold each
defendant accountable for, among other things, terrorism and climate change due to their refusal

to implement programs he developed. Handy lacks standing to bring such a claim as he fails to
identify a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555,560(1992).
IV. CONCLUSION

Having already directed the plaintiff to plead specific facts, and the plaintiff having failed
to do so, the Court dismisses this case with prejudice.
The Court will enter an appropriate order.
Let the Clerk send a copy of this Opinion to all counsel of record and to the pro se
plaintiff.

Date:
Richmond, VA

^

.2017

John A. Gibney, Jr.
United States Districft Jtfd s