Walter v. Government Services Auctions et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. See for complete details. Signed by District Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. on 10/30/2017. (mailed copy to pro se Plaintiff) (nbrow)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
RANDYL WALTER,
Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-295-JAG

GOVERNMENT SERVICES AUCTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION

The prose plaintiff, Randyl Walter, brings this breach of contract claim against General
Services Administration ("GSA"), Fort McHenry National Monument/Historical Shrine, and the
Department of the Interior. The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that Congress has
only waived sovereign immunity for this type of claim in the Court of Federal Claims, and not in
district court.

The Court grants the defendants' motion because the district courts lack

jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim.

I. BACKGROUND
Walter purchased a golf cart from an online GSA auction on March 20, 2017, for $500.
The auction website described the golf cart as having "Eight 6V Batteries" and an "On Board
Smart Charging System." (Second Am. Compl., Exh. A.) Upon returning to his home in
Richmond with the cart, Walter discovered that it had neither batteries nor a charging system.
Walter contacted the GSA's Contracting Officer, George Elefante, who told Walter he had two
options: (1) keep the cart and receive a price adjustment; or (2) return the cart in its present
condition and receive a full refund of $500.

Walter chose neither option and sued the GSA,1 as well as Fort McHenry National
Monument/Historical Shrine and the Department of the Interior. After amending his complaint
twice, once as of right and then with leave from the Court, Walter currently alleges breach of
contract and seeks the following: $1,444.56 for the cost of replacing the batteries, $519 .50 for
the cost of replacing the charging system, and $8,555.44 in punitive damages. The defendants
moved to dismiss.
II. DISCUSSION
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Evans v.

B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
As sovereign, the United States is "immune from suit save as it consents to be sued."

United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). "[T]he terms of its consent to be sued in
any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit."

Id.

Waiver of sovereign

immunity will be "strictly construed .. .in favor of the sovereign." Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,
192 (1996).
Walter relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), known as the "Little Tucker Act," to argue that
the United States has waived sovereign immunity in this case. The Little Tucker Act waives
immunity in district courts for breach of contract claims against the United States for amounts
less than $10,000. 2 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). The Little Tucker Act also states that district courts

1

Walter misidentifies defendant General Services Administration as "Government Services
Auctions." (Second Am. Compl., at 1.)
2
Walter's complaint fails to meet two of these requirements: (1) his claims currently total
$10,519.50, and (2) he has not brought suit against the United States, but against an agency,
which the Little Tucker Act does not authorize. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (" ... claim against
the United States") (emphasis added); see also Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 514 (1952)
(finding that federal agencies may only be sued eo nomine when Congress has given explicit
authority to do so). If Walter were to refile against the United States for an amount less than
$10,000, however, the court would still lack jurisdiction, for the reasons stated below.
2

shall not have jurisdiction over such claims if they are subject to sections 7104(b)(l) and
7107(a)(l) of Title 41. Jd.
Sections 7104(b)(l) and 7107(a)(l) set forth review procedures for disputes subject to the
Contract Disputes Act ("CDA"), which waives sovereign immunity for certain disputes in the
Court of Federal Claims but not in district court. 41 U.S.C. § 7104(b)(l). The CDA governs
disputes arising from contracts made by executive agencies for, among other things, the sale of
government property.

41 U.S.C. § 7102(a).

Under the CDA, "executive agency" includes

executive departments, military departments, and independent establishments, meaning any
"establishment in the executive branch ... which is not an Executive department, military
department, [etc.]." 41 U.S.C. § 7101(8)(c); 5 U.S.C. § 104(1). The GSA is "an agency in the
executive branch of the Federal Government," which does not fall within any listed exclusion.
40 U.S.C. § 301.
Walter's claim falls within the scope of the CDA as it arises from a contract with an
executive agency, the GSA, for the sale of government property, the golf cart. Disputes within
the scope of the CDA are subject to its review procedures and excluded from the Little Tucker
Act's grant of jurisdiction to district courts. 3 United States v. J&E Salvage Co., 55 F.3d 985, 987
(4th Cir. 1995).
The CDA's review procedures allow Walter to either (1) appeal the decision of the
contracting officer to the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, or (2) pursue direct relief from the
Court of Federal Claims. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7104(a)-(b), 7105(b). These procedures are "exclusive

3

Walter contends that he is not subject to the review procedures set forth by the CDA because
the CDA only provides jurisdiction over "contractors" and not private individuals. (Opp. to Mot.
to Dismiss, at 2.) Walter misunderstands the use of the word "contractor" in the statute. The
CDA defines "contractor" as "a party to a Federal Government contract other than the Federal
Government." 41 U.S.C. § 7101(7). This definition includes Walter.

3

of jurisdiction in any other forum" and do not allow Walter to bring his claim in district court.

J&E Salvage, 55 F.3d at 987.
III. CONCLUSION
This case falls within the scope of the Contract Disputes Act because it arises from a
contract with an executive agency for the sale of government property. The CDA limits
jurisdiction over this case to the Court of Federal Claims. Defendants' motion to dismiss is
granted because this Court lacks jurisdiction.
The Court will enter an appropriate order.
Let the Clerk send a copy of this Opinion to all counsel of record and to the pro so
plaintiff.

~~~

Date:
Richmond, VA

30

Isl
John A. Gibney, Jr.

2017

United States Distri

4