Prasad v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs et al
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 10/05/2018. (Copy mailed to Plaintiff) (smej, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
SUNDARI K.PRASAD,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.3:17CV379
V.
DEPT. OF VETERAN AFFAIRS,et aL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sundari K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se^ submitted this action. For the
reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed for Prasad's failure to follow the directives
of the Court.
I. Prasad's Historv of Abusive Litigation
In the last two years, Prasad has submitted over fifty civil actions. Prasad's actions have
been dismissed as frivolous and malicious, or for failure to state a claim, or because she has
failed to follow the directives of the Court. Prasad's many actions have strained the resources of
the Court.
Litigants have an obligation to "'Stop, Think, Investigate and Research' before filing
papers either to initiate a suit or to conduct the litigation," Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479,
482(3d Cir. 1987). Prasad has ignored this obligation and flooded the Court with her inchoate
claims for relief.
Additionally, Prasad has engaged in a consistent pattern of disregarding the directives of
the Court. For example, the Court has informed Prasad that she may not tack on allegations or
defendants to a complaint through partial amendments, but must file a comprehensive amended
complaint. Prasad has ignored that directive. Moreover, because of the nature of her rambling
complaints, it has been necessary for the Court to direct Prasad to file a particularized complaint
in each action she has filed. Those particularized complaints are often no better than the original
complaint. Even after filing a particularized complaint, and despite being repeatedly directed not
to do so, Prasad has continued to submit mere amendments to tack on claims or defendants
which she may not do. As the Court has explained to Prasad ad nauseum, although Prasad's pro
se status makes her "entitled to some deference," it does not relieve her of her duty to abide by
the rules and orders of this Court. Bollard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93,96(4th Cir. 1989)(citation
omitted). Prasad has refused repeatedly to comply with the Court's directives. Further, many of
the claims in Prasad's cases are repetitive of claims made in prior actions.
More recently, because Prasad has not liked the disposition of her actions, Prasad has
begun to name the undersigned as a defendant, simply because ofthe adverse decision. Prasad
believes that naming the undersigned as a defendant requires recusal of the undersigned.
However,that is simply not the case. An unfavorable ruling fails to constitute a valid basis for
recusal or a judicial bias claim. United States v. Williamson, 213 F. App'x 235, 237-38(4th Cir.
2007)(citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,555 (1994)). Rather, Prasad's addition ofthe
undersigned as a defendant in both pending and closed civil actions is both abusive and done in
bad faith. Another judge of this Court has also found that Prasad's attempt to have the
undersigned recuse herself for this reason was taken in bad faith. See Prasad v. Gothic Beauty
Magazine, No. 3:17CV446(E.D. Va. May 4,2018), ECF Nos. 15, 16.
By Memorandum Order entered on July 3, 2018, the Court directed Prasad, within
fourteen (14)days ofthe date of entry thereof, to submit a certificate of compliance in order to
assist the Court in monitoring Prasad's repetitious and multiplicitous litigation. The certificate of
compliance was required to contain in separately numbered paragraphs:
1.
2.
A brief summary, not to exceed two (2) pages, explaining why the
interests ofjustice warrant consideration of her current complaint.
A list by style, case number, and current status of all cases filed by Prasad
within one year preceding the date of entry of this Memorandum Order
that names each and every defendant that Prasad has named in this civil
action.
3.
A certification that the claims that she brings in this complaint are not
4.
could not have been raised in one of her previous actions.
A certification that the claims that she has brought in this action have not
been dismissed with prejudice.
raised in any other pending or closed action and set forth why each claim
5.
A statement from Prasad under penalty of perjury that the statements made
in the certificate of compliance are true.
(EOF No. 9, at 2-3.)
II. Prasad's Response
On July 13, 2018, Prasad filed her response to the July 3, 2018 Memorandum Order,
wherein she largely ignored the directives of the Court. (EOF No. 10.) For example,the
responses fail to contain:
3.
A certification that the claims that she brings in this complaint are not
raised in any other pending or closed action and set forth why each claim
4.
5.
could not have been raised in one of her previous actions.
A certification that the claims that she has brought in this action have not
been dismissed with prejudice.
A statement from Prasad under penalty of perjury that the statements made
in the certificate of compliance are true.
(ECF No.9, at 3.) Instead, Prasad derides the Court's attempt to sort out her frivolous or
repetitive litigation and states: "(sections 3-5 listed in case compliance blah blah blahs) was
certified in the complaint form from the state or in the amended revision that I took so
LOVINGLY and dedicatedly long to craft
"(ECF No. 10, at 1.) Prasad is incorrect.
Neither the Complaint(ECF No. 1), nor the Particularized Complaint(ECF No. 8), contains the
requested information. Prasad also fails to tender any coherent explanation as to why the
interests ofjustice warrant the Court's review of her current complaint.
Given Prasad's history of abusive litigation, her failure to abide by the directives of the
Court, her contumacious responses to the July 3, 2018 Memorandum Order, and the Court's
explicit warning that the failure to submit a proper response would result in the dismissal of the
action, dismissal with prejudice would be an appropriate sanction. See Bollard v. Carlson, 882
F.2d 93,95-96(4th Cir. 1989)(affirming dismissal with prejudice for failure to abide by the
court's order where the court explicitly warned the plaintiff that his case would be dismissed if
he failed to obey the court's order); Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 810(4th Cir. 1978)
(observing "that the dismissal power should be exercised 'only on the face of a clear record of
delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff"(quoting Dunham v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 385
F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1967))). Nevertheless, in this instance, the Court concludes the lesser
sanction of dismissal without prejudice will appropriately address Prasad's failure to abide by the
directives of the Court. Accordingly, the action will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
An appropriate order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/
M. Hannah Lauck
Date:
OCT 05 201B
Richmond, Virginia
United States District Judge
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