Prasad v. Facebook et al
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge M. Hannah Lauck on 12/18/2018. Copy mailed to pro se plaintiff. (jsmi, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
SUNDARIK.PRASAD,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:17CV391
V.
FACEBOOK,et aL.^
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sundari K. Prasad, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and informa pauperis,filed this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.^ The matter is before the Court for review ofPrasad's Petition for
Rehearing(ECF No. 13). For the reasons set forth below,the Petition for Rehearing(ECF
No. 13) will be DENIED.
L Procedural History
By Memorandum Order entered on February 15, 2018, the Court directed Prasad to file a
particularized complaint within fourteen(14)days ofthe date ofentry thereof. (ECF No. 9.)
Almost two months elapsed and Prasad failed to file a particularized complaint. Accordingly, by
Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on April 13,2018,the Court dismissed the action
without prejudice.(ECF No. 10,11.)
On April 19, 2018,the Court received Prasad's Particularized Complaint. (ECF No. 12.)
^ The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws,shall be liable to the party iniured in an action
at law....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Particularized Complaint was not accompanied by any explanation as to why Prasad failed
to submit it in a timely manner.
On May 21, 2018,the Court received Prasad's Petition for Rehearing.
II. The Amended Complaint
The Court will construe the filing of the Particularized Complaint, as a motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See MLC Auto., LLC v. Town ofS. Pines, 532 F.3d 269,
277-78 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that filings made within twenty-eight days after the entry of
judgment are construed as Rule 59(e) motions(citing Dove v. CODESCO,569 F.2d 807, 809(4th
Cir. 1978))).
"[Rjeconsideration of ajudgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should
be used sparingly." Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'I Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396,403(4th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit recognizes three grounds for relief under Rule 59(e): "(1)to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law;(2)to account for new evidence not available at trial; or
(3)to correct a clear error oflaw or prevent manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d
1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993)(citing Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406, 1419
(D. Md. 1991); Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D.625,626(S.D. Miss. 1990)).
Prasad does not explicitly address any ofthe above recognized grounds for relief in her
Particularized Complaint. Nor does the record readily suggest that Prasad's dilatory filing ofthe
Particularized Complaint satisfies any ofthese grounds. As the matter was dismissed without
prejudice, Prasad remains free to refile the action. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Prasad
any relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)in conjunction with her filing ofthe Particularized
Complaint.
2
III. Petition for Rehearing
Because Prasad filed her Petition for Rehearing after the twenty-eight-day period for
filing a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59,the Court reviews this submission
as a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See In re Burnley,988 F.2d 1,23(4th Cir. 1992). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to "relieve a
party .., from a final judgment, order, or proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). It is an
extraordinary remedy requiring a showing ofexceptional circumstances. May
field v. Nat7Ass'n
for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369,378(4th Cir. 2012){citing Ackermann v. United
States, 340 U.S. 193,202(1950)). The party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)"must make a
threshold showing oftimeliness,'a meritorious claim or defense,' and lack of unfair prejudice to
the opposing party." Coleman v. Jabe,633 F. App'x. 119,120(4th Cir. 2016)(quoting Aikens v.
Ingram,652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011)). A party must also demonstrate "exceptional
circumstances." Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Gas. Auto. Ins. Co.,993 F.2d 46,48(4th Cir.
1993)(quoting Werner v. Carho,731 F.2d 204,207(4th Cir. 1984)). After a party satisfies this
threshold showing,"he [or she] then must satisfy one ofthe six specific sections of Rule 60(b)."
Id. (quoting Werner, 731 F.2d at 207).
Here,Prasad fails to identify any exceptional circumstances that would warrant setting
aside the April 13,2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Indeed, in her Petition for Rehearing
she fails to offer any explanation as to why she failed to submit a particularized complaint in a
timely manner. Accordingly, the Petition for Rehearing(EOF No. 13) will be DENIED.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
M. Hannah
Date:
Richmond, Virginia
/hf
United State s pisirrct Judge
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